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SUMMARY
The post-war history of the Electricians' union has been a very
stormy one indeed. During the 1950s, when the union was controlled
by the Communist Party, there began a stream of allegations from
within the union and from the press that the leaders of the ETU
were engaged in electoral malpractice. Eventually, in 1961, the
High Court did find that some ETU leaders, who were also members of
the Communist Party, had used "fraudulent and unlawful devices" to
secure the re-election of the Communist General Secretary of the
union in 1959. Following the trial the ETU was expelled both from
the TUC and the Labour Party, but they were re-admi tted in 1962
after a new right-wing leadership was elected to office. Since 1962
the right-wing has enjoyed an uninterrupted control of the
Electricians' union. Its opponents claim that this control has been
maintained because, under the name of reforms, a huge reshaping of
the union's internal democracy has occurred which has been
effective in undermining any oppositional challenge and has placed
more and more power in the hands of the Executive Council.
The thesis is an examination of these two periods of the
union's history, and the different strategies pursued by the
Communist and right-wing leaderships. It details the rise of the
Communist Party in the ETU, and considers the allegations of
ballot-rigging that led to the 1961 trial. It examines the
remodelling of the union in the 1960s, charts the rise of the
organized opposition to the leadership in the 1970s, and considers
the controversial "strike-free" agreements that the union has
negotiated in recent years. However, the thesis attempts to do more
than just chronicle particular episodes in the post-war history of
the Electricians' union: it also attempts to understand this
history by the use of two broad theoretical approaches.
Firstly, the union's internal history is considered in the
light of the wider political and industrial factors that have
shaped and re-shaped that history. In other words, the union's
democracy cannot be understood by solely examining its internal
workings, "external" factors also have to be considered. From this
perspective it is argued that the ballot-rigging and bureaucratic
manipulation that took place under the Communist leadership cannot
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be understood simply in terms of a faulty electoral process open to
abuse by unscrupulous men. Rather, those factors that allowed
the CP to legitimately take charge of the union in the first place,
and those which compelled some members of the ETU to eventually
abuse the union's electoral process, were intimately linked to the
post-war industrial climate and in particular the political and
industrial strategies of the Communist Party. Similarly, the
remodelling of the union's democracy in the 1960s, and the history
of the union up to the present day, has to be understood not just
in terms of an authoritarian leadership, but by reference to the
particular circumstances that allowed the right-wing to take
control of the union, and the political and industrial policies
that underlay the reshaping of democracy in the union.
Secondly, throughout the thesis there is an engagement with
Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy". Michels' theory was
expostulated in his Political Parties (1911) and can be summed up
in his famous dictum "who says organization, says oligarchy", and
in his assertion that in the trade union movement the
"authoritative character of the leaders and their tendency to rule
bureaucratic organizations on oligarchic lines, are even more
pronounced than in political parties." This theory is critically
considered in the context of the actual workings of the post-war
Electrician's union.
Overall, the thesis attempts to do a number of things: to
give a particular account of the major episodes in the union's
post-war history, which range from the ballot-rigging of the 1950s
to the "strike-free" deals of the 1980s; to explore the
relationship between the political and industrial policies of the
CP and right-wing leaderships and the union's democracy; to offer a
critical appraisal of Michels' "iron law of oligarchy; and,
finally, as the union faces expulsion froID the TUC, to consider the
future prospects for democracy in the EETPU.
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1INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years the Electricians' union has gained a
certain notoriety and has seldom been out of the public spotlight.
The attention the union has received has been due to its signing of
a number of highly publicized single union "no-strike" agreements
and its controversial role in the News International dispute at
wrapping. Because of these activities the Electrical, Electronic,
Telecommunications and Plumbing Union (EETPU) now faces possible
expulsion from the TUC, and is itself threatening to leave the TUC
and form a rival trade union confederation. However, the
Electricians' union is not unaccustomed to publicity or
controversy: its post-war history is full of both. Few union
leaderships can have had as much vilification directed at them from
within their own ranks, as well as from the wider labour and trade
union movement, than have the leaders of the post-war Electricians'
union. The focus of this criticism has not only been the politics
and industrial strategies of both the Communist leadership of the
union in the 1950s and the right-wing leadership from 1962 onwards
but, to an unprecedented degree, the internal democracy of the
union. No post-war trade union seems to have spent as much time
wrangling over its own democratic procedures as the Electricians'
union, and, given the history of the union, this is hardly
surprising.
During the 1950s, when the union was controlled by the
Communist Party (CP), the Electrical Trades Union (ETU) was
regularly attacked in the popular press and by the right-wing of
the labour movement as the union that automatically made every
strike official, and, with some justification, as the union whose
policies slavishly followed those of the British CP and the foreign
policy of the Soviet Union. At the same time a systematic campaign
was conducted in the media alleging that the CP held its leading
posi tions in the union through ballot-rigging. In 1961 an internal
opposition grouping centred around the former Communist Les Cannon
took the union to court in the famous ballot-rigging trial, where
it was proved (and later admitted by the CP) that certain members
of the ETU, who were also members of the CP, did rig the 1959
ballot for the election of General Secretary of the union. In these
2circumstances it was easy for the opponents of the ETU leadership
to forge an unpalatable connection in the minds of many trade
unionists between communism, strikes, and ballot-rigging. Indeed,
journalists such as Woodrow Wyatt had been warning of the takeover
of British trade unions by Communists long before the ETU ballot-
rigging trial. The trial seemed to be a graphic confirmation of the
association that Wyatt and others had been making over the years
between the politics of the CP, their industrial strategy, and
electoral malpractice.
Following the trial judgement of 1961 the union was expelled
from the TUC, only to be re-admitted in 1962 after the union was
captured by the right-wing. Under Les Cannon 's leadershipin the
1960s the ETU was completely remodelled along industrial lines, its
internal democracy totally transformed, the CP banned from holding
any office in the union, and an industrial and political strategy
pursued that made the union one of the most slavish supporters of
Harold Wilson's 1964-1970 Labour Government. So, with Cannon, we
see a new political leadership, a new industrial strategy, and the
introduction of an internal democracy that was characterised by
increasing bureaucratisation and centralisation and the use of the
ballot as the acme of union democracy. We also see the emergence of
the union's now distinctive abrasive style - its disregard for many
of the conventions of traditional trade unionism and its hostility
to the mainstream policy of the TUC - and an overall philosophy
that was modelled on American business unionism and, in particular,
the example of Walter Reuther, head of the United Automobile
Workers of America (UAW) between 1946 and 1970.
Soon after Les Cannon died late in 1970, the man who is most
associated with the union's distinctive style and policies, Frank
Chapple, took over the leadership of the EETPU. Under Chapple's
leadership the EETPU was to become even more centralised and
bureaucratic, the philosphy of business unionism more pronounced,
and the internal democracy of the union even more circumscribed
than it had become under Cannon's leadership. But Chapple and the
leadership of the union had to implement their policies in the
highly charged industrial and political climate of the 1970s, a
cl imate that had produced a growing organized opposition wi thin
the EETPU to the leadership. In this period, especially during the
3early 1970s, we see the union's industrial strategy being shaped
and re-shaped by the clash of forces inside and outside the union.
Chapple's successor, Eric Hammond, took charge of the union
in 1984. He has continued on the course that Cannon and Chapple set
the union on in the 1960s and 1970s, but in a period in which the
trade unions are generally regarded to be in "crisis" (essentially
because of declining membership) his response to this "crisis" has
marked him out even from his two controversial predecessors. It has
not just been his attacks on the leadership of the National Union
Kineworkers (NUM) during the strike of 1984/85, or his hostility to
the organized internal opposition in the union that has marked him
out. Rather it has been the strategy which has led the EETPU into
accepting Government money for union ballots in defiance of TUC
policy, which has involved the union in "no-strike" deals and the
debacle at Rupert Murdoch's News International plant at 'Wapping,
and which now may well result in the EETPU either being expelled
from the TUC or leaving of its own accord. Hammond's strategy is an
extreme response to the "crisis", and one that puts the present day
union's philosophy with regard to trade union and industrial
democracy into high profile.
In the thesis that follows these episodes in the union's
post-war history will be examined in detail. But my aim is not just
to detail the major episodes in the union's internal history; the
thesis also attempts to examine the relationship between the
poli tics of the Electricians' union leaderships, the industrial
strategies they pursued, and the conflicts and changes that such
policies have produced in the internal democracy of the union.
Related to this, the thesis is concerned to show how the
prevailing social, economic and political forces impinge on the
internal operation of the union. Overall, then, the primary intent
of the work is to place the stormy history of the union's internal
democracy within the context of the wider social forces that have
shaped and re-shaped that history. The argument that is presented
is that the union's democracy cannot be understood by solely
examining its internal workings. Consequently, "external" factors
are at times given as much attention as internal ones, but the
balance shifts throughout the thesis depending on the particular
episode that is being examined. My study of the union's democracy
4is more than an examination of the internal relationships that
exist between union leaders, officials and the rank-and-file, but
these relationships are of course central to any understanding of
the Electricians' union. And any study of union democracy that
wishes to explore these relationships, as this one does, cannot
avoid an engagement with the theoretical insights made by Robert
Michels in his seminal work Political Parti~.
Robert Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy"
Robert Michels' Political Parties has probably served as the
theoretical starting point for more studies of trade union
democracy than any other single work. This continued attraction
derives from Michels' famous contention that all democratic
organizations, despite their avowed democratic principles, are
dominated by oligarchical cliques who pay scant regard to the
people who are supposed to control them. Indeed, he says, in the
trade union movement the
"authoritative character of the leaders and
their tendency to rule democratic organizations
on oligarchic lines, are even more pronounced
that in political organizations." (1)
It is not the case, then, according to Michels, that a "two-way
system of control" operates in trade unions between the rank-and-
file and the leadership which sets limits on the legitimate powers
of each. (2) Rather, this "two-way system of control" is only
formally accepted as the basis of trade union democracy, whereas in
reali ty a "one-way system of control" operates that places actual
power in the hands of an oligarchical elite.
For Michels the principal cause of oligarchy in democratic
organizations such as trade unions, was "the technical
indispensabili ty of leadership" and their "detachement from the
mass", which in turn was a product of the demise of direct
democracy and the growth and complexity of the division of labour
in the mass organizations of late nineteeth century capitalism. (3)
This division of labour placed more and more power into the hands
of the oligarchical groupings and bureaucracies that controlled
trade unions, and far from the members being able to exert control
5over these bureaucracies through representative elections the
reverse had in fact taken place, with the bureaucracies assuming
the form of an "endless screw" with at best one elected
oligarchical clique replacing another. What passed for trade union
democracy, then, was in most cases merely the re-election of the
same elite or the chosen successors of that elite, or the periodic
rotation of competing elites within a union. Either way. the
maj ori ty of members had no real control or influence over the
direction and policy of their union. Nor were the majority of trade
union members much interested in the affairs of their union, says
Michels:
"The majority of members are as indifferent to
the organization as the maj ori ty of the
electors are to parliament." (4)
And even if they were interested their incompetence would prevent
them from seriously challenging the power of the leaders:
"The incompetence of the masses is almost
universal ... and this constitutes the most solid
foundation of the power of the leaders." (5)
Moreover, said Michels, free from the environment of the
workplace, trade union leaders undergo "a profound psychological
transformation" which only serves to reinforce and broaden the
conservative and oligarchical tendencies that are inherent in
democratic organizations. The manual worker of former days "becomes
a petty bourgeois or even a bourgeois" and "his political and
social education will seldom suffice to immunize him against the
new influences" (6) This social and ideological separation from the
members they supposedly represent is reflected in a deep
organizational conservatism:
"The ... doctrines are, whenever requisite,
attenuated and deformed in accordance with the
external needs of the organization.
Organization becomes the vi tal essence ... more
and more invincible becomes its aversion to all
aggressive action... Thus, from a means,
organization becomes an end." (7)
Though Michels' "law of the historic necessity of 01 igarchy"
has been ably criticised by Hands, and although he himself stated
6rather oddly in Political Parties that he was not concerned "with
the causation of oligarchy in trade unions", his theory has still
attracted widespread acceptance because, as Hyman observes, "it
does appear accurately to fit the facts of the development of
national union organisations. Repeated studies have appeared to
underline his diagnosis." (8) So much so that Lipset could write
that most of
"the literature which deals with the problem of
bureaucracy and oligarchy either simply
documents this fact in one or more unions, or
reworks Michels' classic analysis of the
conditions that breed oligarchy... " (9)
When I first set out on my study of the Electricians' union I
must admit that I did expect it to be just one more addition to the
Lt terature that confirmed the "iron law of oligarchy". A cursory
examination of the union's post-war history seemed to be enough to
chalk up another victory for Michels. After all, went my reasoning,
the union had been controlled by "Stalinists" rigging ballots for a
period of thirteen years, and this was followed by an as yet
uninterrupted period of right-wing control: surely this was
evidence enough to confirm Michels' theory. And, indeed, as we
shall see, Michels is confirmed time and time again in the study
that follows.
Yet as the work progressed, the Michelian account became less
and less convincing. Many of the events under examination just did
not fit so easily into his account, no matter how hard I tried to
make them. In particular, Michels took no account of areas of union
acti vi ty where rank-and-file members exerted a level of control
over their own affairs that was largely outside the control of
their own leadership. The strong, independent workplace bargaining
that developed in Britain in the post-war period is a prime
example. Nor did his account recognize that many rank-and-file
union members were far from being incompetent or apathetic, but
were themselves fully aware of the problems of leadership and
formed oppositions within the unions that were, contrary to
Michels, often successful in checking or challenging the powers of
their leaders. Les Cannon's Reform Committee of the 1950s and the
CF's Flashlight grouping formed in the 1960s, are examples in the
7Electricians' union. Reali ty is not as one-dimensional or as
monolithic as Michels would have us believe then. True, Michels was
writing in 1911, and true Political Parties is not an explicit
study of trade unions, but his general theory, which is meant to be
applicable to all forms of democratic organization, is clear: even
the strongest of democratic movements could only contribute "to the
enfeeblement of oligarchic tendencies". Historically, he said,
"evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been
adopted for the prevention of oligarchy". (10) However, the views
of Michels have not gone unchallenged.
The "Iron law of democracy"
Even when he wrote Political Parties in 1911 Michels' analysis of
trade unions was not altogether new. Such diverse political figures
as the Fabians Sidney and Beatrice Webb and the revolutionary
socialist Rosa Luxemburg had already analysed the growth of a trade
union bureaucracy in their respective countries. In their 1894
History of Trade Unionism, the Webbs had already welcomed the
shifting during the course of that century of the leadership of the
trade unions "from the casual enthusiast and irresponsible agitator
to a class of permanent salaried officials expressly chasen out of
the rank and file of trade unionists for their superior business
capaci ty". <11> As early as 1906, Rosa Luxemburg in her pamphlet
The Nass Strike, had noted that the rapid growth of the German
trade union bureaucracy had led to a "specialization of
professional activi ty" and an "overvaluation of the organization,
which from a means has gradually been changed into an end in
itself, a precious thing, to which the interests of the struggles
should be subordinated". (12) But unlike Michels, the Webbs and
Luxemburg did not believe that oligarchical control was inevitable
in trade unions. They had totally different solutions to the
problem of oligarchy of course. The Webbs believed that the trade
union leaders could be placed under the democratic control of the
membership by the development of effective representative
institutions, such as existed in the British cotton spinning union.
While Luxemburg believed that the trade union leaderships could be
"swept away" in times of high political and economic struggle.
8Since the time of the Webbs and Luxemburg many others have
pointed to the counter-tendencies and compulsive democratic
pressures that operate against Michels' "law", and many trade union
and political activists have attempted to construct organizations
within the unions that would not only check the oligarchical power
of leadership but act independently of them if need be. (3) But
one essay in particular, written at the time when Lipset was
lamenting the fact that most pieces of work tended to confirm or
amend the Michel ian account (his own j oint work on the American
International Typographical Union being a case in point), most
clearly presents the counter-thesis to Michels - Alvin Gouldner's
1955 essay Xetaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy:
"It is the pathos of pessimism, rather than
the compulsions of rigorous analysis, that
leads to the assumption that organizational
constraints have stacked the deck against
democracy". (14)
This terse remark seemed to be specifically designed for those who
had been caught in the Michelian snare. This was followed by
Gouldner's more general point:
"When ... Michels spoke of the "iron law of
oligarchy", he attended solely to the ways in
which organizational needs inhi bi t democratic
possi bili ties. But the very same evidence to
which he called attention could enable us to
formulate the very opposite theorem - "the iron
law of democracy". Even as Michels himself saw,
if oligarchical waves repeatedly wash away the
bridges of democracy, this eternal recurrence
can happen only because men doggedly rebuild
them after each inundation. Michels chose to
dwell on only one aspect of this process,
neglecti ng to consider this other side. There
cannot be an iron law of oligarchy, however,
unless there is an iron l a w of democracy" (15)
The end result of this encounter with Gouldner and the
literature that was critical of Michels was not to jettison
Michels, but to approach my study of the Electricians' union wi th
9a keener eye for democratic tendencies, as well as oligarchical
ones. In fact, I found there to be a constant tension between the
two, one dominant at one particular time and one at another,
depending on the relation of forces inside the union at any given
time. This tension between the "iron law of oligarchy" and the
"iron law of democracy" I have referred to in the dissertation as
the Michels/Gouldner debate. This is not to say that only Michels
and Gouldner are referred to, far from it. Such diverse figures as
Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci are brought into the framework of the
discussion set by Michels and Gouldner. This debate will be
considered at points throughout the study in relation to the actual
workings of the Electricians' union.
The thesis that follows attempts to do two things: firstly,
to give a particular account of the union's post-war internal
history; and secondly, to consider periodically the
lUchels/Gouldner debate in the context of the actual history of
the Electricians' union. The thesis is divided into four parts
consisting of twelve chapters:
PART ONE THE TRIAL
Part One examines the accusations of ballot-rigging that were
levelled against the Communist leadership of the union in the
1950s, accusations which eventually led to the famous "ballot-
rigging" trial of 1961 and which totally discredited the union's
democracy.
Chapter One
The rise of the Communist Party in the Electrical Trades Union
This chapter attempts to explain why by 1956 all the leading
posi tions of the ETU were held by CP members or "fellow-
travellers". It argues against the widely held belief that these
positions were secured and retained by electoral malpractice.
Instead it argues that the rise of the CP in the ETU can be
explained by the Party's war-time popularity and their post-war
political and industrial strategies.
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Chapter Two
Ballot-rigging and the Comnwnist Party
From the mid-1950s onwards a stream of press articles, most of
which dealt with the treatment of opposition candidates in the
union's elections, began to appear alleging electoral malpractice
in the ETU. A detailed account of the charges levelled at the
Communist leadership of the union and their reponse to them is
given in this chapter.
Chapter Three
The Trial and its aftermath
It was proven at the 1961 trial that the principal officers of the
ETUI all members of the CP, had used "fraudulent and unlawful
devices" to secure the re-election of Frank Haxell in the 1959
election for the General Secretaryship. Besides detailing the
events of the trial and its aftermath, this chapter tries to
explain the reasons why the CP leadership of the union resorted to
ballot-rigging.
PART TWO THE NEW MODEL UNION
Part Two concentrates on the shift in the union's political and
industrial stance and the wholesale remodelling of the union 's
internal structure that took place under the new leadership of Les
Cannon during the 1960s, and the consolidation of the "new model
union" in the 1970s.
Chapter Four
The remodelling Of the ETU
In January 1962 the new right-wing Executive Council of the ETU
took office. By 1969 they had almost entirely reshaped the internal
structure of the union, a reshaping that they claimed not only made
the union more efficient but far more democratic. This claim is
considered in this chapter. The chapter also attempts to explain
11
the remodelling in terms of the union's developing philosophy -
business unionism.
Chapter Fiye
Consolidation. centralisation and growth
Charts the continuing centralisation of the union's internal
structure and the rapid growth in membership under the leadership
of Frank Chapple during the 1970s.
PART THREE THE CHALLENGE OF THE OPPOSITION
Part Three details the conflicts between the EETPU leadership and
the opposition in the union in the 1970s.
Chapter Six
Strategies for reform: the rise of organized opposition
This chapter examines the development of organized opposition in
the union, with particular attention being given to the conflicting
strategies for internal reform of the two largest political
organizations operating within the union in the 1970s the
Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party.
Chapter Seven
The EETPU and the Industrial Relations Act
In this chapter we examine how the leadership's position on the
Conservative Government's 1971 Industrial Relations Act was shaped
and re-shaped by external events impinging on the internal
democracy of the union.
Chapter Eight
The EETPU and the Social Contract
Shows how the reponse of the leadership to three strikes of its own
members was influenced by the 1974-79 Labour Government's Social
Contract.
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PART FOUR STRIKE FREE
This final part considers recent developments in the EETPU, set as
they are against the back-drop of "Thatcherism" and the "crisis" in
the trade union movement.
Chapter Nine
Ballots and union democracy
At the Wembley conference of union executives in 1982, it was
agreed that unions should not accept funds for union ballots under
the provisions of the 1980 Employment Act. The EETPU was the first
union to defy that decision and was subsequently threatened with
expulsion from the TUe. This chapter looks at the EETPU's stand,
and the response of the opposition inside and outside the union.
Eventually t however t the TUe backed down on its opposition to
ballot funding. One result of this climbdown has been a shift
towards a view of union democracy that sees the ballot as the
central democratic mechanism, a view that is most strongly held by
the EETPU. This shift towards a "ballot only" type union democracy
is also examined in this chapter.
Chapter Ten
rhe EErpU and the Wapping dispute
For over a year (January 1986 to February 1987) one of the most
bitter disputes in British labour history was fought outside Rupert
Murdoch's News International printing plant in Wapping, East
London. The role of the EETPU in this dispute is chronicled in this
chapter.
Chapter Eleyen
Single-union strike-free agreements and industrial democracy
This chapter examines the furore surrounding the signing of a
number of "strike-free" agreements by the EETPU. It argues that
although only one other major trade union (the AEU) has negotiated
similar agreements, nevertheless, all the components that go to
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make up the "strike-free package" - single-status, single-unionism,
and especially flexible working are all major features of
agreements willingly negotiated by other unions. So although the
debate concerning "strike-free" clauses is extremely important, it
tends to detract from a more generalised appraisal of the "new
realist" strategies being pursued by most other trade unions. This
chapter also argues against the position of the EETPU leadership, a
posi tion supported by Bassett in a recent book Strike Free, that
the agreements are an extension of industrial democracy in the
workplace.
Chapter Twelve
Conclusion
The two strands of analysis that were set out in the introduction -
the social factors shaping the union I s democracy and the
Michels/Gouldner debate - are now reconsidered in this chapter.
Finally, the future prospects for the EETPU are considered.
The material for the research was gathered from a number of diverse
sources, as the EETPU would not allow me access to their own
archive at Hayes Court. I would like to thank for their assistance
the staff of the Local History Department of Dundee Central Library
and the staff of the British Library of Political and Economic
Science, London. In particular I would like to thank Mr.
R.A.Storey, the archivist at the Modern Records Centre, University
of Warwick, for his assistance with the Cannon Papers. My thanks
are also extended to George Matthews of the Communist Party Library
and Archi ve and to the editors of Flashl ight. Many individuals
deserve my thanks, but in particular I would like to thank
Professor John Eldridge and Bert Moorhouse of the Department of
Sociology. University of Glasgow, for their encouragement and
critical support throughout the research, and Mr.A.B. McLuckie, an
Executi ve Councillor of the EETPU, for allowing me access to the
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PART ONE THE TRIAL
CHAPTER ONE
THE RISE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE ELECTRICAL TRADES UNION
By 1956 Communist Party members held the following leading
positions in the ETUj President, General Secretary, Assistant
General Secretary, 4 of the 5 National Officers' posts, 6 of the 11
Executive Council seats, and 20 of the 39 Area officials'
positions. On top of this, many of the non-Communist officials in
the union were said to be "fellow-travellers" of the Communist
Party. According to Les Cannon, who led the campaign to oust the
Communist leadership from the union, and who was to become its
General Secretary in the wake of the 1961 ballot-rigging trial, the
ascendancy of the CP in the union was so great "as to be almost an
embarrassment to the Party":
"In practice, the Communists try to ensure that
only about three-quarters of the members of the
Executive Council are card carrying Party
supporters." (1)
This dominance was widely disproportionate to the actual strength
of the CP in the ETU, where it was estimated to have about 700
members out of a total union membership of 228,000 in 1956. (2) Nor
could the political influence of the CP at national level seem to
account for its prominence in the union, since it only polled
33,144 votes at the 1955 General Election, and the Party's
membership had fallen from a wartime peak of 56,000 to stand at
33,095 in 1956. How then did the Communist Party come to control
the ETU?
Today the instant response to this question is that the CP
secured and retained their control of the union by rigging the
ballots for union office. And certainly it was proven at the 1961
ballot-rigging trial that the President, General Secretary,
Assistant General Secretary and two others, all members of the
Communist Party, had used "fraudulent and unlawful devices" to
secure the re-election of Frank Haxell in the 1959 election for the
General Secretaryship. What was not proven, however, was that the
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majority of Executive Council positions (let alone the minor posts
in the union) held by CP members were secured or retained through
ballot-rigging. This was the accusation levelled at the ETU
leadership by the Daily Telegraph as early January 1956, and
subsequently taken up by Les Cannon's opposition grouping in the
union (the Reform Group) with the support of a press campaign. They
claimed that the few "well-placed, rigidly disciplined and
apparently ubiquitous" Communists were able to control about 150 of
the union's 700 branches, and that it was through this manipulation
of the union's internal democracy that the CP exerted its
disproportionate influence in the ETU. (3) Moreover, it was this
power base in the branches, they claimed, coupled with its control
of the leading bodies of the union, that allowed the Communist
Party to make a mockery of the union's democracy and rig many of
the ballots for union office. But before we examine in detail the
allegations of ballot-rigging levelled at the ETU leadership during
the 1950s, and before we deal with the specific allegations
surrounding the trial, an explanation other than that of ballot-
rigging will be offered for the rise of the CP in the ETU.
There are at least two major reasons that can be offered as an
explanation for the rise of the CP in the post-war ETU, both of
which concern the political and industrial shifts made by the
Communist Party of Great Britain: (1) the CP's war-time popularity
after the Nazi invasion of Russia in June 1941, which enabled it to
establish a firm industrial base in the trade unions, and
especially in the ETU; (2) the CP's post-war industrial militancy,
exemplified by the electricians' union, which dovetailed both with
the working class opposition to the Labour Government's wage
controls of the late 1940s, and with the sectional militancy of the
post-war shop-stewards movement.
(1) The Communist Party's wartime popularity
On 2 September 1939, the day after Poland was invaded by Hitler's
troops, the Daily Worker published the CP's manifesto on the war.
Shortly afterwards, on 12 September, this was re-published in the
form of a pamphlet by Harry Pollitt, General Secretary of the
Communist Party I under the title How to Win the fiar. It stated:
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"The Communist Party supports the war,
believing it to be a just war which should be
supported by the whole working class and all
friends of democracy ...
The prosecution of this war requires a struggle
on two fronts. First to secure the military
victory over fascism, and second, to achieve
this, the political Victory over the enemies of
democracy in Britain." (4)
Two days after the publication of Pollitt's pamphlet an important
broadcast from the Soviet Union referred to the war as
"imperialist" and "predatory" on both sides. (5) Clearly, Stal in's
position on the war contradicted the British CP' S characterization
of the war as a struggle against fascism. The war, the Communist
International declared a few weeks later, was imperialist and
unjust and consequently:
"In no country can the 'Working class or the
Communist Parties support the war." (6)
The reason for the Soviet Government's position became clear on
28 September with the announcement of the detai Is of the Nazi-
Soviet "Declaration" on the war signed in August, in which the two
states undertook to be neutral to each other if one of them should
be involved in war.
Pollitt's pamphlet was now withdrawn, and he himself was
removed from the General Secretaryship of the Party. Then on 7
October 1939 a new manifesto was published in the Daily Worker,
which declared that the "war was not a war for democracy against
fascism" but "a fight between imperial ist powers over profits". (7)
In practice the new line meant that the CP campaigned in support of
strikes, for better air raid protection, against profi teering, for
the nationalization of the munitions industry, and for the
extension of shop-steward organization. To some extent this anti-
war radical ism payed off, as membership grew by several thousand
and the Party's publications all increased their circulation.
Nevertheless, writes Pelling, "as the war intensified in the spring
and summer of 1940 the gap between the popu Lar t.emper and the
Communist 'line' continued to widen". \<'3)
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In the autumn of 1940, the CP attempted to broaden their anti-
war appeal when they launched a call for a "People's Convention",
whose demands centred on the call for a "people's peace" and a
"People's Government", as well as the defence of living standards
and democratic and trade union rights. When the Convention convened
on 12 January 1941, it was attended by 2,234 delegates
representing, according to the official report, 1,200,000 workers
from 1,304 organisations (co-operative and political organizations,
Tenants' Associations, Housewives' Committees and so on). A measure
of the Communist Party's industrial influence at this time can be
gauged from the number of trade union delegations that attended the
Convention. In all there were 665 trade union delegates, and
another 471 from 239 factories and jobs, representing in total
1,004,953 workers. For a tiny Party opposing the war the
delegations were far from being negligible, but how representative
these delegations actually were is hard to judge. Not surprisingly,
though not inevitably, the largest delegations came from those
unions where the CP had a serious base, in particular the mining
industry with 31 delegates representing 270,000 workers, transport
with 153 delegates representing 45,450 workers, while the ETU had
one of the smallest delegations with 55 delegates representing
6,500 workers. (9) The Convention seems to have been the last straw
as far as Herbert Morrison, the Home Secretary, was concerned, for
on 21 January 1941, he banned the Daily Vorker. But the CP's
fortunes were to take a rapid turn for the better as the Party did
another volte-face on its war position just months after the
January Convention.
It was Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union at the end
of June 1941 that led to the Communist Party's complete about-turn
in its attitude to the war. Now the "imperialist war", wrote
leading CP intellectual Dona Torr, "merges with and is transformed
on one side into a war of liberation". (0) Early in July the CP
issued a manifesto headed "People I s Victory over Fascism", which
called for the unity of all peoples against German fascism, and
said that the Communist Party would support every measure of the
Government designed to secure the defeat of Hi tIer. The Party put
forward four immediate demands:
1. A pact of alliance with the Soviet Union.
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the entire people for victory
fullest democratic activity and
(11)
through the
initiative."
2. All friends of fascism to be cleared out of
government posts.
3. "Organise production for victory, end waste
and disorganisation, ensure equal distribution
of food supplies, give adequate air-raid
protection."
4 "Mobilise
In practice the new political line meant that the drive to
increase production conditioned the entire industrial strategy of
the CP after June 1941, and, consequently, was the main concern of
Party members operating in the trade unions. This new strategy, as
Richard Croucher writes, placed CP members in a novel, and at
times, difficult position:
"Arguing in favour of intensified work,
enlisting the help of the foremen in the
production drive, working against strikes and
so on was not always popular on the shop-floor
when local grievances had accumulated to the
point where workers contemplated a stoppage.
Stakhanovism did not export well to the British
shop floor." (12)
The Communist Party also took the initiative in popularising
the proposal first made by Ernest Bevin in December 1940 for Joint
Production Committees at plant level between management and shop
stewards. By June 1944, over 4,500 such Committees existed to
promote efficiency and productivi ty in the workplace. It is no
exaggeration to say that the CP was now the most enthusiastic
advocate of increased production and the most virulent opponent of
strikes. So much so, that at the CP's 1942 Conference Harry Pollitt
(now back as leader of the Party) praised one strike-breaking
docker in glowing terms: "What courage, what a sacred spirit of
real class consciousness, to walk on the ship's gangway and resume
his job". (13) Another example of the Party's obsession at this
time with any disruption to the war effort was a mass sale pamphlet
it produced in August 1942 called Clear out Hitler's Agents, which
was aimed at the tiny and insignificant British Trotskyist
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movement, which still viewed the war as an imperialist struggle and
as such held a position on the industrial front which was very
similar to the one the CP had held the previous year. "Honest
workers" were now warned not to be fooled by "their talk of strikes
and the bosses profits into sabotaging our troops and the Red
Army", and were urged to "clear them out of every working class
organisation and position". (14)
Without doubt the Communist Party's new pro-war position
proved to be highly popular, as the rapid increase in members from
an estimated 12,000 in June 1941 to 56,000 just over a year later
indicates. (15) But why should the CP's productionist crusade and
opposi tion to strikes prove to be so popular with thousands of
workers? Surely the sentiments that the CP were expressing were no
different from those being put forward by Churchill's Coalition
Government "Dig For Victory"? Wherein lay the difference?
Certainly the Red Army's heroic struggle against the fascists and
the CF's mass campaign for the opening of a Second Front made the
Party both respectable and popular. As Richard Croucher puts it:
"From mid 1941, a 'red haze' began to spread
across British politics, and the CP benefited
greatly." (16)
But it was not just the Soviet war effort that led to the CP
being the beneficiaries of a new found popularity, their popularity
also reflected the ability of the Party, as James Hinton argues,
"to construct an appropriate political focus for anti -capi talist
sentiment" :
"They sought to channel working class feeling
and initiative into an offensive against
managerial power - but one designed to increase
rather than restrict production." (17)
Hinton's point is endorsed by Croucher: "The terrific growth of the
CP during 1942 ... was related to their leadership of a popular anti-
managerial current of some depth". (18) By attacking management red
tape, inefficiency and bureaucracy and by calling for the radical
re-organisation of industry, the CP line dovetailed qu t t.e neatly
with a popular view that the war effort was being hindered not by
the trade unions but. by managerial malpractice. (19) The very
success of the CP's new line, which as Hinton says was an
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"ambiguous combination of class and national themes", enabled the
Communist Party to lay the foundations of its post-war industrial
strength in the trade unions. (20)
After 1941, then, the Communist Party's advocacy of a militant
reformism and nationalism gained them a radical respectability
which enabled them for the first time to penetrate the higher as
well as the lower echelons of the trade union movement in some
numbers. In London, for example, Ted Bramley, the CP District
Secretary, could report that in 1943:
"20,000 Londoners have joined the Communist
Party in 12 months. Today there are 25,000
members 140 branches 800 factory
organisations and 400 residential
organisations. This is the most momentous thing
which has happened in the Labour .Movement in
the last 30 years ... No less than 250 Trade
Union Executive Committee and District
Committeemen and over 2,500 Shop-Stewards
Ticket Stewards - Union representatives have
joined. Over 85 per cent of the members are in
the Trade Unions." (21)
In Glasgow membership rose from a few hundred to several thousand,
and numerous factory branches were built. (22) Similarly in
Coventry, where the Party grew from 70 members and no factory
groups in 1940, to 2000-3000 members and 40 factory groups in 1943.
(23) Even in Slough, as Raphael Samuel recalls, his mother was able
to recruit some fifty workers to a Party branch in the aircraft
factory she was working in. (24) Despite a fall in membership from
the 1942 peak of 56,000, to 45,400 in 1945, a fall that Hinton
attributes to the CP's inability to move from a war strategy to one
that raised the sharp class issue of post-war reconstruction, and
despi te the onset of the Cold-War, by 1948 the Party still had a
membership of 43,000, and an influence in the trade unions that
owed nothing to ballot-rigging. A survey carried out by The Times
in 1948 as part of its Cold-War effort showed how successful a
trade union base the CP had built up over the war years:
"They held four general secretaryships - of the
miners, electricians, foundrymen, and firemen.
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They had one member on the TUC General
Council ....
Of the fifteen unions with a membership of more
than 100,000, it was indicated, the Communists
and their supporters had sufficient
representation on the executives to control or
dispute control of four - the Electrical Trades
Union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the
Civil Service Clerical Association, and the
Tailors' and Garment Workers' Union, while they
had appreciable influence on six the
Transport and General Workers', the Miners',
the Railwaymen's, the Distributive Workers',
the Teachers', and the Post Office Workers' .
Among the smaller unions, they were said to
have strong or appreciable influence in the
Fire Brigades' Union, the Post Office
Engineering Union, the Foundry Workers', the
Cine-technicians', the Scientific Workers' and
the Clerical and Administrative Workers· ... "
(25)
Communist Party influence in the ETU pre-dated their wartime
popularity, however, and the extent of this pre-war influence
partly explains how they were able to gain control of the union
during the war. Early in the 1930s, the CP gained control of the
union's powerful London Area Committee. This so enraged the
Executive Council that in 1937 they took the opportunity to expel
the entire London Committee for supporting an unofficial strike of
100 contracting members working at Earl's Court. But in the
elections for the Executive Council that same year, several of the
si tting members who were primarily responsible for the expulsions
were defeated and replaced by pro-Communists. From then on, as Les
Cannon laments:
" ... the progress of the Communists continued.
The outbreak of the Second World War, and the
widespread goodWill displayed towards the
Soviet Union after the German attack on Russia,
provided the Communists in the ETU with an
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excellent opportunity to consolidate their
position, and they did not miss it." (26)
A clear sign that CP influence was growing rapidly in the ETU
was the decision taken by the Executive Council (by 5 votes to 4)
in October 1942 to call a special rules revision conference,
" for the purpose of dealing with the
interference of the Communist Party of Great
Britain into the internal affairs of the
Electrical Trades Union, and to deal with a
proposal from the Executive Council that
members of the Communist Party be debarred from
holding any office or acting as a delegate on
behalf of the Union." (27)
However, because the EC decision was not unanimous, the rules of
the union required that a ballot vote of the entire 100,000 strong
membership had first to be taken before the conference could be
convened. The ballot decided by 11,343 votes to 6,662 votes that a
special conference should be held (the size of the vote against the
calling of the conference is a gauge of the CP' S strength in the
union at this time). The special conference met on the 9-10 May
1943, at the Conway Hall, London, and by 31 votes to 19 carried a
resolution stating
"That this conference is satisfied interference
has taken place in the internal affairs of the
Electrical Trades Union by the Communist Party
of Great Britain." (28)
EW Bussey, the General Secretary of the union, then moved on behalf
of the EC a further resolution that called for the debarring of CP
members from holding any office or acting as a delegate on behalf
of the union. But only one of the twelve speakers who took part in
the debate on the resolution supported it, and following an
adj ournment the EC withdrew the resolution, a decision that was
approved by the conference. And that was the end of the attempt to
ban the CP from holding office in the union. It was not until 1963
that Communists were finally debarred from holding any office in
the union, a ban that still exists to the present day.
As the war progressed so did CP influence in the ETU, and by
its end they were poised to win control of the union. For by
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January 1945 the CP held 4 of the 11 Executive Council seats, 9 of
the 23 Area Officials' posts, and 1 of the 2 National Officers'
positions. Later the same year Frank Foulkes, who had been a
National Organiser for the union since 1942, and who was also a
leading CP member, was elected General President. After being
elected General Secretary in 1947, Walter Stevens, who had been
Assistant General Secretary since 1942, promptly joined the
Communist Party. That same year, Frank Haxell and Robert McLellan,
both CP members, were elected to the positions of Assistant General
Secretary and National Officer respectively. By 1948, then, the
Communist Party had won a controlling influence in the Electrical
Trades Union.
So far we have argued that the rise of the CP in the ETU has
very little to do with ballot-rigging, but is to be accounted for
primarily by its pre-war strength in the union, and the popularity
the Party enjoyed as a result of the political and industrial shift
made after June 1941. Yet, in the wake of the 1961 trial, although
most critics of the Communist leadership of the ETU did not openly
say that the Party had gained control of the union through ballot-
rigging, nearly all agreed with Eric Wigham's inference that from
1948 onwards control of the union was "retained by rigging the
ballots for union office". (29) First, let us consider an
alternative explanation for the CP's continued control of the union
in the post-war period.
(2) The Comwrunist Party's post-war militancy
During the last 18 months of the war popular concerns were moving
away from an interest in the prosecution of the war to the question
of post-war reconstruction, a question that raised fundamental
class issues. But, as James Hinton argues, instead of capitalising
on these feelings, the CP found itself increasingly at odds with
leftward moving opinion in the labour movement. The non-Communist
left took up the question of socialist reconstruction and called
for a sharpening of the strategy against the implementation of Tory
policies during the last stages of the war:
"In contrast the CP... moved towards an explicit
rejection of any programme involVing a sharp
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offensive against capitalism... In February
1945, following the Yalta Conference, the
leadership decided to advocate the continuation
of a National Government - including Churchill
and Eden - after the post-war election." (30)
Seemingly the Party leadership had its sights set on the kind of
broad coalition with Communist participation that had taken office
in France and Italy, but this totally overestimated its own
influence and completely underestimated the pull of radical
Labourism
Not surprisingly, the CP began to lose ground in the latter
period of the war and in the wake of the election of the first
maj ori ty Labour Government in July 1945. They were qu i t e simply
outflanked from the left, their politics failing to meet working
class aspirations for radical change, while the Atlee Government
seemed willing to articulate and meet such demands. Nevertheless,
in 1945 the Communist Party still had 45,000 members, the Daily
Vorker had a circulation of 100,000, and the industrial base that
the Party had built up during the war period was still solid. It
spent the next two years in an uneasy relationship with the Labour
Government, a relationship that was finally shattered by the
changing international and home situation.
On 12 March 1947, President Truman, announcing United States
intervention in Greece, established what became known as the
"Truman Doctrine"; in effect the US committed itself to intervene
against any "revolution" believed to be "communist". This was the
signal that the Cold War had begun in earnest. That same year the
Communist Parties were thrown out of the Government coalitions in
France and Italy and the Eastern European countries threw out the
non-CP politicians. In 1948 the Berlin blockade and airlift was the
occasion for the first direct (but "cold" - not a shot was fired)
confrontation between what were to become the rival Russian and
American military pacts.
At home, in the spring of 1948 Sir Stafford Cripps, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, told the House of Commons in his
budget speech that the country could not afford any general rise in
personal incomes of any sort. With a few modifications the
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Government's policy of voluntary wage restraint was accepted by the
TUC (5,421,000 votes to 2,032,000). According to Clegg and Adams
the policy had some success in that in the two and three quarter
years from January 1948 to September 1950 wage rates only rose by
6% while prices rose by 12% (although because of "wage-drift"
earnings are thought to have risen in line with prices) (31) .
Koreover, any strike action that might be mounted in resistance to
the wage controls was still illegal under war-time Order 1305,
retained by the Labour Government. In fact, although there was a
downward trend in strike activity between 1946 and 1952, on average
some 528 strikes took place each year over this period, and on no
fewer than 18 different occasions between 1945 and 1951 the Labour
Government sent troops, sometimes 20,000 of them, across picket
lines to take over strikers' jobs. By 1948, it has been argued,
"strike-breaking had become almost second nature to the Cabinet".
(32) Clearly, the CP had to respond to the dramatically changed
international and home situation.
Taking their cue from Moscow, the British Communist Party
rapidly moved away from its period of peaceful coexistence with the
Labour Party and embarked on a new policy which characterized the
Atlee Government as an active partner in the imperialist camp
intent on carrying through a capitalist solution to the crisis. Not
only were the right-wing of the Labour movement attacked, the ties
that the Party had made with the Labour left were now also to be
unceremoniously cut. This new "Two Camps - One World" policy was
naturally reflected in the CP's industrial strategy. No longer was
the Party to continue to support increased production - this policy
had been "absolutely correct" in the past, said Harry Pollitt in
December 1947, but now would "only result in trailing behind the
Government's reactionary policy". (33) Now the CP was to become
effectively the only organisation in the trade unions that was
actively opposing the Government's wage restraint policies. Central
to organising this resistance was to be the workplace, which the
Party had tended to neglect over the previous two years. As Harry
Pollitt told an extended Executive Committee in February 1949:
"There can be no substitute for factory organisation. To
underestimate the key role of the factory branch is a Social
Democratic atti tude." (34)
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This reversal of their pro-Government position, together with
onset of the Cold Var, quickly produced a response from the Labour
machine. In April 1948, the Labour Party expelled the so-called
"crypto-communist" MPs, and in October Arthur Deaken, Bevin's
successor as head of the T&GWU, launched a major attack on
Communist influence in the unions. In November the TUC General
Council issued a document called Defend Democracy in which it urged
unions to consider banning Communists from holding union posts and
acting as union delegates. As we have seen, the ETU Executive
Council had proposed such action in their union as early as 1942.
The only union to fully implement the call was the T&GVU, which in
1949 voted to ban Communists from holding office. Nine full-time
officials were dismissed, including Bert Papworth, the only
Communist on the TUC General Council. Though similar moves were
made in other unions they did not establish complete bans on
Communist office-holders, but strong anti-Communist currents
emerged which limited the CP's activity. (35)
Despite the witch-hunt of the late forties the CP was able to
maintain the industrial base it had built up after 1941. Membership
did not decline too dramatically, and the circulation of the Daily
Vorker actually increased from 100,000 a day in 1945 to 118,000 in
1947-48. How was the CP able to maintain its industrial base in
these unfavourable conditions? Largely because the CP was the only
organised opposition to wage controls, and because its activists
were prominent in the major strikes of the late 1940s, particularly
in the docks, so they were able to build a solid reputation amongst
a wide layer of trade union activists, the very people who would
attend union branch meetings and vote for candidates on the basis
of their industrial record first and foremost and consider their
political allegiances at best a secondary issue. Vhat is more, the
CP's industrial strategy began to meet with a much wider response
in the labour movement as the Government's retreat from the
aspirations of 1945 became more apparent. Indicative of this move
to the left was the defeat of the General Council over its
continued support for wage restraint at the 1950 TUC:
"Underlying this was a growing rank-and-file
resentment at the degree to which the trade
union establ ishment had placed loyalty to the
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Labour Government before the pursuit of their
members' interests. Relations between organised
labour and the Government were further worsened
by the use of Order 1305 which had been
little employed since its introduction in 1940
- first against striking London Gasworkers, and
then, in February 1951, against the leaders of
the unofficial Port Workers' Committee." (36)
The only union leaders who did not seem to be putting the interests
of the Labour Government before those of their own members were the
Communists. After all, not only was the Government openly hostile
to the Party, but they were blamed for virtually every manifestion
of industrial unrest that occurred, even though this was far from
being the truth. The net effect was to widen the industrial
influence and respect that the Party had in the trade unions. This
was especially the case in the ETU.
From the start the Executive Council of the ETU opposed
Cripps' wages policy, and the union's 1948 Conference carried, with
only one vote against, a resolution endorsing the EC's decision and
declaring that the Government "should ensure that wages and living
standards of the people shall at all times have precedence over
profi ts". And at the 1950 TUC it was Walter Stevens, the General
Secretary of the ETU, who moved the resolution that called for the
aboli tion of wage controls, which was carried, narrowly, against
the opposition of the General Council. (3,949,000 votes to
3,727,000), (37)
With regards to Order 1305, both the 1949 and 1950 policy
conferences of the union carried resolutions opposing its continued
retention. When one of the ten leaders of the unofficial London
Gasworkers' strike of September 1950, arrested under the provisions
of Order 1305, turned out to be a member of the ETU, the union came
to his assistance. Although the rule book did not allow the
granting of legal aid in such a case, the Executive Council issued
a circular to all branches appealing for financial support. After
an appeal the one month's jail sentence passed on all ten workers
was reduced to a £50 fine. (38) ETU militancy should not be
exaggerated of course, for the leadership were often quite cautious
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in their approach to strikes. For example, in the summer of 1949 a
strike over pay differentials was threatened in the power stations:
"Ironically ... it was being threatened by TGWU
members, while the Communist-led Electrical
Trades Union was recommending its members to
stay at work." (39)
Further, the wave of unofficial lightning strikes that hit the
newly nationalised Electricity industry in 1949, leading in Belfast
and London to the drafting in of troops, do not appear to have
received any support from the Executive. In the official history of
the union, published in 1953, these disputes do not even get a
mention. Nonethless, the generally militant stand of the union over
this period seems to have met with membership approval. Not only
did the Communist leadership carry the union conferences, but in
the various union elections of the late 1940s they extended their
control.
If we now turn to the early 1950s further reasons for the CP's
continued control of the ETU can be offered. In industry the early
1950s were characterized by two dominant and related features.
Firstly, there was the growth of workplace bargaining, especially
in engineering, which produced a strong and militant layer of shop-
stewards who frequently used the sectional militancy that had
elected them to enforce their bargaining position. One of the most
striking products of workplace bargaining was the gap that
developed between nationally negotiated wage rates and what the
workers could obtain above and beyond this rate at factory level -
"wage drift". It was this "informal" bargaining system that,
according to Fox and Flanders, had led to a breakdown of the
"normative" order of industrial relations in post-war Britain, and
was considered by the Donovan Commission to be "the central defect
in British industrial relations". (40) Secondly, as Michael Shanks
wrote in his much read book on the ills of British society in the
1950s, The Stagnant Society, the growth of workplace bargaining had
led to a
"growing conflict between union officials and
shop stewards, and to the steadily widening
gulf between the union leaders and their own
members. Tbis is undoubtedly the main cause
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behind the increase in unofficial strikes, the
breaking of agreements, and the disregard for
procedure on the workers' side." (41)
Besides unofficial strikes, estimated to account for 95% of all
strikes in the 1950s, the downward trend in official strike
activity of the late 1940s was reversed in the latter part of 1953
and thereafter, and despite an isolated fall in 1956, the overall
trend was firmly upwards. (42)
It is not altogether surprising that an organisation whose
maj or orientation was now on factory and union work should make
some headway in this period and that a very high proportion of
Communists should be elected shop-stewards. They were not chosen
for their politics by and large, but first and foremost because
they were tough negotiators and best articulated the industrial
concerns of the workers they represented. Although with the
publication of the Party's programme, The British Road to Socialism
- issued by the Executive Committee in February 1951, and revised
and adopted by the 22nd Congress in April 1952 - the Party clearly
placed itself within the same political orbit as the Bevanites in
the Labour Party who were then battling it out with Atlee and the
right-wing of the movement over such issues as further
nationalisation and a foreign policy more independent of the USA.
After the witch-hunt of the late 1940s, and the Party's own move
away from the left in the Labour Party, to now be associated with a
much wider left current in the labour movement could only make the
work of CP activists in the unions and workplaces that much easier.
Their political policies were now cutting with a strong left
reformist grain in the labour movement, just as their industrial
acti vi ty was cutting with the growing sectional militancy on the
shop-floor.
The ETU was the centrepiece of the Communist Party's political
and industrial strategy in the 1950s. Politically the union
exemplified the strategy set out in the British Road to Socialism
of pushing the Labour Party in a left direction. John Gollan, the
General Secretary of the CP, put their position very clearly in
1954:
" ... the outstanding new feature of the 1953
Margate Labour Party Conference was the
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emergence of a powerful group of important
trade unions with a vote of around one and a
quarter million, including the engineers,
electricians and railwaymen, in alliance with
the majority of constituency parties. This
alliance will grow and develop and is the key
to the transformation of the situation in the
Labour Party." (43)
The ability of the CP to directly place resolutions on the
order paper of Labour Party conferences through the channels of the
ETU delegation was central to this strategy. When the CP leadership
of the ETU attempted to push this process too far, however, they
suffered the rare experience of being checked by their own union
conference:
"The 1952 conference refused C158: 142 with 16
abstaining) to agree that any member might
represent the ETU at any body to which the
union was affiliated. This amounted to a claim
that the union's Communist President and
General Secretary should be allowed to attend
the Party Conference as delegates and that
Communists should be delegates to Constituency
Labour Parties. This demand was rejected again
by the 1953 Conference (165:151), but in later
years it has been smuggled through in the guise
of a call for 'the removal of bans and
proscriptions' with little difficulty." (44)
After the 1953 ETU Conference Frank Foulkes told the press
that "the ETU's Labour Party members will not tolerate Communists
representing them at Labour conventions... ". (45) This was not as
problematic as it might at first seem for the ETU leadership; for
they were allowed constitutionally to attend Labour Party
conferences as advisors to their delegations and, more importantly,
there was little divergence on industrial and economic matters
between the CP and the left-wing Labour Party members who made up
the bulk of the delegates at ETU conferences. Opposition was much
more apparent on political matters, where the CP leadership did not
al ways carry the delegates with them (most notably on the Soviet
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invasion of Hungary in 1956). But, so long as the CP leadership did
not go beyond the framework of left Labour politics, they were able
to send ETU delegations to Labour Party Conferences that genuinely
represented the dominant politics of ETU activists. The balance the
CP leadership of the union was always trying to strike was one that
brought "the ETU' s policies as close to the Communist line as is
compatible with remaining within the Labour Party". (46)
Industrial and economic concerns were, as we have already
noted, an entirely different matter. Baldly stated, the Communist
Party were able to maintain their control of the ETU in the 1950s
because they articulated the general industrial concerns of the
union's membership. As one study of policy formation in the post-
war ETU put it:
"For the most part outright opposition wi thin
the union to policies of industrial and
economic militancy was non existent, support of
the leadership being typically ... unanimous and
enthusiastic... " (47)
Not only did the leadership articulate the industrial concerns of
the membership, they also, in the main, and unlike many other trade
union leaderships, supported them when they were in dispute. As
Woodrow Wyatt complained:
"The Communists have even introduced the most
extraordinary strike rule in the history of the
British Trade Union movement. It is that all
strikes, however trivial the occasion, are
automatically official in the ETU until and
unless they are declared unofficial." (48)
Or, as Frank Haxell, the General Secretary of the union, put it:
"In this union every strike is official until, and if, the
executive council says otherwise". In 1955 alone they paid out
£190,643 in strike payout of a total income of £440,891. (49) At a
time when shop-floor militancy was characterised by unofficial
strikes, the ETU leadership's pronouncements cannot have failed to
have had a resonance with a wide layer of ETU members, even though
the vast majority of unofficial strikes were over and done with in
a very short period of time, and in most cases before the Executive
Council heard of them. So in one sense the leadership of the union
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could afford to be magnanimous on unofficial strikes. Nonetheless,
the gesture would have no doubt been well received by the majority
of BTU members.
Overall, then, we would agree with Lewis 1Unkin when he says
that
"Ballot-rigging aside, the success of the
Communist leadership was based on its militant
industrial policy and its harmonization with a
Left-wing Labour tradition indigenous to the
union." (50)
This indigenous left-wing labour tradition was in itself the
product of an historical industrial militancy rooted in the type of
industries that the union covered. For the core of the union's
membership had always been in the electrical contracting and
engineering industries, both of which had a history and tradition
of militancy. With the rapid growth of both of these industries
during the war period the union membership shot up from 70,065 in
1939 to 187,520 in 1949, and thereafter by 3% a year till it
reached 215,596 in 1955. These industries, especially engineering,
were precisely the ones where the main features of the post-war
militancy we have described above were most prevalent. This
provides us with a further explanation for the rise of the CP in
the BTU. For as H.A. Turner has argued:
" ... in general, Communists have only achieved
much power in British unions where they were
able to identify themselves with historical -
and often local militancies specific to
particular industries ... So that the recent
situation of the BTU seems... explicable as
being the one case in which Communists were
able to exploit an association with the
engineering industries' tradition of shop-
steward militancy to the critical point of
capturing the key union offices." (51)
Turner's line of argument was developed by R. Bean, in an
article in the Pol i tical Quarterly in 1965, which examined BTU
pol icy formation between 1945-1961. Bean's concern was to explain
why, given that the political views of the ETU leadership were only
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shared by a fraction of the membership, the union's policy
conferences consistently advocated policies shared by the Communist
leadership. Bean's survey of ETU conference decisions shows how
year after year certain issues - international co-operation, the
abolition of nuclear weapons, total opposition to wage restraint,
the extension of public ownership, reciprocal trading with the USSR
and China - were placed on the agenda and carried with practically
no opposition from the floor. However, Bean argues that this
militancy is not to be understood solely as a result of the
Communist leadership of the union, but is in many ways a
continuation of the ETU's militant tradition, a tradition
"Rooted in the structure of the union and the
type of industries it organises, together with
its history and the extensive powers conferred
on its executive. In this context, then, it may
be said that the Communist leaders were as much
symptomatic of the union's militant policy as
that they themselves were the direct cause of
it." (52)
It can be argued then, that the combination of an indigenous
militancy that was able to blossom in the industrial climate of the
1950s, together with a strong body of CP members who actively
encouraged such militancy and made up a high proportion of the
union's 7000 stewards, provides a plausible explanation for the
continued support that the Communist leadership enjoyed in the ETU
after 1948.
Two explanations, both concentrating on the politics and
industrial strategy of the Communist Party, have now been given
that attempt to account for the rise of the CP in the ETU. Both
explanations implicitly reject the idea that the Communist Party
gained and retained its control by manipulating the internal
democracy of the union. The first, and least contentious, argues
that the CP' s capture of the union was the result of its general
war-time popularity, which enabled it to take advantage of its
already strong pre-war base in the union. The second argues that
the continued post-war control of the ETU by the Communist Party
can be explained essentially by the political and industrial shift
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made in Party policy at the end of 1947, a shift which allowed the
CP to capitalise on working class opposition to the Labour
Government's wage controls and the growth of strong local, plant
and sectional bargaining where militant shop-stewards frequently
led short, sharp, unofficial strikes. As well as this, the Bevanite
upsurge in the Labour Party in the early 1950s can be said to have
tempered the cold war atmosphere in which the CP had operated in
the late 1940s, making them now a part of a wider left-wing
current. The CP leadership of the ETU were better placed than most
to take advantage of these favourable conditions primarily because
of their greater implantation in the union and because their
policies cut with the grain of a traditional militancy that began
to flower in the conditions of the post-war boom.
The union's democracy during this period can be seen to have
been shaped by a number of social and political factors and the
peculiarities of the ETU' s own growth and development. Yet the
still dominant explanation for the Communist Party's continued
control of the post-war ETU is the one put forward by Woodrow
Wyatt:
" ... since the war the Communists had controlled
the ETU by falsifying election returns". (53)
This explanation rejects the notion that the union's policies were
democratically arrived at, and instead argues that an oligarchy of
CP members controlled the ETU and thus its policies by a
combination of bureaucratic manipulation and ballot-rigging. It is
to this explanation that we now turn.
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CHAPTER TWO
BALLOT RIGGING AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY
During the period in which the Communist Party controlled the ETU
(1948-1961) all positions in the union were secured by election and
re-election (see Appendix 1, diagram 1). There was a reason for
this, as Gordon Schaffer explains in his official history of the
union:
"In some unions... officials are elected for
life, and are, therefore, far less responsive
to the desires of the members.
The ETU has avoided this danger and all full-
time officials, from the General Secretary
downwards, come up for re-election every five
years. The Executive Council is elected every
two years.
Not only does this rule act as a reminder to
the officials that they are the servants and
not the masters of the Union, it also prevents
the leaders of the moment from exercising the
power of patronage which is inseparable from
any organisation able to offer well-paid
positions. Aspirants for office in a union in
which appointments are made by elections know
they have to please not the General Secretary,
or the Executive Committee, but the membership
as a whole." (1)
Be that as it may, what this elective principle did not guard
against, it was alleged, was the manipulation of the electoral
process itself by an organised minority wi thin the union - the
Communist Party.
A note on the ETU' s voting procedure.
Hopefully the intricacies of the ETU' s electoral process will
become apparent as we examine in some detail the charges of ballot-
rigging levelled at the Communist leadership of the union, but
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before we proceed a brief note on how the union's voting procedure
operated might help to avoid unnecessary confusion.
To avoid the deficiencies of the relative maj ority voting
system the ETU along with several other unions employed the second
ballot system. (2) This method of voting required that a successful
candidate should receive an absolute majority over all other
candidates. If there there were three or more candidates and no one
candidate received an absolute majority of the votes cast, the two
leading candidates would stand again in a second ballot.
The procedure for voting was that every member who was not
more than 13 weeks in arrears received a ballot paper at his or her
home address. It was the branch secretary who had the
responsibility of distributing the individual ballot papers to the
home addresses of the members and of enclosing an official envelope
for its return. Members who were unable to vote in person at the
quarterly branch meeting at which the ballot was to be taken could
return the sealed envelope containing their ballot paper either by
post to their branch secretary or directly to the branch quarterly
meeting, or in person to their branch secretary, money steward or
shop steward. At the quarterly branch meeting all the ballot papers
were then handed over to two previously elected rank-and-file
branch scrutineers <ie other than the branch officials) who counted
the votes and declared the result at the end of the meeting. The
result of the ballot was recorded on a branch scrutineers' return
form, signed by the scrutineers, the branch secretary and the
branch president, and then posted to the Head Office of the union.
To be valid the scrutineers' return form had to reach union
headquarters no later than the first post on the fifth day
following the quarterly meeting.
The Daily Telegraph's allegations
From the mid-1950s onwards a stream of press articles began to
appear alleging electoral malpractice in the ETU. The first of
these to appear, in the Daily Telegraph on 11 January 1956,
contained the core of all the SUbsequent allegations that were to
be directed against the Communist leadership of the union. Under
the heading "Election Methods in a Communist-Led Union", the
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unsigned article claimed that an analysis Qf the vQting figures fQr
the electiQn Qf the uniQn's General Secretary in March 1955,
CQntested between the sitting CQmmunist candidate Frank Haxell and
John Byrne, and the e l eo't i on f or the peat of Assistant General
Secretary in September Qf the same year between JQhn Byrne and the
si tting Commun.is't candidate Rober-t McLennan, made "odd reading t o
say the least". What is mQre, the Qdd nature Qf the vQting figures
f or these tWQ e Lect i ons , claimed the Daily Telegraph, "repeats the
same cur i ous pattern which has marked ETU na t i ona I and certain
regiQnal electiQns since 1948". What was this "curiQus pattern"?
A study Qf the tWQ 1955 electiQns in which the sitting
CQmmunist candidates had retained their PQsts revealed tWQ
suspiciQUS facts, wrQte the special cQrrespQndent: firstly, a high
vo t e in t.hose branches that either had Communi s t of f Lc i a l s or- a
small grQup Qf CP members in the branch; and secQndly, the
smallness Qf the VQte in many branches with nQn-CQmmunist Qfficers
Qr influence. FQr example, in the Haxell-Byrne electiQn, the
fQIIQwing vQting figures (expressed as a percentage Qf branch
membership) f r om a number of unnamed "prQ-CQmmunist" branches were
given as evidence tQ suppQrt the cQrrespQndent's cQntentiQn:
CQmmunist NQn-CQInlIlunist
Branch "A" 76.6 0.5
"B" 86.4 nil
"C" 73.8 1.4
"D" 62.8 15.8
"E" 74.9 14.8
"F" 71. 8 3.9
In cont.r-aat , said the Daily Telegraph, "the voting returns
from branches auppor-t i ng the non-Ccmmum s t are extremely IQw". A
similar pattern was alsQ evident, the article claimed, in the
McLennan-Byrne election eight months later. Moreover, if the two
elections of 1955 were compar-ed "a number of puzzling points
emerge". For instance, in branch "F" the poll dropped from a total
vote of 75.7% in the Haxell-Byrne election to one of only 12.2% in
the McLennan-Byrne election. Other alleged irregulari ties in the
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ETU's electoral process going as far back as 1948 were also cited
in the article. The conclusion that the Daily Telegraph drew from
its analysis of the ETU's "curious pattern" of voting was that the
"triumvirate of Communists in the union's top executive posts, a
triumvirate which ... directed the aggressive policy of the union
throughout this period" had been able to pursue their political and
industrial ends by manipulating the union's internal democracy. How
had they done this?
Firstly, the article said, the voting procedure in the union
lent itself to manipulation in a number of ways. For example, the
branch secretary whose task it was to distribute the ballot papers
amongst the membership was in a position to dispense with them in a
selective manner. Woodrow Wyatt put it 1ike this several months
after the Daily Telegraph article appeared:
"Many rank-and-file members of the ETU do not
even know or care when an election is taking
place. And many Communist and fellow-travelling
branch secretaries know how to take advantage
of this apathy.
They do not stop at failing to urge the
laggards to vote. Frequently they send out only
fifty to sixty ballot papers out of several
hundreds, to those members who, they have
found, take an interest in trade union
proceedings. They bank on the rest never
hearing about the election. This makes the
falsification of the returns less troublesome.
If anyone has not received a ballot paper for
an election and wants to know why he has been
left out the answer is pat: 'It must have been
lost in the post.' or: 'It was a clerical
error. I ticked you off as having been sent
one.' " (3)
Secondly, the article says that the system of counting votes
in ETU branches is open to abuse. Once again Woodrow Wyatt says
openly what the Daily Telegraph article only implies:
"It is easy for an official who is a Communist
or fellow traveller to fill in the votes in any
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way he likes and no questions asked
provided that he has access to the forms. Once
the branch meeting has started the President
and Secretary are concerned with conducting
that and may not be able to watch closely the
counting of the votes. Consequently not even
the connivance or complaisance of all the
officials concerned is required to falsify the
returns." (4)
A further three articles were published in the Daily Telegraph
on January 12, 13, and 16, 1956, all of which continued the attack
on the ETU. The article on 12 January dealt with "irregularities in
the election of an officer of the Communist-Led Electrical Trades
Union some years ago". It reported that although an ETU committee
of inquiry had found almost all the allegations proven, the
Executive Council decided not to disqualify the votes of the
branches concerned. Consequently "the election of Mr A. A. Wallis,
now 52, a Communist, was confirmed. He still holds office". (5) And
it was not just the ETU that was being attacked, as the article on
13 January used the example of the ETU to illustrate a general
point about the deficiencies and flaws of those trade union voting
procedures which allowed "ill-disposed people" to take advantage of
the rules and secure the election of their candidates. Flaws, said
the Daily Telegraph, that have "long been recognised by some union
leaders". (6)
According to the Daily Telegraph's special correspondent, the
article of 11 January was described by Frank Foulkes, the President
of the ETU, as "all lies":
"He did not elaborate which parts were
inaccurate. I asked him to examine with roe the
suggestions made in the article and to give
explanations or replies. He declined to do so.
I then asked whether he would cornrnent in
general terms on the article. He did not." (7)
But according to Frank Foulkes: "I immediately submitted a 1,500-
word letter to the editor for publ ication which he refused to
publish on the grounds that it was impossible to print a letter of
such length". (8) Yet, oddly, the union did not consider it
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worthwhile publishing Foulkes' refutation of the Telegraphs's
allegations in the union's own monthly journal, Electron, in the EC
minutes or in circular form to the branches. In their report to the
ETU's Annual Delegate Conference in May 1956, the Executive Council
merely said that the articles were a "distortion" and a
"misrepresentation" aimed at wilfully misleading the readers of the
Daily Telegraph. The Report said that the Executive Council could
only conclude that the Daily Telegraph's reluctance to publish the
union's reply was because to do so "would effectively dispose of
the attempts made in the articles to discredit the Union. (9) But
the letter was not reproduced in the Report for the information of
the delegates. Eventually, early in 1957, the union published its
first statement concerning the Daily Telegraph's allegations in a
small pamphlet entitled The Union's Reply to the Press Attacks, and
in July Electron mentioned the press campaign for the first time.
The union did not really have much choice: with the publication in
December 1956 of Woodrow Wyatt I s booklet The Peril in Our Xidst,
and with the coverage the booklet received in the popular press,
especially in the wake of the crushing of the Hungarian revolution
by Soviet tanks, the ETU leadership had to refute the charges in
some detail or by their silence condemn themselves.
The Peril in Our Nidst
In September 1956, Woodrow Wyatt wrote a series of articles for the
Illustrated magazine attacking Communist influence in British trade
unions. In December of the same year they were published in booklet
form under the title The Peril in Our Nidst. One of the chapters in
the book, "Faked Ballots", dealt exclusively with the ETU and was
written on the basis of "masses of confidential documents" supplied
to him by John Byrne, the most prominent oppositionist in th8 union
at the time. (10) Wyatt did not mince his words:
"Once a Communist State always a Communist
State. There are no further free elections.
However much the people of Poland or Hungary
may dislike their Communist governments, they
have no democratic or constitutional means of
throwing them out. As I shall show, it is the
42
same with the Communist officials of the
Communist-controlled Electrical Trades Union.
Indeed, I go further and have no hesitation in
saying that on more than one occasion the rank-
and-file members of the ETU have actually voted
in favour of a non-Communist for an important
official position. But the Communist has been
declared the 'winner' because some of the
Communist-influenced branches have 'cooked' the
votes ....
I am convinced that the great maj ori ty of the
216,000 rank-and-file members of the ETU do not
wish their union to be run by Communists. But
under the present conditions they are helpless.
I wi 11 prove it." (11 )
How did Woodrow Wyatt prove that the internal democracy of the
ETU was open to such gross manipulation? Much of what he wrote was
in fact a re-working of the Daily Telegraph allegations with Wyatt
drawing the explicit conclusion that Communist Party members within
the ETU had rigged certain ballots for high office. But besides
writing about the two 1955 elections, as the Daily Telegraph
article had done, he also reports on three other elections that
took place in the late 1940s, which the Daily Telegraph article had
only touched upon. Of the three elections, Wyatt examines two in
some detail and claims that both had been rigged. The two rigged
elections were for the post of Assistant General Secretary. In the
first ballot in June 1948, despite it being rigged, John Byrne had
received 27,587 votes and the Communist candidate, Frank Haxell,
25,000 votes, but Byrne had failed to win an overall majority over
the other two candidates (Haxell and Lowden) as the rules required
by just 229 votes. A second ballot was held between Byrne and
Haxell in September, but this time Byrne only received 28,732 votes
to Haxell's 33,399 votes. This result was achieved, says Wyatt, by
32 Communist influenced branches falsifying their voting returns:
"Take Blackpool for instance. In the election
of December, 1947, for the post of General
Secretary when Mr. Stevens, the Communist, did
not seem seriously threatened it recorded 4
votes for Mr.Byrne and 284 for the Communist.
In the election for Assistant General Secretary
in June, 1948, after Mr.Byrne had caused a stir
with his election address, it recorded only 1
vote for Mr.Byrne and 595 votes for Mr.Haxell,
the Communist.
Blackpool was stepping up the pressure. Its
vote had apparently increased from 40% of the
membership to 84% of the membership an
unheard of thing in Trade Union elections of
this type - and in six months, too. There was
more to come.
When Mr Byrne headed the list of candidates in
the first ballot for the Assistant General
Secretaryship in June, 1948 - although as I
have explained he did not get the post because
his vote did not exceed the combined total of
the other two candidates - the Communists were
in a panic.
In September 1948 in the second vote that year
for the Assistant General Secretaryship, 5
votes were recorded by Blackpool for Mr. Byrne
and 695 for Mr.Haxell, the Communist.
This was an extraordinary vote for two reasons.
The first is that it was 98% of the members
whose names were on the books of the Blackpool
branch at the time.
In other words it was the sort of vote that
Stalin used to win elections by in Russia.
The second curiosity about the vote is this.
You are not entitled to vote in an election of
the ETU if your union contributions are in
arrears of thirteen weeks.
At that moment - September, 1948 - the number
of paid-up members of the Blackpool branch who
were really entitled to vote was 559. Yet the
branch had the effrontery to return 700 as
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having voted in this important election
nearly 150 more people than were supposed to
vote under Union rules.
Ten other Communist-dominated branches also
returned as having voted more people than were
qualified to vote." (2)
According to Woodrow Wyatt, then, John Byrne was cheated out
of his election victory by 32 Communist influenced branches
stepping up their vote for Frank Haxell by over 3000 votes between
the first and second ballots. Moreover, 11 of these 32 branches had
recorded votes for more members than were entitled to vote, claimed
Wyatt. So two related charges were being levelled at the ETU
leadership: firstly, that 32 Communist dominated branches of the
union increased their pro-Haxell votes by unprecedented numbers
between the first ballot in June and the second ballot in
September; and secondly, that 11 of these branches recorded more
votes than they were entitled to. The union published its reply to
these charges and those contained in the Daily Telegraph early in
1957.
In substance The Union's Reply to the Press Attacks argued
that the "wild allegations" made by the Daily Telegraph and Woodrow
Wyat t were not onl y wrong bu t part and parce I of a "McCarthy-l i ke
wi tch hunting" campaign aimed at discrediting a miHtant trade
union. Specifically, the pamphlet said that the irregularities the
Daily Telegraph had pointed to concerning the high returns from
certain branches were not unusual. This was because of the very
nature of the electrical industry where, for instance, 80,000 ETU
members worked shifts, so "there were sometimes considerable
fluctuations both in ballot returns and branch attendances".
Turning to Woodrow Wyatt I s allegations, the pamphlet says that he
uses "figures from two different sources, and, in addition relating
to two different years":
"First he takes the analysis of branch voting
returns in the September, 1948 election for
assistant general secretary, and compares them
wi th the financial membershi p of the branches
at December, 1947.
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The membership of the branches is compiled for
various purposes in three ways:
1. The actual membership that is the number
of members of the branches irrespective of any
arrears of contributions.
2. The voting membership that is those
members less than 13 weeks in arrears of
contributions.
3. The financial membership that is the
number of members for whom full contributions
for the year have been paid.
Vyatt, failing to appreciate these very
important distinctions, uses entirely unrelated
figures and alleges that three branches
registered more votes than they had members!
Let us take his example of Dorking branch;
Wyatt said that. 'with 206 members entitled to
vote, by September, 1948, it was returning 20
votes for Mr.Byrne and 189 for the Communist.'
The implication is quite clearly that Dorking
branch, with 206 members. was returning 209
votes - three more votes than members!
As we told the Daily Express, 'the Dorking
branch has a financial membership of 206, but
its total membership at that date was 264. '
More important still, at the time of the ballot
'the number of members entitled to vote was
242. The comparison is therefore between 209
and 242 and not between 209 and 206 as claimed
by Wyatt. This is also the case with the
Blackpool and Leyland branches who both polled
fewer votes than the members entitled to vote."
(13)
The argument about the 1948 election was not to end there. In
January 1958 Woodrow Wyatt published a long article in the New
Statesman entitled "The Case against the ETU leaders" in which he
repeated and expanded on the allegations he had made in The Peril
in Our Midst, and made further allegations about the rigging of a
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very recent election in the ETU. (14) For Wyatt's New Statesman
article came at the end of a three month period in which the ETU
had been subject to a vitriolic press campaign alleging once again
Communist electoral malpractice in the union. The occasion for this
renewed and far larger press campaign against the ETU was the
result of an ETU election held in September 1957.
The Cannon - Frazer election of 1957
In September 1957 Les Cannon and Jack Frazer contested the ETU's
Di vision 9 for a seat on the Executive Council. Frazer was the
sitting member and also a member of the Communist Party. Cannon had
joined the Communist Party at the age of nineteen in 1939, and in
the post-war period had become one of their most prominent
industrial members. Cannon's intellectual abilities were put to
good use both by the Communist Party and the ETU. For the Party he
wrote numerous articles on a wide range of issues, and a very good
pamphlet on producti vi ty - Producti vi ty - for whom? - in September
1955. Cannon had been on the Executive Council of the ETU, which
was a lay body, since 1945, and had earned his living working in
the industry, but in 1954 he was offered a job at the ETU's
residential college at Esher, with the condition that he did not
stand for elective office while working at the college, a condition
which he accepted.
When Les Cannon left the Communist Party in November 1956 in
the midst of the Soviet invasion of Hungary it was a major blow to
the Party and to the CP leadership of the ETU. There followed a
period of intense bitterness with Cannon being virtually ostracised
by the CP members of the union, and in the spring of 1957 he lost
his job when the residential college was closed down. So Cannon
could expect a tough fight from Frazer and the Communist leadership
of the union in the September election. Especially as the election
was an important test of the Party's strength in the union
follOWing the crushing of the Hungarian revolution. Already around
10,000 members had left the CP over Hungary, and at the ETU
conference in May 1957 the delegates had voted against the
Executi ve and condemned the "brutal attack of the Soviet armed
forces on the Hungarian people". (15) Not only this made the
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election so important, the victor also had the right to sit on the
union's sub-executive of five that ran the union in between the bi-
monthly meetings of the full Executive Council. If Cannon were
elected the CP control of the union would be severely hampered,
because the decisions of the sub-executive, at the time made up
entirely of CP members, had to be unanimous, and so an experienced
former EC and CP member would be a real thorn in the side of the
leadership.
There were 61 branches in Division No.9 spread over a wide
area of the south of England, and it was imperative that each
candidate secured as many branch nominations as possible in order
to make an impressive show on the ballot paper (all the nomimations
that the candidate received appeared under his name on the ballot
paper) . For Les Cannon this involved visiting as many of the
branches as he could in person in a very short space of time:
" ... he had to try to visit them all during the
last two weeks of June, when the quarterly
meetings were held - it was at these meetings
that the nominations of candidates for the
forthcoming election were made ..
By the end of June Les succeeded in getting
sufficient nominations to make a respectable
showing on the ballot- paper." (16)
Frazer, on the other hand, had all the resources of the union
and CP machine behind him. According to Olga Cannon and J. R. L.
Anderson, as the election drew nearer the "Communists in the
Di vision grew seriously alarmed, and they mounted a substantial
campaign against Les":
"At least five Area officials - all Communists
- visited branches in the Division to assist
the sitting candidate. The candidate himself
found Executive Council reasons for visiting
the Isle of Wight twice, Reading twice,
Portsmouth twice, etc all with full
delegation fees paid ... Every conceivable
attempt was made to blacken Les he was
accused of being in the pay of Roman Catholics,
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the Economic League, and the capitalist press."
(17)
The result of the election was expected to be announced at the
Executive Council meeting on 19 October 1957, but instead the
General Secretary, Frank Haxell, reported that inquiries were being
made "into the way in which a number of branches had conducted the
ballot held at the September quarterly meetings" , and that
meanwhile the results could not be announced. Before the findings
of the "inquiries" were published, however, Les Cannon approached
Geoffrey Goodman of the News Chronicle and Len Jackson of the Daily
Xirror and told them of the investigation and of his own suspicions
of electoral malpractice. On Monday 21 October the News Chronicle
ran a story by Goodman under the headline "ETU Election Row -
Communist Didn't Win". Goodman's article dealt with one of the
branches that was to be investigated for ballot irregularities by
the ETU leadership, the Mitcham Electronic Engineers branch, which
had voted by 410 votes to 35 in favour of Les Cannon. He wrote:
"Cannon and Frazer have been contesting the
ETU's No. 9 Division, which covers one in ten
of the 230,000 members in South-West London,
Surrey, Berkshire, Hampshire, the Isle of Wight
and the Channel Isles.
And despite the efforts of the ETU leaders,
Cannon is bel ieved to have have won - by more
than 300 votes.
The Executive has not yet announced the result.
The union chiefs met at the weekend but no
statement has been issued.
If they invalidate the returns from the Mitcham
Electronic Engineers, the effect could be to
snatch victory from Cannon." (18)
In the event the ballot returns of 8 branches were
disqualified (2 of which had cast majorities for Frazer), with
three of the branches - the Mitcham Electronic Engineers, London
Station Engineers No. 14, and the London Jointers branch - being
investigated in some detail for ballot irregularities. The details
of the disqualifications were given by Frank Haxell at a special
meeting of the Executive Council held on 15 November. The Mitcham
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and LSE No. 14 branches were disqualified on the grounds that more
members voted than were entitled to vote, which was rather ironic
in the light of the charges previously made against the Communist
leadership of the union by the Daily Telegraph and Woodrow Wyatt.
In the case of the Mitcham branch, said the EC report, they had
claimed a voting membership of 1084, but 699 members were not
enti tIed to vote because of arrears, 37 members received ballot
papers when they were not entitled to them, 43 who were entitled to
vote did not receive ballot papers, and 60 more votes than the
maximum possible had been cast. As for the LSE No.14 branch, a
voting membership of 932 had been claimed but, according to the
EC' s findings, only 821 were entitled to vote, 57 members received
ballot papers who were not entitled to them, 72 who were entitled
to them didn't receive them and 12 ballot papers were returned to
Head Office unused. (19) Despite appeals made by both branches, and
allegations that the appeals machinery itself was being abused by
the Executive, the decision to disqualify the branches' ballot
returns was upheld. The investigation into the London Jointers
branch was of a lesser order: the branch vote was disqualified
because the doorkeeper had started to open the scrutineers'
envelopes before the meeting opened to assist the scrutineers who
were late for the meeting. According to the Executive Council
minutes, the other five branches were dis-enfranchised either
because branch scrutineers were not appointed in accordance with
the rules, or because ballot documents were not returned within the
time limit laid down in the rules. (20)
The Executive Council minutes of 15 November also contain the
result of the Cannon - Frazer election, although the result was not
made public until 27 November:
Cannon 1451
Frazer 2023
A breakdown of the branch voting is also given, except, and this
was normal practice in the ETU, for the 8 branches that were
disqualified. So although the minutes showed that Frazer had a
majority of 572 over Cannon, what they did not show was what the
result would have been if those 8 branches had not been
disqualified. In the weeks that followed it was to be these
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"missing votes" that were to be at the centre of the press campaign
that was waged against the ETU.
The renewed press campaign
Geoffrey Goodman's article in the News Chronicle in October was the
signal for a torrent of further press articles which all implied,
directly or indirectly, that Les Cannon had been elected to the
Executive Council of the ETU by a majority of some 300 votes, and
that the Communist leadership of the union were now in the process
of cheating him of his victory. In the first phase of the campaign
the press clamoured for the result of the election to be made
known. The Daily Nail (Scotland) of November 23 was not untypical
of the many reports that were appearing at the time:
"It is widely believed that Leslie Cannon, a
former Communist, secured the position ... But
who knows? The reds refuse to talk ...
The union's Communist President, Mr. Frank
Foulkes says 'We do not intend to make any
public announcement of the results of the
election. It will be made known to members in
due course when they receive the minutes of the
meetings of the executive'."
And again in the Daily Nail (Scotland) of 25 November, under the
headline "ETU REDS KEEP THE IRON CURTAIN", Foulkes was reported as
saying that he would
"tell members in the routine circulation of
minutes of the EC meetings probably about mid-
December. "
In fact the minutes of the 15 November EC meeting were not
circulated to the branches until mid-January 1958, by which time,
as we shall see, the bulk of their contents were public knowledge.
One reason for the delay could have been that branches could not
challenge the result of the Cannon - Frazer election until the the
EC minutes were circulated to the branches. So by the simple
expedient of delaying their circulation the whole appeals machinery
of the union could be held in suspension till a time when the heat
surrounding the Cannon -Frazer election had died down.
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A few days after Frank Foulkes had reportedly said that no
public announcement of the election result would be made, The Times
carried an article which stated that the "results of the September
ballot for the executive committee of the ETU were made known
yesterday... .Mr. Cannon learnt that he had been declared defeated
and that .Mr. Frazer had been elected." (21) But as yet no details
of the election had been released by the union - the findings of
the investigations into the three branches and the breakdown of the
voting figures. The confirmation that Cannon had been defeated only
increased press interest in the affairs of the ETU, an interest
that was given a further boost by the union's Special Rules
Revision Conference that was to begin on 30 November, three days
after Cannon's defeat had been announced in The Times.
The main rule changes proposed at the conference were
concerned with increasing membership contributions so that benefits
could be increased and the financial plight of the union
alleviated. But Frank Foulkes' Presidential address to the
delegates, and the press coverage of the conference, made it qutte
clear that the financial troubles of the union were at best' a
secondary issue, and that the real issue was the union's internal
democracy and the continuing attack on the Communist leadership of
the union. Frank Foulkes held aloft a recent copy of the Daily
Telegraph, which carried a report on the financial condition of the
union that could not have been written without access to the
conference agenda, and said to the delegates that "every member
sitting here at this conference is suspect of handing this document
to our enemies". (22) And certainly the "enemies" of the ETU in the
press thought there were far more sinister things taking place
behind the doors of the Agricultural Hall, Knightsbridge, than the
raising of membership contributions. The day before the conference
opened the Daily Hail ran an article under the headline, "THE RED
FRANKS OF THE ETU GIVE THE SHACKLES A FINAL TWIST". On the closing
day of the conference the same paper's frontpage headline was: "RED
GRIP CLOSES ON ETU". (23) Other, more restrained newpapers, such as
The Times, carried reports asserting that Communist control of the
ETU had been strengthened by the decisions of the Special Rules
Revision Conference.
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There were a number of rule changes that directly affected the
internal democracy of the union. For example, branches would now be
attached to an Area Committee, thus ensuring that every branch was
represented at Area level. It was also decided that all charges
relating to maj or offences would now be dealt with by the Area
Committee and not by the branch. What infuriated the press though,
was the change in the composition of the 5 man sub-executive of the
union which ran the union in between the meetings of the full
Executive Council. As we have already seen, if Les Cannon had won
his election against Frazer he would have been entitled to a place
on the sub-executive, since it was made up of three full time
officers (Foulkes, Haxell, and McLellan, the Assistant General
Secretary. all CP members), and two other EC members from the most
conveniently situated Divisions to Head Office. Under the new
arrangements the two EC members could be chosen from any Division.
The press claimed that this would allow the CP to retain its
control of the sub-executive if the two horne Divisions of the union
were to go anti-Communist, for they could now choose CP or pro-CP
EC members from any of the union's 10 Divisions.
The ETU's response
The press furore surrounding the Cannon - Frazer election and the
Special Rules Revision Conference reached its peak following the
release on 3 December 1957 of the union's first public statement
concerning the press allegations of the previous months. The press
release was the start of an offensive by the ETU leadership that
lasted several months. The ETU's reponse to their critics was
essentially twofold. Firstly, they attempted to refute the specific
allegations levelled at the union. Secondly, they explained the
"anti-ETU stunt" in terms of a generalised attack on the whole
trade union movement, arguing that the press's alleged concern
with democracy in the ETU was merely a cover for a political
assault on a trade union whose political stance and industrial
record were an open affront to everythi ng that the "capi ta 1 i st
press" held dear. Let them get away with attacking the ETU, they
argued, and every trade union would be under threat.
53
(1) The uniQn's respQnse tQ specific allegatiQns Qf malpractice
TWQ majQr pQints were made by the ETU leadership here: (a) that all
the branch vQtes that had been disqualified had been dQne SQ
cQnstitutiQnally under the rules Qf the uniQn; and (b) that even if
the vct.ea of the 8 disqualified branches had been a Ll owed Frazer
WQuld still have been the victQr. In their 3 December statement the
uniQn said that the investigatiQn intQ the Mitcham and LSE branches
had revealed a whQle number Qf breaches Qf rules, and that in the
face Qf such evidence they had nQ alternative but tQ reject thQse
branch returns. Since at this time the relevant EC Minutes had nQt
been published, a detailed refutatiQn Qf the EC's findings was nQt
poess i b l e anyway. In the end, however , the Mitcham and LSE branch
cQmmittees accepted the EC's findings, althQugh Les CannQn and SQme
individual branch members refused t o accept them. (24) MQreQver,
the cQnstitutiQnal cQmplexities Qf the ETU rule bQQk were such that
the leadership CQuld quite legitimately find a technical
infringement Qf the rules in Virtually any Qf the 61 branches that
were invQlved in the CannQn - Frazer electiQn. What Patrick WintQur
wrQte of the present day leadership of the EETPU is a l ao true of
the CQmmunist leadership Qf the ETU in the 1950s: " ... the
appearance is Qf a uniQn leadership able tQ make the jack Qf spades
jump ou t of a r-uLe-ibock and squirt cider in a l mos t anyone t s ear. II
(25) By virtue Qf its cQntrQI Qf the uniQn machinery the leadership
can, in mQst instances, interpret the rules tQ its Qwn advantage.
Or as Max Weber put it, cQntrQI Qf the bureaucratic structure " gQe s
hand in hand with the cQncentratiQn Qf the material means Qf
management in the hands of the master. II (26) But in this instance
the weight Qf evidence did seem tQ justify the disqualificatiQn Qf
the returns Qf the Mitcham and LSE branches. The Qther 6 branches
accepted the Executive Counc i I decisiQn tQ disqualify their
returns.
In Qrder tQ challenge the result Qf the CannQn Frazer
electiQn a branch appeal WQuid have tQ have had the suppQrt Qf 10%
Qf the membership. If it gained this suppQrt the questiQn Qf a re-
electiQn CQuld have been put tQ a ballQt Qf the entire membership
Qr a cQnference Qf the uniQn. Of CQurse, the appeals Qf the Mitcham
and LSE branches never gQt this far, but even if they had it seems
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most unlikely that they would have secured the support of 10% of
the membership. The reason being that the ETU leadership had
repeatedly suggested that even if the disqualified branch votes had
been included <and remember that two of the disqualified branches
returned maj ori ty votes for Frazer) the result of the election
would have been no different - Frazer would still have been the
victor. This repeated assertion completely undermined the press's
case that Les Cannon had been cheated of his victory. On top of
this, some of the media coverage of the ETU served to rally support
for the Communist leadership rather than undermine it. A Panorama
programme presented by Woodrow Wyatt on December 9, 1957 was a
case in point.
Woodrow Wyatt tells us that the Panorama programme was "a
devastating exposure of how the Communists had just defrauded Les
Cannon ... of his victory". Wyatt interviewed a number of ETU members
with their faces hidden from the cameras:
"The fear in their voices made the more
convincing their description of how they had
watched Communist officials falsifying the
election returns and disqualifying votes for
Les Cannon." (27)
Wyatt exaggerates, since the ETU members on the programme were not
that specific. One interview went like this:
Q. How long have you been a member of the
Union?
A. Twenty three years.
Q. Do you think that the Executive Council has
behaved correctly over the business of the
election of Cannon and Frazer?
A. I don't think so. They seem to have put bias
in favour of Frazer. They don't seem to want
Cannon there for some reason or other, and I
think under the circumstances and the whole way
the ballot has been conducted they should have
called a fresh ballot and given the members the
right to vote. It has been done in the past,
why not this time? (28)
No specific details of
assertions that it was
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ballot-rigging were given, just general
a standard practice employed by the ETU
leadership:
Q. How long have you been a branch officer?
A. Four years.
Q. And how many people usually vote in your
branch?
A. Well it will be something like fifty out of
a thousand.
Q. Do you think that is the average for most
ETU branches where the votes aren't fiddled?
A. I should say, knowing what I do about
apathy, it is just about the correct
percentage.
Q. Do you think the members of the union want
to have a Communist-controlled Executive?
A. Oh, no. They certainly don't want to have 'a
Communist-controlled Executive Council at all.
Q. Well, why do they have it now?
A. Well, as I said before, it is just general
apathy, that is all. They won't vote.
Q. But what is the guarantee that their votes
will be honestly dealt with when they have
recorded them
A. Well I couldn't give any guarantee where
that is concerned at all. But I would say that
if the maj ori ty of the members did vote it
would be useless to even try to fiddle it."
(29)
Ballot-rigging, apathy and fear of Communist union officials
were the reasons for the continuing domination of the Communist
Party in the ETU, according to the ETU members interviewed by
Woodrow Wyatt. Wyatt informs us that his piece on the union "was a
national sensation", but Les Cannon's biographers tell us that the
over-dramatization "offended a good many non-Communist members of
the Union, who felt the Union's affairs were just being 'blown
up'to make a good TV show (and) antagonized a number of people who
might otherwise have been on Les's side". (30)
The ETU immediately demanded an apology from the BBC. In a
widely publicised letter to Sir Ian Jacob, the BBC Director
General, Frank Foulkes said that the BBe was lending itself to a
campaign of "vilification... designed to horrify the British public
into believing lies and innuendoes about this union". The letter
goes on to deny any irregularities in the union's electoral
procedure and concludes:
"Whatever figures other people may have, in
this office we have the actual voting returns
from each of the 61 branches and we repeat that
if every branch mentioned in the broadcast and
by the press as having their votes disqualified
were to be included then it would make no
difference to the result." (31)
This was the union leadership's trump card. They had first stated
it in their 3 December statement which also received extensive
press coverage:
"It is not without interest to note that had
all the votes of the branches mentioned been
accepted, it would not have made any difference
to the resu I t of the ballot." (32)
However, Olga Cannon claims that the union's trump card was in
actual fact the product of a deft sleight of hand by the ETU
leadership:
"We suffered... from an unhappy error in the
Press reporting. For some reason only seven of
the eight branches invalidated after Les's
election were mentioned in the newspapers and
on radio ... it became a serious embarrassment to
us, for it enabled Haxell to circulate a
statement that if all the invalidated branches
mentioned in the Press and on Radio and
television were included, the result of the
ballot would not have been affected. If,
however the eighth invalidated branch (Walton
and Hersham, which had voted heav i Ly in Les's
favour) had been included, the result would
have been vi tally different Les would
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undeniably have won. The Communists exploited
this omission to the full." (33)
Two things need to be said about this statement of Olga
Cannon's. Firstly, when interviewed on lTV's This Week programme on
December 14, 1957, Frank Foulkes was reported by the Daily Worker
as saying that
"even if all the votes which had been
invalidated in the election had been counted,
won thenot haveMY. Cannon would still
election. II (34)
So in this instance there was no mention of the rider, as mentioned
in the press and on radio and television. With or without the
rider the public statements confirmed ETU members in the belief
that Cannon would have lost anyway. Secondly, why wasn't this
sleight of hand, if that was what it was, exposed by the Cannon
camp? They could have done this quite simply by publishing the
voting figures for the eight disqualified branches. The simple
answer seems to be that they did not have the voting figures for
the 8 branches, and if that was the case why were they so certain
that Les Cannon had been cheated of his victory by some 300 votes?
This view is confirmed by the fact that in neither of the two
unofficial circulars sent to all 675 branches of the union by Les
Cannon, nor in the numerous press articles, especially by Woodrow
Wyatt in the New Statesman, were the voting figures of the 8
branches ever disclosed. (35) So where did the figure of 300 come
from? Presumably from information given to Cannon by his supporters
in the 8 branches.
However, in a letter to the New Statesman on 22 February 1958,
Woodrow Wyatt revised the scope of Les Cannon's lost victory:
"It has not been denied that if all the votes
had been counted in the election in Division
No.9 for a seat on the Executive Council, Mr
Cannon, the non-Communist, would have won by 35
votes. As the result of the disqualification of
six branches that voted in favour of Cannon
and, with reluctance, of only two which voted
in favour of the Communist, the Communist
candidate was declared elected." (36)
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Of course, it had been continually denied by the ETU leadership
that if all the returns had been allowed Cannon would have been the
victor. That was one of the main planks of their case. And the ETU
leadership were quick to pick up on the new maj ori ty by which
Cannon had supposedly won: "a somewhat modest claim compared with
the national daily which asserted on October 7 last that the
maj ori ty was 300 votes! " (37) What is so puzzling about Wyatt's
letter is the impression that it gives of a detailed knowledge of
the disqualified branches' voting figures without revealing the
obvious - a breakdown of the voting returns of the 8 branches. The
very fact that such ardent opponents of the ETU leadership could
not produce convincing evidence of their claim only served, as Olga
Cannon recalls,
"to convince a lot of ETU members that the
Press really was making a fuss about nothing,
and that the anti -Communist campaign was
precisely as alleged a smear campaign
designed to injure a militant trade union."
(38 )
At no time did the ETU reveal the voting figures for the 8
branches, even though Foulkes had said on the This Veek programme
that they would be published in full. It was not until the 1961
ballot-rigging trial that it was revealed that if all the votes
from the 8 disqualified branches had been allowed then Cannon would
have beaten Frazer by 34 votes. (39) The CP leadership of the union
had been lying, but the Cannon camp had been unable to prove it
conclusively. However, it did not follow that the Cannon - Frazer
election had been rigged, for the branch disqualifications had been
consti tutional and eventually accepted by the two branches that
appealed against them. What the Cannon - Frazer episode illustrates
quite well is the bureaucratic methods that the leadership employed
to defeat their opponents. Their actions, as we have already noted,
were always justified by recourse to the rules of the union, a
practice that would not have surprised Max Weber:
" ... the continued exercise of every
domination ... always has the strongest need of
self-justification through appealing to the
principles of legitimation ...
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The "validity" of a power of command may be
expressed ... in a system of consciously made
rational rules <which may be either agreed upon
or imposed from above> ... " (40)
Rational rules are however very often open to a flexible
interpretation. Take the case of two of the branches that voted in
the Cannon - Frazer election:
"One, known as Reading Branch, had returned 50
votes for Les as against 12 for the Communist.
This branch was disqualified, the General
Secretary observing in a letter to the branch:
"though your difficulties are appreciated, your
branch return cannot be accepted". The other t
known as Reading Supply Branch, had returned 80
votes for Les against 137 for his opponent.
Although this branch had sent in its election
returns two days late, its breach of rule was
dismissed with a mild reprimand: "Your ballot
returns will be accepted on this occasion but
they must be returned in accordance with rule
in future." <41>
Cri ticism of the way the ETU handled the Cannon - Frazer
election came also from the left as well as the right. For example,
Peter Fryer, correspondent for the Daily Worker, who resigned from
the paper and was sUbsequently expelled from the CP following the
suppression of his dispatches from Hungary in 1956, wrote an
article in the Trotskyite Newsletter on 14 December 1957
critical of the bureaucratic manoeuvres of the ETU leadership.
Fryer's article, which was to be issued in pamphlet form in January
1958 under the title, Defend the ETUf - Against Fleet Street and
King Street, stated that it was "common knowledge in the trade
union movement that there is less democracy inside the ETU now than
there was before the stalinists took control ten years ago". In
their fight against Cannon, said Fryer, the ETU leadership had
abandoned their socialist principles. Instead of fighting the
right-wing in the union openly and politically, "Haxell and Foulkes
fought with the weapon of procedure". A genuine communist or
socialist leadership, he continued, "would not have hesitated to
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hold a fresh election instead of skulking behind the rule book".
Fryer suggested that a national committee of inquiry,
democratically elected by the rank-and-file of the ETU, should be
set up to investigate the entire machinery of the union and all the
allegations of malpractice. (42) As we shall see, the ETU did set
up a Committee of Inqu i r y in 1959, but it was far from being the
type of national committee that Fryer was advocating.
(2) "An attack on the whole trade union movement. "
The ETU leadership argued that Les Cannon and his followers, aided
and abetted by the "capitalist press", were bent on causing
dissension in the ETU at a time when maximum unity was needed in
the movement to repel the attacks being made by the Tory
Government. Frank Foulkes put it like this at the union's Special
Rules Revision Conference in November:
" ... certain members of this Union have been
si tting down with the enemies of the worki ng-
class and inventing lies and innuendoes in
order to weaken this Union and sow discord
amongst the membership, and weaken the Union's
fighting strength on this, the eve of the
Government's promised onslaught on the Lt v i ng
standards of the whole of the working-class of
this country ...
Anyone wi thin our movement gu i Lty of creating
division within the movement at this important
time is doing an unforgivable dis-service to
the working-class, and is sacrificing his
family by assisting the Tory Government to make
good the threats they have made." (43)
J.S.Coleman has dubbed the type of approach employed here by
Foulkes as the "here-come-the-saboteurs" strategy, which attempts
to forge a link between political opposition in a trade union and
the interests of the employers or Government. (44) At a time of
battle with the employers or the Government, so the argument goes,
the abuse of union democracy by a discontented minority is
tantamount to collaboration with the class enemy. Calls for unity,
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then, can be used merely as means to neutralise or marginalise
opposition groupings in a trade union. And this was precisely the
line the ETU leadership were taking, with some success, against Les
Cannon's opposition grouping. They also argued that the attack on
the ETU's internal democracy was just a cover for a wholesale
political attack, not only on the Communist Party, but on the whole
trade union movement. This was clearly expressed in a major article
on the press campaign in the union's journal, Electron, in January
1958:
"Using allegations that there was 'corruption',
'the whiff of fear' in the Union and election
'rigging' they all claimed to be staunch
defenders of democracy. But they did not waste
any words on abusing this organisation before
they came to the point. It was the whole trade
union movement which was the target." (45)
How true was the ETU's claim?
A Gallup Poll in the spring of 1955 revealed that a large
maj ori ty of people felt that the Government had been too soft in
dealing with the trade unions over the issue of strikes, and this
was true of Labour supporters as well. Henry Pelling tells us that
there was no shortage of advice to be found in the newspapers on
how the Government should have dealt with the strikes of 1955:
"Some thought that there should be legal
provision for a ballot of union members before
any strike took place. This, of course, would
not prevent unofficial strikes, but there were
those also who thought that unofficial strikes
should be declared illegal ... Another not
unrelated suggestion was that there should be a
system of compulsory arbitration for all
disputes. Finally, there were the more cautious
cri tics who urged the appointment of a
commission of inquiry into the trade unions."
(46)
But the industrial relations "problem" continued to get worse.
In each of the years 1955-8 the annual number of stoppages due to
strikes or lockouts was higher than before 1955, and with one
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exception the annual number of working days "lost" as a result was
higher than in any year since 1944. (47) In the year of the Cannon-
Frazer debacle, 1957, there were 8,412,000 days "lost' through
strikes, compared with 2,083,000 the year before. Most of the days
had been "lost" early in 1957 due to the strikes in engineering and
shipbuilding, strikes that had forced substantial wage increases
from the employers and finally scuppered any hopes that the
Government might have about a period of voluntary wage restraint.
This demonstration of the unions' latent power, writes James
Cronin,
"impressed the rank-and-file of the unions as
much as the employers, for while the bosses had
long ago sensed the altered balance of power,
the workers had not been so sure ...
With the gradual fading of the old, cautious
leadership and the awakening of workers to
their new-found bargaining leverage and to
higher expectations, prospects for industrial
peace dimmed. When the dimensions of the change
were fully revealed in 1957, the outcome was a
major upsurge of strikes and a massive increase
in local, shop steward organization." (48)
And, of course, the Communist Party was depicted as being behind
much of the industrial trouble, which was seen as part and parcel
of their overall strategy that aimed "at the complete capture of
the British trade union movement". (49) So even before the Cannon-
Frazer furore broke trade unions were in the midst of an extremely
hostile political climate. The allegations of ballot-rigging in the
ETU (and the AEU) only added fuel to the fire, and following the
release of the ETU's 3 December statement on the press allegations
fresh demands for the Government to investigate not only the ETU
but also the way in which all trade unions conducted their affairs
were raised daily in the press.
Early in December 1957, F. W. Farey-Jones, Conservative MP for
Watford, asked the Prime Minister if he would move for the
appointment of a tribunal under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence)
Act 1921, into the recent conduct of the affairs of the ETU. Harold
MacMillan replied that there would not be an investigation into the
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affairs of the ETU at this stage. The Spectator of 6 December
complained that the whole tone of the ETU's statement was defiant,
and concluded that there was "no chance of the Union reforming
itself in the immediate future" and therefore there was "no
al ternati ve ... to intervention by Parliament". The Spectator agreed
with Farey-Jones that a investigating tribunal into the affairs of
the ETU was sensible, but argued that immediate change in the law
should take place that would compel all trade unions to have their
elections conducted by the Registrar of Friendly Societies. A
similar proposal was echoed in The Recorder of December 7:
"The ETU affair is at long last leading
reponsible opinion towards the conviction that
if what trade unions do affects the rest of the
community, the community has the right through
the Government to regulate the way in which
trade unions are to be conducted... All that is
required is a simple law making it obligatory
for every organization with more than, say, 500
subscribing members, to have its chief officers
and officials elected by secret ballot under
the control of an independent Returning
Officer."
The Economist of December 7 was concerned not just with question of
trade union electoral reform, but with "the whole question of trade
union law and privilege, not simply the case of the ETU". And the
New Statesman of the same date warned:
"there are already signs, both in parliament
and the press, that 'boss-rule' can provide the
Tories with an excuse for legislation which
would gravely damage the trade union movement."
Thirty years later, after eight years of trade union "reform"
under Margaret Thatcher's Conservati ve Government, the arguments
and proposals of the late 1950s are more than familiar. But, of
course, there is a maj or difference between the debate on trade
union reform in the 1950s and the 1980s; in the latter period the
Conservative Government did introduce legislation that gravely
damaged the unions, while in the 1950s MacMillan's Government did
not. For in the 1950s the "post-war consensus" between the trade
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unions and government had, despite the industrial battles, not yet
broken down, and was not to do so, according to Hugh Clegg until
1971. (50) On the trade union side the consensus meant above all
else a continuation of what Alan Flanders has termed "The Tradition
of Voluntarism" - essentially the non-interference of the State in
the collective-bargaining process and the internal affairs of the
unions. (51) Even after the influential Inns of Court Conservative
and Unionist Society published A Giant's Strength in the wake of
the 1958 bus strike, in which they argued that the unions had
become "over-mighty subj ects" and that legal measures shou ld be
taken against them, the Government still refused to act. (52)
We can see then, that there was a great deal of truth in the
ETU's claim that the attack on them was also an attack on the whole
trade union movement. Taken with the ETU leadership's constant
assertions that Cannon would not have won the election even had the
invalidated branch votes been counted, it is not altogether
surprising that many rank-and-file members of the union considered
the press campaign as a smear campaign and supported their leaders.
Victory for the ETU leadership?
By spring of 1958 the whole unfortunate affair surrounding the ETU
seemed to be over. If not quite a victory for the ETU leadership,
they could feel satisfied that they had at least limited the damage
to their reputation, and that a substantial number of trade
unionists both inside and outside of the union accepted their case.
Before the spring calm however, there was a final flurry of press
interest in the union prompted by, as we have already mentioned, a
long article by Woodrow Wyatt in the New Statesman in January.
Wyatt I s article, entitled "The Case Against the ETU Leaders", was,
according to John Freeman, the future editor of the New Statesman,
" the effective brief to which many others subsequently worked."
(53) As we have said, there was nothing new in Wyatt's article, it
was merely a re-working of the material contained in The Peril in
Our Xidst and a reiteration of the allegations of malpractice
surrounding the Cannon- Frazer election. Its significance lay in
the fact that it brought together the maj or part of the evidence
against the ETU leadership since 1947 in compact form and at a time
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when the union was under intense pressure from many quarters.
However, according to Wyatt, there was a "new dimension" to the BTU
affair that the article brought out:
"It was becoming increasingly obvious that the
fraudulent take-over of the BTU was not the
work of a few wayward communists acting on
their own ini tiati ve, as the Communist Party
was later to pretend. It was a conspiracy
organized from the headquarters of the
Communist Party... " (54)
And, indeed, as we shall see, the 1961 trial was the first occasion
that the law of conspiracy was applied to a trade union election.
The New St.etieemsn article and a subsequent letter by Wyatt
drew a response from the BTU in the form of a pamphlet - The ETU
Replies to the New StatesJ1JB.n. They had been forced to publish their
reply in pamphlet form, said the BTU, because the editor of the New
StatesJ1JB.n refused to print their 4,500 word reply (the same length
as Wyatt's article) on the grounds that he was only prepared to
allocate the union space for a 1,200 word reply, which they
refused. Like Wyatt's article the union's reply was a re-working of
their previous pamphlet, The Union's Reply to the Press Attacks,
and the statements they had made concerning the Cannon - Frazer
election. At the same time the union published another pamphlet,
The Facts about the Press Campaign, which was concerned largely
with defending their actions in the Cannon Frazer election,
arguing that the actions they had taken were in complete accordance
with the rules of the union. By the time these two pamphlets were
published the press interest in the ETU had begun to subside and by
March the furore surrounding the ETU seemed to be over. Les Cannon
attempted to resuscitate the campaign inside the union by issuing
another unofficial circular under the title "The Skeletons are
Rattling in the Cupboard", but with little success. However, an
interest in the affairs of the ETU was to be rekindled by two
events that took place later on in the year.
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The 1958 TUC
The first event that put the ETU back under the glare of publicity
concerned Les Cannon. In the summer of 1958 Les Cannon was charged
with "bringing discredit on a member of the union", as a result of
which he was not issued with his delegate I s credentials for the
September TUC, to which he had been elected. A further charge of
making "unauthorized press statements and radio and television
interviews" was also levelled at Cannon after he had "gone public"
on the eve of the TUC Congress.
Early in 1958 Les Cannon stood for the post of London Area
Official, and he also stood in the election to choose the union's
delegates for the September TUC. Both ballots were taken at the
same time, at the March quarterly meeting, and the results were
published in the Executive Council minutes in June:
Full-Time Official, Area No.2?
Cannon, L
Nash, E.A.
Symms, T.J.A
1958 TUC
Cannon, L
2,856
608
3,951
9,286 (national ballot) (55)
Cannon did very well in both elections. In the London election
he was up against the EC and CP backed candidate, while in the TUC
ballot he polled the eighth highest vote in the rank-and-file
section out of 43 candidates (9 of which made up the rank-and-file
delegation, the other part of the delegation was made up of full-
time officials). On the night of the ballot Cannon attended the
meeting of the London Electronic Engineers No.2 branch:
"As he sat watching the scrutineers open the
envelopes handed to them by individual members,
it struck him how few people there were,
considering the high number of votes usually
recorded by that particular branch. Then, in
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the middle of the count, the branch secretary.
a Communist Party member, came across wi th a
hold-all bag, so filled with ballot envelopes
that he had difficulty in getting them out as
he undid the zip fastener of the bag.
Eventually he piled a heap of envelopes on the
table, and Les noticed that comparatively few
of them bore a postmark. There and then he
decided to challenge the secretary. He got up,
quoted the rules, formally 'cast suspicion' on
whether the votes were honestly cast, and said
that he was going to report the facts to Head
Office and insist on an investigation similar
to that carried out at the Mitcham branch ...
Needless to say the Communist branch secretary
was acquitted, and he then proceeded to charge
Les with bringing discredit on a member of the
Union." (56)
Les Cannon was informed that the charge against him would be
heard by the Area sub-committee on 15 July. However Cannon was
unable to attend because of domestic difficulties and asked for a
postponement. But on 28 August he received a letter informing him
that the Area sub-committee had found him guilty of the charge and
as a result he should, pending an appeal, be disqualified from
holding office for five years and fined five pounds. (57) The next
day a letter arrived at Cannon's home address from Frank Haxell
informing him that because of his conviction he would no longer be
entitled to attend the TUC as a delegate of the union, but to avoid
this letter Cannon had already left for the TUC in Bournemouth.
On the eve of the TUC Congress Cannon held a maj or press
conference where he read out a prepared statement. In the statement
Cannon said that the "vicious penalty" imposed on him was the
culmination of eighteen months of "consistent provocation" by the
Communist Party inside the ETU to discredit him. Moreover, said
Cannon, the decision to penalise him would not have been initiated
by the CP inside the union without the approval of the National ETU
Advisory Committee of the Communist Party, which in turn would have
received the approval of the Political Committee of the Communist
68
Party. (58) In other words, Cannon was saying that the internal
democracy of the union was being overridden, and that the decision
whether or not to penalise him was decided not by rank-and-file ETU
members but by CP members inside the union advised by the Communist
Party nationally. At the 1961 trial the very existence of a
National ETU AdVisory Committee made up of leading CP members both
inside and outside of the union was denied repeatedly by the ETU
leadership.
As well as losing his appeal against the Area sub-committee
decision, Cannon was now also charged and proven guilty of making
unauthorised press statements and radio and television interviews.
(59) Yet the extensive press coverage, not to mention the radio and
television interviews, that his dramatic eve of Congress press
conference received served once again to put the internal affairs
of the ETU back in the spotlight. (60) The second event to rekindle
interest in the affairs of the ETU was what became known as the
"Jarrowaffair".
The "Jarrow Affair"
In the same month as the TUC Congress was being held in
Bournemouth, elections for the position of Area President were
taking place in all twenty-nine of the union's Areas bar one. When
the results were published in the November Executive Council
minutes the result of the Area No.5 election was missing. The
explanation given was that
"as a result of alleged breaches of rule,
enquiries were being made into the way in which
Jarrow Branch had conducted the ballot for Area
President ... " (61)
It transpired that the Jarrow branch scrutineers thought it
suspicious that of the 63 ballot papers returned by post, 61 of the
envelopes bore exactly the same type of stamp and cancellation mark
- namely, an Empire Games 3d stamp bearing the cancellation mark
"lOam 22.9.58. Jarrow". Further, all the 61 suspect ballot papers
were cast in favour of one candidate, R.B Carr. Carr turned out to
be not only the Jarrow branch secretary, so all the ballot papers
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from Head Office would have passed through his hands, but also a
member of the Communist Party.
As part of its inquiry the Executive Council sent out a
questionnaire to the 279 members of the Jarrow branch who were
entitled to vote in the election. From the 257 questionnaires that
were returned only 6 had returned their ballot papers through the
post. When the EC met in December they had no al ternative but to
disqualify the Jarrow Branch returns. A special sub-committee was
then appointed to investigate the circumstances of the Jarrow
ballot. (62) In the meantime the result of the Area No.5 election
was declared with Carr coming bottom of the poll with only 20
votes. Even if the 61 fraudulent ballot papers had been accepted,
he would have still be far short of the new Area President's vote
of 329. (63)
It was not until October 1959 that the sub-committee submitted
its report. The report admitted that the
"total number of ballot papers forwarded to
members was 274, out of which 201 state they
did not vote. The maximum possible vote,
therefore, was 73. The number of ballot papers
received by the scrutineers and recorded on the
Scrutineers Return Form was 137, that is, 64
more than the maximum possible vote."
What about R.S. Carr's involvement?
"The Committee have to report that it has not
been possible, however, to establish whether or
not the 61 ballot papers received by post
(which gave rise to the Inquiry) had been
posted by individual members, or whether a
member or members had obtained ballot papers or
collected ballot papers from other members,
marked them and forwarded them to the Branch
Secretary." (64)
And that was the end of the matter until the 1961 trial -
well, almost the end. One of the Jarrow Branch scrutineers, R.
Fenwick, was charged with making an unauthorised press statement.
The offending statement appeared in The Times in September 1958,
and Fenwick was on several occasions advised by the General
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Secretary that in his own interest he should endeavour to seek a
wi thdrawal and an apology from The Times. Fenwick refused. The
article in The Times was very brief (two short paragraphs) and was
buried at the bottom of page 10. It simply referred to the 61
suspect envelopes and quoted Fenwick as saying:
"A full scale investigation is taking place
into certain aspects of the ballot. I have sent
a detailed report to my Head Office in London."
(65)
That was it! This nitpicking over the smallest infringement of
union rules could hardly be in starker contrast to the "whitewash"
surrounding the dubious activities of the branch secretary of the
Jarrow branch. However, the "Jarrow Affair" seems to have been the
straw that broke the camel's back as far as the TUC were concerned,
for in December 1958 the TUC began to press the ETU to give a
better account of itself in the face of renewed press criticisms.
The ETU and the TUC
What was to turn out to be a voluminous correspondence between the
ETU and the TUC began in December 1958 and continued until the
union was expelled from the TUC in 1961. (66) The first letter the
General Council of the TUC sent to the ETU asked the union to
comment on "the observations made publicly about the conduct of the
Union's affairs" and in particular the "public allegations of the
manipulation of elections and of the influence of the Communist
Party". (67) These allegations had been made, as we have seen, by
Les Cannon and taken up by the press. Similar accusations had also
been made by BTU member Mark Young, who had been expelled from the
Communist Party in July 1958 for "political acti vi ty incompatible
wi th party membership". Young had written a long letter to the New
statesman in August 1958 which claimed amongst other things that
the "controlling CP group rigs elections" and that the "Communist
Party maintains its control of the union through factions called
'advisory committees at the national and local level". (68) The BTU
replied to the TUC that it was the "press propaganda" that made "it
appear that there is widespread public concern about elections in
this Union", and that the union had already made available "the
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whole of the facts in connection with the allegations". Concerning
the second allegation the union said that it was "not controlled by
the Communist Party or any political party or by any outside body".
(69) The TUC's next move was to push for a more detailed rebuttal
of the allegations being made against the union by ex-Communists
such as Les Cannon and Mark Young, and in particular they pressed
the ETU to instigate legal proceedings against those journals and
newspapers that the union claimed had smeared them. Under
increasing pressure the Executive Council decided in April to
appoint a Committee of Inquiry to look in detail at the allegations
levelled at them , and this, they hoped, would satisfy the TUC.
The Committee was made up of two EC members and a National
Officer, all of whom were members of the Labour Party. The
Committee's terms of reference were to " inquire into all the
allegations and to report and, if necessary, to make
recommendations". (70) It delivered its report to the Executive
Council on the 9 June 1959. Nothing new came out of the report: it
unequivocally supported the actions of the Executive Council. Les
Cannon and Mark Young, it said, had "abused their democratic
rights" and the Executive Council had been "excessively lenient in
connection with the continued activi ties of these members" .
Addressing the main charge of Communist control of the union the
report stated:
"No evidence has been produced to show that the
Communist Party has interfered in the affairs
of the Uni cn ; nor was there any evidence to
show that even if there had been such
interference, it would or could have affected
the democratic processes by which our Union
elects its officers and officials and carries
out its business, including the important
matter of conducting appeals." (71)
Not suprisingly Les Cannon and his followers were not exactly
enamoured with the report. In an unofficial circular to all
branches of the union he said: "Never before has Britain witnessed
the accused appointing the accused to inquire into the accusers."
(72) Nor were the TUC General Council satisfied with the union's
findings. They received the report on the 26 August, just before
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the start Df the 1959 TUC CDngress, and informed the CDngress that
the ETU had still nDt dealt adequately with the tWD pDints first
made by the General CDuncil that the ETU shDuld cDnsider
instituting legal proceedings against those newspapers and jDurnals
that had accused the un I on of malpractice, and the need for a
precise denial that the union's principal officers were associated
with CDmmunist Party AdvisDry CDmmittees. Electron cDmplained that
the impressiDn was being given that the whDle trade union mDvement
was meeting in BlackpoDl fDr the 1959 TUC fDr the sDle purpose Df
discussing the affairs of the ETU. (73)
By December the press campaign had escalated tD such an extent
that Electron was nDW claiming that the "techniques of the late
unlamented Dr.Goebbles and SenatDr McCarthy" were being used
against the union. (74) The increasing pressure Dn the union was
caused by the General Counc i I sending out a circular to all
affiliated unions which said that they had decided nDt tD engage in
any further discussiDns with the present ETU leadership. This they
said was because the uniDn had cDnsistently evaded dealing with the
charges made against them, and that this cou Ld on l y be because
"there is much substance in these charges" and they are "unable
specifically and unequivDcally to deny them". (75) As it turned DUt
onl y three morit hs were t o pass bef or-e the TUC were yet again in
cDrrespondence with the ETU. The reaSDn fDr the re-opening Df the
dialDgue was yet another cDntrDversy concerning the cDnduct of an
electiDn in the uniDn that had taken place near the end of 1959.
TWD important electiDns were held in the ETU in the last
quarter of 1959. The first was between Frank Fou Lke s and Bill
BlairfDrd fDr the pDsition Df President. Frank Chapple recalls:
"The RefDrm GrDup fielded Bill Blairford, a
Scottish ex-CDmmunist who had left the Party
Dver Hungary but, despite the hard work we put
in, FDulkes gDt back with a majDrity of nearly
3000. We were sure it was anDther fraud, but we
cou l dnt; prDve how it was done ... " (76)
Olga CannDn, hDwever, says it was "an honest ballot", but
"It shook the ETU leadership tD find that their
mDst popular man, DppDsed by a virtual unknDwn,
came SD c l ose t o Los i ng . They knew what t o
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expect in the forthcoming election for the
General Secretary, and prepared for it." (77)
It was the conduct of this election, between Frank Haxell and
John Byrne, that was to cause two members of the ETU to issue writs
against their own union alleging fraud and ballot-rigging. This was
the beginning of a series of events that were eventually to lead to
Divorce Court Four at the Royal Courts of Justice in the Strand and
the famous 1961 "ballot-rigging trial".
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CHAPTER THREE
THE TRIAL AND ITS AFTERMATH
The Byrne - Haxell election December 1959
On 6 February 1960, the result of the Byrne - Haxell election for
the position of General Secretary was announced to the Executive
Council of the union by the Assistant General Secretary, Robert
McLennan.
John Byrne
Frank Haxell
Majority
18,577.
19,611.
1,034.
Jack Frazer then moved "that the scrutineers' return be accepted
and that Bro.F.L.Haxell be declared elected General Secretary for a
period of five years." Frank Foulkes, the union's President, said,
"all those in favour? against?", and the motion was carried by 8
votes to 3. There was some argument about the number of
disqualified branches, but this was qUickly dealt with. Frank
Foulkes then moved next business and that, it was thought, was the
end of the matter. (1) In fact the returns of 109 branches had been
disqualified, of which 106, it was later to transpire, had voted
for John Byrne. As the news of "irregularities" in the Byrne -
Haxell election began to filter out, the press once again descended
on the union.
Public interest in the affairs of the Electricians' union was
further heightened when dissident members of the union appeared on
a Panorama programme on 15 February, where they complained about
irregularities in recent elections in the union. (2) The follOWing
week Frank Foulkes appeared on the programme to put the
leadership's case. John Freeman, the deputy editor of the New
Statesman, who conducted the Panorama interview, suggested to
Frank Foulkes that 100 branches had had their returns disqualified,
but Foulkes refused to give a straight answer. A year later, during
the course of the "ballot-rigging" trial, Foulkes insisted that on
the evening of the Panorama programme he did not know how many
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branches had beeen disqualified. It hardly seems credible that the
President of the union did not know how many branches had been
disqualified, especially as this was the central question the press
and the opposition were asking. (3) The ETU responded to the
Panorama interview in an editorial in the March edition of
Electron, headed "Trial by BBC". But the editorial evaded the
substanti ve issues that the programme raised, and instead
concentrated on the McCarthyi te "process of character
assassination" employed by the BBC. (4) While this was a fair
point, it did nothing to alleviate the suspicion that the
leadership were involved in a cover up.
Ironically, some press articles put up a better defence case
for the ETU leadership than they themselves did. For example, an
article that appeared in the Financial Times on the very day that
Foulkes was to appear on the Penoreme programme argued that, "from
the industrial point of view... the only surprising feature of
Nr.Haxell's re-election is that his declared majority was as small
as 1,034 votes". In terms of improving their members' wages and
condi tions, said the Financial Times, the ETU leadership II are
clearly successful", and this was why "there is no evidence of
widespread discontent in the union over the allegedly infamous
conduct of its Communist hierarchy". (5) Most of the press, however,
was not so magnanimous. Just five days after Foulkes' Panorama
appearance, the New StatesJIJan summarized the case of "the opponents
of the present leadership":
"The election, they claim, was rigged in two
principal ways: first, the votes of an
unprecedented number of branches were
disallowed on the ground that they were
dispatched to union headquarters after the
latest date permissible under the rules; and it
is asserted that the great maj ori ty of these
di sa11 owed votes were for Mr. Byrne. Secondl y ,
they claim, some Communists in individual
branches have exploited the known apathy of
many of their fellow unionists (the total vote
in this crucial election was only 16 per cent)
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by faking or forging postal votes in their
name." (6)
The smouldering scandal surrounding the Byrne Haxell
election prompted the General Council of the TUC to resume its
correspondence with the ETU leadership. In a letter dated 24
February 1960, the General Council informed the ETU that they
intended to resume their examination of the allegations made
against the union, and that they intended to proceed by
investigating the union under Rule 13 of Congress Rules and
Standing Orders. Rule 13 empowers the General Council to
investigate the conduct of an affiliated organisation whose
activities "may be detrimental to the interests of the trade union
movement" (the same Rule that has been invoked against the present
day leadership of the EETPU). There followed, on 14 Karch, a
meeting between Frank Haxell and Frank Foulkes and the General
Council's Finance and General Purposes Committee (F&GPC), at which
it seemed to be understood by both parties that the ETU should
either:
(1) Institute legal proceedings against one or
other of those who had accused the union of
malpractices or,
(2) co-operate with the General Council in a
throughgoing inquiry into allegations made
against the union and its officers provided
that such an inquiry was conducted "within the
Movement". (7)
However, on 11 April the ETU informed the TUC that because Les
Cannon had instigated legal proceedings against the union (in
relation to the 1958 decision that barred him from office) they had
been "advised not to proceed with the alternatives" pending the
outcome of the proceedi ngs. (8) Not surprisingl y, the GC cou ld not
see why the Cannon writ prevented the ETU from arriving at a
decision on the two alternatives offered to them. On April 27 the
General Council sent the ETU an ultimatum:
" ... unless you inform the General Council by
Kay 18 next of the decision of your Executive
Council on the alternatives set out ... the
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Electrical Trades Union will be suspended from
membership of the Trades Union Congress." (9)
In reply the ETU said they were prepared to accept the suggestion
of an inquiry, but that they could not agree to it taking place
while the union was facing legal proceedings. The legal proceedings
now referred to, however, were not those instigated by Les Cannon,
but those being pressed by John Byrne and Frank Chapple in
connection with the disputed election for the General
Secretaryship. In view of the changed circumstances, the TUC agreed
that any further consideration of the ETU's affairs must be held
over until the result of the legal action.
On 9 May 1960, John Byrne and Frank Chapple issued the
following statement:
"We have decided to institute proceedings in an
attempt to redress the very serious grievances
of the members of the union. We are mindful of
the difficulties of the General Council of the
TUC in the protracted exchanges wi th the ETU
and appreciate that in the light of the lack of
cooperation from the leaders of the ETU they
might have no al ternati ve but to suspend the
union, leading to disaffiliation from the TUC
in September.
Unfortunately, this would deprive our members
of the prestige and privileges of affiliation
to Congress and would still leave all questions
unresolved. We are proceeding at this stage
because we believe that the very considerable
and important issues involved can only be
resolved in the High Court. We feel that the
membership will understand that we are left
wi th no al ternati ve but to act in this way."
00)
The General Secretary of the union informed the Executive
Council on May 14, 1960 that a writ had been served on the ETU and
sixteen of its members. The writ against the ETU was as follows:
(a) The Plaintiffs claim against all the
Defendants:
0) A Declaration that the purported election
in December 1959 of the Defendant Haxell as the
General Secretary of the Defendants Electrical
Trades Union was and is contrary to the Rules
of the said Union, ultra vires, illegal and
void.
(2) A Declaration that at the said election the
Plaintiff Byrne was validly elected General
Secretary of the Defendants Electrical Trades
Union.
(3) Alternatively to the Declaration claimed
under head (2) a Declaration that the
Defendants Electrical Trades Union are bound
forthwith to hold an election for the office of
General Secretary under the control and
supervision of members of other than the
personal Defendants and/ or on such terms and
subject to such provisions as the Court may
think fit to declare.
(4) Costs.
(5) Such further or other reliefs as to this
Honorable High Court may seem just.
(b) The Plaintiff Byrne also claims against all
the personal Defendants:
(1) Damages for conspiracy, by breaches of the
Rules of the Defendants Electrical Trades Union
and by unlawful and fraudulent practices and
devices, to prevent non-Communist members of
the said Union being elected or appointed to
offices or representative positions in the said
Union and to procure the election and
appointment of Communist members or other
candidates favoured by them thereto.
(2) Damages for breaches of contract contained
in the Rules of the Defendants Electrical
Trades Union. (1)
The stage was now set for the "ballot-rigging" trial.
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The Trial
The trial began on 17 April 1961, and within five minutes of its
opening there was an unexpected occurrence. Neil Lawson, the
counsel for the Defendants (the ETU), announced that they "did not
now seek to uphold the validity of the election, and agreed that a
new election must be held". The reasons given for this startling
pronouncement were twofold:
" ... first of all, that owing to mistakes made
by the branch secretaries in their returns to
the Head Office of the number of members
entitled to vote, a large number of papers were
issued by branch secretaries to persons who
were not entitled to vote, and secondly that a
substantial number of members who were entitled
to vote were not issued with ballot papers at
all."
Furthermore, continued Lawson, in the course of the election
scrutiny "irregularities occurred which make it impossible for the
Defendants to contend that the Rules were observed." (12) It seems
clear that the Communist leadership of the union hoped that a new
election would be ordered by the trial judge, Mr Justice Winn, and
that that would defuse the whole situation. The Plaintiffs (Byrne
and Chapple) counsel Gerald Gardiner would have none of this
though:
"What matters very much more, my Lord, is the
purpose for which the action has been brought,
namely that after due investigation in open
Court it may be decided whether or not the
elections in this Union have for some time been
rigged." (13)
Gerald Gardiner then proceeded to present the Plaintiffs'
case, which centred on three accusations:
(1) That the Defendants had conspired together,
by breaches of union Rules and by various
frauds, to prevent non-Communists from being
elected to any union office and to procure the
election of Communists.
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(2) The Defendants all belonged to Committees
of the Communist Party made up of members of
the ETU.
(3) They had rigged certain elections. (14)
How had they "rigged certain elections"? According to
Gardiner, the conspiracy (and this was the first time that the law
of conspiracy had been applied to a trade union election) involved
7 methods:
(1) By arranging that there should never be
more than one candidate offering himself for
election in any given position;
(2) By arranging who that candidate was to be;
(3) By ensuring that the candidate was proposed
by as many branches as possible;
(4) By sending "national officers" (employees
of the union) to branch meetings just before an
election, ostensibly on some official business,
but really to canvass for the Communist
candidate;
(5) By making trivial charges against prominent
non-Communists, so that they could be
disqualified from union office for a period of
years;
(6) By "disqualifying" non-Communist branches,
using the impossibly complicated Rules as a
source of reported irregularities in election
procedure, and condoning the same
irregularities at Communist ones;
(7) When all else failed, by altering the
returns of voting sent in by branches. (15)
In the 1959 election for the General Secretaryship this "racket was
carried just too far", said Gardiner. (16) The case that
oppositionists in the union were pressing then, was that the
rigging of the 1959 election was merely one example of a widespread
practice. Prove that the 1959 election had been rigged, they
reasoned, then it could be taken that other elections had also been
rigged.
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The trial had two central themes, then: firstly, the actual
methods by which the alleged conspiracy was carried out in the
Byrne Haxell election of December 1959; and, secondly, the
coordination of the alleged conspiracy by the Communist Party.
(1) How the 1959 election was rigged
Three main methods were said
printing of "surplus" ballot
alteration of branch returns;
branch returns.
to have been employed: (a) the
papers; (b) the falsification and
and (c) the disqualification of
(a) The printing of "surplus" ballot papers
So that they could complete the job on time, the Manchester
printers had always asked the ETU for an advanced estimate of how
many ballot papers they would require for any particular election.
Once the printers received the exact order from the ETU Head
Office, which was based on the actual number of members entitled to
vote as calculated by the branch secretaries, they would print more
ballot papers if required, and then dispatch the exact number of
ballot papers needed directly to the union's branch secretaries.
Any surplus ballot papers stayed at the print works and were
destroyed. The system had always been open to abuse, of course.
Head Office could, for example, quite easily inflate the number of
ballot papers needed for a particular branch, so that a sympathetic
branch secretary received "surplus" papers. For the Byrne - Haxell
election the process was the same, but with one very significant
modification.
Early in November 1959, the ETU's Office Manager, Robert
Oliver, visited the head of Express Printing, Manchester, Mr Swift,
to see about the printing of additional ballot papers for the Byrne
- Haxell election in December (although James Humphrey, a Communist
Party member, and the newly appointed Office Manager was in charge
of the conduct of the Byrne - Haxell election). Nothing odd in
that. What was odd though, was that subsequently Oliver asked Swift
to send the additional ballot papers, not directly to the branches
that required them, nor directly to the union's Head Office, but to
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St Pancras station, and that they should be marked "to be called
for". It was to transpire that the difference between the Head
Office estimate and the actual number of ballot papers required for
the election was 26,833, but instead of the printer destroying
them, Robert Oliver had arranged to have them dispatched to St
Pancras "to be called for". They were called for later in
November by James Humphrey, who took them to the union's Head
Office at Hayes and locked them away in a small office, the key of
which was held by him alone. (17)
That parcels of ballot papers had been sent to St Pancras
station was not denied by the ETU's defence counsel. Neil Lawson
actually gave the dates in November when the various parcels were
dispatched to St Pancras. (18) The question was, what were these
"surplus" ballot papers used for? As far as the prosecution was
concerned it was self evident: the ballot papers <which were all
marked with a branch code-mark) were to be sent to Communist
members of the union and if required used for fraudulent voting.
Humphrey's evidence did little to counter that strong suspicion.
Asked why he had ordered 26,833 ballot papers too many, he replied
that he could not give an adequate explanation. As for the reason
why the "surplus" ballot papers were sent to St Pancras station,
Humphrey explained that it was all to do with secrecy and security.
He wanted as few people as possible to know that there were so many
extra ballot papers at the union's Head Office for fear that they
might have fallen into the wrong hands and been used fraudulently,
and this was why they were not left at the printers' premises in
Manchester. (19)
It was not a very plausible defence, and the judge's verdict
reflected that fact:
"My judgement in this matter expressed in full
appreciation that it involves a grave finding
against Mr.Humphrey is that he deliberately
ordered excess quanti ties of ballots for
branches where he expected that fraudulent
votes could be registered, if need be for
Mr.Haxell, intending that the excess quantities
would be sent to Head Office or could be caused
earlier to be sent to branches."
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With regards to Frank Haxell's insistence when cross-examined that
he knew nothing of the "surplus" ballot papers the judge said:
"It is impossible for me to suppose that such a
scheme could be operated without the knowledge
and concurrence of Mr.Haxell ... I am wholly
convinced that Mr. Haxell not only knew that
surplus ballots had been brought to Head Office
but caused them to be there intending that
fraudulent use be made of them." (20)
What evidence was there to show that the "surplus" ballot papers
had been used fraudulently during the election?
Eric Storrer, branch secretary of the Southampton Central
branch of the ETU, was sent the exact number of ballot papers that
he had asked for, and he had posted them off to members at 10.30am.
on Saturday 12 December 1959. On Monday 14 December, shortly after
noon when he arrived home from work, five ballot papers had already
been returned by post - four of them postmarked 6.45pm December 13,
and one postmarked 12 December. Suspicious of this qu i ck return,
Storrer contacted the GPO. They told him that none of his outgoing
envelopes could have been delivered before Monday the 14 December,
so that it was impossible to have them returned by the Monday. It
was revealed at the trial that the number of ballot papers printed
for the branch was 387, of which 306 were sent direct by the
printers to Eric Storrer, thus leaVing a "surplus" of 81. Two other
branches, Woolston and Hythe, also experienced the "arrival before
departure" mystery, and each had a "surplus" of 21 and 24 ballot
papers respectively. In each case the extra votes were cast in
favour of Frank Haxell. Justice Winn's verdict was,
" ... that a supporter of Mr. Haxell intended by
their use to increase his vote in each of these
branches but had acted prematurely in posting
what might well have been only the first batch
of forged ballots. Further I find that those
ballots were obtained from Head Office." (21)
Five branches of the union were also thought to have
suspiciously high postal votes. Belfast Central illustrates the
suspicion. At its September meeting this branch nomimated Byrne in
preference to Haxell, but only by a majority of two votes. In the
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December e Lec't t on the vo t t ng was 41 vo t e s f or Byrne and 127 f or
Haxell. James Ful t.on , the branch secretary, said in his evidence
that he CQuld nQt remember anQther QccasiQn Qn which the branch had
failed tQ suppQrt its own nominee by a majority vQte. On previous
occaaf ons Byrne had been cppossad by Haxell, Fou Lke s and McLennan,
but they had never received more than 32 votes. Ful t.on said that
the usual postal vote ranged up tQ 25 or 30 but agreed that there
was a keen interest in the Byrne Haxell electiQn. On this
occasion about 90 vQtes were received by post. Of thQse, according
t o Fulton, 48 were brought t o his attention during the scrutiny
because they all bore an identical postmark and date-stamp. The
judge considered
" the overwhelming extent of change in this
branch's pQsition as between September and
December ... tQgether with the peculiar bunching
of 48 postal vQtes are sufficient to establish
beyond any real doubt that a substantial number
of fraudulent ballQt papers were included,
probably a number of the or-der- of 90 ... this
case is, in my judgement, one of fraudulent
rigging ... " (22)
Similar judgements were passed on the four ct.her- branches whose
postal votes were t.hough't to be suspiciQusly high. (23)
<b) The falsificatiQn and alteratiQn of branch returns
Only one blatant case of f'a Lat t t cat i on was revealed at the trial,
that of the PrestQn branch. Francis Clarkson, whQ was Chairman of
the branch meeting Qn 30 December, testified that the result read
out at the meeting was Byrne 52, Haxell 101. Clarkson signed the
minutes of the previQus branch meeting, which included the voting
figures for the Byrne - Haxell election, as correct. Some months
later, when the breakdown of the voting figures were circulated in
the union's minutes, the result was recorded as Byrne 52 and Haxell
191. The judge found:
" that the true voting was Byrne 52, Haxell
101. The return when received at Head Office
showed 191. I find after hearing several
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witnesses from this branch, that the secretary
fraudulently altered on the return form 101 to
191, wrote 191 in his minute book but when he
had read the minutes at the next meeting of the
branch, read out 101." (24)
(c) The disqualification of branch returns
The substitution of envelopes
By 24 December 1959, it was known at the ETU's Head Office that
John Byrne had received 12,060 votes to Frank Haxell's 10,803 (this
is assuming that all possible grounds for disqualification were
ignored). So at this stage Byrne had a lead over Frank Haxell of
1,247 votes. By 28 December, the votes that had then come in
totalled for Byrne 20,363 and for Haxell 19,385. Byrne still led,
but his lead had been reduced to 978 votes. (25) It looked very
likely, then, that Byrne would defeat Haxell. To avoid this
eventuality, alleged the Counsel for the Plaintiffs, the Communist
leadership of the union organised at this critical stage of the
election the substitute envelope operation.
The Rules of the ETU stipulated that after an election the
branch scrutineers must open the envelopes, count the votes, fill
in the scrutineers' return form showing how the voting went, and
ensure that it reached the Head Office not later than the first
post on the fifth day after the branch quarterly meeting at which
the voting took place. The Rules also stated that the date when the
scrutineers' return forms were posted to Head Office would be
governed by the postmark shown on the envelope containing the
forms.
Counsel for Byrne and Chapple alleged that the envelopes in
which 55 branches sent in their returns were destroyed or switched
to other returns. In each of the 55 cases either an empty envelope,
or an envelope into which the original returns had been
transferred, was newly posted from the area from which the original
returns had been sent. When the substitute envelopes arrived "late"
at the ETU's Head Office they were disqualified for breach of the
Rules. So even though witnesses from 40 of the 55 disqualified
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branches gave evidence that they had definitely posted the branch
returns in ample time, the ETU were able to produce envelopes in
Court with postmarks that showed the returns had been posted late.
But the activi ties of one Wi 11 iam Cobbett seemed to swing the
evidence in favour of the the branch secretaries and others who
all said they had posted their returns on time.
Cobbett's "Rural Rides"
In October 1960, Olga Cannon recalls, their lawyers obtained from
the ETU the envelopes which had contained the ballot papers
rejected for late posting:
"Les had sorted the envelopes in geographical
order, and in studying the postmarks an
extraordinary thing struck him - they had been
posted in geographical order! He made lists of
the disqualified branches, with the dates on
which the branch officials said they had posted
their returns. Here is one of them:
Peterborough December 23
Boston 24
Spilsby 19
Brigg 20
Doncaster 23
Barnsley 26
Huddersfield 18
Vlhitby 21
Darlington 23
Bishop Auckland 24
This is a random scatter of dates, as one would
expect, and all the dates were within the
proper time for posting off the ballot returns.
But here is the same list with dates of
postmarks on the envelopes which the ETU
produced.
87
Peterborough December 30
Boston 30
Spilsby 30
Brigg 30
Doncaster 30
Barnsley 31
Huddersfield 31
Whitby 31
Darlington 31
Bishop Auckland 31
All, as alleged by the ETU, had arrived out of
time, and so were disqualified. It seemed
inconceivable that such a pattern of posting
could have come about by chance. Les was
convinced that it had not come about by chance;
he reckoned that someone in the conspiracy, to
ensure the defeat of Byrne, had set off with a
bundle of fresh ballot envelopes and posted
them from town to town. This would have
produced the necessary postmarks as evidence of
late posting." (26)
To test the theory Cannon's solicitor, Ben Hooberman, employed
a private enquiry agent, William Cobbett, to travel around Britain
on a series of long car journeys and put into practice Cannon's
hunch. The three "rural rides" that Cobbett made did seem to show
that at least it was physically possible to have re-posted the
envelopes in the way Cannon had said. However, Nei I Lawson, the
ETU's Counsel, pointed out that if the object of the exercise was
to produce a result favouring Haxell, it would have been far easier
to visit fewer places but ones where the voting differential was
much higher.
"In other words, an itinerary which involved
somebody fooling around with envelopes which
produced a differential of under twenty is
rather a stupid sort of itinerary, when by
going to one place on the same route you could
produce a differential of something like a
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hundred and fifty or two hundred. In other
words, it's a little too elaborate. It's rather
like the thirteenth stroke of the clock: that
is to say, it casts a certain amount of doubt
on the validity of what has gone before." (27)
Justice Winn thought that Cobbett had produced evidence which
had "some corroborative significance". Of the 40 cases of alleged
substitution into which the Court inquired the judge found that
"27 were established to my complete
satisfaction and beyond any doubt that I can
regard as reasonable; a further four cases seem
on balance of probability to be made out ... It
is to be noted that in every case the majority
of votes ... was for Byrne.
It is not possible to determine who must for
certain have known contemporaneously of the
plan to post substitute envelopes... I am
prepared to believe that neither Mr.Foulkes nor
Mr.McLennan participated in that ... It has in my
judgement all the hall-marks of Mr.Haxell and
Mr. Frazer ... agents must have been used whom it
is impossibe to identify .. " (28)
The December 1959 scrutiny
Besides disqualifying pro-Byrne branch returns for supposedly
arriving late at the union's Head Office, it was alleged that the
1959 scrutiny also showed a very selective process of
disqualification for other breaches of the Rules. The
responsibility of deciding whether or not a branch had conformed to
the Rules lay with two National Scrutineers. The scrutineers had a
record of all the past infringements of the branches, a record that
was prepared not by the scrutineers themselves but by the Head
Office staff. Notes were attached to the returns of infringing
branches shOWing the nature of the infringements, and it was on the
basis of this information that the National Scrutineers acted. The
time taken for the scrutiny was short - about 1~ hours. It seems
the scrutineers accepted without question the information supplied
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to them concerning a particular branch's infringement record. By
manipulating the information presented to the scrutineers, it was
alleged that leading members of the ETU arranged it so that pro-
Byrne and pro-Haxell votes were selectively disqualified to the
advantage of Frank Haxell.
So late returns were allowed from 217 branches (out of a total
of 700). The effect of allowing the votes from all these branches
was to Haxell's advantage to the extent of 927 votes. The effect of
alloWing the votes from 148 branches which had earlier
infringements of one kind or another was to Haxell's favour to the
extent of 1,231 votes. However, if the votes from the 69 branches
wi th first infringements had been allowed (which was the usual
practice) and only those with earlier infringements disqualified,
that would have been to Byrne's advantage to the amount of 304
votes. (29) In other words:
liThe substantial point emerges that whether
regard be had to all types of previous
infringements or solely to prior defaults by
lateness, the number of pro-Byrne previous
offenders who were excused was very slightly
greater than the number of pro-Haxell previous
offenders, but the voting advantage for Haxell
resulting from the acceptance was considerable,
indeed, sufficient to determine the election in
his favour ... " (30)
Of the 109 branches which had their returns disqualified, as
we have already noted, 106 had produced majorities for John Byrne,
and the remaining three together only gave Haxell a majority of 3.
And 148 pro-Haxell branches had had their infringement records
"doctored" so that they would not be disqualified by the
scrutineers. Therefore, the judge declared,
"it is established, in my judgement, beyond the
possibility of reasonable doubt, that the
Scrutineers were caused by devices which can
only have been fraudulent, including some
forged votes, to make their return in favour of
Haxell ... But for them, Byrne would in my
judgement, have had a majority of at least
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1,150, but probably of the order of 1,500."
(31)
The ETU's defence Counsel, as we have seen, conceded that the
1959 election was not a valid election. They conceded that the
votes for Haxell were not validly returned by the scrutineers, but
they also argued that neither were the votes cast for Byrne validly
returned. That being the case, a new election should be held.
Despi te the irregularites in the election, Neil Lawson insisted
that there were plausible, if not rather mundane explanations for
these irregularities. The ordering of "surplus" ballot papers was
simply an error committed by an electrician not used to business
management (so much for Michels' theory of the "technical
indispensability of leadership"), Cobbett's "rural-rides" didn't
make sense if the object was to increase Haxell' s vote, and the
sheer complication of the ETU Rules could fox any individual and
make it appear as though the Rules were being manipulated. It has
to be said that the defence Counsel's case appeared very weak in
comparison to the case pressed by Gardiner for Byrne and Chapple.
Neil Lawson was on stronger ground though, it seemed, in rejecting
the idea that these infringements of the Rules were part of a
Communist conspiracy organised by an ETU National Advisory
Committee.
(2) A COmmunist Party conspiracy?
One of the maj or disputes at the trial was whether or not there
existed a National Advisory Committee of the ETU organised by the
Communist Party. When questioned Frank Haxell agreed that such
Committees existed for some industries, for the bUilding industry
for instance, where its function was to advise and assist in the
preparation of pamphlets on building and housing and so on. But,
said Haxell, it was not true that he was a member of any National
Advisory Committee of the Communist Party "consisting of Communist
members of the ETU". There wasn't such a committee for the ETU, he
said. (32) Several ex-Communists still active in the union gave
contrary evidence. For example, Tom Vetterlein, a member of the
Communist Party from 1924 until he resigned in 1958, and a member
of the ETU Executive Council from 1949 to 1957, told the Court that
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after the war a London Advisory of the ETU, a National Advisory
which met in King Street and, around 1948, four Divisional
Advisories were set up. Moreover, Vetterlein repudiated the
Defendant's line of argument that such meetings were merely
informal gatherings and as such could not be considered Advisory
Committees. He said the business of the National Advisory Committee
was to determine how best to advance the cause of the members of
the ETU together with that of the Communist Party in the light of
general policy about wages and conditions. (33) Why Haxell should
want to deny the existence of a committee with such aims at first
seems perplexing. The reason was, of course, that the Counsel for
Byrne and Chapple were attempting to establish that such a
Communist controlled committee not only directed the policy of the
ETU, but also conspired to prevent non-Communist members of the
union from being elected or appointed. It was this accusation of
conspiracy that Neil Lawson for the ETU was intent on demolishing.
Lawson argued that it did not really matter whether or not you
called a thing officially a committee or not, what really mattered
was what these bodies did. There was nothing wrong in such
committees discussing how best to advance the politics of the
Communist Party in the ETU, he said, "as long as, when you do come
to the question of elections, nobody encourages the exercise by
individuals concerned of fraudulent practices." Lawson continued:
"No one would desire to import into the concept
of liability for wrongful acts any kind of
theory of gUilt by association... In relation to
each of the defendants the relevant enquiry is
this. .. what evidence is there of some specific
act of participation, by the Defendant
concerned, in the matters of complaint on the
December 1959 ballot? (34)
In other words, the existence or non-existence of a National
Advisory Committee that controlled the ETU was a secondary issue,
the real issue was whether or not it could be proved that any of
the Defendants had conspired at these alleged meetings to rig the
1959 ballot. From the evidence given by ex-Communists at the trial
there was no such collective conspiracy.
In his judgement, Justice Winn said:
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" ... in 1959 the Communist Party of the United
Kingdom controlled the ETU ... the main
significance ... of the dispute in this trial
about the application of the name "Advisory" to
certain meetings or groups described in the
evidence, is that only bodies officially
appointed by the Communist Party are properly
so termed and qualify for the distinction
conferred in Party circles by that title." (35)
The Communist Party controlled the ETU, according to Winn, by
virtue of its dominant position on the leading bodies of the union.
Whether or not meetings between Communist members of the ETU and
representatives of the Communist Party of Great Britain were
formally referred to as "Advisory Committees", as Haxell denied,
was not really the point:
"The substance of the matter, which he (Haxell>
was endeavouring to conceal, is that a
committee of Communist members of the ETU met,
often with him in the chair, to consult with an
appointed representative of the Communist Party
and with one another to foster Communism and
Communist objects in and by means of ETU
acti vi ties." (36)
On the important issue of whether or not the ETU Advisory
Committee was involved in a collective conspiracy to rig the 1959
election, however, the judge made no comment. And at no place in
his verdict does Justice Winn even suggest that there was an
organized conspiracy directed from King Street to rig elections in
the ETU. What the judge did say in his final verdict on 28 June was
that
"the Defendants Foulkes, Haxell, McLennan,
Frazer, and Humphrey acted between September
1959 and February 1960 in their several
capacities as officers or servants of the
Defendant Union, and on its behalf, in breach
of the Rules of the Union; also that they
conspired together to prevent by fraudulent
and unlawful devices the election of the
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Plaintiff Byrne in the place of the Defendant
Haxell as General Secretary of the Defendant
Union." (37)
As to the pre-1959 allegations of ballot-rigging that were
raised at the trial:
"In general my considered judgement upon all
these topics is that when fully examined as
they have been in at least adequate detail,
they do not amount to or establish any
fraudulent practice by any of the defendants."
(38)
The aftermath
On 3 July 1961, Justice Winn declared John Byrne General Secretary
of the ETU. Although Byrne and Chapple had achieved most of what
they intended by the legal action, they, and the other
oppositionists in the union, were still facing a major problem that
had been left untouched by the Court judgement - the power of the
Communist Party in the union. John Byrne might have been declared
General Secretary, but the the majority of Executive Council seats
and the national apparatus of the union was still controlled by the
Communist Party. The opposition in the union hoped they could
reverse this situation at the forthcoming EC elections in
September, but they feared that they would be severely hindered by
the CP's determination in the wake of the trial to hold on come
what may to their positions. But it was not just the CP's control
of the apparatus that was the problem: the leadership still seemed
to have the support of the majority of the rank-and-file activists
in the union, support that seems to have been undiminished by the
trial.
Just a few weeks after the judge's final verdict was
announced, the ETU held its policy conference at Portsmouth. With
the exception of Haxell, the other four members of the EC who had
been found gUilty of conspiracy at the trial were on the platform.
There was no condemnation or criticism of the ETU leadership from
the floor, and on most issues the EC position was carried by the
conference. The conference rallied behind the President's slogan of
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"Don't Retreat - Mobilise" and his calls for unity to heal the
suspicions and hatreds that had been engendered by the trial. While
John Byrne, the "victor", had to suffer the indignity of being
relegated to speak on youth training and apprenticeships. (39) This
could be explained, of course, by the fact that the delegates were
elected before the Court's final verdict was known and as such were
likely to be pro-leadership. Even so, this did not mean that they
were uncritical supporters of the CP leadership, and if they had
believed the Court judgement they would have certainly voiced their
opinions. But did they believe the accusations that had been
levelled against their union's leadership? - this was the point.
There is good reason to believe that they didn't. One reason for
this was that when a popular figure in the union such as Foulkes
stood up at the conference and declared that "I am completely
innocent of the charges that have been made against me", it carried
conviction. (40) In contrast the dubious alliance of a number of
ex-Communists and Mr. Justice Winn could not have been all that
appealing to union activists. On top of this the ETU was appealing
against the verdict, so there was a possibility that the leadership
would still be exonerated. However, these were the activists, and
what the larger minority of ETU members who bothered to vote in
elections thought about the whole affair would be known when the
results of the September elections were announced in November. The
TUC's intervention in the post-trial autopsy, however, changed the
climate dramatically.
The expulsion of the ETU from the TUC
The full Executive Council of the ETU met the F&GPC of the TUC on
24 July 1961. The five hour meeting was an attempt by the TUC to
elicit from the ETU what exactly they intended to do in the light
of the Court judgement. To this end the meeting was unsuccessful.
The ETU did little more than repeat that the union had given an
undertaking to the judge that the September elections would be
eupe r-v i aad by a firm of chartered accountants under the existing
voting system. Frank Foulkes did reveal that the union was
appealing against "every decision of the Court" and in particular
against the declaration that Byrne was elected General Secretary.
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The meeting ended with an understanding that the members of the
union's EC should hold themselves in readiness for a further
meeting later on in the week. In fact the meeting was held the
following day. At this meeting the F&GPC informed the EC of the ETU
that since they were not prepared to make any suggestions for
dealing with the matters revealed in the Court judgement then they
themselves must declare what in their view was the minimum required
to be done by the ETU. The F&GPC formulated the following
directions which, subject to any comments the ETU might make, they
said they would recommend to the General Council:
(a) direct the Executive Council of the
Electrical Trades Union to take within ten days
such action as will satisfy the General Council
that Messrs. Haxell, McLennan, Frazer, Humphrey
and Hendy are effectively debarred for a
minimum period of five years from taking any
part in the administration of the Union in the
capacity of an elected officer or as an
appointed member of the Union's staffj
(b) invite Mr.Foulkes to allow the membership
of the ETU to show the extent to which he still
retains their confidence by resigning his
position as President of the Union and standing
for re-election by ballotj and
(c) direct the Executive Council of the ETU to
rescind at its next meeting the resolutions of
its meeting held on July 10-11 appointing sub-
committees for ballots, litigation,
establishments and publications and cancelling
the General Secretary's appointments and
suspension of members of the Union's staff.
(41)
These recommendations were adopted by the General Counci 1 on 26
July. A reply was received from the ETU on 2 August:
"The Executive Council having considered the
demands of the General Council of the Trades
Union Congress rejects them as wholly
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unacceptable and an unwarranted interference in
the affairs of the Electrical Trades Union.
It reminds the Trades Union Congress that an
appeal against the decision of the High Court
has now been entered and any action by the
Trades Union Congress would prejudice the
issues involved.
It informs the Trades Union Congress that the
powers of the Executive Council of the
Electrical Trades Union are determined by its
rules and have been endorsed by a policy
Conference. It regards the suggestions that
many of the present leaders should be excluded
or resign, together with the demand that the
Executive Council should delegate full powers
to a new General Secretary, as evidence that
the Trades Union Congress is more interested in
changing the policy and leadership of the Union
than ensuring the efficient continuation of its
administration." (42)
A fortnight later, on 16 August, the TUC received a letter
from the union's solicitors threatening them with legal action
should they take "any action adverse to the union" at their next
meeting. This letter, and a circular that had been issued by the
ETU to all its Area full-time officials, branch secretaries and
shop stewards on 18 August declaring the Defendants' innocence and
reiterating the substance of the correspondence between the union
and the TUC, were considered by the GC on 24 August. (43) Taking
all this into account, the GC decided, as they had done in December
1959, that there was nothing further to be gained from continuing a
correspondence with the union, but this time they decided to
recommend to the September TUC Congress that they
(a) expel the Electrical Trades Union
forthwith; and
(b) authorise the General Council to take such
steps as seem to them to be necessary in order
to make it possi ble for the Electrical Trades
Union to be reaffi liated to Congress. (44)
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At the Portsmouth TUC in September the expulsion debate lasted
2 hours 10 minutes, 45 minutes of which was taken up by George
Woodcock, the General Secretary of the TUC, putting the GC' S case
for the expulsion of the union. Woodcock went through once more the
tedious history of the relations between the TUC and the ETU over
the previous years. He said the General Council would have been
qu i te prepared to defend the ETU at anytime "if the ETU had given
us anything to fight with - which they never have". Implicit in
Woodcock's speech was an acceptance of the High Court's judgement,
which, given the ETU's stonewalling since the trial, was not
altogether surprising. Concluding his speech he said that the issue
to be voted on was not Communism but fraud: "Fraud is the question,
fraud is the issue". (45)
Replying to Woodcock, Frank Foulkes reiterated the main points
of the ETU's position as it had been presented in the
correspondence with the General Council. Specifically on the trial,
all Foulkes said was that the members of the Executive Council
that had been found guilty had all declared their innocence and
were appealing against the judgement. Given that there was an
appeal pending, he asked if it was right for Congress to expel the
union:
"In a murder case, the logical simile would be
that the appellant should be hanged first and
his appeal dealt with afterwards." (46)
That the Congress could contemplate such an action before the
appeal took place (and the way the vote was to go was almost a
foregone conclusion even before the Congress began) is an
indication of the increasing exasperation felt with the ETU by many
active rank-and-file trade unionists. Even the Communist Party, as
we shall see, tacitly admitted that the judgement was correct, and
this was the month before Frank Foulkes' appeal took place in
January 1962 (Foulkes' was the only appeal that reached Court).
Foulkes' rhetoric about the "capitalist press" and the forces of
reaction that were arrayed against the ETU, as true as this was,
sounded hollow as he avoided the substantive issue of ballot-
rigging under the cover of the forthcoming appeal.
In the debate that followed Foulkes' speech, delegates from
the Boilermakers, the Draughtman's union, and the ACTT spoke
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against the expulsion of the ETU. The general drift of their
contributions was that expulsion would create more problems than it
solved, and that expulsion would only gladden the hearts of the
"leader writers of the Press, the Tories, and the general rag-bag
of individuals and organisations who hate the guts of the trade
union movement". (47) What is more, as Dan McGarvey of the
Boilermakers argued, the TUC directives sent to the ETU on 25 July
rode roughshod over the democratic constitution of the
Electricians' union. When the card vote was taken, however, it was
more than apparent that the delegates had not been swayed by the
words of Frank Foulkes or Dan McGarvey, they voted by 7,320,000
votes to 730,000 votes (with about a quarter million abstentions),
a majority of 6,585,000, to expel the ETU from Congress. As
Electron solemnly reported:
"At exactly 4.47 pm. on the afternoon of
Monday, September 4, 1961, the Electrical
Trades Union's 59 years old affiliated
membership of the TUC - unbroken since January,
1902 - was brought to an end ...
The last word spoken in Congress by an ETU
delegate - the well reported "Au Revoir. Ted"
[Ted Hill the Congress President - NSJ from
President Bro. Frank Foulkes - could not be
heard on the stage. They were lost in the
hubbub of conversation that welled-up in the
great conference hall; a murmur of voices
pierced only by a single boo and one cheer from
a far flung corner.
With dignity, the ETU delegation left the
Guildhall through the nearest door.
And with them went 242,000 members." (48)
The September issue of Electron was also of interest because
it contained the first editorial by John Byrne, who, with that
month's Executive Council elections evidently in mind, urged the
membership to attend "more diligently to the affairs of the union".
Byrne needn't have feared, the elections brought a victory for the
opposi tionists inside the union. They turned a hitherto 8-3 CPI
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"fellow-traveller" majori ty on the Executive Council into a 9-2
majority for the right-wing. But it was not as sweeping a victory
as might have been expected in the circumstances, for the CP and
"fellow-traveller" candidates secured almost 15,000 of the 49,000
or so record votes cast (in the EC elections in 1959 only 33,000
voted) . Al though the 5 CP members on the EC all lost their seats,
two "fellow-travellers" retained their seats, Foulkes was still
President and the majority of National Officers were Communist
Party members. So for both sides the fight was far from being over:
the next round was to begin on 1 January 1962 when the new
Executive Council took charge of the union.
One further important event took place before the new EC took
over the union. At the beginning of October, on the eve of the
Labour Party Conference in Blackpool, the National. Executive
Committee decided to disaffiliate the ETU on the grounds that the
union was a Communist controlled organisation and therefore could
not accept the programme, principles and policy of the Labour Party
which it was obliged to do as a condition of membership. Even
before the Conference had begun, then, the ETU delegation were
deprived of their credentials. Instead they were issued with
visitors' tickets and sat out the conference in the public gallery.
However, Sam Goldberg for the ETU EC, (a position he was to lose
when the September election results were announced) was allowed 20
minutes to address the delegates when Standing Orders were
suspended so that the NEC's decision could be debated. Goldberg in
his 12 minute speech said little, other than that the
disaffiliation was an unprecedented and a dangerous move for the
Labour Party to make, and a device to interfere with the election
of the new ETU EC. Following a brief debate, a card vote was taken
and the ETU were expelled from the Labour Party by 5,337,000 votes
to 642,000 votes. (49)
So far we have outlined the ETU leadership's response to the
trial judgement, which essentially was to proclaim their innocence,
to suspend any detailed refutation of the judgement till after the
appeal - a position they asked the labour and trade union movement
to follow - and to point to the reactionary and anti -trade union
forces that were attacking the ETU and as a consequence the whole
trade union movement. And, as we have seen, the leadership's pleas
i.
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were falling on deaf ears. They had been expelled from the TUe and
the Labour Party, and the CP's seemingly impregnable positon on the
EC had been almost destroyed. How did the Communist Party
nationally react to the whole affair? Was their reaction
substantially different from that of the Communist leadership of
the ETU?
The response of the COmmunist Party
Throughout the trial the Daily Worker carried factual reports of
the day to day proceedings. The paper said that they would not make
any comment on the proceedings until the trial was over, which was
not surprising given the law of sub judice. On 30 June 1961, two
days after the major part of Justice Winn's judgement had been
del i vered, the Communist Party issued its first maj or statement
about the trial. Under a front page headline in the Daily Worker -
COM:M:UNISTS AND UNIONS - there appeared a long statement by the
Political Committee of the Party. Once again they declined to make
any direct comment on the outcome of the trial because they said,
correctly, that the final judgement of the Court would not be known
until 3 July. However, the statement does make some general
comments about the relationship between the CP and the trade unions
and the trial itself:
"Throughout its history the Communist Party has
been the most consistent opponent of all
undemocratic practices, all ballot-rigging, all
bans and proscriptions, all suppressions of
minori ties which have operated in the trade
unions ... Not the winning of official positions,
but the winning of the support of the workers
for a progressive policy is their basic trade
union aim... the Communist Party is opposed to
all attempts, from what ever quarter they come,
to control the trade unions from the outside or
to induce them to accept policies which do not
correspond to the will of the membership ... This
has been and is our position regarding the
ETU ....
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At no time during the proceedings in the ETU
case was it alleged that any meetings of
Communists discussed or decided on ballot-
rigging or any other illegal practices as far
as the union was concerned. Nor was any
instance given where Communists had sought to
get the union to operate any specific policy
which was not approved by the union members in
policy-making conferences and elsewhere ... Any
attempt of Communists to secure a monopoly of
union posts at any level would be entirely
opposed to Communist policy, which is based on
the need to create an alliance of all
progressive union members to increase the
power, the unity and political clarity of the
members and leaders of the union ... The
Communist Party does not deny that it
endeavours to influence the policy of the trade
unions ... But it seeks to influence the unions
in a democratic way ... " (50)
Whatever is made of this statement, and in its essentials it was
formally correct, there is one sentence that is glaringly
inconsistent with the situation in the ETU: "Any attempt of
Communists to secure a monopoly of union posts at any level would
be entirely opposed to Communist policy". Clearly by any standards
a Party which had members in such leading positions in a trade
union as President, General Secretary, Assistant General Secretary,
as well as 5 members on the Executive Council and 17 National
Officers, not to mention the Office Manager, left itself open to
the charge that it had a monopoly of leading posts in that union.
And, of course, this was the position in the ETU at the time of the
trial (in 1956, as we saw in chapter one, the CP held more leading
positions than in 1959).
After Justice Winn's final judgement on 3 July, it might have
been expected that the Communist Party would have made a fuller
statement concerning the outcome of the trial, and indeed they had
intimated as much in their statement of June 30. It was not to be.
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On 4 July an editorial in the Daily Vorker informed its readers
that
"The ETU leaders are appealing against the
judgement, and comments on the nature of the
case shou 1d not be made at thi s stage." (51)
Six days later though, the Daily Worker reported that the
"Executi ve Committee of the Communist Party at the weekend
considered the ETU case". (52) The article goes on to say that the
EC of the CP had adopted a statement on the position of the CP and
the trade unions, which would be printed in full as a leaflet for
wide distribution. Extracts from the statement were then quoted at
length in the paper. Disappointingly, the full text of the
statement contained in the leaflet added nothing new to the
statement that the Party made on 30 June, and the Daily Worker
editorial of July 4. The Communist Party's position then, not
surprisingly, was Virtually the same as the ETU's:
"The ETU leaders have declared their innocence
of the charges and are appealing against the
judgement. Further consideration of the case by
the Executive, therefore, was postponed unti 1
after the appeal." (53)
The appeals of 4 of the 5 Communist Party ETU leaders who were
found guilty of ballot-rigging were never to take place, ostensibly
because they were denied legal aid. Frank Foulkes though, the fifth
member of the leadership to be found gUilty, was determined to
appeal against the verdict although he too was denied legal aid.
Because Foulkes was, as Olga Cannon says, "exceedingly popular" and
may have been unaware "of some of the things that went on under
Haxell's administration" the union decided to pay for his appeal.
(54) Foulkes made his unsuccessful appeal in January 1962. Lord
Justice Sellers upheld the June 1961 verdict and concluded as
Justice Winn had, "that the appellant played his part in the
rigging of this election". (55) Before Foulkes' appeal was heard,
however, the Executive Committee of the Communist Party issued a
major statement on the ETU affair. The full text of "THE COMMUNIST
PARTY STATEMENT ON THE ETU" appeared in the Daily Worker of
December 4. It reiterated much of the two previous pu b l i c
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statements the Party had made, but then got down to the real
business:
"In our opinion actions were taken at the Head
Office of the Union which amounted to
distorting the real position for the
scrutineers. It appears to be reasonably
certain from the material produced in the trial
that Branch returns whose validity had been
subject to query at earlier stages, were never
put before the scrutineers for close
examination as they should, but were put into
an "all right" file and were counted as valid.
A maj ori t y of these votes were for Haxe11 ...
VIe have asked those Party members most
concerned how such a result could have been
obtained if everything had been fair and above
board, and have not been able to get any
satisfactory explanation...
On the question of how exactly these things
came about, there is a difference of opinion.
Most of the leading Communists in the ETU whom
we have consul ted, agree that while mistakes
occurred, these cannot account for the
si tuation, and see no other explanation than
acts which amount to rigging of the ballot,
though they are by no means unanimous as to how
this was done or by whom, and each individual
concerned declares his innocence ...
There was no possibility, in our opinion, of
outside interference with the votes after they
had been delivered to the office. The sWitching
of Branch returns must have taken place within
the office.
The leading official in charge of the
administration of the Head Office was the
General Secretary I Frank Haxell, and he must
accept responsibility for a situation which has
brought discredit on the union and its
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Executive, including members against whom the
Court could find no vestige of a case. Comrade
Haxell, therefore, has offered to resign from
the Communist Party ... we accept Frank Haxell's
resignation ... " (56)
There followed in the months ahead a number of expulsions of
Communists not only from the ETU but from the Communist Party as
well. Frank Haxell, Robert McLennan, former Assistant General
Secretary, James Humphrey, the Office Manager of "surplus" ballots
fame, and Jack Frazer who had contested Les Cannon in the 1957 EC
election, were all expelled from the ETU in April 1962 for
"bringing discredit" on the union. Frank Foulkes was expelled from
the union in July still proclaiming his innocence, although he now
admi tted that "a fraud had been planned and carried out" in the
Head Office of the union. His request that the membership should
decide in a ballot (conducted by a firm of chartered accountants)
whether or not he was innocent or guf Lty of ballot-rigging was
turned down by the Executive Council. (57) Two other prominent
Communist members of the union, R.Sell and J.Feathers, both former
EC members who lost their seats in the September 1961 elections,
were also disciplined at the same time that Foulkes was expelled
from the union. Sell was disqualified from holding office in the
union for 5 years, and Feathers for 3 years. And Patrick O'Neil, a
leading Communist Party activist and branch secretary of the South-
West London branch of the ETU, was expelled for being involved in a
fraudulent ballot. (58) Patrick O'Neil, together with Harold Woolf,
Chairman of O'Neil's South-West London branch, and Jack Frazer were
all expelled from the Communist Party in June, in what the press
referred to as the second stage of a "cleaning-up operation". All
three were in fact expelled for campaigning in the Party, with some
success, for the reinstatement of Frank Haxell, who they said was
being used as a scapegoat for the Party's gUilt and responsibility
in the ETU matter.
They were right, in that the responsibility cou l d not just be
laid at Frank Haxell's doorstep. The Communist Party had constantly
tried to explain the ballot-rigging by recourse to the actions of
individuals in the union. Who had done it? How had he/they done it?
W'hat was missing from their musings was a political explanation lor
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the actions of certain individuals in the union. That certain
prominent CP members in the ETU might have taken the actions they
did because of the politics of the Party itself never seems to have
been considered.
Ballot-rigging and politics
In chapter one we argued that the rise of the CP in the ETU was a
resul t not of ballot-rigging, but of the general pol i tical and
industrial strategy pursued by the CP in the post-war period. With
the publication of The British Road to Socialism in 1951 this
strategy was laid out in some detail. The essence of the Communist
Party's line was that Socialism could be achieved in Britain
through parliamentary means, and it was "slanderous" to suggest,
said Harry Pollitt, leader of the CP, that the Party believed in
creating Soviets in Britain. (59) The strategic aim of the Party
was to get a "people's government" elected through the support of a
united working class and a popular alliance of all democratic
forces. This truly representative government, the CP said, would be
able to effect socialist nationalisation of the monopolies, develop
a planned economy and by democratic reforms break capitalist
poli tical domination. Should the capitalist class refuse to abide
by the will of the "people's government" and attempt to use force
to maintain their privileges, the people and their government would
not hesi tate to act deci si vely. (60)
At the core of the popular alliance, or anti-monopoly
alliance, the CP envisaged a Communist-Labour alliance that once
united would be the prime mover in shifting power away from capital
to the people, and would thus constitute the maj or element in any
future people's government. So through the institutions of the
labour movement - the Communist Party, the Labour Party, the trade
unions and the cooperatives - the Party hoped to gradually shift
the movement leftwards. The key to this strategy was the gaining of
positions of authority in the trade union movement, which in turn
would enable the Communist Party to influence the direction of the
Labour Party at their annual conference. The strategy was, as Bill
Warren comments on a later edition of the British Road to
Socialism, "in essence an approach to the masses irom above and
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indirectly through the instrumentality of bureaucratic
institutions, structurally adapted to operating through the normal
channels of capitalism". (61) While this was true, it leaves out of
the picture the rank-and-file activity in the labour movement that
the Communist Party encouraged. In a sense the CP operated at two
levels in the movement. At one level (and Warren is right - this
was the main strategic arena), the CP sought to operate through the
bureaucratic institutions of the labour movement albeit to reform
them; at another level, Party activists were heavily involved in
the day to day bread and butter issues that were raised on the
shopfloor.
The centre-piece of the Party's strategy at this time was, of
course, the Electrical Trades Union. Here was a union dominated by
a Communist-Labour alliance whose delegate conferences throughout
the 1950s repeatedly supported the majority of motions tabled by
the union's leadership, and as a consequence the leadership were
able to directly influence TUC and Labour Party policy in a
leftwards direction. For example, out of twenty-three motions moved
by the ETU at the TUC from 1945 to 1960 one half had originally
been moved at the ETU's own conferences by the Executive Counci 1.
And on no occasion in this period did a motion find its way to the
TUC which had been carried at the union's conference yet opposed by
the EC. (62) One of the rare occasions when the leadership were
defeated, as we described in chapter one, was on the issue of
whether or not the Communist leaders of the union should be allowed
to represent the union at Labour Party Conferences. But the
delegations that did attend (including CP members as advisors)
represented the views of the ETU conference, which was of course
largely dominated by the politics of the Communist Party. Not
having Frank Haxell or Frank Foulkes speak for the union in an
official capacity at Labour Party conferences was really only a
minor inconvenience, as the politics of the CP were carried by the
ETU delegation.
The strategy outlined in The British Road to Socialism seemed
to be meeting with some success in the early 1950s, at least with
the activists in the labour movement (sales of the pamphlet reached
150,000 in six weeks). A militant reformism wrapped in a radical
nationalist package must have appealed to those activists who were
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on the Bevani te-wing of the Labour Party and many more besides.
Industrially the Party's activity could not fail to attract the
attention of those industrial workers who were frequently involved
in shop-floor disputes with management. So although marginalised
electorally, hundreds of thousands of workers who would never have
voted Communist or read the Daily fiorker willingly accepted the
leadership of Communist shop-stewards and union officials. The
irony was that the largely de-politicised industrial mi li tancy of
the 1950s provided the CP with their passport into the national
poli tical arena of Labour Party politics. If the Party lost the
leading trade union positions that it held, the strategy contained
in The British Road to Socialism would suffer an enormous setback.
After 1956 this position of influence in industry and the
trade unions did seem threatened. Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in
his "secret speech" in February 1956 caused turmoil in the Party,
and in the wake of the crushing of the Hungarian revolution the
Party lost some 10,000 members, many of them prominent trade
unionists, including leading CP members in the NUM, FBU and of
course the ETU, and also some of its leading industrial militants.
(63) Nor were all those leaving the Party moving to the right as
the leadership claimed. Some did of course (Cannon in the ETU was
the prime example), but many moved to the left. A substantial
number identified with what became known as the "New Left" centred
round the New Reasoner magazine set up by E. P. Thompson and John
Saville, and around 200, mainly workers, joined the Trotskyist
Socialist Labour League. Needless to say, such defections could not
have improved the Party's political and industrial influence, but
there seems to be 1 i ttle evidence that the CP's industrial and
trade union base was shattered (damaged certainly), as a result of
the upheaval of 1956. The composition of the delegates to the
Party's Annual Congress was left untouched at least. Over the
period 1944 to 1963 on average 43% of all Congress delegates were
workers in engineering, building. mining and transport and
railways. (64) In some areas in the years after 1956, however, the
CP seems to have strengthened its industrial base - in the motor
industry and the Yorkshire coalfield in particular. (65) And by
1963 the Party had made good the losses of 1956.
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Yet it seems reasonable to assume that the confidence of the
CP leadership was shaken by the events of 1956. They could not
afford to lose leading trade unionists such as Lawrence Daly of the
NUM and John Horner of the FEU if they were to retain their
influence in the labour movement. The severe jolt the Party's
credibility suffered in many unions was exascerbated in the ETU by
the press allegations of electoral malpractice that began in
earnest with the publication of Wyatt's The Peril In Our Midst in
December 1956, allegations that were substantiated by leading ETU
members who had just left the CPo As we have seen, the ETU
leadership's response to the allegations did very little to
alleviate the suspicions of many who were far from being enemies of
the ETU and the CPo Nonetheless, the ETU rank-and-file activists
still seemed to support the Conununist leadership of the union, on
industrial matters at least. On the question of Hungary, the
delegates to the union's 1957 Conference rebuffed the leadership
and sent a message of fraternal support to the workers of Hungary
in the shape of a number of resolutions. But if the branch
activists still by and large supported the Conununist leadership,
how true was this of the "active voters" in the union, for these
were the members that kept the CP in power?
The first real sign that the "active voters" were becoming
disenchanted with the leadership was in 1959, when Foulkes stood
for re-election as President of the union. Until then, both in the
EC elections late in 1957 and in the elections for Area Presidents
in 1958, there was little indication of a falling away of electoral
support for the Conununist officials in the union. Foulkes was
first elected President in 1945, re-elected in 1950 (beating John
Byrne), returned unopposed in 1954, and defeated William Blairford
(who left the CP over Hungary) in September 1959 to retain his
posi tion. However, considering Foulkes' record and his popularity
in the union, and the fact that Blairford was li ttle known outside
Scotland, the election result was close (Foulkes 18,100, Blairford
15,311). For v.t.he first time in a decade or so, then, the leadership
could not fail to be aware that their support in the union was
waning. The spectre of the CP losing control of the union must have
loomed large in the minds of. people such as Haxell and Frazer. The
spectre not just of losing control or the ETU, bu~ of the
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industrial centre-piece of The British Road to Socialism. The
Party's entire strategy of gaining union posts and political
influence would have been badly damaged by such a loss. In these
circumstances, and as the returns for the Byrne - Haxell election
began to come in, certain members of the Communist Party in the
union, acting they believed in the best interests of the Party,
rigged the election returns. Their motives were entirely political,
personal considerations being, in our view, completely absent.
Ballot-rigging was, of course, not a normal Communist practice
in the ETU, or any other union for that matter. It was an
aberration, but one which can be explained not simply in terms of
the deviant behaviour of a number of individuals, nor by a
IHchelian approach with its abstract references to the power of
oligarchies. Of course, the ETU ballot-rigging episode offers ample
evidence that can be used in support of Michels' thesis. But the
episode also offers evidence that amends and counters Michels'
assertions. For example, the root cause of oligarchy according to
Kichels was the technical indispensability of leadership, which was
itself a product of the division of labour. Control of the ETU,
however, was in the hands of lay officers (with the exception of
the 3 leading positions) and these were far from being technocrats.
So we could amend Michels by saying that the primary cause of
oligarchy in the ETU at this time was not the technical
indispensability of the leaders but rather the control which these
leaders had over the ETU's bureaucratic structure. Control of the
apparatus was the key, a control that allowed them to manipulate
the union's procedures.
However, it was because they abused this control and acted
undemocratically that they were toppled. True it involved a High
Court action, but the action would never have taken place if there
had not been pressure from the press, the internal opposition, and
the TUC for the union leadership to act democratically. This tends
to confirm l.R.Coleman's thesis that there are compulsive pressures
on union leaders to act democratically, pressures which are unique
to trade unions. (66) Or, as Gouldner argued, there cannot be an
"iron law of oligarchy" unless there is an "iron law of democracy",
(67) In the wake of the trial the "iron law of democracy" was in
full ascendancy. The new right-wing Executive Council were able to
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take control and consolidate their position in the union only by
harnessing rank-and-file demands for an extension of democracy.
and even more significantly. as we shall see in the next chapter,
they were stopped by the rank-and-file from pressing through
"reforms" which were considered undemocratic. Michels, by
concentrating on the organizational factors which inhibit democracy
and strengthen oligarchy, tends to miss those factors which have an
opposite effect.
Without an historical and political understanding of the CP
and the ETU in the 1950s. it is hard to explain at all why the CP
should have had such influence in the union, or why certain
individuals acted in the way that they did. Seen from this point of
view. both the genuine strength and support the CP had in the ETU
and the ballot-rigging affair are explicable in terms of the
industrial relations climate of the 1950s, the ETU's militant
tradition and the politics of the CPo In the first instance. as we
argued in chapter one, the Party's strategy dovetailed with the
industrial and, to a lesser extent. the political concerns of the
ETU membership. Whereas the ballot-rigging was a product of a
period when the Party's strategy was under pressure. a pressure
that in the ETU at least threatened to shatter 15 years' work.
Kichels' theory is not entirely refuted, but in the end, and
contrary to Michels, it was the demand for democracy in the ETU
that defeated the CP leadership.
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PART TWO THE NEW MODEL UNION
CHAPTER FOUR
THE REMODELLING OF THE UNION
The new right-wing Executive Council of the ETU held its first
session at the union's Head Office on 2 January 1962. In the
editorial of that month's Electron - DEMOCRACY IN YOUR HANDS - the
newly appointed General Secretary, John Byrne, said that he
regarded the election of the EC as
"a mandate to build a more powerful and truly
democratic Union in which more and more members
play an ever-increasing part in determining the
Union's affairs ... No political group or
undemocratic leadership will ever again control
the Union if we work together ... Instead of the
Union's energy being sapped in the pursuit of
obscure political prejudice, the Union will be
used for the purpose for which it was founded
and the whole of its industrial strength
applied to secure improvements in the wages and
condi tions of our members." (1)
Xandate or no mandate, the left in the union still controlled
the influential Area Committees and a sizeable number of the
branches, and as such were likely to be able to dominate the rules
and policy conferences of the union and thereby retain their
influence. In order to by-pass the activists in the union the
leadership employed a procedure that was to be used frequently in
the years to come - a ballot of the entire membership on specific
issues of union democracy. It was hoped that this "democracy by
referendum" would mobilize the "active voters" in the union in
support of the Executive's plans for remodelling the union, a
remodelling that was intended to erode the power of rank-and-file
acti vists by placing more and more power in the hands of the
Executive Council.
Firstly, the EC asked the approval of the membership to hold a
Special Rules Revision Conference (SRRC) to which each of the
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union's 650 odd branches could send a delegate (previously there
had been one delegate for every 600 members, about 400 in total, so
many branches did not have their own delegate). Such an extension
of democracy in the union was supported overwhelmingly by 26,458
votes to 6,206 votes. The specially convened Rules Revision
Conference that met at Margate on B October 1962, then, was the
largest gathering of delegates in the union's history. The
leadership had been working hard in the run-up to the SRRC to press
for the implementation of a number of key recommendations that were
to be the first phase in the wholesale restructuring of the union:
(1) A system of balloting which would ensure
fair and honest elections.
(2) A full-time Executive Council.
(3) The introduction of industrial conferences
in order to establish direct lines of
communication down to the members in the
separate industries.
(4) Rules revision conferences which would meet
more than twice as often as were then provided
for.
(5) A final Appeals Court where members subject
to the disciplinary procedure could seek
redress. (2)
The recommendations listed here in the September edition of
Electron under the heading GUARD OUR UNION DEMOCRACY f were also
coupled with warnings about the "unscrupulous methods" that the
"Communist Party and the Trotskyists were resorting to" in order,
they claimed, to oppose the EC' s reforms. Unofficial circulars and
a meeting of CP delegates to the SRRC were c i ted as evidence of
such methods. It seems clear that the EC still feared the power of
the CP in the union. They hoped that the proposed reform of the
balloting system would be the decisive blow that would "put an end
to machine politics in the ETU" and "sound the death-knell of the
Communist Party's organisation wi thi n the Union". (3)
All but one of the EC's five major reforms were carried by the
delegates at Margate. The old bra'nch voting system was replaced by
a postal balloting system under a single transferable vote, all to
be administered by the Electoral Reform Society ..This was obviously
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the main achievement of the SRRC as far as the EC were concerned,
wi th most of the SRRC report in the December issue of Electron
being taken up by the new Rule 21 governing elections. A Biennial
Delegate Conference (BDC) was introduced which incorporated a Rules
Revision Conference every four years. Previously policy conferences
were held annually, but as much as ten years could elapse before a
Rules Revision Conference was held; however, this was not the case
in the period that the CP controlled the union ( RRCs were held in
1947, 1948, 1951, 1952, and 1957). The referendum that decided that
conference representation should be on the basis of one delegate
per branch was confirmed. The new Rule also made it clear that
"no delegate shall be mandated in advance as to
how he shall or should vote on any matter
coming before the conference." (4)
For the first time conference was given the power to vote on a
motion referring back any section of the Executive Council's
report. (5) However, the Rules still vested the "general management
and control of the Union" in the hands of the EC, although the
clause that specified that conference decisions were merely
recommendations to the EC was removed. (6) Nonetheless, conference
decisions were still not binding on the EC as they were in most
other trade unions. The highest decision making body in the union
was still the Executive Council, and not the union's conference. On
this point at least, the new EC were no more willing to challenge
the ETU's tradition of Executive authority than were the CP
leadership of the union. Industrial Conferences of shop-stewards
from the various sections of industry that the union covered -
electrical contracting, supply, shipbuilding and engineering - were
to be convened between BDCs. The setting up of a Final Appeals
Committee (FAC) made up of 11 rank-and-file members elected at the
BDC where the revision of rules was on the agenda (every 4 years)
was also endorsed by the delegates at Margate. The FAC had the
power to reverse the decisions of the EC on matters concerned with
discipline and its decisions were final and binding. But. the
Execu t t ve Council's, attempt ·to extend the term of office of the lay
EC from .2 to 5 years was rejected by the SRRC, and so the EC
withdrew proposals to make membership of the EC a full-time job.
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The paradox of the 1962 SRRC was that under the leadership of
a right-wing EC the union shifted to the left. Or, more precisely,
the EC had to move left in order to keep ahead of the wave of anger
that swept through the union in the wake of the ballot-rigging
trial. So although the new leadership had instigated the democratic
reforms, they were supported whole-heartedly by the rank-and-file
activists in the union who made up the bulk of the SRRC delegates
and who were still, on the whole, well to the left politically of
Byrne and his associates:
"There was no sudden shift in the political
position of the union conference. It contained
a strong Left-wing representation and the tone
of the floor speeches in 1963 was little
different from those of the late 1950s." (7)
And if there was no clear sign yet that the new leadership were
ready to depart from the left Labour tradition of the union, John
Byrne's statement that the whole of the union's industrial
strength would be applied to secure improvements in the wages and
conditions of ETU members, seemed to make it clear that there would
be no departure from the union's traditional militancy either. (8)
At this early stage then, it must have been difficult for many
rank-and-file activists to view the Byrne leadership as "right-
wing". After all, it was they who introduced the democratic reforms
that extended rank-and-file control, reforms that had not been
introduced by the CP in its 15 year reign (a "real advance in
democracy" was how the CP in the ETU later described the reforms of
1962). (9) The CP was of course to become the main opposition force
in the union as the reforms of 1962 were whittled away during the
1960s, but the irony is that their failure to further democratise
the union in the 1950s paved the way for the right-wing to act as
the champions of rank-and-file democracy and thereby tighten its
grip on the union.
Margate was exceptional however. The right-wing leadership was
still not firmly entrenched and the CP was still in some disarray
following the trial. They both responded to the pressure from below
which culminated in what Patrick Wintour has described as an "orgy
of democracy" at the 1962 SRRC. (0) The crucial difference that
was to emerge between the right-wing and the left-wing in the union
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over the 1962 reforms was, that the left saw the reforms as
valuable additions to the already eXisting democratic structure of
the union, while the right saw some of the reforms as temporary
concessions to the rank-and-file that could be taken back as the
overall remodelling of the union I s internal structure got under
way. Ironically, in the coming years it was to be the Communist
dominated opposition grouping, Flashlight, that defended the
reforms of 1962 against the right-wing leadership that had
introduced them. The task the Reform Committee (as the Reform Group
now called themselves) centred around Les Cannon (elected President
in 1963), Frank Chapple (elected Assistant General Secretary 1963)
and National Organizer Kark Young set themselves at this stage,
was to prepare the ground for the 1965 Rules Revision Conference
(RRC) where they hoped their restructuring proposals would be
accepted by the delegates. Olga Cannon, presumably aware of the
historical parallels that could be drawn, says that the far
reaching reforms of 1965 created effectively a II New Kadel" union.
She also recalls that Les Cannon "prepared the way very
carefully". (11) Indeed Cannon was without doubt the prime mover and
major ideologue behind the transformation of the ETU into a "New
Kadel" union. However, the type of union that Les Cannon wished to
build had very little to do with the "New Kadel" unions of the
1850s in Britain, and a lot to do with the business trade unions of
the 1950s in the USA. We shall come back to this point later in the
chapter
The Reform Committee's strategy
Cannon and the Reform Committees's (RC) strategy in the run up to
the 1965 RRC can be conveniently divided into two parts: (a) their
campaign to get their restructuring proposals accepted; and (b)
their campaign to neutralise the organized opposition in the union
- the Communist Party.
(a) The first shot in the RC's campaign was to circulate in 1963 a
document produced by Cannon entitled the Internal Structure of the
Union. Cannon argued that the rules and internal structure of the
union reflected the needs of the ETU of the 1890s and not the
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1960s. He said that if every member of the union was to have
"administrative service facilities at the level of the best ... a
radical reorganisation of the branch structure of the union along
with the corresponding alterations at area and national level" was
urgently required. (12) The proposed new structure of the union
involved the abolition of the powerful Area Committees, the
amalgamation of most of the geographical branches based in the
ci ties and towns into large industrial branches, and the
replacement of the lay Executive Council by a full-time body. If we
examine Diagrams 2 and 3 in the Appendix, we can see that what
Cannon was proposing was a scrapping of the structure that emerged
after the "orgy of democracy" at the 1962 SRRC, and its replacement
by an industrial based structure. What cannot be seen from a
perusal of Diagram 3, and what did not become clear until much
later on, was how the new structure was designed to centralise
power in the union in the hands of the EC. In his document, Cannon
argues largely for restructuring in terms of cost and efficiency,
and only indirectly in terms of making the ETU more democratic.
There is a compelling and familiar logic governing Cannon's
proposals: an efficient, cost-conscious, centralised union
organisation geared to the complex world of the 1960s, would be
much better placed to provide a good service for its members than
the archaic Victorian union organisation that had lumbered on
hitherto. Many in the union must have seen the similarities between
Cannon's vision of a revitalized "New Model" ETU and Harold
Wilson's vision of a "New Britain" shorn of the incompetence and
out of date attitudes represented so plainly by the aristocratic
leader of the Conservative Party, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. If
Wilson's aim was to revitalise the "fitful and sluggish" British
economy in order to compete more successfully in the international
market place, then Cannon's aim was to revitalize the sluggish ETU
so that the union could compete more successfully within that
regenerated British economy. From this point on we see the
emergence of a distinct new ETU philosophy whose recurring themes
are efficiency, competence, professionalism, rationalisation and
modernization. Democracy begins to be subordinated to these aims,
and at best is seen largely in terms of better communication
between officials, shop-stewards and the ordinary members. In
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short, we see the beginnings of a business-like approach to trade
unionism in the ETU, an approach quite alien not only to the
traditions of the ETU but also the British trade union movement as
a whole.
However at this stage, 1963, the RC were still very unsure
whether or not they could carry their proposals with the bulk of
the membership let alone transform the ETU into a business union.
Their comments on the Internal Structure of the Union to the
Donovan Commission in 1966 give an indication of this unease:
" ... there then ensued two years of intensive
education and persuasion in order to bring the
proposed changes to the notice and
understanding of the rank-and-file members ... In
the event, a long period of discussion,
education and persuasion turned out to have
been most necessary since, despite all this
great effort, the proposals were only narrowly
passed at the Conference." (13)
During the "two years of intensive education and persuasion" the
EC's case was put across at hundreds of branch, district and area
meetings, in the pages of Electron, and at special pre-Conference
classes held at the union's Esher College. Despite this massive
campaign the result was very much in the balance, especially as the
organizational skills of Communist members in the union were being
used to oppose the EC's proposals. From the very start of the
campaign the RC set out not only to counter the CP's opposition but
in the words of Chapple, lito smash them once and for all". (14)
(b) Ever since the new EC took control of the union in January
1962, the editorials in Electron had been given over regularly to
attacking Communist "interference" in the union and warning of the
threat that they posed to the union's democracy. By "i nterference"
was meant unofficial circulars, factional organization, and
frequent blistering attacks on the EC in the columns of the Daily
Yorker. Precisely the forms of "interference" that Cannon and his
group were involved in when the CP were in control of the union, in
fact. During the course of 1963, however, the veiled warnings of
membership retribution that had hitherto been directed against the
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CP in the union began to take a more definite form. In a letter in
the June edition of Electron a member from Swindon, A. J. Davies,
advocated "barring all Communists from office":
"Some members will probably dismiss this by
saying 'witch hunt'. But I believe very
sincerely in democracy, and to my way of
thinking democracy means that no discrimination
should be taken against anyone purely on the
grounds that he or she belongs to any political
party or holds certain political, economic or
religious beliefs. In short, every member
should stand on equal terms with every other
member for any office becoming vacant wi thin
the Union.
But when it can be proven, as was done in the
High Court, that the Communist Party managed
and controlled the Union, then surely this must
be seen as a direct threat to our democracy."
(15)
Similar sentiments were expressed by W.G. Crowe in the August issue
of Electron. but Crowe went further and suggested that
"In view of the decisi ve mandate given to the
EC to remove the perpetrators of fraud (which
must include those who wittingly or unWittingly
support the return to power of those who owe
allegiance to the same creed). I would deem it
imperative to institute a ballot to ascertain
if the membership concur with this course of
action, to restore sanity and unity to our
organization." (16)
With the election of Cannon as President in September 1963
with the highest :vote for office in the union's history (34,978
votes, an overall majority of 14.502 over his two rivals), and the
return of the right-wing leadership in the Executive Council
elections of the same time, the Reform COIDIDittee must have felt
increasingly confident of their position. Now if ever, they must
have reasoned, was the time to move against the CPo But they needed
an excuse. This came in 1964, in the run up to the all important
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1965 RRC. The CP dominated opposition in the union circulated a
document entitled Amendments to Rul e, which 1 isted a number of
amendments that they were pushing for at the 1965 RRC. When the 243
"official" amendments reached Head Office from the branches, it was
claimed that 90 were either worded precisely as in the CP document,
or as near enough as to make no difference. (17) In view of this,
the EC decided in October that
"there has been outside interference by the
Communist Party in the internal affairs of the
Electrical Trades Union, calculated to
determine a substantial part of the agenda of
the Rules Revision Conference." (18)
W.G. Crowe's suggestion was then taken up and a special ballot
of the members was held on whether or not Communist Party members
should be allowed to hold any official positions in the union. The
ban on CP members holding office in the union was carried by 42,187
votes to 13,932 (the ban still holds to the present day; the only
other union to ban Communists from office, the T&GW. reversed
their 1949 ban in 1968). (19) Communist Party members who already
held office in the union were then given three months in which to
either give up that office or resign from the Party. There was no
persecution, Olga Cannon tells us, "rather the whole matter was
handled in keeping with the British tradition of fair play and of
gentlemen's agreements". (20) For its part the CP instructed its
members who held office in the union to resign, but then found that
only one official, Bert Atwood. would do so. Initially two other
full-time officials in the London Area decided to resign their
posts, but by January 1965 they had changed their minds, and the
election to replace them was called off. In all, twenty leading
Communists resigned from the Party rather than give up their
official positions in the union. (21) This was, of course, a body
blow to the morale of the CP members in the union, not to mention
the strategy of the British Road to Socialism which saw these very
same left-Wing officials as the key element in moving the labour
movement leftwards. So as the crucial 1965 RRC approached, the
organized opposition in the union had suffered a setback, while the
leadership ·seemed to be going from strength to strength. Be that as
it may, the CP were far from defeated, and they were far from being
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the only people in the union opposed to the restructuring
proposals. There were many rank-and-file members, especially
amongst the activists, just as opposed to the proposals as the CP
were. The leadership knew this, and so were still unsure of which
way the Conference would swing.
The 1965 Rules Reyision Conference
One sign of the leadership's unease about the possibility of defeat
was the venue chosen for the 1965 RRC - the Isle of Man. For a
cost-conscious leadership it seemed like an odd choice, but it had
the advantage of dissuading rank-and-file activists from making the
journey to lobby the delegates. Another sign was the ominous tone
of Cannon's Presidential address:
"The task before the Rules Revision Conference
is very great indeed. VIe now have probably a
once and for all chance to reform the internal
structure of the Union. If we fail in this
task, we fail to consumate all the great
possi bili ties before us. VIe will for a time
stagnate in organisational mediocrity waiting
at a later date to be rescued by some other
Union which has been able to grasp hold of
history and move along with it."
Besides dwelling on the gravity of the decisions that were to be
made by the delegates, Cannon associated the momentous changes that
were needed in the ETU with the Vlilsonian vision of a "New Britain"
forged in the "white heat of the technological revolution":
"VIe live at a time when every thinking person
in the country is anxious to see Britain
modernised as quickly as possible ... But for
Britain to be modernised, it means not only our
economy but our ideas and our institutions,
including the Trade .Union Movement ... So many
people are all for modernisation except when it
affects themselves. However, I am confident
that in this crucial moment in the history of
our Union, this Conference will show that when
it speaks of the new, modern
recognises the need for a
electrical workers' Union." (22)
Britain it
new, modern
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The message was clear: Harold Wilson's "New Britain" that was
to be built "on the basis of expanding output, expanding investment
and rising producti vi ty" demanded a new, modernised trade union
movement fit for the technological age. (23) The ETU could either
spearhead that change or fall by the wayside and later be swallowed
up by some other union that had grasped hold of history and moved
along with it. The immediate task, however, was an organisational
reshaping of the structure of the union in order to equip it for
the tasks that lay ahead. To this end the Executive Council
proposed three principal rule changes: firstly, the abolition of
the Area Committees and their replacement by Area Industrial
Conferences; secondly, the abolition of the lay Executive Council
which was elected every 2 years and its replacement by a full-time
EC elected every 5 years; and, thirdly, the amalgamation of the
geographical branches into large industrial branches under a full-
time appointed branch officer. The EC's thinking was
straightforward enough at one level. The old structure of the union
had to be Virtually scrapped and replaced by an industrial
structure that corresponded more closely with the collective
bargaining machinery operating in the various industries covered by
the union (see Diagram 3, Appendix). And this also ruled out
combinations of the old and the new structures, such as had come
into existence after the 1962 SRRC (see Diagram 2, Appendix)
But Cannon's Wilsonian vision of a streamlined and efficient
union for the new age was not really the main issue of contention
at the RRC. No doubt the majority of the delegates had welcomed the
return of a Labour Government after "thirteen years of Tory mis-
rule", and no doubt the maj ori ty of them shared the Wilsonian
vision of a better future, and no doubt they could appreciate that
this would mean the "modernising" of the union along industrial
lines. But the proposed rules changes were to do with much more
than modernisation: they were to do with democracy in the ETU. What
was being proposed by the. EC was a centralisation of power, an
extension of the Executive authority which had always been checked
by the powerful Area Committees, by branch autonomy, and by the
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fact that EC members still had to work alongside the people who had
elected them. Behind all the arguments about efficiency and
modernisation, which were genuine enough, lay the real issue of
where power should reside in the union. How the proposed new
industrial structure would affect the union's democracy, then, was
the central focus of the debate at Douglas.
(1) Abolition of the Area COmmittees
W.B. Blairford for the EC led off the lengthy debate on the
abolition of the Area Committees (ACs). He argued that the ACs were
not only costly and inefficient and rapidly becoming an impediment
in a period of technological change, but they were no longer
necessary as it was the EC's intention to extend the National
Industrial Conferences (NICs) set up in 1962 to Area level.
Delegates who spoke in favour of the EC's move focused their
criticisms, in the main, like Blairford, on the cost and poor
.-,
service of the ACs, or on personal experiences that had sullied
their respect for the Committees. But the major criticism levelled
against the ACs was that the branch delegates who attended them had
scant knowledge of the particular industries or workplaces that
they were expected to make decisions about, a problem that would
not arise in Area Industrial Conferences (AICs) where the delegates
would be drawn from the same industry and many from the same
workplaces. Cannon linked this criticism directly to the issue of
union democracy. Democracy requires two things, he said:
"The first is that there shall be opportunity
for people to discuss and take part in deciding
matters which affect their interest. That is
democracy as far as the Trade Unionist is
concerned. It requires that, and requires one
other thing, which our Union did not have
sufficient of over many years: it requires a
critical frame of mind so that people can take
advantage of those opportunities ...
Let me now look at the functions of the middle
committee organisation in the light of that
conception of democracy ...
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Just how do you explain, in the light of
democracy, an Area Committee on which there
might be no Electricity Supply Delegates in
these days when a complicated agreement has to
be interpreted, a part of which provides for
the introduction of new patterns of working
depending upon District agreement. That means
that the Area Official, I suppose, would
consul t the Area Committee ... I say here and
now... they are not competent to decide. They
should not decide whether these staggers should
be worked. The people the Area Officials should
consult and no one else are the Shop
Stewards and the Works Committee members of the
Electrical Trades Union in the Electricity
Supply Industry. Is there an Electricity Supply
man here who wi 11 come and say he wants to
forego the opportunity to decide whether he
will go on one of these staggers, leaving the
decision to other members of the Union in other
industries?" (24)
Cannon's point was well made. The proposed new AICs would be far
more democratic than the ACs, he was saying. because workers in
particular sectors of the electrical industry would have delegates
discussing subj ects of which they had an intimate knowledge and
which directly affected their own livelihoods.
The EC's case against the Area Committees was essentially
twofold then. Firstly they argued that the ACs were inefficient not
only in terms of cost to the union but also as local negotiating
bodies. Secondly, they said that the ACs were undemocratic because
of the cross-industry basis of their composition, which often
precluded delegates from particular industries having a say in the
decisions that directly affected them. Even on those ACs that did
have representatives from all the industries covered by the union,
the EC argued that only those with an intimate knowledge of the
relevant industry in question were competent to make decisions
relating to that industry. It was not a matter of broader
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representation, then, but of first hand knowledge and experience
gained from working in the industries concerned. The proposed new
AICs, made up entirely of delegates from one industry would, it was
argued, be far more efficient and far more democratic than the ACs.
How did the opposition to the EC' s proposals counter these and
other arguments in the course of the debate?
The argument hitherto expounded by the EC and many of the pro-
EC delegates at the Conference concerning the high cost of the ACs
compared to the proposed new, cost-conscious AICs was disposed of
from a rather unexpected quarter - Les Cannon:
"" I think what you can say is that with the
optimum attendance at Area Industrial
Conferences, the new arrangements would
probably work out at the same cost." (25)
As to the main charge that the ACs were undemocratic, the
oppositionists argued that if it was the case that the ACs'
composition precluded certain sections of the electrical industry,
then the answer was not to abolish them, but to extend their
functions and representation. It was admitted that errors of
judgement could be made because delegates might not possess an
intimate knowledge of a particular industry or factory, but, as one
delegate put it:
"How often did our Area Coromi ttee delegates
arrive at a decision which was contrary to the
views of the shop stewards and members employed
in any particular industry? On the contrary,
the decision to el iminate the Area Committees
by the Executive Council may well arise from
the support given by these Committees to our
members engaged in local disputes and because
of oppositional viewpoints expressed by them in
relation to national issues." (26)
Another delegate pointed out that lack of intimate knowledge of a
particular industry or workplace was not a problem faced by the ACs
alone. Surely, he said, the EC had a greater problem in this
respect?
If Cannon's two requirements for union democracy were to be
taken seriously, it would seem that the ACs.went a long way in
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meeting those requirements. For the ACs were not just talking
shops, they possessed real power at local level, and thus provided
an arena where a genuine participatory democracy could develop.
Many delegates made the point that the ACs were the training
grounds for members with the potential to become officials and
forums where rank-and-file members could gain an intimate knowledge
of industries other than their own. As a delegate from Govan in
Glasgow explained:
"I believe that the Area Committee is important
as a proving ground. I have worked in the
Shipbuilding and Contracting industries and I
am now in the Miscellaneous section. I have
learned a lot about Supply, although I have
never worked there, primarily because I have
listened to the problems of Supply delegates at
these Area Committee meetings." (27)
This echoed another complaint about the proposed new AICs:
that they would lead to sectionalism, cutting members off from the
broad affairs of the union. Cannon took note of this concern and
suggested that the problem could be alleviated by the development
of Electron into a monthly newspaper whose front and back pages
would be "white" twenty-four hours before publication, so that news
could reach the members rapidly. Cannon also reminded the
Conference that there was also provison under the Rules for any
member to visit any branch of the union and speak on any subject on
the agenda.
But the real issue was not communication or lack of it. The
real issue was the power and autonomy that the ACs had, a power and
autonomy that went completely against the centralisation that was
at the heart of Cannon's plan to remodel the union. Surprisingly,
this crucial issue was skirted both by the EC and the organized
opposi tion at the Conference - the Communist Party. Al though it
underlay the arguments of both sides, it was only mentioned once
directly by a delegate from Luton:
"There is a place in this organisation for Area
Committees. Why are' they not allowed to
function? This is because the Executive Council
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are either afraid or do not want to delegate
powers to the Area Committee ... " (28)
The reason why the EC avoided the issue of power and instead
concentrated on cost, efficiency and democracy is not hard to
fathom. If they had concentrated on the powers of the ACs compared
to the "powers" of the proposed AICs they might well have badly
damaged their case. For the ACs of the ETU, like the District
Committees of the AEU on which they were based, had not only
widespread powers to appoint delegates to the various local Joint
Industrial Councils and trade union bodies, to convene meetings of
shop-stewards and to discipline members, but they also had the
power to
"deal with and regulate the rates of wage,
hours of labour, terms of overtime and general
conditions affecting the interests of the
members of the Union in the area." (29)
What is more, all the decisions of the ACs were binding on the
members in the Area. Thus the ACs were powerful autonomous bodies,
al though they were sti 11 su bj ect to the overall control of the
Executive Council.
In contrast the powers of the proposed AICs would be
restricted to electing delegates to the union's annual National
Industrial Conferences and local Joint Industrial Councils and
trade union bodies "by such number and in such a manner as
determined by the Executive Council". (30) The local negotiating
powers of the ACs would be virtually abolished and replaced by four
AlCs per year covering, initially, electrical contracting,
electrical supply, ship bUilding and ship repair and engineering
and they would merely act as consultative bodies - they would have
no binding powers. Later Area Industrial Committees would replace
the quarterly AICs, which would then meet annually, but their
powers, or lack of them, would be the same, restricted to assisting
the local full-time official. The AICs would be exactly what Cannon
said they would be in his speech about the two requirements of
democracy, places where members of the same section of the
electrical industry could discuss openly and critically common
problems. What was not said, however, was that no matter how much a
particular problem was discussed the final decision to implement a
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particular negotiating strategy (for example, a rise in overtime
payments at a factory backed up by an overtime ban) rested with the
full-time official and not the Area Industrial Conferences or the
Area Industrial Committees. Cannon's conception of democracy was
all to do with discussion and very little to do with power - rank-
and-file members actually having a direct controlling interest in
the matters that affected their day to day existence.
'What is puzzling is why the organized opposition in the ETU
(the CP and their supporters) should concentrate their fire on the
issues raised by the Executive (the cost and composition of the ACs
and so forth), as important as these were, and not demonstrate that
the real intent behind the EC's proposals had 11ttle to do with
cost and democracy and everything to do with the centralisation of
power in the union in other words, a massive reduction in
democracy. Presumably, they thought they could win the argument
within the confines of the agenda set by the Executive Council. But
to stray outside this agenda had dangers for both sides. For the EC
the argument about cost and democracy conveniently avoided the
particulars about the power shift that would take place if their
proposals were implemented. For the organized opposition, to press
this point might have caused the EC to resort to its familiar
tactic of claiming that the ACs were controlled by a minority of
Communist Party members and "fellow-travellers". This, only months
after the ballot that banned CP members from holding any official
positions in the union, was obviously an area that the CP wanted to
avoid. It was also an area that the EC wanted to avoid as well. The
ACs were popular despite the disproportionate influence of the CP
in them. To portray them as tools of the CP in front of a
Conference of activists would hardly have gone down too well. So
the crucial issue of power was not tackled head on by either side
in the debate, only indirectly.
In the end the vote in favour of thE! EC position was close -
325 votes for the Amendment and 292 votes against.
'Wi th hindsight what can be made of the Executive Council's claim
that the abolition of the ACs served the best interests of ETU
members by providing them with· a more efficient and democratic
structure? If by efficient they meant a 'streaml i ned industrial
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structure that corresponded more closely with the contours of the
collective bargaining machinery in the electrical industry, then
the EC had a strong case. Of course it was more efficient and made
more sense for members in particular industries to come together in
local and national Industrial Conferences to hammer out issues and
discuss wages and conditions in their area of work. Not
surprisingly then the National Industrial Conferences were welcomed
by union activists at the 1962 SRRC, as even the CP admitted. They
were welcomed because they were seen as complimenting the existing
structure of the union (at this time there was no talk of the
abolition of the ACs) and were thus seen as extending democracy in
the union, and because, as we have said, the logic of the
Industrial Conference, calling delegates from one industry
together, seemed sound to most ETU members. However, the ECI s
decision to get rid of the ACs and replace them by AICs changed the
situation entirely. Now what was proposed was not a compliment to
the eXisting system but a replacement. And if the EC could argue
with some justice that the new industrial structure was more
efficient, the argument that it was more democratic holds little
water.
With all their shortcomings the ACs were nothing if not
democratic. They were made up of delegates elected every two years
from every branch of the union in a particular area. The Area
President was elected by the newly elected members and the Area
Secretary (a full-time position) by the entire membership of the
area. And as we have seen, the cornerstone of their democracy was
the power they had over local negotiating policy, the power to
translate decisions into local policy, whether on over-time
working, discipline, or support for strikes. Democracy was thus not
just about discussion, but about action also. So in stark contrast
to the AI Cs, in the Area Commit tees there was no di vorce between
negotiating policy and democracy - they were the two sides of the
same coin.
Why then were such democratic bodies rejected by the delegates
at the 1965 Conference? Partly for the reasons outlined above, and
partly because it seems that the actual powers that the AICs would
have were not altogether clear to the delegates. Most delegates,
presumably, envisaged the AlCs haVing more powers than they were in
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fact to have, although the rule change presented to the delegates
made it qu i t e clear that important functions of the ACs (such as
regulating wages and hours) would not be transferred to the new
bodies. Given this uncertainty, those who voted against the
Executive Council were probably in favour of Area Industrial
Conferences but not at the expense of ACs. Put another way, they
held to the 1962 position a mixture of the old and new
structures. Those who voted for the rule change more than likely
did so in the belief that the new AICs would carry more weight than
in fact they were to do. However this is speculation. What is clear
with hindsight though, is the role that Cannon saw for the "middle
Committee organisation" of the union the Area Industrial
Conferences.
B.C. Roberts observed that unions which have District or Area
Committees can be divided into two main categories,
"those which empower the Committees to conduct
an important part of the union's business, and
those which use them merely for consul tative,
advisory and propaganda purposes." (3D
Area Committees fell into the former category, Area Industrial
Conferences (and National Industrial Conferences) firmly into the
latter. Questioned by Hugh Clegg during the course of the ETU's
oral evidence to the Donovan Commission in November 1966 as to
whether the Industrial Conferences had the power to make decisions
or were merely consultative, Cannon replied:
"They take decisions on general lines of
policy... It is not possible to take a decision
which will direct each stage of negotiations.
At the industrial conferences they are dealing
with the report of negotiations which have
taken place, or they might be dealing with some
interim report of negotiations which are
proceedi ng. They will give a general view of
what they think about the direction in which
the negotiations are going, and the negotiators
are thus guided. If they feel that the
negotiations are going in a totally wrong
direction they make that perfectly clear to us
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and we would have to take heed of it. It is not
so much a question of having power to decide
what should be done; "consultative" is probably
the proper word ... " (32)
If Cannon had been so honest at the 1965 Conference it is doubtful
whether the rule change would have been carried. The Industrial
Conferences were to be powerless, providing no mechanism for rank-
and-file members to sit on negotiating committees, let alone
allowing ratification of agreements before they were signed.
The destruction of the semi-autonomous centres of power in the
union - the ACs - was a major achievement for the leadership. The
immediate gain as far as the Executive Council were concerned was
to isolate the local activists, especially those belonging to the
CP, from their strongholds in the ACs. It also set the process in
motion of moving the union away from the old geographical branch
and Area organisation towards an "American-style industry-based
system, with area industrial committees and national industrial
conferences which have no binding influence on industrial
officers". (33)
(2) Abolition of the rank-and-file Executiye Council
The leadership's recommendation to abolish the lay Executive
Council of the union and replace it with a full-time one elected
every 5 years instead of every two years, was argued for largely on
the need for technical expertise and cost saving. A rank-and-file
EC was fine in the early days of the ETU, argued E. Hadley on
behalf of the Executive Council, but with the rapid growth and
industrial di versi ty of the union what was now demanded was the
specialized skills of a full-time EC:
" ... it is not so easy now for the part-time
Executive Council members to understand the
working conditions of all our members in these
diverse industries, primarily because in all
probability they have no working experience in
most of the industries from which our members
are drawn ...
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The Executive Council has the responsibility to
examine and ratify every agreement negotiated
by the Union at both national and local levels.
For this reason alone, the part-time Executive
Council member inevitably tends to become the
servant of the officials who have the time and
facilities at their disposal to master all and
every detai I of every section of every
trade .. . We agree with the early founders of our
Union, that the Executive Council must have the
final authority in the Union. We also believe
that they have to a very large extent lost that
authority because they have not had the time to
master their job... At the same time, this part-
time Executive Council lacks even the virtue of
economy... it is costing this Union on an
average t1,240 per Executive Council member per
year for the Executive Council as it exists at
present." (34)
The need for a professional Executive Council as opposed to a
costly and fumbling part-time one were the main reasons given by
Hadley in support of the EC' s recommendation. Hadley also put the
argument that EC authority was being undermined by the power of the
full-time officials. So that those in the union who saw the lay EC
as a cornerstone of the union's democracy could not see that this
very democracy was being undermined by the technical expertise that
the elected full-time officials were able to acquire and upon which
the lay EC members were dependent. The implication was clear: the
lay EC were in grave danger of becoming the mere puppets of the
full-time officials and the only way to rectify this position was
to raise the technical level of the EC members by making them full-
timers.
Opposition delegates took on this argument directly. They
argued that the greater industrial di versi ty of the union was no
reason to make the EC a full-time body, but a good reason to elect
more full-time of f t c I a l e , As for the cost, one delegate reckoned
that the cost of six new full-time officials, as opposed to the
cost of eleven full-time EC members, would save the union tl0,OOO
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per year. (35» But the main thrust of the opposition case was to
do with the role of the EC and full-timers and the relationship
between the two. Far from the lay EC members becoming servants of
the full-time officials, they argued it was precisely their
function to keep a check on the officials and make sure they
carried out the general policy of the union. The primary function
of the EC members was not therefore to have a detailed knowledge of
all the agreements negotiated by the union at local and national
level or even in one particular section of the electrical industry,
rather their function was policy implementation and direction of
the full-timers. They would naturally be acquainted with many
agreements in great detail, but their main task was to ratify
agreements in consultation with the officials and the membership
in the various sections of the industry. A contribution from a
delegate from Edinburgh summed up the general position of the
oppositionists:
"Bro. Hadley gave us a wonderfully correct
answer to the problems we are faced with but
the answer was given to a very wrong question.
The question that should have been asked by the
Executi ve Council is, "What is the purpose of
the Executive Council?" The lay members of the
Executive Council are the safeguard and the
watchdog of the membership of the trade union.
When he said to us that the part-time Executive
Council become the slaves of the full-time
officials, he also led us to believe that if we
elect a purely full-time Executive Council then
the membership becomes the slave of the full-
time officials ... a lay membership of the
Executive Council is our stop button for
anything that we feel might be wrong with the
organisation of the trade union." (36)
Once again then union democracy was at the heart of the
restructuring debate. Both the Ee and the opposition argued for and
against the rule change by reference to safeguarding the union's
democracy. For the EC the efficiency of the union organization
would be vastly improved by a full-time EC that was also capable of
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controlling what they referred to in their evidence to Donovan as
the "full-time professional bureaucracy" of the union. (37) For the
opposition the efficiency of the union's organization would be
improved by the election of more full-time officials and the
retention of a rank-and-file EC as the best means of controlling
and directing the full-timers. Koreover, in this debate (unlike in
the debate over the ACs) the implications of the leadership's
attempts to centralize the union's structure came fully to the
fore. Fred Gore a leading oppositionist in the union explained it
like this:
"The Executive Council are calling for a full-
time Executive Council. This will mean that we
will be electing the supreme policy-making body
in the union for five years instead of two
years at present. Not only will the Executive
Council decide policy, but they will implement
it and conduct all important negotiations. The
individual Executive Councillor by virtue of
that office will become the senior official
controlling Area Officials in a Regional
Office. By judiciously recruiting branches and
installing a full-time branch secretary, this
Executive Council devised structure, including
their proposal to eliminate Area Committees,
will ensure complete domination from the top on
all policy questions, and national and district
wage negotiations." (38)
This was, indeed, the shape of things to come.
The debate ended with a card vote and a victory for the
leadership. The EC' s amendment to the rules was carried by 321
votes to 297, with one invalid vote. But as the debate and the
close vote showed, the centraliZing principle pursued by the
leadership, although it was presented in terms of efficiency, cost-
saving and union democracy, kept on running up against the
established tradition of rank-and-file control which was based upon
the decentralising pr-f ncd p Le ,of the separation of powers. Indeed,
.. ,
Cannon specifically mentioned ~he American political system as the
model that some delegates seemed to think appropriate to the ETU
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and begged them to introduce a little more realism into the debate.
Ironically it was this "American system" with its separation of
powers that the Cannon leadership saw as the main obstacle to
transforming the ETU into an American style business union, while
the Communists and other oppositionists in the union were busy
defending the "American way".
It was in many ways a classical debate, with both sides
unwittingly employing arguments that were used by both the Webbs
and M1chels. The Webbs had pinpointed what they considered to be
the major dilemma of late 19th Century trade union democracy:
" ... the problem of uni ting efficient
administration with popular control." (39)
They argued that the growth and complexity of trade union affairs
had put popular control (by this they meant direct democracy)
outside the reach of the average trade unionist who was "unversed
in the technicalities of administration." (40) The solution to this
democratic dilemma was, according to the Webbs, the acceptance of
representative institutions such as existed in the cotton spinning
union (which had an EC made up of seven working spinners and six
full-time officials). However, the Webbs did not deny (indeed they
welcomed) the fact that the "representative solution" that these
unions had found necessarily entailed the creation of "two classes
of members, salaried officials... and representative wage earners,
and that the paramount necessity of efficient administration
produced "a progressive differentiation of an official governing
class, more and more marked off by character, training and duties
from the bulk of the members". (41) Nonetheless they believed that
"popul ar- control" could be exerted on "this civil service of the
trade union world" by union "parliaments" (conferences) where the
rank-and-file had their say and elected their leaders, and by the
working spinners on the Exceutive checking the powers of its full-
time members.
Similar problems are raised in discussing the ETU. Both the
leadership and the opposition admitted the power of the officials,
and both wanted to add to that power. The leadership by making the
EC full-time,. the opposition by creating more full-time officials.
But there was a difference. The opposition believed that because
the majority of full-timers were elected at local level they were
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s'tr-ongly conat.r-atned in their act t one , and the rank-and-file EC
members acted as a dQuble check Qn these Qfficials as well as the
nat i onal l y elected of f t cta l s such as Cannon and Chapple. And of
course , the off i cfaLs elected at Local level cou l d a.l so act as a
check Qn the lay EC. FQr despite the fact that they were still "Qn
the tQQls", and therefQre in theQry open t o direct pressure f r-om
their wQrkmates tQ act demQcratically, it was CQmmon knQwledge that
EC members wQrked fQr the uniQn, as Hadley put it, "Qn a tempQrary
full-time basis" anyway. (42) These checks WQuid disappear Qnce the
ACs and the rank-and-file EC were abol Lahed (and it must a l so be
remembered that ETU confer-ence decfatone were not; binding on the
leadership). True the off LcfaLs were still t o be elected (until
1969 that is), but the checks and balances that were inherent in a
demQcracy that separated pQwer between natiQnal and IQcal Qfficials
and the EC were tQ be IQst. SQ already the "pQpular pQwer" enjQyed
by ETU members did nQt seem tQ fare very well with that enjQyed by
the cQttQn-spinners at the end Qf the last century.
Hadley's argument that lack Qf expertise made it pQssible fQr
the full-time official tQ manipulate the lay EC member, missed the
pQint that the delegate frQm Edinburgh had made: if the lay EC were
the slaves Qf the full-timers WQuid that nQt mean that the
membership WQuid be the slaves Qf a full-time Executive CQuncil? On
the one hand, Hadley seemed t.o be agreeing with Xichels' theQry
that "the principal cause of o.l i gar-chy... is t o be f'cund in the
technical indispensability of leadership". (43) On the other- hand,
he was prQpQsing a sQlutiQn tQ this prQblem that WQuid increase the
"technical indispensability of leadership" while at the same time
remQving the existing checks Qn the abuse Qf that pQwer. LQQked at
either frQm the Webbs' Qr Michels' pQsitiQn, the leadership's
reasQning that a full-time EC WQuld curb the pQwer Qf the Qfficials
appears very flimsy.
(3) Branch amalgamatiQns
In his Qpening address tQ the CQnference CannQn Qutlined the
prQpQsals fQr phasing Qut mQst Qf the geQgraphical branches Qf the
uniQn and amalgamating them intQ large industrial branches made up
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of members from the same section of the electrical industry and
administered by a full-time branch secretary/treasurer:
"Our proposals will permit, on the basis of
sound economics, the possibility of full-time
administrative officers in branches of 1,400
and upwards. This means that not only the major
cities - such as London, Manchester, Liverpool,
Glasgow and Birmingham with a membership of
10,000 and above, not only Sheffield,
Edinburgh, Leeds and Bristol with a membership
around the 3000 - but also smaller cities and
large towns... In total, it might be possible,
even in the beginning, to think in terms of 50
full-time administrative officers covering our
membership in the cities and large towns and
involving as much as 40 per cent of our total
membership. Even in this transitional stage, we
shall not lose sight of the ultimate objective
of trying to get quickly to industrial
branches." (44)
Cannon's projection was that the existing 600 odd branches of
the ETU and their lay branch secretaries should in the not too
distant future be incorporated into a streamlined industrial
structure that reduced the number of branches to about 100, each
headed by a full-time officer. So in the major cities and towns all
the contracting members would be in one branch and all the supply
workers in another, and so on. It was agreed that not all branches
would fit neatly into this new industrial structure, especially in
country areas, consequently many of the old geographical branches
would continue to exist as before. But once again what seemed on
the surface to be a debate about how best to make the union more
efficient and business-like, turned out to be an argument about
union democracy, about the centralization of power in the union and
the rights of the rank-and-file.
The result of the debate was almost a foregone conclusion,
since the rule changes abolishing the ACs and the rank-and-file EC
had already been carried by the Conference. The debate then did not
centre on the rights and wrongs of the new industrial structure as
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such (that argument seemed already to be lost) but rather on the
implications of the proposed rule changes. Moreover, and this is a
point worth stressing in the light of the subsequent forced
amalgamation of some branches of the union and the appointment of
some full-time branch secretaries against the wishes of the
branches concerned, the rule changes under debate only referred to
the election and not the appointment of full-time branch
secretaries, and to the amalgamation of branches only after
consultation with the various branch committees:
"Where the Executive Counci 1 consider it
necessary, the branch shall elect a full-time
officer who shall perform the duties of
secretary/treasurer .. "
"The Executive Council in consultation with the
appopriate branches shall from time to time
determine the limits of each branch." (45)
The points made in the debate about efficiency and democracy are
thus very revealing, given the storms that were to take place in
the union in the 1910s over the appointment of branch officers and
the closure and amalgamation of branches without consultation.
The case the EC and their supporters presented in the debate
was quite straightforward, and all the more compelling because of
that. They simply argued that full-time branch officers were
obviously in a better position to provide the membership with a far
more efficient service than were the overworked lay branch
secretaries who had to earn a living as well as carry the burdens
of their local branch. That lay branch officials, as dedicated as
they were, could not hope to hold down a regular job and then put
in as much as 28 hours a week in branch work and at the same time
maintain an efficient service for the members seemed
incontrovertible. (46) As to the fears voiced by some delegates
about the way the new proposals would be implemented, Cannon
assured them that the EC could "not successfully reconstruct
branches without consultation, without good will ... we will proceed
with the greatest caution with the maximum consultation", (47)
If the EC's arguments rested once again on the need to
construct a modern, efficient union structure in order to provide a
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better service for the membership, then once again the opposition
pointed to the danger that centralisation posed to the union's
internal democracy. As a delegate from the Watford branch of the
union argued:
"The proposal to have full-time branch
officials is not, in my opinion, a simple move
to strengthen the efficiency of this union,
al though I would agree that in certain
circumstances it might be useful and possibly
desirable. I feel it is a move that will give
the Executive Council the powers to make one of
the most drastic changes ever in the
construction of our union. It will open the
flood gates, giving the Executive Council the
supreme power to change the absolute
construction of the union... Branches, as they
are now constituted, are the focal point of our
organisation where every individual member can
join in the administration, debate policy,
discuss the work of the Executive Council and
put forward his suggestions... If we pass this
amendment, we will give the Executive Council
the powers to herd our members into huge
industrial branches. This will decrease
membership participation in our union and be
one more step towards putting our union firmly
in the hands of full-time officials." (48)
Other issues and questions were raised by the opposition
delegates. How would the amalgamation of branches affect ETU
representation on local bodies such as Trades Councils and Labour
Party committees? How much would the full-time branch secretaries
be paid? How big would the branches become - 15,000 strong? But the
main concern was loss of rank-and-file control and the augmentation
of Executive power. However, on a show of hands the rule change was
declared to be carried. There were cries for a card vote but Cannon
refused.
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As we have seen then, at the 1965 RRC <probably the most
important in the union's history), the EC's proposals for
remodelling the union on the lines put forward by Cannon in his
1963 paper the Internal structure of the Union were all narrowly
carried by the delegates. The "New Kodel" union envisaged by Cannon
was now about to take shape. However, the leadership had not quite
finished reshaping the internal structure and thus the internal
democracy of the union to their complete satisfaction in 1965. But
by the time of the union's 1969 Conference they felt confident and
secure enough not only to finish the job, but to discard some of
the democratic reforms that they themselves had introduced during
the "orgy of democracy" at the 1962 SRRC, and also to jettison one
of the cornerstones of ETU democracy.
There were three major rule changes proposed by the Executive
Council at the 1969 Conference: firstly, the abolition of the Rank-
and-File Appeals Committee established at the 1962 Conference;
secondly, the abolition of elections for full-time officials; and,
thirdly, the abolition of the elected rank-and-file trustees of the
union. All these measures were rej ected by the delegates. The EC
then by-passed the decisions of the Conference and successfully
balloted the entire membership of the union on the rule changes.
The most important consequence of the ballot victory as far as the
EC were concerned was that they could now appoint all 150 full-time
officials of the union. Far from the EC being the servants of the
officials, as Hadley had argued for the leadership in the 1965
debate on the abolition of the lay EC, the full-timers were now the
servants of the Executive, or, more precisely the National Officers
of the union - Cannon, Chapple, Young and their close associates.
The separation of powers that gave elected officials a large degree
of independence from the central apparatus grouped around Cannon,
as well as giving the membership a real choice of candidates, was
now to all intents and purposes destroyed.
In the space of seven years then the internal democratic
structure of the Electricians' Union had changed out of all
recogni tion. The semi-autonomous centres of power in the union -
the Area Committees - had disappeared, the branches were in the
process of being closed down and amalgamated, and there were now
only 14 elected positions in the entire union as opposed to over
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160 before 1969. The new industrial structure was arguably more
"efficient" and practical, in that it corresponded more closely
with the contours of the collective bargaining process and brought
together ETU members in the same sector of the electrical industry.
But despite claims to the contrary by the leadership, the "New
Kodel" was no where near as democratic as the the structure that
emerged after the 1962 Conference. For neither the National or Area
Industrial Conferences were endowed with any binding powers, the
independence of the branches was to be checked by amalgamation and
in many cases the appointment of full-time branch secretaries, the
main organized opposition in the union - the CP - was banned from
holding any office, and the referendum was used to by-pass any
unfavourable conference decisions <although it will be remembered
that the leadership did not have to resort to this expedient as
conference decisions had never been binding on the the EC in the
ETU) .
The overall aim of the changes was, as we have argued, to
centralise power in the union and isolate the active and organized
elements from their bases in the branches and ACs. However, the
leadership recognized that centralisation could only go so far in
any trade union; and this itself was a problem for the leadership,
as their comments on the function of the shop steward to the
Donovan Conmrlssion indicate:
"The ETU recognises that the function and
activi ty of the shop steward is necessary as
the most direct and positive link with their
rank and file membership... At the same time it
is recognised that the position is not without
its dangers to the official structure and could
have a disruptive effect upon trade union
discipline since by its very nature the
steward/member relationship cannot be rigidly
controlled." (49)
What was true of the shop-pteward was also true of the
activists in the union. No matter how far power had been
centralized in the union, it was impossible for the leadership to
rigidly control the activists in the union. They would always be an
unpredictable force liable to upset the best laid plans of the EC.
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In fact the strength of the opposition had been growing since
1965, as the rejection of the EC's proposals at the 1969 Conference
shows. One of the main reasons for this was that it had become
increasingly clear that the remodelling of the union undertaken by
Cannon was part and parcel of a dramatic shift in the political and
industrial strategy of the union. The rising internal opposition in
the late 1960s was a reflection of this fact. With hindsight,
however, we can see that underlying the dissatisfaction felt by a
large section of the membership with the policies pursued by the
leadership was a more fundamental, and as yet unrecognized, shift
in the orientation of the union, a shift that entailed a move away
from the traditional British model of trade unionism towards an
American type model. It was this model that had inspired the
changes that Cannon had championed.
Britain's first business unipn?
In its evidence to the Donovan Commission the ETU claimed that a
"new attitude" was developing in British trade unions. This "new
atti tude" they said was "in line with the conception of trade
unionism held by men such as Walter Reuther in America". (50)
Before examining the particular attraction that the leader of the
United Auto Workers mAW), Walter Reuther, held for the ETU, we
will look firstly, and more generally, at the allurements of
American business or market unionism as it developed in the 1950s.
For without doubt the American-model of the 1950s provided Cannon
not only with a structural model to follow, but also with a
philosophy that dovetailed quite easily with the politics of right-
wing Labourism that gUided the actions of the EC throughout Harold
Wilson's first term of office. And it has been this marriage of
American business unionism and right-wing Labourism, consumated in
the 1960s, which has prevailed and developed in the union until the
present day.
If we first look at the general "philosophy" of American
business unionism as it developed during the 1950s, what is
striking are the similarities between this philosophy and that
developed by the ETU in the 1960s. Daniel Bell has captured quite
well the shift in American trade union policy and attitudes in the
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1950s. In his The End Qf IdeOlQgy, Bell argues that hiatorrceLly
ADerican trade uniQnism must be seen as existing in tWQ cQntexts,
as a sQcial movement and an eCQnQmic fQrce (market uniQnism),
playing a different r oLe in each. As a soctat mQvement or-gamaed
labQur can be seen as part Qf an histQrical trend that challenges
the established Qrder:
"Xarket unf onfam, on the ot.her hand, is an
eCQnQmic cQnceptiQn, a delimiting rQle and
functiQn, impQsed by the realities Qf the
special industrial envirQnment in which the
um on oper-at.ee.." (51)
Bell makes clear, hQwever, that the distinctiQn between sQcial
mQvement and market uniQnism is nQt a distinctiQn between pQlitical
and cQllective bargaining uniQnism, for all trade uniQns are
directly Qr indirectly fQrced intQ pQlitics. What sort Qf pQlitics
came t o the f or-e , t.hcse that challenged the established or-der- or-
thQse that remained firmly within the cQnfines Qf that Qrder, was
dependent on the particular circumstances prevailing at the tiDe.
DiViding the history Qf the American labQur mQvement frQm 1860 tQ
1955 intQ fQur periQds, Bell shQWS hQW in each periQd it was either
the ideas of a social movement or market unt ontsn that dondna't.ed
the labQur and trade uniQn movement. In his fQurth periQdizatiQn -
1940-1955 - he argues that the aocta I movement, the "ideQIQgical
f Lavour-" that had domf nat.ed the Labour movement in pr-evfoue
per i ods (1860-1880, 1933-1940), and had existed in confI Lc't with
market unf onten between 1880-1920 (the 1920s being a par-Led of
stagnatiQn accQrding to Bell), was abandQned and instead the trade
unf ons concent.rat.ed on market uni.ontsn. Whatever may be said of
Bell's all tQQ neat schema, it seems clear that in pQst-war America
there was indeed a sharp mQve away frQm any ideQlogy rOQted in the
unions that challenged the established order and a dramatic shift
tQwards the ideQIQgy Qf market uniQnism.
A repQrt by the InternatiQnal Labour OrganizatiQn, who sent a
mtsaf on to study the trade union situation in the USA in 1959,
prOVides a vivid picture Qf the shift Bell was writing about. The
ILO delegation
" ... was struck in its discussions with union
leaders by the almost total absence of any
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questioning of the bases of the American
economic and social system. Unlike many labour
movements in Europe and elsewhere, the trade
unions in the United States do not appear to
even consider, still less advocate, any major
changes in the system in which they operate, in
spite of the many bitter battles that have
occured between unions and capital." (52)
According to Bell, in practice this meant that there was a
growing awareness amongst trade union leaders that wage and welfare
increases could only be obtained above and beyond the cost of
liVing if they were linked to increases in productivity. This
resulted in a major shift in the collective bargaining strategy of
American trade unions in the 1950s, one that not only eschewed any
form of challenge to the priorities of the market economy, but one
that consciously formulated its bargaining strategy on the basis of
the competitive needs of the particular company or industry. Of
course this did not mean there was total harmony between capital
and labour as the 1LO's comments make clear. And Bell himself noted
that
"the logic of market-unionism leads to a
limi ted, uneasy partnership of union and
company, or union and industrYi uneasy because
in many cases employers would still prefer to
exercise sole power, although the more
sophisticated employers know the value of such
powerful allies as the union in safeguarding
their interestsj uneasy, too, because there is
still the historic tendency of labour, acting
as a social movement, to oppose the employers
as a class." (53)
Nonetheless, the shift was real enough, and can be compared to the
similar shift that has taken place in the British labour movement
in the last ten years or so - from the militancy of the 1970s to
the "new realism" of the 1980s.
Overall, though, it is not hard to see why the ETU leadership
should be attracted to the American attitude towards industrial
relations and why they saw signs of this "new attitude" developing
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in the mid-1960s under the Labour Government of Harold Wilson. For
the "Joint Statement of Intent on Productivity, Prices and
Incomes", signed in 1964 by the TUC, the Labour Government and
employers' organizations, premissed as it was on the sound market
reasoning that social benefits and increases in wages could only
come as a result of an expanding economy, left unquestioned the
bases of the economic and social system that the ILO had noted in
their discussions with American trade union leaders. However, the
panacea of economic growth continued to escape the Wilson
Government, and in its increasingly desperate search for the
conditions in which that growth could occur, the Government turned
on the trade unions, imposing wage restraint, fostering
productivity deals, and eventually attempting to introduce anti-
union legislation modelled partly on the notorious American Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947 - "In Place of Strife". (54) But even when the
most moderate of trade unions deserted the Labour Government in the
wake of the November 1967 devaluation of the pound, the ETU
continued to the end to give the Wilson administration support,
albeit at times critical. Cannon told the 1969 ETU Conference that
most industrialists admitted that the Labour Government was making
the right decisions wi thin the limits of the nation's resources,
and went on to say:
"All the measures, most of them unpopular,
which this Government has taken over the past
five years along with considerable improvement
in industrial management at all levels during
the same period will, I believe, soon begin to
payoff... It will be a tragedy if as a result
of this unpopular, but praiseworthy effort, a
sound economy is handed over once again to the
Tories.. " (55)
As with the American trade union leaders that the ILO interviewed,
Cannon's speech and his entire philosophy left unquestioned the
bases of the economic and social system that most other trade union
leaders at least questioned and, at times, rebelled against.
That the ETU should mention \Valter Reuther in their evidence
to Donovan is, again, not at all surprising considering the history
of his union. For if American trade union attitudes in general
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served as an example for the Cannon leadership during the 1960s,
then the post-war history of the UAW under the leadership of
Reuther served as a close model to be admired and emulated. Just in
the description alone that Bell gives of Reuther as the "Jansenist
confronting the 'whiskey priests' " we can see a self-image that
Cannon admired and that Chapple (and Eric Hammond) were to
cultivate. Reuther was also a virulent anti-Communist, (although he
was still considered to be a "radical") and was at the centre of
the anti-Communist crusade that began in earnest in the trade
unions, as elsewhere, in 1947.
On 23 June 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act which contained a
battery of anti-union provisions and clauses was passed. One of the
provisions of the Act required that each principal union officer
had every year to file an affidavit that he was not a member of the
Communist Party. This was directly aimed at the Committee of
Industrial Organisation (CIO) , one of the two main trade union
federations, where it was variously estimated that 30 to 40 percent
of the membership were in unions controlled by the CPo Strangely
enough, the main bastion of the CP at this time was, as in Britain,
the Electricians' Union - the United Electrical Workers (UEW) - an
organization with some 500,000 members. At the 1949 CIO Convention,
that followed in the wake of the general capitulation of the labour
movement to the Taft-Hartley Act, the UEW and the Farm Equipment
Workers were expelled, and the following year another ten Communist
dominated unions were thrown out of the CIO. In the case of the UEW
a new CIO anti-Communist union was formed, the International Union
of Electrical Workers, and by 1955 it had a membership of 300,000,
while the expelled UEW had shrunk to 30,000. One of the CIO unions
with a strong Communist influence was the UAW.
For years the UAW had been involved in a bitter struggle for
control between the pro-Communist tendency led by the secretary-
treasurer, George Addes, and the anti -Communist tendency led by
Vice-President Walter Reuther. The President, R.G. Thomas, tried to
bridge the gap between the two groups without much success. But in
1946 Reuther just succeeded in ousting Thomas from the Presidency,
although his faction did not secure a majority on the Executive
Bureau. However the following year at the UAW Convention, Reuther
was not only re-elected President but also gained an overwhelming
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majority on the Executive. Having defeated the Communist opposition
in the union Reuther, like Cannon in· the early 1960s, was
determined to press home his victory and rout the CP in the UAW.
Cannon and the leadership of the ETU were helped in their task by
the ballot-rigging trial of 1961, while Reuther was helped in his
by an unforeseen event. In Xay 1948 Reuther was shot by a gunman.
One of his closest supporters, August Schole, President of the
IUchigan CIO, made a statement blaming "the communists". At the UAW
Convention in July 1949, Reuther was able to capitalise on the
shooting and the rising cold-war hysteria and push through rule
changes that would enable him to neutralise his opponents,
Communists or otherwise. For example, the right of UAW locals to
discipline their own members was removed and transferred to the
Executive Bureau. Reuther could now penalise or expel any member of
the UAW for such misdemeanours as "unworthy conduct", whereas
before CP control of a local could protect an activist from the
wrath of the leadership. Applying this new rule straight away, the
Convention voted for the expulsion of two of the leaders of the
pro-Communist faction. (56) So in his style, rhetoric and virulent
anti-Communism, Reuther was bound to appeal to the Cannon
leadership, who themselves had waged a bitter battle against the CP
in the ETU, and who, like Reuther, had waged it successfully.
But the parallels do not end there. Having dealt with the CP
opposition in the UAW, Reuther went on to transform the UAW, just
as Cannon went on to remodel the Electricians' Union. The
description given by one American industrial relations commentator
of the transformation that the UAW underwent in the 1950s could
almost serve as a descri ption of the metamorphosis that the ETU
went through in the 1960s. The UAW, he writes, was transformed from
a
"social reform union with a militant grassroots
potential to a centrally administered business
union husbanding its own power and satisfied
wi th the creation of a private welfare state."
(57)
This shift was not just forced on the UAW by the conservative
political climate of the 1950s as Bell's analysis might lead us to
believe. Quite the contrary, Reuther was actively involved in
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bUilding the American post-war "industrial relations settlement".
Nelson Lichtenstein argues that the UAW's active involvement
reflected the
"dynamic relationship that existed between the
social ideology of the union's leadership, the
collective bargaining strategy it pursued, and
the character of shop-floor struggle in the
auto industry's core firms." (58)
We can illustrate this "dynamic relationship" by looking
briefly at one of the long-term contracts that the UAW were
pursuing as a central feature of their bargaining strategy - the
"Treaty of Detroit". In 1950 the UAW signed the so called "Treaty
of Detroit" with General Motors. In return for higher wages and
improved welfare benefits the UAW signed an unprecedented five-year
contract which would make General Kotors' labour costs wholly
predictable throughout the company's massive expansion programme of
the early 1950s. But, as Lichtenstein argues, the "Treaty of
Detroi t" had a profound, long-range impact on the internal
structure of the UAW. Why? Because the "Treaty" helped to
consolidate and further centralise the bargaining machinery in the
hands of the leadership and consequently undermined rank-and-file
control and participation in the bargaining process at local level.
SUmming up the impact of the UAW-GX contract, Frederick Harbison
wrote in 1950 that
"This kind of collective bargaining calls for
intelligent trading rather than table-pounding,
for diplomacy rather than belligerency, and for
internal union discipline rather than grass
roots rank and file activity." (59)
Centralisation and discipline rather than local bargaining and
rank-and-file activity naturally led, argues Lichtenstein, to "an
erosion of the union's internal democratic structure". As power
became increasingly centralised in the Executive Bureau, the UAW
leadership saw its primary role as one of "servicing" the
membership and "policing" the national contracts.
We can see then from this brief outline of the UAW's
industrial strategy in the 1950s why the ETU leadership of the
1960s should find Reuther such an admirable figure. For what was
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common to both union leaderships was a strong ideological
commi tment to fighting Communism in their organizations and an
acceptance of the principles of the market economy, and the need to
operate competitively in the labour market on the basis of those
principles. On the basis of this "social ideology" both unions
pursued industrial strategies that involved a centralisation of
power and thus a consequent decline in internal democracy as the
semi-autonomous centres of power that previously existed were
either curbed or abolished (the locals in the UAW, the ACs in the
ETU). Both pursued centralised bargaining strategies that would not
only by-pass rank-and-file negotiators but attempt also to
"harmonise" industrial relations by joint management/union policing
of agreements (most notably in the case of the ETU the JIB
agreement that they signed in the electrical contracting industry
in 1966, which was modelled on a similar agreement operating in
America). Of course, the parallels should not be taken too far, but
nevertheless, it seems clear that the strategy pursued by Reuther
was one that the ETU wished to follow, even if that strategy would
have to be modified to take account of the British terrain and the
peculiarities of the ETU.
So the "Hew Xodel" union that Cannon created in the 1960s was
designed not just to operate in the market economy and
pragmatically adjust and adapt to the pressures and opportunities
that the economy offered them, as most other trade unions did. From
this time on, the Electricians' union actively accepted the
priorities of the market economy and sought to mould its strategy
on the basis of those priorities. The remodelling of the union was
essential if this strategy was to be pursued effectively and free
from the interference of the rank-and-file. This aggressive
acceptance of the market, coupled with a strong hostility to a
union democracy that allowed rank-and-file activists some real
power, was what marked the ETU off from most other unions, and this
is why we can say that in the 1960s Britain's first business union
began to take shape.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONSOLIDATION CENIRALISATION AND GROWTH
Les Cannon died on 9 December 1970. But the course he had set the
union on in the 1960s was to continue and develop in the 1970s
under the leadership of Frank Chapple. Under Chapple's leadership
the EETPU was to become even more centralised and bureaucratic, the
philosophy of business unionism was to become more pronounced, and
the internal democracy of the union was to become increasingly
circumscribed. (1) The 1970s, then, was a period when the right-
wing leadership that took control of the union in 1962 further
consolidated its position. But that is only half the story. The
industrial militancy of the late 1960s and early 1970s enabled the
Communist Party opposition in the union to re-group around the
journal Flashlight. This period also saw the spawning of a number
of rank-and-file groups, as well as the first significant organized
political grouping outside the control of the CP - the Rank-and
file Contact group, dominated by the Socialist Workers Party. So as
well as being a period of consolidation for the leadership, the
1970s were also a period in which the organized opposition carried
on a determined battle to win control of the EETPU. While in this
chapter we shall see how well the opposition fought the final
stages of the restructuring programme that began under Cannon, we
will deal more fully with the challenge of the organized opposition
in the the follOWing chapters. Here we shall concentrate on how the
leadership consolidated its position under Chapple's leadership.
Consolidation and centralisation
The "New Kodel" union created by Cannon in the 1960s placed more
and more power in the hands of fewer and fewer elected full-time
officials. By the time Cannon died the elected 17 man Executive
Council had under them a bureaucracy of over 100 full-time
appointed national and area officials. Chapple, however, was
determined to push this centralising process still further and in
so doing augment his own personal power.
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With the death of Cannon there was naturally a vacancy for the
Presidency of the union, and an election was expected early in
1971. But it was not to be. There was a rather complicated legal
wrangle instigated by the Ee, who claimed that the rules of the
union debarred full-time officials from standing for office. A
legal opinion was sought and it was found that full-time officials
could not stand either as President or General Secretary without
first resigning their posts. Moreover, the barrister, Ronald
Waterhouse, also held that both President and General Secretary
were simultaneously Executive Council members and National
Officers, and as EC members were prevented from standing as
National Officers, so unless he resigned from his post as General
Secretary Chapple could not stand for the Presidency. The upshot of
this farcical situation was that the entire EC as well as prominent
National Officers like Chapple and Young were excluded from
Cannon's succession, and the election was deferred till after the
October 1971 Rules Revision Conference. :Meanwhile, in September
1971, Chapple was re-elected as General Secretary. In the following
year, and despite the previous legal ruling, the election for the
Presidency finally took place, and Chapple won it outright.
A further election was now expected to fill the vacant post of
General Secretary, but the new President had other plans. By the
time of the EETPU Conference in May 1973, there had still been no
moves to hold an election for the vacant post. At that Conference
some 200 delegates signed a petition demanding that an election
take place in the near future. The petition, together with the
hundreds of protest resolutions that had already been sent to the
EC, extracted an assurance from Chapple that, pending the outcome
of merger talks with several other unions, a decision about the
election would be made by the end of the year. New Year came and
went and still no election. But late in 1974, after more than 200
branches had called for the election, the EC decided by 7 votes to
4 not to hold the election, but to ballot the membership on whether
or not the post of President should be abolished. The result was
that 77,943 voted for the abolition of the Presidency and only
17,221 against. Chapple now held an unrivalled position of
authority in the union.
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Chapple informs us that it was Cannon who first mooted the
idea of getting rid of the "dual leadership" and merging the two
posts. (2) But the final decision to abolish the post of President
seems to have been arri ved at on the basis of a report on the
union's structure compiled by a firm of business consultants, the
Glasgow based Higher Productivity (Organization and Bargaining) Ltd
(HPL) , whose managing director was James Dobbie Houston, chairman
of the Joint Industrial Board for electrical contracting. The
report recommended that five national heads of department be
created, that the post of President should be abolished and be
replaced by a Chairman elected by the Executive Council, and that
the General Secretary should have a number of powerful personal
assistants. (3)
The centralisation of power went a step further at the union's
1977 Conference, where it was agreed that full-time officials
should in future be free to stand for the Executive Council without
first resigning their posts. The separation of powers between the
appointed officials and the elected EC that been near enough
destroyed in 1969 when the election of officials was abandoned was
now effectively dissolved. Also passed at the 1977 Conference was
the EC recommendation that the number of Divisional members of the
EC be reduced by one to 13. The Executive Council was now to
comprise the General Secretary, the Plumbing Secretary, and 13
Divisional members <10 from the electrical section and 3 from
plumbing) . The two Secretaries were also empowered by the
Conference to now vote on issues brought before the EC, and the
" President" (Chairman elected by the EC in line with the HPL
recommendation) was now entitled to vote as a Divisional EC member
and was also given an additional casting vote in the case of a tied
vote on the EC. (4)
In the space of just over ten years the number of elected
posi tions in the union had been reduced from 145 to a mere 15,
whilst over the same period the membership of the EETPU had shot up
from 250,000 to around 400,000. Power was now firmly in the hands
of the Executive and their appointed bureaucracy, and free from
those semi-autonomous centres of power that existed in the 1960s,
and free also from the vagaries of frequent elections. The EETPU
was now displaying many of the classical characteristics that
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H.A.Turner attributed to one of his three typologies of trade union
government - "popular bossdoms":
" ... such unions are marked by a generally low
level of membership participation, and by the
greatest difference between the members and the
professional officials on which they
depend... there is often a distinct hierarchy
among the officials themselves... senior
officials may virtually appoint their own
successors." (5)
Turner also talks of the "central, and usually dominating
role of the General Secretary" in such unions. (6) One ex-EETPU
official goes further, claiming that power in the union was
effectively wielded by Chapple and his close associates and not the
elected EC:
"It became very obvious after only a few days
spent working in the EETPU head office that the
union was run by a tight-knit group of leaders,
and that this group was not the ostensible
ruling body of the EETPU, namely, the executive
council." (7)
Add this testimony to that of another ex-official of the union who
claimed that the rank-and-file in the EETPU "have no real power"
and the Xichelian thesis seems to come to life once more. (8) For
here we have a formally democratic organisation which is in fact
governed by a bureaucracy which is directed, and derives its power
from, a "tight-knit" oligarchy dominated by one man, Frank Chapple.
This seems to confirm not only Xichels but also a point made by
Weber, a point that we have already noted in connection with the
CP domination of the union in the 1950s:
"The bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand
with the concentration of the material means of
management in the hands of the master." (9)
Weber, unlike Michels, however, considered that there were a
number of mechanisms by which the inherent tendency of bureaucracy
to accumulate power could be prevented from reaching the point
where it controlled the policy and action of the organisation that
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it was supposed to serve. And as we shall see, although rigid
control of the apparatus made it all the more difficult for the
organized opposition in the union to break the hold of the EC, this
control was still open to challenge and was at times badly dented
by the forces of the opposition. The continuing fight over the
final stages of restructuring is a case in point.
Restructuring in the 1970s
As we saw in the previous chapter, Cannon's 1963 document the
Internal Structure of the Union was widely discussed in the union
and the proposals for moving to an industrial branch structure
debated at the 1965 RRC. And the 1969 Biennial Delegate Conference
(BDC) referred to the leadership a motion calling on the Executive
Council "to investigate and reorganise the area structure of the
Union within the framework of the existing Rules". (10) However,
what became apparent by the early 1970s, was that much of the
restructuring of the union was, contrary to the rules, being pushed
through without consultation with the appropriate sections of the
membership. At the 1973 BDC all these grievances came to a head.
Debate at the Conference centred on three areas of union
reorganization: firstly, the merging of Plumbing Trades Union (PTU)
lodges with Electrical Trades Union branches; secondly, the closing
down of Area offices; and, thirdly, the closure and amalgamation of
branches. In 1967 the 55,000 strong right-wing led PTU voted to
amalgamate with the ETU to form the Electrical Electronic
Telecommunication and Plumbing Union (EETPU). At the time of the
amalgamation the PTU had some 400 lodges, 80 of which had been
merged with ETU branches by 1973, and by the end of the 1970s there
were less than 100 plumbing lodges left in existence. A Flashlight
pamphlet listed some of the more general effects of amalgamation on
PTU democracy and organization:
1. Delegates to the Biennial and Rules Revision
Conferences would no longer be elected by
district membership, but appointed.
2. District representation meetings could no
longer mandate or in any way control their
Conference delegates.
of Lodges in
for example,
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3. Conference agendas would no longer be
circulated to Lodges prior to Conference.
4. The sharp cut-down in the number of PTU
officials - District 1 had 4 officials before
amalgamation, there were by that time only 2.
This was the trend nationally.
5. Since amalgamation all District Officials
were now appointed. They were formerly elected
by the district membership.
6. Large scale reorganisation
every District. In District 1,
from 44 Lodges down to 24.
7. Discrimination for full-time office on
poli tical affiliations. (11)
It was this loss of identity, as many plumbers saw it, that
caused so much dissatisfaction in the plumbing section and which
led to the formation of groups like the Plumbers Action Gonmdttee
that we shall discuss in the next chapter. But this
dissatisfaction did not clearly manifest itself at the 1973
Conference. In fact the two motions before the BDC that dealt with
lodge and branch mergers were both supported by the Executive
Council, wi th one of them urging a faster approach to
"integration", and both were carried by the delegates. Debate was
very short and no speakers from the floor objected to the pace of
mergers, nor did anyone complain about any lack of consultation
over the reorganisation. Even the left-wing plumber on the
Executive Council, Bill Gannon, did not intervene in the debate,
even though he had been elected to office, with Flashlight backing,
largely as a result of his opposition to the way the plumbing
section were being treated since the 1967 amalgamation.
The reason why the plumbing lodge mergers generated so little
heat might be explained by the fact that the other motions that
were up for debate during this session of the Conference dealt more
fully with the whole question of amalgamation and closure. So
motion 14 read:
"This Conference agrees that where
reorganisation takes place between areas or
branches consultation should take place between
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the Executive Council and branches concerned,
prior to the reorganisation taking place and
not just a fait accompli as has happened in the
past."(12)
Two other motions (15 & 16) were also critical of
reorganisation, one complaining that "too often we find that
reorganization has taken place before the membership knows anything
about it". (13) A particular grievance was the closing down of Area
Offices without consultation with the membership:
"It has been decided to close down 1'0.17 Area
Office at Cardiff. We in South Wales are not
happy with this. If Cardiff closes in October,
as we are told it will, Swansea Area will have
to cover over fifty branches. We think you
should maintain an office in Cardiff as well as
at Swansea in accordance with the wishes of the
membership.
We do not believe there has been full
consultation with branches as regards
amalgamation. How many branches no longer
exist? How many branches no longer have
opportunities to send delegates to the most
important body of this union, namely this
Conference? One finds we have consultation
taking place only with interested officials.
What about members of the branches? Were they
consul ted? I certainly think not." (14)
A further two motions were moved before the general debate
took place. Motions 17 and 18 were concerned not just with the lack
of consultation during the course of reorganisation, but with the
whole policy of reorganisation that had been instituted in the
union. Thus motion 17, which was concerned specifically with Area
and Regional reorganisation, declared that this "Conference is
opposed to the recent reorganisation that has taken place
throughout the Union". While motion 18 was directed at the "void in
communication" that the closure and amalgamation of branches had
left in the union. It therefore called on the EC "to halt any
further branch closures until such times as proven al ternati ve
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lines of communication can be established". (15) The mover of the
latter motion said:
"It appears the Executive Council can close any
branch with the minimum of consultation with no
reference back to our members. We have seen the
effects of the decision to terminate the area
committees and replace this structure with the
area industrial conferences which were doomed
from the start to become the biggest non-event
so far produced by this Union. Do not let the
same sort of thing happen to the
branches... ". (16)
At the time of the Conference many of the branches in the
major cities had been reorganized against the wishes of the
members. In Glasgow, for example, two of the largest and most
active branches in Scotland, Glasgow Central and Glasgow No.1, were
amalgamated into a super-branch of 5000 members after the fight to
keep the branches open was eventually lost in the courts.
Similarly, Liverpool's eleven branches had been reduced to five,
Southampton's five to one and so on. One delegate from Manchester
complained that he was in his "third branch in a period of twelve
months". And, as delegates pointed out, branch amalgamations also
had the effect of reducing the number of delegates at the Biennial
and Rules Revision Conferences, as there was only one delegate
allowed to attend from each branch no matter how large or small the
branch was. So whereas 650 delegates attended the 1969 BDC, by 1975
this had been reduced to 525 delegates. Reducing the number of
delegates from the maj or cities also had the added advantage of
cutting down the number of oppositional delegates at Conference as
the city branches were on the whole the strongholds of the
opposition in the union.
Eric Hammond replied to these and other criticisms on behalf
of the Executive Council. Firstly, he distinguished between the
three motions that were "concerned with how we go about
reorganisation" and motions 11 and 18 that "are not concerned with
method but with stopping reorganisation". Secondly, he said,
contrary to what many speakers had said or implied from the
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rostrum, the leadership had the power according to the existing
rules of the union to implement reorganisation:
"Let us be quite clear from the very beginning
who has the responsi bility and the authority
under the Rules of this organisation to be
concerned about making decisions regarding
organisation. Rule 4(2) says: 'The Executive
Council shall, under these rules, have power:
(J) to determine the boundaries of each branch
and area'j and' (k) to determine the boundaries
of the electoral divisions for the purposes of
the election of divisional members of the
Electrical Industry Committee and Plumbing
Industry Committee ... "(17)
The implication was clear: the EC, if they so chose, could go
ahead with reorganisation without consulting the members. However,
this was a selective reading of the rules. As Hammond himself
acknowledged the "centre of gravity of the complaints seems to be
on the area part of the issue, that is what branch and therefore
member is in what area". Area reorganisation, therefore,
necessarily entailed branch reorganisation. Specifically on the
branches Hammond goes on to say that there "has been massive
reorganisation". But on branch reorganisation, as we saw in the
last chapter, the rules of the union were quite clear:
"The Executive Council shall have the power to
establish, dissolve and determine the limits of
branches in consultation with the appropriate
membership" (Rule 14 (1) 1975 Rules)
This rule, or a very close variant of it, had applied during the
time when the CP dominated the union, it applied at the time of the
first wave of reorganisation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and
it applies in the union today. The critiques of the reorganisation
process contained in motions 14, 15 and 16 were completely in line
with the rules of the union. To quote the powers of the Executive
as Hammond did was a rather flimsy attempt to claim legitimacy for
actions that the EC were well aware were, if not wholly
unconstitutional, then certainly not based on a full reading of the
letter let alone the spirit of the rules of the union. The very
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fact that Hammond spent a large part of his speech claiming that
consultation had taken place with the appropriate membership over
branch reorganisation was a sign that the content of Rule 14 was
the issue at the Conference and not the powers of the EC that
Hammond had referred to. But even on the issue of Area
reorganisation Hammond later admitted:
" Areas were amalgamated and some offices
closed. We examined carefully the reasons for
these changes and believed them to be in our
members best interests. But in this matter we
did not consult as we now feel we should have
done and as we fully intend to do in future."
(18)
When it came to the vote the EC supported motion 15, which was
a non-committal motion concerned with the ability of officials to
service large Areas, and were not against motion 14. To recall:
motion 14 said that consultation should take place prior to any
reorganisation and should not be presented as a fait accompli.
Both motions were carried. However, the Executive Council opposed
motion 16 which read:
"This Conference should be concerned by lack of
consultation between the Executive Council
because too often we find that reorganisation
has taken place before the membership knows
anything about it. II (19)
Seemingly the wording of this motion was just a little bit too
strong for the EC. Nevertheless, the delegates ignored the
Executive's recommendation and voted for this motion as well. The
EC also opposed the two motions (17 & 18) that were against
reorganisation and not just lack of consultation. Both motions were
defeated. So, the delegates at the 1973 BDC were in no doubt that
there had been very little consultation with the membership over
the reorganisation of the union, and the leadership themselves were
forced to concede that this was the case despite Hammond's
arguments to the contrary.
There was a lull in the pace of amalgamations and mergers in
the wake of the 1973 BDC: reorganisation without consultation, it
seemed, had been stopped in its tracks by the force of the rank-
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and-file members' feelings on the issue. But by that time over 100
branches and lodges had been merged and amalgamations had taken
place in virtually all the major cities and towns. So the lull was
in part because the bulk of the proposed mergers and amalgamations
had already been carried through. And it was never the intention of
the leadership to reduce the branch structure to such a scale that
it would consist solely of a series of mega-branches. The
geographical location of the membership would at any rate rule this
out.
As a result of this lull, the heated debate that took place at
the 1973 Conference was not repeated at the 1975 BDC. There were
only two motions up for debate on branch amalgamations, both of
which were supported by the Executive Council and carried by the
Conference. Both motions were uncontrover-sta.L, one favouring the
retention of local branches drawing their membership mainly from a
single industry as opposed to the formation of large multi-industry
branches, the other declaring that steps should be taken to merge
lodges with branches where it was possible to do so. Any lingering
fears about reorganisation without consultation were laid to rest
by Charlie Lovell, National Secretary of the plumbing section and
EC member:
"What we have got to get clear is that we do
not want branches and lodges merged by force.
That is not being done. It is being done after
proper consultation; and we are continuing to
do that." (20)
Following the 1977 BDC, however, there was a renewed campaign
by the leadership to force through branch closures and
amalgamations, and the first to feel the brunt of this operation
were Charlie Lovell's plumbers. A rule change that was passed at
the 1977 Conference gave the EC the green light to amalgamate the
maj ori ty of the remaining plumbers lodges (about 300). Previously
the plumbing section representation at the Biennial Delegate
Conferences had been on the basis of two delegates from each PTU
Districtj Districts with over a 1,000 members were allowed to send
three delegates and Districts with over 2000 members four
delegates. This rule was abolished at the 1977 BDC to bring the
plumbing section representation at BDC into line with the
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electrical section representation - one delegate from each branch.
This move was welcomed by many in the union who were hostile to the
leadership but, as Flashlight reported,
"It was a sprat to catch a mackerel and it was
swallowed. Delegates were warned by some of
their rank-and-file colleagues that Lodge
closures would inevitably follow. This is what
is now happening. The central feature of the
re-organisation is to bring about an equation
of the number of delegates under the new rule
as the plumbers had under the old." (21)
What this meant in practice was that in order to establish the
right level of PTU representation on the basis of one delegate per
lodge the number of lodges had to be drastically reduced. In
London, for exampl e, the 17 lodges were reduced to just 4, in
Manchester 17 lodges were also amalgamated into 4. A similar
pattern was repeated throughout the country so that by the end of
the 1970s there were only about 100 plumbing lodges left intact. As
for Lovell's statement at the 1975 BDC that there would be no
forced amalgamations, the experience of the Manchester plumbers is
enough to discredit such rhetoric - 16 out of the 17 lodges were
against amalgamation. The only lodge to survive intact after the
London amalgamations was Eltham and District, which just happened
to be Lovell's lodge.
Opposition began to mount once again in the wake of the forced
amalgamation of many of the plumbing lodges and the closure and
suspension of a number of opposition branches. At the union's 1979
BDC at Brighton, and against Executive Council advice, the
delegates, in what the Financial Times described as a "grassroots
revol t", voted in favour of a motion from one of the leading
opposition branches, Cardiff, which declared that the
"wholesale policy of closure of branches and
the spate of compulsory amalgamations that the
Executive Council implemented recently in 1978
were not in the best interests of the members
concerned."(22)
A second motion affirming that branches should be managed by
elected branch officials was also carried against EC advice. But as
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with the "rebellion" against lack of consultation, the horse had
already bolted. The bulk of the EC's plans for reorganisation had
been pressed through with or without the consent of the membership.
All the EC had to do then was bide its time and, when it chose,
take on the strongholds of the opposition in order to complete its
reorganisation of the union's structure. For example, the three
London contracting branches were finally amalgamated into an all
London super-branch of 11,000 members only in 1982. At the 1983 BDC
there was no discussion whatsoever about branch amalgamations and
closures. So the restructuring of the union that began under Cannon
in the 1960s was, with the exception of a few rearguard skirmishes,
completed in 1983 (the all London Contracting branch, for instance,
was suspended by the EC after its first meeting and was not opened
again until four years later).
Branches are now mostly administered by an appointed full-time
branch secretary, and the sheer size and geographical coverage of
many of the branches makes it impossible for many members to
participate in the union's affairs. For example, the Londom Lift
and Escalator branch covers the whole of south east England, and so
not surprisingly few of its 2000 members attend branch meetings.
And as with the London Contracting branch, oppositional branches
are frequently suspended by the EC for alleged infringements of the
rules. All in all, the industrial restructuring of the geographical
branches has effectively reduced rank-and-file democracy in the
EETPU.
Union growth
The rapid expansion of the union's industrial base in the late
1960s and 1970s also served to further augment the power of the
leadership, while at the same time diluting the influence of the
tradi tional oppositional centre in the union electrical
contracting. Between 1964 and 1974 EETPU membership increased by
22.9% reaching a total membership of some 413,000 by 1975.
Expansion was mainly in light engineering and telecommunications
and in the service industries that employed largely semi-skilled
and women workers (the increase in women members was 116%, from
24,000 in 1964 to 52,000 by 1974). To co-ordinate recruitment a new
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department was set up in 1969 employing seven recruitment officers,
At the union's 1971 Conference growth was reported in
telecommunications, engineering, and in particular radio and
television servicing where "our membership ... now stands at 10,000
compared with 4,400 two years ago." (23) And two years later the EC
could report that
"The service industries have been an extremely
fruitful field, with large and stabilized
increase in membership in many of the major
companies...
In domestic appliance, and other service
industries, there has been a considerable
advance and is part of a continuous process of
further expansion," (24)
The EETPU's expansion was far from being exceptional: after
all, this period was, as Robert Taylor writes, "one of the great
periods of expansion for the British trade union movement, similar
in magnitude to the growth between 1911 and 1913". (25) :Moreover,
it is not at all surprising that the union should have achieved
this increased growth mainly in the service sector, for it was
precisely this area of the economy that was expanding. But the most
rapid and spectacular growth rates occurred in the public sector
trade unions, in the areas of local government, education, health
and so forth (between 1964 and 1974, HALGO grew by 60%, HUPE by
111%, TASS by 90% and ASTXS by 346% (26». "White-collar" trade
unionisn was booming. Put another way, in the decade up until 1978,
2 million "white collar" trade unionists were added to the labour
force, but only 1 million manual members, so that by 1978 the
proportion of trade union members in "white collar" jobs had risen
to 39% from a figure of 30% ten years earlier. (27)
In an effort to cash in on this boom the EETPU created the
Electrical and Engineering Staff Association (EESA) in 1971. But
they had little success in recruiting "white collar" workers
directly, as the established unions proved to be far too strong for
them to break into this area. The only substantial gains the EETPU
were to make in this field were as a result of mergers, or more
precisely takeovers, of much smaller trade unions. Even here
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though, the only substantial gain that was made in the early 1970s
was announced by Chapple to the union's 1973 Conference:
"I can report with great pleasure the merger of
the B. 1. C. C. Staff Association with EESA and
the pleasure that this gave us was not lessened
by the fact that the merger ballot of 4000
B. 1. C. C staff chose this union by a maj ori ty
vote of 6 to 1 with 70% of the members vot i ng. "
(28)
So minimal were the overall gains made in the "white collar" area
that the EESA membership figures were excluded from the Executive
Council's 1973 report. We can only presume that at this time the
bulk of the EESA membership were made up of BICC workers, despite
claims of expansion by the EC. (29) An indication of the problems
that the EETPU were having in recruiting in this general area was
the drop in membership in the technical and supervisory section
from 11,613 in 1971 to 11,516 in 1972, after a sharp increase
between 1968 and 1970. By the early 1980s, however, the EETPU was
claiming that EESA had a membership of some 50,000, representing
"technical, managerial and professional staff". (30) How had this
growth been accomplished? Largely by mergers with staff
associations not affiliated to the TUC, as we can see from Table 1
below.
Table 1
1972
1976
1979
1980
1982
1983
Mergers with the EETPU 1971 -86
BICC Staff Association
Association of Managerial and
Electrical Executives
Laurence Scott and Electrometors
Foremans Association
United Kingdom Association of
Professional Engineers
Steel Industry Managers' Association
Telecommunication Staff Association
British Transport Officers Guild
Association of Management and
Professional Staffs
4000 members
?
?
8000
9000
?
2,640
?
1984
1986
Rolls Royce Xanagement Association
White collar staff employed by
Radio Rentals
?
2,056
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Sources: various
By the 1980s EESA had become, in Chapple's own words, "a union
within a union". (31) This "union within a union" has acted as a
solid right-wing block within the EETPU, and as such has given
staunch support to the leadership of the union at the all-union
Biennial Delegate Conferences. The electrical contracting section,
which was the bastion of opposition in the union, was by the late
1970s an isolated section of an expanding union. Now any serious
challenge to the leadership would have to be mounted on a much
wider front, one that brought in members new to the union (women,
the semi-skilled and "white collar" workers) and to the traditions
of militancy that existed in the contracting and supply sections.
Chapple was so pleased with the catches that the union had
made that in 1982 he recommended to the EC that
"wi th the transfer of engagements to the EESA
section of several professional and managerial
groups and the prospect that others would
follow, our organisation would be strengthened
by the establishment of a Council of
Professional and Xanagerial Staffs." (32)
COKPS was to act as a sort of mini-Executive Council co-ordinating
and furthering the work of EESA. Needless to say, COKPS was to be
firmly under the control of the EC, as the new amendments to the
rules made clear:
"The Executive Council shall determine the
terms of the obj ects and the constitution of
COKPS after consultation with all the
appropriate groups of members." (33)
EESA was so structured then that any organisation joining it could
in theory retain its identity wi thin the "white collar" section,
while at the same time having influence over EESA's direction and
policies through COKPS, and thus over the parent body the EETPU.
Thus small organizations could still view themselves as "profess-
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ional associations" with all the "status" this implied, while sti 11
having the protection of a strong, "moderate" and ideologically
conducive trade union around them. In this way it was hoped that
the membership of other professional associations, who might
otherwise shudder at the thought of joining a trade union, could be
pulled into the EETPU's orbit by the bridging mechanism of EESA. As
we can see from Table 1 the EETPU were quite successful in this
venture.
Throughout the 1970s the EETPU, as with so many unions, also
attempted to extend its base by merging with industrial unions of
comparable strength, and as a result was involved periodically, and
unsuccessfully, in merger negotiations with two large trade unions
- the HUGXW and the AUEW. The rationale for merger was not just
ideological (at the time of the first set of merger talks with the
engineers the AUEW was controlled by the left, at the time of the
second talks in 1978 by the right, and both times the negotiations
led to nought), it was also to do with cost and efficiency and the
power to corner particular areas of the labour market. Having said
that ideology was not all, it is plain to see that the vision that
the EETPU leadership had was one of a right-wing mega-union capable
of out-voting and out-organizing the left in the TUC. And this
vision is far from being dead. At the 1986 TUC, leaders of UCATT,
the AEU, the Institution of Professional Civil Servants and the
EETPU met in secret to draft a blueprint for a new mega-union
codenamed "Project 2000". Yet even before the project got off the
ground UCATT and the IPCS withdrew from the negotiations. (34)
Xerger talks usually collapse because one or more of the
participants is not prepared to abandon a particular feature(s) of
their union's autonomy or internal democracy, and this was, by and
large, why the EETPU merger approaches failed. So, for example, the
prospects of a marriage between the ABU and EETPU which have been
in the air for so long, and which to most observers seemed to be a
most compatible marriage, have floundered on, amongst other things,
the AEU's refusal to abandon its District Committee structure and
the election of its full-time officials. Although in the renewed
merger talks between the two unions that began early in 1988 it
seems that the AEU is now prepared to drop its insistence that its
internal democracy should remain intact. And with the prospect of
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the EETPU being expelled from the TUC it now seems most likely that
the unions will merge into what will be Britain's largest, most
powerful, and right-wing union.
If we consider the Xichels/Gouldner debate, the picture of
continuing centralisation, consolidation and expansion that we have
painted above, seems to lend further credence to Michels and not to
Gouldner. After all, bureaucratic control was tightened in the
EETPU during the 1970s, the bases of the organized opposition in
the union (particulary contracting) were weakened as they became a
smaller proportion of an expanding union that now had wi thin its
ranks 50,000 professional and managerial members, and where they
did raise their heads (for example, on branch amalgamations) they
were out-manoeuvred and eventually defeated. On top of all this,
it could be argued, the apathy of the majority of the membership to
the affairs of the EETPU only confirms IHchels' contention that
most union members are indifferent to the goings on in their own
organizations and thus fail to act as a check on the power of the
leadership.
This is certainly one picture that could be presented, and in
the following chapters there is further evidence that could be used
to confirm this, but it is far from being the whole picture. It is
a distortion, one that lacks balance and focus. In truth we find a
constant tension in the struggles in the EETPU between democratic
and oligarchical tendencies - it is seldom one-way traffic. To view
the EETPU under Chapple's reign, as well as today, as monolithic,
is nonsense. Our discussion on restructuring in this chapter shows
what pressures the leadership were under to act democratically.
That the opposition were eventually defeated is in a sense
secondary, since the point is that the power of the EC was
constantly challenged and checked by the activity of thousands of
rank-and-file EETPU members, and this presents us with a picture
far removed from the simplicities of Xichels' "iron law" with the
apathetic and incompetent mass being easily manipulated by the
sophisticated technocrats in the union leadership. In fact a more
detailed look at the history of the organized opposition in the
union lends credence to Gouldner's contention that the evidence
offerred by Michels (and his disciples, we might add) could enable
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us to formulate the very opposite theorem to the "iron law of
oligarchy, the "iron law of democracy".
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PART THREE THE CHALLENGE OF THE OPPOSITION
CHAPTER SIX
STRATEGIES FOR REFORM: THE RISE OF ORGANIZED OPPOSITION
Opposition to the right-wing leadership existed from the very first
day that they took control of the union on 2 January 1962. The
focus for that opposition was, and still is, the Communist Party.
But in the early 1960s, with the ballot-rigging trial still fresh
in the minds of the membership, and with the subsequent ballot
that debarred CP members from holding any office in the union,
which in its turn resulted in the defection of all but one of the
CP's ETU full-time officials, the CP members in the union were
demoralized and in some disarray. This, together with the climate
of "red-baiting" that existed in the union, affected their capacity
to organize against the policies of the leadership. The non-CP left
in the union were also affected by the defeat of the CP, for those
who had worked alongside CP members were now cast in the role of
Communist dupes or "fellow-travellers" by the right in the union.
This state of affairs should not be exaggerated: after all, the
union had under pressure from below initially swung to the left
after the Cannon leadership took office. What it did mean though,
was that the "organized opposition" in the union (the CP and its
supporters) were in a very vulnerable position, and as such were
not capable in the early 1960s of leading any sustained counter
attack against the new leadership.
By the late 1960s, however, the memory of the trial was fading
and the leadership's continuing support for the increasingly
discredited Labour Government under Harold Wilson, together with an
industrial strategy that brought them into conflict with the best
organized sections of the union, enabled the CP to re-group and an
organized opposition movement to emerge. If we briefly look at the
turmoil in the electrical supply and contracting sections of the
union, which as well as being the best organized sections made up
something like a third of the total membership, then we can more
clearly see the industrial climate that allowed the organized
opposition to emerge.
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The promised fruits of the various Productivity and Status
Agreements for electrical supply, which the Electricians' union
had signed along with four other unions, had by the late 1960s
still not materialized in any meaningful way. A NBPI report stated
that although hourly earnings had risen between 1964 and 1967,
"average weekly earnings... are now more than 30s. below the 'all
industries' figure. This gap has steadily widened since April,
1965". (1). Or, put another way, between 1965 and 1969, supply
workers suffered a fall in real income of 0.6% per year. (2) True,
average hours worked in the industry were reduced from 49.3 to 41.8
per week, a fall of 16%, but this was accompanied by a sharp move
to shift and staggered patterns of working - a 14~% increase from
1964 to 1966. (3) Xoreover, the benefits that the Agreements gave
the workforce (staff status being the main one) were accompanied by
significant rises in productivity. The union itself claimed that
the deal resulted in an 18.2% increase in productivity between
November 1967 and September 1969. (4) As a consequence management
was able to drastically reduce the workforce. In 1969-70 the Area
Boards, on the distribution side, lost 9.4% of their manual
workers, while the CEGB lost 4.1%. The figures for apprentices,
always a good indicator of the state of the industry, show an even
sharper decline - 19% for the Area Boards and 14.6% for the CEGB.
(5) Not surprisingly, the union's 1969 Supply Conference repudiated
the Executive Council's policies in the industry and demanded that
in future there be consultation before any agreements were signed.
That same year, the supply workers won a 10% wage rise against the
background of unofficial strikes. And in 1970, a work to rule and
overtime ban caused major power cuts - 31% at peak periods - as
well as inspiring E. P. Thompson to write his famous essay in
response to an outraged letter to the Times, "Sir, Vlri ting by
Candlelight" .
The situation was no better in the electrical contracting
industry where the union had sole negotiating rights. On 1 Karch
1963 the ETU signed a three year agreement with the National
Federated Electrical Association - the employers' organization.
Under this deal, a NBPI report informs us, pay relatives
deteriorated:
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" ... improvements from pay deriving from the
1963-1966 electrical contracting agreement
failed to 11 ve up to the expectations of its
negotiators in that, if anything, the relative
position of contracting electricians was
somewhat worsened rather than improved during
the three years." (6)
At a meeting of the Executive Council on 7 June 1966, the new
1966/69 industrial agreement for electrical contracting "A
Transformation in :Management-Labour Relations" - was discussed and
approved by 9 votes to 2. (7) The main features of the agreement
were:
U(a) substantial increases in national wage
rates planned for Septemeber 1966, September
1967 and September 1968;
(b) the replacement of the old Industrial
Councils by a Joint Industry Board (JIB)
supported by 13 Regional Joint Industry Boards;
(c) the regrading of the entire operative
labour force from old traditional grades into
new grades linked with qualifications and
ability." (8)
The most controversial aspect of the agreement was the
formation of the JIB. The inspiration for the JIB came from a
similar institution for electricians in operation in New York
State. A joint ETU/NFEA team had visited the USA in September 1966
to see how it operated and, as Electron reported, the ETU
delegation were particularly impressed by the high rate of
productivity achieved under the scheme. (9) The JIB came into
operation in England and Wales (a similar agreement was not signed
in Scotland until December 1968) on 1 January 1968, and the objects
it set itself were clearly laid out in the agreement:
(1) increasing skills and proficiency
(2) increasing productivity by improved methods
of work
(3) improving the welfare of the employees
(4) increasing the profitability of the
industry
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(5) measuring output to ensure increased
productivi ty and maki ng correspondi ng benefits
to the employees
(6) regulating and controlling overtime and
eliminating all unauthorised stoppages of work,
and
(7) providing for a right of appeal by either
employers or employees from decisions of the
Board to an independent authority. (10)
The JIB also had wide disciplinary powers:
"The Agreement implies a far higher degree of
discipline among member firms and workers than
is commonly found in British industry, and this
is likely to be strengthened as the work of the
JIB develops. The character of this discipline
is largely influenced by the troubled history
of the industry before 1962 and by the
hostili ty of a fringe of militant workers to
the introduction of the Agreement ... the Rules
provide for penalties against members who break
the Rules (including those failing to comply
with the disputes procedure) or behave in a way
'prejudicial to the interests of the JIB'.
These penalties range up to expulsion and
include such provisions as loss of welfare
benefits or fines of up to tl00 for operatives
or tl000 for employers ... " (11)
The leadership of the union considered the operation of the
agreement a great success, for the industry-wide deal clearly
demonstrated the benefits of a centralized bargaining system. So,
for example, between 1966 to 1969 the agreement had led to the
virtual eradication of "wage drift" in the industry and seen
productivi ty rise at an annual rate of 4 to 5 per cent. (12)
J(oreover, the initial high wage increase of 13% under stage 1 of
the deal ensured that the majority of the union's 70,000
electricians, who worked largely in the smaller and not so well
organized workplaces and sites, accepted the agreement, or more
precisely the money. But on the large and well organized sites it
172
was a different story. This was to be expected given the JIB's
attitude to site agreements:
"The JIB is hostile to the whole concept of
site agreements and claims that they are a
threat, not only to their own agreement, but to
the national incomes policy and good industrial
relations." (13)
Here we see a convergence of the obj ectives of the Executive
Council, the Donovan Commission and the Labour Government. For site
agreements not only threatened the power of the union's central
bureaucracy, they also threatened the Government's incomes policy
by encouraging "wage drift" and unofficial strikes. In short, site
agreements were part of the "informal system" of industrial
relations that the Donovan Commission argued was in confict with
the "formal system" embodied in the official institutions. The
obj ective of all three was to incorporate the "informal system"
wi thin the framework of the "formal system" and thereby, it was
hoped. reduce conflict and promote "harmonious" industrial
relations. The maj or difference was that Donovan envisaged this
move coming about on the basis of voluntarism, while the Labour
Government wi th the backing of only one maj or uni on by 1968, the
Electricians, moved, or were forced, steadily away from the
voluntary tradition as the pay norms of their incomes policy
legislation gave way to pay freezes and pay ceilings and, to top it
all, In Place of Strife.
However, the JIB agreement had also generated a large
movement of opposition in the union. Even Cannon had to admit, in a
centre page spread in Electron that was designed to allay the fears
of contracting members, that the members were confused about the
agreement. (14) The activists in the union, and many more besides,
were far from being confused. They saw it as yet another
curtai lment of their power and ability to control wages and
conditions at local level. They saw it as a direct attack on the
strongest centre of opposition in the union and a further
diminution in the union's internal democracy. Protest meetings were
held up and down the country, culminating in a mass rally of 2000
in Coventry. Chapple recalls being punched, manhandled and having
his hair pulled as 300 demonstrators descended on the union's HQ.
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(15) Hooded electricians turned up several months later at another
picket of the union's Hayes Court Headquarters. They had good
reason to be hooded, because all the activity against the
implementation of the agreement was unofficial, and as such members
could be disciplined or expelled from the union. As a report in the
SUD on 1 November 1967 shows, the leadership were determined to cut
the head off the opposition in contracting:
"A private film show was screened yesterday for
the 11 man Executive of the Electrical Trades
Union to help them identify ringleaders of
recent rebel activities in the union ... A
member of the ETU Executive who attended the
film show said last night: 'Some of the film
was based on TV recordings. Some had been taken
on a cine camera by someone at the meeting.
Each film lasted about five minutes. We
identified as many of the ringleaders as we
could." (16)
Eventually 20 members of the union were expelled for engaging in
"unofficial activity".
This internal dissent was fanned and spread far wider than the
activists in the union by the leadership's continuing support in
the late 1960s for the policies of Harold Wilson's Labour
Government. Hinton writes that
" In the autumn of 1968 the Government's
economic policies were overwhelmingly rejected
at both TUC and Labour Party
Conferences ... There were limits beyond which
the trade union leadership could not be induced
to place nation before class." (17)
This is not quite correct, as there was still one major union
prepared to put the interests of nation before class - the EETPU.
At the 1968 TUC the EETPU put forward a motion that reaffirmed
support for the Government's prices and incomes policy, albeit with
the usual reservations about the damage that a too rigid policy
would to do to productivi ty and the plight of the low paid. The
disillusionment with the Labour Government was amply expressed in
the vote: 360,000 votes for the motion and 8,252,000 against. Frank
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Cousins' motion opposing the incomes policy legislation was carried
by 7,746,000 votes to 1,022,000. (18) At Blackpool the Labour
Party Conference voted for the repeal of all incomes policy
legislation by 5,098,000 votes to 1,124,000. (19) But still Chapple
could write in Electron, in an editorial entitled THIS VICIOUS
CRITICISM, that "the Government have already done much to create
the foundations upon which a more socially just and more efficient
Britain can be built." (20) Moreover, there was support for this
stance in the union. At the union's 1969 Conference, the same
Conference that rejected further "reforms" in the internal
structure of the union, the EC's position on incomes policy was
endorsed, as was its support for In Place of Strife, by a 3 to 1
vote.
But the very fact that Cannon spent much of his opening
address to the 1969 Conference attacking the left in the union and
in the wider labour movement, was a clear indication that the
leadership were under some pressure for their continued support for
the economic strategy of the Wilson Government. The danger for the
leadership was that the growing internal dissent from large
sections of the membership was liable to mushroom as the union's
isolation from the mainstream of the movement increased. And
increase it did. The EETPU's isolation was made almost complete
when at the Special TUC held at Croydon on 5 June 1969, they were
the only trade union to oppose the TUC's Programme of Action
designed to combat Barbara Castle's anti-union legislation - In
Place of strife.
So in the late 1960s the discontent in the two most important
sections of the union supply and contracting - the general
discontent manifested at the 1969 Conference to the EC's proposals
to further reduce the union's democracy, together with the
isolation of the EETPU from the rest of the labour movement as
widespread opposition began to mount against the economic and anti-
union policies of the Labour Government, formed the backdrop for
the rise of the organized opposition.
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The rise of organized opposition
Two national rank-and-file newspapers - the Power Worker and the
Electricians' Voice - were the only manifest signs that any openly
organized opposition existed in the union for most of the 1960s.
(21) Of course this could present a misleading picture, for
opposition was widespread amongst the activists at least, but it
had no national focus, no platform which could attract wider
sections of the membership into activity. Oppositional was, by and
large, carried out informally through the CP network in the union.
The Power Worker was the exception to this general rule. It
organized openly and was produced largely by CP members working in
the electricity supply industry. But, it must be remembered, the
supply industry was covered by five unions - the National Union of
Enginemen, Firemen, Mechanics and Electrical Workers (which merged
with the T&GWU in 1969), the Electricians, the AUEW, the T&GWU and
the GKWU - and so the Power Worker did not have to face the same
problems as a paper produced exclusively from wi thin the
Electricians' union (falling foul of the rules, being accused of
"unofficial activi ty" and so on). What made the Power Worker such
an important rank-and-file paper was not just its contents, but the
fact that it was linked with the unofficial Power Workers' Shop
Stewards' Combine.
Both the Power Worker and the Combine had existed under the
Communist leadership of the ETU. In fact they were a considerable
embarrassment to the CP leadership of the time. Foulkes, for
example, said in November 1960, while he was still President of the
union and Chairman of the Electricity Supply National Joint
Council, that "unofficial bodies are not in the best interests of
the industry". (22) One result of this attitude was the
disciplining by the AUEW of George Wake, secretary of the Combine
and also a CP member, for continuing to oppose a productivity deal
signed by his fellow CP member Frank Foulkes. This was just one
sign of the tension that existed between CP full-time union
officials and CP militants on the ground. For on the one hand, CP
members had achieved a good number of official positions in the
unions, while on the other hand, decentralized bargaining and the
growth of the post-war shop stewards' "movement" meant that many CP
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members were elected as stewards because they were the best
militants. The result was a serious contradiction. Because, as we
noted in chapter one, during the 1950s and 1960s there was a
growing conflict between union officials and shop-stewards. And
this confl ict, no matter how it might have been mediated by a
commom political outlook, existed within the Communist Party too.
After the fall of the Communist leadership in the ETU the
Power Worker was no longer looked upon so unfavourably by the CP
leadership. For now that all four main unions covering the
industry were controlled by the right, unofficial pressure was to
be encouraged not discouraged. So, for example, when the Combine
called for a "go-slow" in 1963 in order to put pressure on the
employers at the time of wage negotiations, a call that was taken
up at a number of power stations, there were no jibes about
"unofficial bodies" from CP leaders.
The Power Worker and the Combine continued through most of the
1960s to call for the election of left officials as the way to
advance the interests of workers in the industry. However, by the
late 1960s, the pol!tical make-up of two of the unions in the
industry had shifted dramatically to the left. With Jack Jones
leading the T&GWU and Hugh Scanlon now President of the AUEW, it
seems that many of the militants organized around the Combime and
the Power Worker no longer saw the need for such unofficial bodies
and publications. After all, Jack Jones was not only the chosen
successor of Frank Cousins, but like Hugh Scanlon he was closely
associated with the Institute of Workers' Control. What need now of
unofficial organization if the reins were held by the left? Thus,
soon after describing the 1968 supply agreement as a "plan for
unbridled speed up and redundancy" the Power Worker ceased
publication. (23)
The second oppositional paper to appear in the 1960s was the
short lived Electricians' Voice. It appeared only a few times from
1966, and was one of the series of Voice papers edited by Walter
Kendall during the birth of the Workers' Control Movement on the
left of the Labour Party. It ceased publication in April 1968 after
a libel action taken against Voice of the Unions and Ripley
Printers by the Executive Council of the EETPU. While the
Electricians' Voice was able to propagandise in favour of rank-and-
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file candidates such as Fred Morphew, who stood for the position of
General President against Les Cannon in 1968, unlike the Power
Vorker it was not an organizer. So the organization of the
nomination campaign that gave Morphew over 200 branch nominations
was carried out largely by the Communist Party. Nonetheless, the
Electricians' Voice played an important, if short lived, role in
propagandising for the Left in the union.
As we have said, the real opposition in the union was still
carried out by Communist Party members and other activists. This
involved, amongst other things, getting oppositionists placed on
union committees and sent to union conferences, and organizing
support for left candidates such as Fred Morphew. But the CP did
not organize openly because, as was demonstrated in the run-up to
the 1965 Conference, any organized intervention could be labelled
as "outside interference in the affairs of the union" by the
Executive. And given the history of the union the Communist Party
were very susceptible to this charge. Moreover, the way the
leadership dealt with the rebellion in the contracting industry
proved only too clearly that they were not adverse to using the
rules to get rid of their opponents. All in all, then,
oppositionists had to tread carefully. It was only at the end of
1969 that Flashlight, the CP dominated newsheet, appeared and
began to openly propagate a series of demands to reform the union.
Yet in the late 1960s the fight against the JIB agreement in
contracting did encourage the production of a number of local and
area rank-and-file bulletins that began to articulate what were to
be the central demands of Flashli.ght. One such bulletin was The
Spark produced in Glasgow.
The first issue of The Spark came out in :Kay 1967, and its
editorial made it qu i t.e clear where it stood with regards to the
leadership of the union. It lamented the decline of democracy over
the previous five years and attacked the way the rules had been
manipulated by the EC so that the elected full-time officials could
not challenge them. It set its tasks out as follows:
"We shall name firms which are adopting a
reactionary attitude towards electricians. We
shall mention sites where the boys aren't
getting a fair crack of the whip. We shall
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encourage stewards who are doing a job in the
best interest of our members ... and most
important of all, we will fearlessly criticise
any paid official of the ETU who shirks an
issue or falls down on the job he is paid by US
to do. Namely, the advancement of the wages and
condi tions and organisation of the Electrical
contracting industry." (24)
The September 1967 edition contained The Spark's main demands
for regenerating internal democracy in the ETU:
(1) All positions in the Union to be Elective.
(2) A part-time EC which would truly be based
in the workshops.
(3) The right of recall, which unlike Bro.
Chapple's oversimplification of it, meant that
if the members felt aggrieved at the conduct of
an official, they would have the right to
demand a ballot vote to decide on his removal,
wi th the builtin safeguard for the official,
that he would be allowed the right to state his
case.
(4) An Annual Policy Conference, made up of one
delegate per branch of up to 500 members, with
an additional delegate for every 500 members,
up to a maximum of 3 delegates from one branch.
All decisions of Conference to be binding on
the EC.
Suprisingly, the reconstitution of the Area Committees was
not one of the "minimal demands" of the Editorial Board. But
demands 1 and 4 were to become central demands of the opposition
platform in the 1970s. The Board itself seems to have been made up
of local CP members and ETU militants and shop-stewards influenced
by the CPo Although in one edition of The Spark it was stated that
the bu lletin was produced by the National Shop Stewards Committee
<NSSC> , it was apparent that it was produced in and largely aimed
at West of Scotland electricians. (25) Consequently this was the
first and last reference to the NSSC in The Spark. Contact was of
course made with other electricians nationally through the CP
179
network, but there was never any serious link up of militants in
contracting as there had been in the case of electricity supply and
the Power Yorker, What the reference to the mysterious NSSC did
indicate though, was that the Glasgow electricians saw the need to
co-ordinate their actvities on a national scale and outside the
confi nes of electrical contracting. So after the first edition,
which confined itself to events in Scotland, subsequent issues
tended to have a wider coverage of national events and issues that
affected all sections of the ETU - equal pay, incomes policy
legislation and so forth - although there was always a greater
emphasis on Scottish events.
Following Cannon's re-election as President of the union in
1968, The Spark wrote that the increase in the left vote was an
indication of "the inevitable coming to maturity of the various
factions of the Left, there is considerable hope for the future".
(26) This optimism was a product of the rising tide of resistance
inside the union and the increasing isolation of the Electricians
wi thin the wider labour movement as it doggedly supported the
Labour Government. The Executive Council's continued support for
the Wilson Government presented the activists in the union with the
ideal opportunity to raise openly the banner of opposition. For
they could not only attack Cannon's remodelling of the union, they
could also come out openly and attack the leadership politically
now that such criticism so clearly cut with the grain of the wider
opposi tion in the labour movement to Wilson's policies, and so
could not be simply dismissed by the leadership as Communist
interference in the affairs of the union. In these favourable
circumstances, then, it was decided, mainly by CP members in the
union, to launch a national rank-and-file newspaper. The first
edi tion of Flashlight appeared in December 1969, and the last
edi tion of The Spark appeared in October 1969, confirming the not
too closely guarded secret that The Spark had been run largely by
Communist Party members.
Flashlight
The aims of Flashlight were spelled out in its first editorial -
"Our Policy";
"This paper is being published exclusively by
and for members of the E. 1. U. P. 1. U. We do so
not because we believe in a rank and file
movement or a rank and file journal within and
for members of the union. It is our conviction
that rank and file participation in Union
affairs should be provided for in the
democratic structure and rules of our union.
When union democracy flourishes there is little
need for a paper such as this. Members are then
fully free to participate and fulfil their own
destiny and aspirations to determine and have a
say in their conditions of labour and to join
when necessary workers from other unions who
are faced with the same basic problems that we
are.
The Electrical Trades Union has a long and
proud history as a fighting militant and
progressi ve Trade Union. Unfortunately during
the past few years our union leadership has
developed into a self-perpetuating elite
showing more and more contempt for democracy
and the will of the membership.
Can any member of our union feel proud that
this paper is necessary or that we cannot give
the names of members who contribute to its
publication for fear of expulsion. For what
reason. For putting on paper what every member
of our union knows to be the truth.
This paper is not dedicated to any faction or
aspirant to union office. It is dedicated to
the best interests of all the members of our
union irrespective of differing viewpoints.
That's what democracy is all about. Our policy
therefore is simply - Transform our union into
a fighting instrument democratically run by the
membership so that all of us will have a
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greater say in our union affairs and in our
wages, hours and conditions of employment.
When we win the fight with your help, this
paper will be unnecessary." (27)
It might seem a little odd that a rank-and-file newspaper For
Electricians and Plumbers, as Flashlight's masthead proclaimed,
should, in its very first issue, say that it did not "believe in a
rank and file movement or a rank and file journal wi thin and for
members of our union". The answer to this conundrum is to be found
in the industrial strategy pursued by the Communist Party.
Following the ballot-rigging trial, the CP moved away from a
strategy of organizing predominantly as the CP in the trade unions,
to one which attempted to seek out Labour Party members and non-
affiliated activists to form Broad Left electoral pacts. So for
example in the AEU, the CP wound up its rank-and-file publication
The Ketal worker in 1962 in order to clear the way for its Broad
Left electoral turn. From 1965 it used the non-CP front Engineering
Voice as its election organiser. (28) And the Broad Left turn in
engineering, coupled as it was with the traditional strength of the
CP in the industry, was very successful, culminating in the
election of Hugh Scanlon as President of the AEU in 1967. The CP in
the Electricians' union were qUite prepared to see Walter Kendall's
Electricians' Voice play a similar role, and, as we have seen, the
good showing of Fred MOrphew against Les Cannon in 1968 seemed to
confirm the correctness of this electoral strategy. But since the
Electricans' Voice had been put out of action, Flashlight now had
to don the mantle of Broad Left organizer, and this above all else
meant that it had to distance itself from any idea that it was a
CP-front, or a CP Party building exercise. Thus the editorial in
the first edition was at pains to make clear that Flashlight was
seeking change in the EETPU only through the election of left or
progressive candidates to office, and once this operation was
complete there would be no need for Flashlight. The editorial then,
was designed to alleviate any fears that those to the right of the
CP might have about the intentions of the Flashlight group.
But the editorial was not just aimed at allaying the fears of
the CP's potential allies on the right, it was also laying down a
marker to those on its left who would seek to go beyond the
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electoral strategy of the CPo The reason the CP in the EETPU had to
take any notice of the small forces to its left in the union was
due to its own relative weakness in the wake of the ballot-rigging
scandal and the proscription from holding any office in the union:
" ... the CP was forced to be more 'tolerant I of
the anti-stalinist left (International
Socialists, the :Militant group) than in most
other unions because they needed non-CP members
to carry the Flashlight banner in the elections
they were so concerned about." (29)
At the same time, if the CP needed the support of the far-left,
groups like the International Socialists (IS) also needed the CP
and Flashlight:
"We needed to work with the potential that the
CP could muster. But within Flashlight from the
start we pushed to transform it into an
expanding rank-and-file organization that would
fight on issues rather than simply on
elections." (30)
Why Flashlight stressed so strongly that it was not attempting
to build a rank-and-file movement was largely for the benefit of
groups like the Trotskyist IS who shared a common heritage with the
CP which went back to the 1920s and the CP's attempts to build a
rank-and-file movement - the National Minority :Movement. Flashlight
was clearly saying that this is not the path we are going down. You
are welcome to join us, but on our terms. It was, of course, an
over reaction on the part of Flashlight, for the largest of the
far-left groups that would work with the CP. the International
Socialists, were in no position to greatly influence the direction
of Flashlight, let alone launch a cross-union national rank-and-
file movement. However, five years later the IS did consider they
were strong enough to launch such a movement, and we shall see how
this affected the organized opposition in the EETPU further on in
the chapter. At its Launch in 1969, then, despite reservations,
Flashlight had the support of all the left factions in the union
bar the ultra-orthodox Trotskyist Socialist Labour League. An
uneasy alliance, but alliance nonetheless.
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The first issue of Flashlight seems to have been well
received, with the editorial in the second edition - BEYOND OUR
FONDEST HOPES - claiming that 10,000 copies had been sold. (31) In
terms of content Flashlight was very similar to The Spark. The
first two editions, for example, carried articles on a meeting of
240 shop stewards from electricity supply who had called for strike
action throughout the industry, the continuing unrest associated
with the JIB agreement in contracting, the dangers of merging with
the NUGMU, the closing down of the "progressive" Clydebank branch
of the union, the need to develop opposition to productivity
agreements and so forth. But the unifying theme that ran through
all these different articles was the lack of internal democracy in
the union and how this directly affected the wages and conditions
of EETPU members. For example, Flashlight 2 reported how the
National Agreement between the Independent Television Companies and
the ETU had "aroused anger, frustration and concern amongst
electricians". Anger at the "derisory settlement of 4%" and
"frustration at the Executives's attitude in repeatedly ignoring
the representations of the shop stewards and members on wages and
conditions".
At this stage, however, Flashlight did not contain a list of
proposals or demands that would act as a focus for a unified
opposition platform within the union. What changes were needed in
order to democratise the union were left unsaid. Instead of
concrete demands and proposals, the first two editions of
Flashlight contented themselves with rather vague comments about
the need for a more democratic union:
"Only a change in policy will ensure that
changes in structure go hand in hand with
democracy, and the members have a say in the
running of the union."
"I we must] fight to make our union a truly
democratic organisation responsive to the needs
and aspirations of the membership." (32)
What Flashlight was clear about though, was that any change that
was to come in the union was to be brought about by electing left-
wing or progressive candidates onto tbe Executi ve Council of the
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union. So from the start Flashlight's strategy was overwhelmingly
electoral in outlook. The aim was to capture the EC by promoting a
national body of al ternati ve EC candidates - the "shadow" EC. Of
course, when we say that Flashlight's strategy was electoral, we do
not mean that they ignored strikes or that CP members in the union
were not still the best shop-floor militants in the union, far from
it. What we mean is that they saw the transformation of the union
coming about solely through the electoral process, and that this
concentration on elections resulted in them missing opportunties to
build a wider opposition in the union that, in its turn, would have
encouraged broader support for Flashlight candidates. We shall come
back to this issue when we look at the growth of oppositional
groupings that rose independently of Flashlight, and when we
compare Flashlight's strategy with that of the Rank and File
Contact group that split from Flashlight in the mid-197Gs. For the
moment let us see how successful this electoral strategy was.
Flashlight's electoral fortunes
No sooner was Flashlight launched than a test of its actual
strength in the union presented itself. For the entire Executive
Council of the union were coming up for re-election in 1970. Four
edi tions of Flashlight appeared before the elections in November,
and in all save three Divisions, Flashlight candidates got at least
the three minimum branch nominations needed to stand against the
sitting candidate. As can be seen from Table 2, the two Flashlight
candidates (Gannon and Montgomery) were elected onto the EC
(al though the Montgomery election was subsequently declared void,
see below), another sitting member (O'Neil) was also defeated, and
all tolled the high total vote cast against the leadership (45%)
was a very good result, if not qu i t e the "tremendous success"
descri bed by Flashl i gtxt: (33).
TABLE 2.
The EC Election results for 1970/71 were as follows:
Div.2: Montgomery. 4,201
Blairfordt 3,598
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(This election was then declared void by a 7 to 4 vote of the
EC, and another election was then called in June 1971. By then
another candidate had entered the field and the final votes
were:
Div.2: Blairfordt 4,614 Re-elected
Montgomery. 3,088
Milligan 769
Div.3: Hadleyt 5,125 Re-elected
Main 4,311
Div.4: Breakellt 5,020 Re-elected
Sabino_ 2,900
Di v . 5: Sheasbyt 5,390 Re-elected
Shaw. 2,496
Div.7: Clarke 4,180 Elected
O'Neilt 4,027
Div.8: Hammondt 4,770 Re-elected
Morphew. 2,899
Div.9: Gittinst 2,500
Pearce- 1,579
Div.10: Blairt 3,392 Re-elected
Gore- 3,278
Div.11: Claytont 3,218 Re-elected
Dormer- 1,348
Aitken_ 1,247
Plumbers 1: Gannon* 6,578 Elected
Frasert 5,080
(The election in Division 6 took place in June 1971 and the
sitting EC member Ashfield was re-elected against a far right
Chapple supporter)
t Sitting member
• Flashlight Candidate
SLL/ WRP Member
Source: Jefferys, "EETPU: The Decline of the narrow left",
International Socialism 88, May 1976.
The attitude
illustrated by the
two of the leading
of the EC to opposition candidates is well
the cases of Charlie Montgomery and Fred Gore I
oppositionists in the union at the time. On 10
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June 1970, three months before the branch nomination for the EC
elections, there was a one-day strike of 4000 electricians in
protest at the introduction of the Scottish JIB agreement. As a
resul t of his attendance at the Glasgow protest meeting,
Kontgomery, the Scottish Flashlight candidate, was expelled from
the union in September, the month of the branch nominations, by the
EC. However Kontgomery, who had already received 23 branch
nominations, took out an injunction against the EC for his
exclusion from the ballot paper and his expulsion. Justice Plowman
on this occasion ruled against the Executive Council, so Montgomery
was reinstated and the election went ahead in January 1971.
Kontgomery defeated the sitting candidate, Blairford, by 4,201
votes to 3,598 votes. But this election was then declared void on
the grounds of "outside interference" by a 7 to 4 vote of the EC.
The EC then ordered a re-run of the election in June, but by then a
third candidate appeared, splitting the vote and returning
Blairford with an absolute majority over the other two candidates.
Fred Gore, Flashlight candidate for Division 10, tried
unsuccessfully to take the union to court for having added without
his permission to his election address a warning against "communist
interference" in the union. Despite this interference by the EC,
Gore came only 114 votes behind the sitting candidate. Such
incidents, especially the disqualification of opposition candidates
and the re-running of elections whose results were unfavourable to
the EC, were to become commonplace under the leadership of Frank
Chapple. The rules of the union allow the leadership ample scope
for detecting infringements of the electoral procedure, and it is
the EC themselves that determine when there has been a breach of
the rules. So, for example, if a political organization that
regularly distributed leaflets outside the gates of a number of
workplaces (a common practice in the 1970s) happened to advocate
support for an opposition candidate, this could be interpreted
quite constitutionally by the EC as "outside interference", and the
election could be declared void. In the hands of such an Executive
Council the rule book becomes a minefield that oppositionists cross
at their peril.
The success of the 1970 campaign only confirmed for the
Flashlight leadership the correctness of their electoral strategy.
187
Flashlight 6 appeared immediately before the election for the
General Secretary in Kay 1971. But in the six months prior to this
election there had been maj or strikes and demonstrations against
the Industrial Relations Bill, but Flashlight made no concerted
attempt to bring together the thousands of EETPU members that were
opposed to the Bi 11 round a common programme of oppositi on aimed
directly at the Executive Council's constant equivocations on the
this issue (see chapter seven). They seemed unwilling to campaign
around such political issues, and instead concentrated their
efforts on elections. However, when the votes for the General
Secretaryship were counted the Flashlight candidate, Fred Gore, had
done nowhere as well as expected. Chapple was elected with 65,231
vote to Gore's 18,132, and the openly political candidate, Dormer,
who stood as a Socialist Labour League candidate, gained a
creditable 12,007 votes. Either way, 30,000 opposition votes were
not to be sniffed at, and Flashlight could take heart from the
respectable vote the joint opposition candidates received.
We said earlier that in its first few editions Flashlight had not
outlined in any concrete fashion proposals or demands for
transforming the union. Following the success of the 1970 campaign,
however, Flashlight did formulate its proposals for change, and
these appeared in the pamphlet The Case for change in the EETU -
PT~ produced in 1971. The theme of the pamphlet was the decline of
internal democracy in the union and how this "debasement
of ... democratic rights (had) gone hand in hand with a sacrifice of
wages and the surrender of long-standing and hard won conditions
and security of employment." The most important aspect of any
union, argued the pamphlet, was its democratic structure. "A
structure that provides for a two way exchange of ideas between the
elected leadership and the members they represent. A structure that
gives the members the right to decide policy through their elected
delegates at Policy and Industrial Conferences." For such a
democratic structure to become a reality in the EETPU, Flashlight
put forward the following "broad outlines of what our union should
be like":
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"(1) An Executive Council that is dedicated to
democratic changes in the structure of our
union.
(2) The election of all officials of the union,
including Trustees. No official has the right
to hold office except by the consent of those
he is to represent.
(3) Policy Conferences should be held every
year. And, policy decided must be the policy
for all members of the union, including the
Executive Council.
(4) Area Committees to be reconstituted within
the confines of each Division. Area Committees
to elect delegates to a Divisional Committee.
(5) Area quarterly shop stewards conferences
which will elect the delegates to the various
National Industrial Conferences.
(6) The National Industrial Conference to have
authority on negotiating policy and elect a lay
member from Conference to be on the negotiating
body for their respective industries, and have
power of ratification of agreements before they
are signed.
(7) The bans against Communists holding office
to be removed...
(8) The Rank and File Final Appeals Committee
must be reestablished. The present system is a
travesty and violates the basic rights of
natural justice of every member.
(9) Branches must be allowed to send notice and
agenda of quarterly meetings and summon special
metings at the discretion of the Branch
Committee." (34)
To the present day, with one or two exclusions and additions
(Flashlight no longer calls for the reconstituting of the Area
Committees, for instance), these are still the broad demands
campaigned for by Flashlight in the EETPU. What they were proposing
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in the pamphlet was essentially a return to the democratic
structure that existed following the "orgy of democracy" at the
1962 Special Rules Revision Conference, and which was dismantled in
Cannon's re-modelling of the union from 1965 onwards. This was an
amalgamation of the old pre-1962 structure of the union with the
1962 reforms grafted onto it (see Diagram 2, Appendix). With this
positive programme of reforms and the success of the 1970 campaign
behind them, together with the good showing of the joint opposition
candidates in the election for General Secretary in 1971, it might
be expected that Flashlight could have entered the contest in 1972
for the position of General President folloWing the death Les
Cannon with some confidence. But this was not the case.
There were in all five candidates running against the
favourite Frank Chapple for the post of President. After Fred
Gore's disappointing results in the 1971 election for General
Secretary, it was argued by a section of Flashlight that they
should support not Gore but the mainstream left candidate Eric
Hammond. The reasoning was clear: if the Broad Left strategy had
not been as successful as anticipated in 1971 the reason was that
the Broad Left had not been broad enough - cast the net wider and
catch more fish. Eric Hammond was to be the bigger net. However the
national Flashlight meeting that considered the proposal renewed
its support for Gore by a vote of 2 to 1. But in both the edition
of Flashlight out before the election and in the special election
leaflet, the support for Gore was not as unequivocal as it had been
in 1971. Hammond was given nearly as much favourable coverage in
the pre-election issue as Gore. And in the end Flashlight came down
on the side of neither Gore nor Hammond:
"The EETPU membership is presented with a
situation far more complex than at the time of
the election for General Secretary. We have to
consider who, if elected offers the best chance
of a breakthrough towards a strong, democratic
union. For obvious reasons rules etc., we must
not endorse a candidate as it would be used
agai nst hi m as it was in the Montgomery case."
(35)
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This was a far cry from the 1971 election, when Flashlight ran
the front page headline FRED GORE NOKINATED FOR GENERAL SECRETARY,
with Gore's picture and a gloWing article on his record and
qualities, and when Flashlight activists openly campaigned with the
slogan "Don't Grapple with Chapple, Score with Gore". (36)
Flashlight's more cautious position was not primarily because it
feared endorsing Gore, that was a red herring. The real reason was
the split wi thin Flashlight which resulted effectively in the
endorsement of two candidates - Gore and Hammond. As might have
been expected, this ambiguity was reflected in the election
results:
Chapple 44,623
Young 10,972
Gore 10,747
Hammond 7,108
Dormer 5,820
Sanderson 3,834
Ironically, in its post-election edition Flashlight complained of
the "separateness of forces" among those who wished for democratic
reform, and of the need for "wider unity" to be established. (37)
As the Gore/Hammond debacle had shown, there was a danger of
Flashlight's Broad Left strategy becoming so broad that electoral
expediency would become the governing motive for supporting a
candidate, rather than the candidate's principles and proven track
record of opposition. The tacit support that Flashlight gave Eric
Hammond was an indication of how elastic the Broad Left strategy
was becoming. A further example of such elasticity, and what
Flashlight's calls for "wider unity" meant in practice, was
provided by Flashlight's campaign during the election for the, it
was assumed (see chapter five), vacant position of General
Secretary now that Chapple had won the Presidency.
As the election results above show, the nearest challenger to
Frank Chapple in the Presidential election was Mark Young. Young,
it will be recalled, was one of the original members of Les
Cannon's band of ex-communists who had formed the Reform Group in
the post-1956 period in order to rid the ETU of the Communist
leadership. Following the death of Cannon in 1970, there followed a
power struggle amongst leading members of the union over who should
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DCCUpy the nDW vacant pDsitiDn Df President. NDw that Chapple had
WDn the Presidency the f ocus of struggle moved t.o the suppoeed.ly
vacant seat Df General Secretary. But, as the accDunt given in the
prevI oue chapter ehowed , Chapple had no intentiDn of sharing the
tDP jDb in the uniDn, fDr this might have meant his eclipse as in
the .. j Dint leadership" days of the 1960s under Cannon. Young it
seems was cDnsidered by Chapple tD be more Df a threat tD him than
any candidates f r-om the left, and SD after ten years service as
NatiDnal Organizer YDung was sacked in August 1973. Chapple's
reaSDn was given at the uniDn's 1975 CDnference:
"YDU t.hought he was a good f'e Ll ow, Quite
simply, I do not want tD gD t nt.o the detail,
the Executive did nDt think so, and that is why
he was nDt appDinted." (38)
The cDnsequences Df the 1969 ballDt that abolished the
electiDn Df all full-time Dfficials were nDW cDming hDme tD rODst.
As Young said in Tri bune:
"I was dismissed as a unt on Dfficial because I
was critical of SDme umon policies... On that
principal any Dfficial can be dismissed and we
wDuld have a cDllectiDn Df yes-men." (39)
Michels wDuld have nDt been at all surprised at Chapple's desire tD
aur-round himself with "yes-men":
"There arises in the leaders a tendency tD
iSDlate themselves, as it were, with a wall,
within which they will admit those Dnly whD are
Df their Dwn way Df thinking. Instead Df
a l l owtng their succeSSDrs t o be appct nt.ed by
the choice Df the rank and file, the leaders dD
all in their pDwer to choose these succeSSDrs
f or- themselves, and t o fill up gaps in their
own ranks directly Dr indirectly by the
exercise Df their Dwn vDlitiDn." (40)
FDr Flashlight the real questiDn that the Young affair posed
was whether Dr not the one time lieutenant of Cannon and Chapple
cDuld nDW act as a fDcus fDr increased DppDsitiDnal activity in the
uniDn. Flashlight answered in the affirmative:
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"Has the sacking of Brother Young unleashed new
forces against Chapple and Company, and if so,
(€ole:]
can they write II wi th us under one cause? The
answer to both questions is yes. We must bring
about as rapidly as possible the closest co-
ordination behind the struggle for changes in
the EETPU. It may be asked, 'where does Brother
Young stand in all this?' Quite simply, it
remains to be seen. If his actions measure his
words and stated intentions, they cannot do
other than help. We shall observe and act
accordingly." (41)
In fact the oppositional forces in the union at this time, 1973,
were unleashing themselves without any assistance from Young as the
same edition of Flashlight quoted above reported:
"The sounds of rebellion in the EETPU are
rising to a new crescendo. The deep and intense
feelings of concern felt by many of us in
recent years about the undemocratic
developments in our union are now finding far
wider expression. We are witnessing new and
important sections of our union taking up and
forcefully expanding our arguments and slogans.
This new awakening of feeling - almost like a
shock wave has created another extension of
support for Flashlight." (42)
It seems that Flashlight entertained the idea that Young could
act as a figurehead for this oppositional upsurge. Thus the
cryptic, "We shall observe and act accordingly" in Flashlight 12. A
very Broad Left campaign in support of Young in the soon expected
election for General Secretary could act, the reasoning might have
gone, as a rallying point not only for the old oppositionists in
the union around Flashlight, but also the "new forces" that were on
the move, as well as for many on the centre and right of the union
who were disillusioned with the Chapple leadership. Young could
possi bly provide the opening for the "wider unity" that Flashlight
sought by securing the position of General Secretary and thus
preparing the ground for the "breakthrough" that Flashlight hoped
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was possible in the Executive Council elections in two years time,
1975. If this was the reasoning, and we believe that it was, the
Broad Left strategy was giving way to a kind of Broad Democratic
Alliance within the union based solely on winning elections. This
is not at all surprising, after all the Communist Party's
programme, The British Road to Socialism, envisaged change coming
about in Britain through a Broad Democratic Alliance of progressive
forces. If in Britain, why not in the EETPU? In the end Flashlight
did not have to throw its weight behind Young, for as we know the
election never took place. And in 1974 Young left the EETPU to take
up the appointed position of General Secretary of the British
Airline Pilots Association.
The rank-and-file "rebellion" Qf 1973
Vie have seen that Flashlight 's main interest in the "r-ebel l Lon in
the EETPU"" in 1973 was hQW these new fQrces equId be harnessed in
a democratic movement to transform the union's structure, and this
for them meant broadening their electoral appeal to encompass
forces well to the right of the organized opposition in the union.
What is interesting is that this rebellion should throw up rank-
and-file organization independent of the only organized grouping in
the union - Flashlight. How strong was this rebellion and how did
Flashlight react to it?
The rising militancy amongst many sections of the EETPU has to
be placed firmly wi thin the context of the general sharp rise in
industrial and political militancy that took place in the early
1970s. One labour historian, Royden Harrison, has described the
struggles under the Heath Government as "the most extraordinary
triumph of trade unionism in its long conflict with government":
"The Labour Unrest of 1970-1974 was far more
massi ve and incomparably more successful than
its predecessor of 1910-1914. Millions of
workers became involved in campaigns of civil
disobedience arising out of resistance to the
Government's Industrial Relations Act and, to a
lesser extent, its Housing Finance Act. Over
200 occupations of f act.or-t es , offices,
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workshops and shipyards occurred between 1972
and 1974 alone and many of them attained some
or all of their objectives. Strikes in the
public services became more frequent and
prolonged. Some of them began to exhibi t an
ominous concern with the conditions of
distribution as well as production...
But it was the coal miners, through their
victories in the two Februaries of 1972 and
1974 who gave to this Labour Unrest a
structure, a final roundness and completeness
which their contribution of 1912 had failed to
supply to the earlier experience. First they
blew the Government 'off course'; then they
landed it on the rocks. First they compelled
the Prime Minister to receive them in 10
Downing Street - which he had sworn he would
never do - and forced him to concede more in 24
hours than had been conceded in the last 24
years. Then two years later their strike led
him to introduce the three-day-week - a novel
system of government by catastrophe - for which
he was rewarded with defeat at the General
Election.
Nothing like this had ever been heard of
before!" (43)
This generalised militancy was reflected in the EETPU in a
number of ways. Firstly, the 1971 BDC decision that took the union
off the Industrial Relations Act register was reaffirmed against
the wishes of the Executive Council at the 1973 BDC. Secondly,
EETPU members were involved in some of the most prominent
industrial disputes of the period. Thirdly, the opposition managed
to capture 3 of the 12 seats on the EC in 1973. Finally, and this
is what we are concerned with here, the period produced a number of
rank-and-file organizations independent of Flashlight.
Three rank-and-file groupings independent of Flashl i gbt:
appeared in 1973 the Reform COJIJJIJittee, the Plumbers Action
COIIJJIJittee, and the Electricians' Charter COJIJJIJittee. The Reform
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Committee, ironically named after the Committee that was formed by
Cannon, Chapple and Young in the early 1960s to oust the CP
leadership (known as the Reform Group in the 1950s), was formed as
a direct result of the sacking of Young from his post as National
Organizer in 1973. The Reform Committee was given space in
Flashlight to state its views:
"We welcome this opportuni ty of putting
forward the views of the CAMPAIGN FOR THE
DEMOCRATIC REFORM OF THE EET&PU. In doing so we
are aware that this paper - which represents
the platform of the broad left within the Union
has consistently put forward similar
proposals to the ones we are now campaigning
for.
The difference between our two groups lies in
our objectives. As a left- wing grouping,
Democratic Reform is only one plank in a number
of associated policies for which you stand.
In our case, Democratic Reform is our single
and only objective. We represent various
opinions and therefore we cannot put forward a
common collective view on wider policy matters
and once the reforms we advocate are secured,
we shall immediately disband.
It is important that this is understood;
because any future coalition we can construct
together to reform the Union's structure and
rules cannot be extended to include broad
policy matters." (44)
The Reform Committee, like Flashlight, protested that "since
1965 we have witnessed a whittling away of members' rights and the
concentration of power at the top of the Union", and the changes
they advocated (election of all full-time officials etc.) were
almost identical to Flashlight's. Even the distinction between
"broad policy matters" and democratic reform, which the Reform
Committee saw as distinguishing themselves from Flashlight, was not
so clear cut. After all, in its first issue Flashlight had said
there would no longer be a need for such a paper as Flashlight once
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the reforms they were advocating had been achieved. Flashlight' s
aim was to reform the union, it gave no indication that once this
was achieved that it would continue as a left-wing body campaigning
on "broad policy matters". True Flashlight carried articles on
broader issues such as strikes and the need for the EETPU to oppose
the policies of the Heath Government, but their actual demands on
the union leadership were almost exclusively concerned with
internal reform. So the gap between the Reform C0111111i ttee and
Flashlight was not all that wide. No doubt in his bid for
leadership Young wanted the support of Flashlight, but at the same
time he wanted to keep his own independent grouping together to
further his own ambitions and distance himself from the CP in the
union.
The Plumbers Action Co111111ittee (PAC) was set up in the North
East of England in June 19'73 in order to combat what they saw as
the loss of identity of the plumbing section of the EETPU since the
ETU and PTU merged in 1968. A national meeting of some 60 plumbers
was held on 29 September 19'73 aimed at broadening the base of the
PAC. But it was not until a further national meeting was held in
:Manchester on 8 December 19'73 that the demands of the PAC were
fully formulated. These were listed in the main resolution before
the meeting:
"(1) Reconstitution of the District Committees.
(2) Election of all full-time officials.
(3) Better deal for Table Z members.
(4) The Final Appeals Committee to be restored
as a rank and file body and elected by ballot.
(5) Full democratic rights for all members.
(6) More representatives for plumbers on the
Executive Council.
('7) Call for a National Delegate Conference of
the Plumbing section." (45)
As well as the main resolution being carried, the following
recommendations were also agreed upon:
That the Reform C0111111ittees' petition be
supported [i.e. for the re-instatement of Mark
Young].
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- That we demand that the election of General
Secretary be held.
- That we broaden our activi ties as much as
possible and aim for a more widely
representative conference in Spring 1974.
That the organising committee of this
conference becomes the basis of a national
committee, and steps be taken to widen
representation on it." (46)
Rank-and-file organization independent of Flashlight was also
taking place in electrical contracting. On 3 Karch 1973, sixty
delegates met in Liverpool to discuss a common programme of action
for contracting electricians in the union. The programme decided on
by the Liverpool Conference became known as the Electricians'
Charter, which contained 10 points:
(1) End the grading system [i.e. the JIB
grading system which resulted in differential
rates of pay depending on how the electrician
was classified].
(2) £1.50 per hour with local negotiations.
(3) 35 hour week without loss of pay.
(4) De-casualisation of the industry.
(5) Full pay during sickness and unemployment.
(6) Four weeks holiday with average pay.
(7) No penal clauses in the agreement
(referring to the disciplinary powers of the
JIB) .
(8) End the Lump 100% trade union
organisation.
(9) Introduce the right to strike.
(10) Better apprenticeship training and
conditions.
Another conference was held in Manchester on 15 September
1973. This was largely concerned with discussing the 1974 wage
agreement and the need to press for local bargaining. The 10 point
charter was re-endorsed and a standing committee The
Electricians' Charter COJIJJDittee - was elected to co-ordinate the
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activities of rank-and-file electricians around the points of the
charter and the decisions of the two conferences. (47)
The high point of the rank-and-file "rebellion" came in May
1974, when more than 600 plumbers and electricians attended a
"Reform the Union" rally in Birmingham. What was so significant
about the rally was that it was jointly sponsored by Flashlight,
the Reform C011lI11ittee, and the Plumbers Action C011lI11ittee, and
represented the first real attempt by the opposition forces in the
union to act together to democratise the EETPU. A statement of
policy and aims was carried without dissension at the rally:
"Our primary aim is a democratic union ensured
by the following:-
- Election of all officials.
- Reintroduction of District Area
Committees.
- Full democratic rights for all members - end
poli tical bans.
- Final appeals committee to be restored to a
rank-and-file committee.
- Better representation for plumbing section
members. "
In short, the rank-and-file groupings wanted a return to the
internal democracy that followed the 1962 SRRC. To this end the
rally endorsed a number of immediate demands: a Special Rules
Revision Conference to be called in 1975 to give effect to the
changes needed to democratise the union, the election for the
vacant post of General Secretary to be held without any further
de I a y , and opposit i on to the proposed merger wi th the G&MWU. (48)
Kark Young spoke at the Conference, and the only people to openly
criticise his record were Billy Williams and Rab Jeffery, who were
both members of the International Socialists. Nonetheless, Young
did not receive the endorsement he was clearly hoping for from the
Conference as the joint opposition's candidate for the expected
election for General Secretary: an endorsement that would in all
likelihood not have been opposed by a large faction of Flashlight
activists, including its leadership.
What was Flashlight 's reaction to the emergence of organized
opposition independent of its own organisation? Quite simply, they
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welcomed it. In fact, the emergence of the PAC and the Electricians
Charter seems to have had the effect of pushing Flashlight to the
left. For their almost exclusive concern with elections and union
conferences was undermined somewhat by the PAC and especially the
Charter group, who were concerned with immediate economic demands
as well as demands for democratic change in the union. It was
precisely because Flashlight did not appear to be articulating
these day to day grievances that such groups appeared in the first
place. Flashlight, it goes without saying, reported the day to day
grievances of plumbers and electricians, and the leading activists
on the sites were very likely to be Flashlight supporters, but they
did not attempt to organise this discontent on a national scale.
The PAC and the Electricians Charter Committee were attempts to do
precisely that: Flashlight merely tail-ended these initiatives.
Moreover, the very fact that three opposition candidates had been
elected onto the Executive Council in 1973, pointed to the fact
that rank-and-file activity on the ground could be translated into
electoral success. The lesson of the 1973 "rebellion" would seem to
be that rank-and-file organization and electioneering had to be run
in tandem if any significant change in the union was to be brought
about. Flashlight's tendency to concentrate on electioneering
received a corrective during 1973, but the events of that year also
raised a political problem for the Flashlight leadership.
In its first edition Flashlight, it may be recalled, stated
that it did not "believe in a rank and file movement or a rank and
file journal". Their strategy had been to build a Broad Left
opposition whose aim was to replace the right-wing EC with a left-
wing one. Yet in 1973 the PAC had set up an unofficial National
Committee, the Electricians Charter had a ~anding Committee and in
London there existed a strong "Shop Stewards Xovement". In fact, it
was the initiative of the London Shop Stewards Novement to set up
the Electricians Charter. These developments showed all the signs
of an embryonic rank-and-file movement gestating in the body of the
EETPU. Even Flashlight now began to talk of the rank-and file
movement. For example, after the December PAC Conference in
Manchester it reported:
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"This conference in itself was testimony to the
tremendous growth in a very short period of our
rank and file movement." (49)
Now the CP leadership of Flashlight knew only too well what
the difference was between rank-and-file activity in the EETPU and
the building of a rank-and-file movement, but what they tended to
do was to wilfully confuse the two. The major hallmark of the two
attempts to build rank-and-file movements in Britain - the Shop
Stewards & Workers' Committee :Movement of the First World War and
the Communist Party instigated National :Minority :Movement of the
1920s was their capacity to mobilise from below and act
independently where necessary of the union leaderships whether they
be left-wing or right-wing. How successful they were in this task
is another matter, but that is what they aimed for. The CP's Broad
Left strategy of the 1960s, was an attempt to control the unions by
getting left-wing and progressive candidates into office, not by
bu f Ld i ng rank-and-file "minorities" in the unions that could act
against those very same left-wing officials if need be. We shall
deal further with this subject when we examine the strategy of the
International Socialists. What we can say here though, is that the
leadership of Flashlight were bound by the CP's all-union
industrial strategy of building Broad Lefts in the unions, so they
were certainly not going to push for the building of a national
rank-and-file movement which would have necessarily entailed
linking together with other oppositional groupings in left-led
unions like the AUEW and T&GWU, as well as right-wing ones.
What happened to the groups? After the 1974 ballot that
abolished the post of General Secretary, Mark Young, as we have
seen, abandoned ship and consequently the Reform Comudi t ee, which
was essentially a vehicle for Young, disappeared. The fate of the
PAC and the Electricians Charter group seems to have been the
same. They continued in name only for a short while but took no
notable initiatives. So there is no reference to either group in
Flashlight, or any of the left press, after the joint rally of May
1974 in Birmingham. Certainly the activists did not disappear, but
the momentum of 1973 had obviously not been strong enough to
maintain two national organizations without any political backing.
Flashlight could sustain itself not only from the support it
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received frQm rank-and-file EETPU members, but alsQ frQm the
backing it CQuld depend Qn frQm the 30,000 strQng CQmmunist Party.
This was nQt primarily financial help, but QrganizatiQnal and
pQlitical, prQviding Flashlight with a natiQnwide netwQrk Qf
cont.act.s t.hr-oughotrt the trade un i on and Labour: movement; and mor-e
impQrtantly a pQlitical directiQn. The Qther grQuping in the uniQn
tQ last Qut the 1970s was the Rank and File Contact grQup, and this
was because it alsQ had pQlitical backing - the InternatiQnal
SQcialists/SQcialist WQrkers Party. The Qnly Qther QppQsitiQnal
jQurnal tQ appear in the uniQn in recent years has been the Beacon,
which is backed by the Xilitant "QrganizatiQn" and which appeared
as their star was rising Qver LiverpQQI in the early 1980s.
AnQther factQr is the general ebb in industrial militancy that
accQmpanied the first tWQ years Qf the 1974-1979 LabQur GQvernment,
with the number Qf days "IQst" thrQugh industrial disputes falling
frQm 14,750,000 in 1974, tQ 6,012,000 in 1975 and tQ 3,284,000 in
1976. There was alsQ the expectancy that the new GQvernment which
had prQmised "a massive and irreversible shift in the distributiQn
of both wealth and pQwer in f avour of worktng pecple and their
families", wou l d deliver this time r-ound, The onl y way that the
grQups that emerged in 1973 cou l d have been deve l opsd was if
Flashlight and the CP had thrQwn their weight behind them. But Qf
CQurse Flashlight had its Qwn rQad tQ travel, and it is mQre than
likely that the activists in these grQups graVitated tQwards
Flashlight in the changed circumstances of 1975. By the end of
1974, then, Qrganized QppQsitiQn seems tQ have been firmly back in
the hands Qf Flashlight.
The Executiye CQuncil electiQns Qf 1975.
Flashlight appeared f our- times in the run-up t.o the Executive
CQuncil electiQns Qf NQvember 1975. But again it gave nQ indicatiQn
of whQ the Flashlight candidates were fQr fear Qf journalists like
WOQdrQw Wyatt denQuncing them as CQmmunists and TrQtskyists, and Qf
the EC taking actiQn against alleged "Qutside interference" in the
affairs Qf the uniQn. Justified as these fears were, nQt to Qpenly
support a slate Qf candidates was a nQvel way Qf electiQneering and
could only lead to cQnfusion. An indication of this confusion was
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that when the election results were announced all but one of the
right-wing candidates increased his majority. (see Table 3) The one
exception was the victory of Hector Barlow, who defeated the
sitting candidate after a re-run election was ordered by the EC and
after, as in the case of the Montgomery election in 1970/71, a
third candidate entered the race. The increased votes of the
sitting members were explained by Flashlight by the press'
"particularly outrageous intervention in union affairs", but went
on to say that some comfort could be derived from the increase in
the votes of the progressive candidates compared to 1970.
Flashlight concluded on an optimistic note: "we take heart from the
changing complexion of the EC over the last five years as shown by
the election of Bros. Gannon, Best, Ramshaw and now Barlow, and the
steady growth of support for democratic reforms in our union." (50)
Table 3.
1975 EC Election Results
Div.4: Breakellt 8,694 Re-elected
Sabino. 3,004
Div.7: Clarket 8,236 Re-elected
Bevan. 3,766
Div.8: Ha1I111lOndt 8,611 Re-elected
Banning 3,549
Atkinson. 1,692
Pearce- 649
Div.10: Blairt 9,518 Re-elected
Gore. 3,810
Div.11: Claytont 7,483 Re-elected
Aitkin. 2,788
Plumbers 1: Gannont Returned unopposed
Plumbers 3: Bar-Low 2,035 Elected
Gaffney 1,546
Sweeney 447
t Sitting member
• Flashlight candidate
- VlRP candidate
Source: Jefferys, op. cit.
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The next electoral hurdle for Flashlight was the 1976 election
for the General Secretary. Harold Best was the candidate supported
by Flashlight. Best was in many ways a dream candidate for
Flashlight, for he refused to be identified with Flashlight or any
other grouping in the union and so was not as readily open to the
charge that he was a Communist dupe. Best was in today's parlance a
"soft left" candidate, and as such Flashlight reasoned that he
could attract votes from a larger section of the membership. This
election is also of special interest because we see the entry for
the first time of an opposition candidate backed by a rival
political organization, an organization that had previously worked
within the Broad Left Flashlight umbrella. Billy Williams stood as
a Rank and File candidate and, as Flashlight pointed out, his
demands for change in the union were "virtually the democratic
demands long established by Flashlight." :Moreover, his decision to
stand "arising from the policies of the International Socialists,
led to an angry rift in the rank and file movement", and had
undoubtedly been a "harmful one" which "in another situation could
be disastrous". (51) The questions are though, why had Williams'
standing caused such an "angry rift in the rank and file movement",
and why did he gain so many votes first time out?
Chapple
Best
Williams
83,838.
24,254.
10,270.
These questions can only be answered by examining the al ternati ve
strategy offered by the Rank and File Contact group.
Rank and ~le Contact 1976-1980
In the militant years of the early 1970s the International
Socialists (from 1977 the Socialist Workers Party) attempted to
build a national rank-and-file movement. The reasoning behind this
industrial strategy was summed up some years later by Alex
Callinicos, a member of the SliP Central Committee:
"It was an attempt to give a class-wide
perspecti ve and a national structure and
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leadership to rank-and-file organizations which
had been bu i I t up gradually between the 1930s
and 1960s, and which were now coming into
increasing conflict with the employers, the
trade union bureaucracy and the state. Out of
this conflict would come, so it was argued, an
increasing potentiality for the economic class
struggle to assume a directly political
character. Revolutionaries, by relating to
workers in struggle, and seeking to weld them
together into a class-wide movement, could win
mass support for their politics." (52)
Central to this perspective, and in stark contrast to the
Broad Left strategy of the CP, was the belief that left-wing trade
union officials should not be relied upon. The IS took the
sentiments expressed in the first leaflet of the Clyde Workers
Committee in November 1915 as their guiding principle as far as
trade union officialdom was concerned:"
"We will support the officials just so long as
they rightly represent the workers, but we will
act independently immediately they misrepresent
them." (53)
Not that the IS thought that all union officials were hewn
from the same rock, they didn't. They recognised the importance of
ideological differences and realised that such differences
affected the way officials acted in practice. So in the EETPU IS
members worked within Flashlight, and in other unions they
supported the left against the right. But the fundamental fact
overriding all differences of ideology, argued IS, was that at
times of radical crisis or in periods of high militancy like the
early 1970s "all sections of the bureaucracy seek to curb and
control workers' militancy". (54) This was true, for example, IS
argued, in the period immediately following the Pentonville dockers
crisis in the summer of 1972. when left and right union leaders
took part in tripartite talks in an effort to deflate the political
crisis. (55) It was also true in September 1973 when the leaders of
the T&GWU and the AUEW urged their members to cross the picket
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lines of 156 striking electricians at Chrysler's Coventry plants
who were in the process of breaking the Tory incomes policy, and it
became abundantly clear with the continuing support given to the
Labour Government's Social Contract by Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon
when in 1977 a rising tide of militancy threatened to destroy the
Government's incomes policy.
Besides the favourable obj ective conditions for launching a
national rank-and-file movement in the early 1970s, Callinicos
argues that there were two further crucial pre-conditions for the
IS initiative. (56) The first was the role of the Communist Party.
In the early 1970s, writes Callincos, the CP found itself virtually
paralysed by the increasingly glaring contradiction between the
trade union bureaucracy and the rank-and-file which ran through its
own ranks. Thus, while its industrial front, the Liaison Committee
for the Defence of Trade Unions (LCDTU) led two large unofficial
stoppages against the Wilson Government's anti-union proposals in
1969, followed by two other unofficial stoppages in 1970-71 against
the Industrial Relations Bill, in the much bigger struggles to
follow they made no effort to link the rank-and-file militants
together in a national organization.
The second pre-condition was IS's own implantation in the
workplaces. Between 1971 and 1974 IS was transformed from being a
predominantly student to a predominantly working class
organization. By March 1974 it had a membership of 3,310, of which
1,115 were manual workers (90 in the EETPU) and 950 routine "white
collar" workers, and they were organized into 13 trade union
fractions and forty factory branches (as well as geographical
branches of course), (57) Two of the most successful factory
branches were in Glasgow. The branch at the Chrysler plant in
Linwood had 25 members, 12 of whom were shop-stewards, including
the first elected chairman of the JSSC, Willie Lee, and the
convenor of the T&GWU stewards, Peter Bain. At its peak the branch
sold between 200 and 250 copies of Socialist Worker each week at
the plant. The Glasgow Corporation branch included some of the
organization's leading EETPU militants, such as the convenor George
Kelly, and they were to play a leading role in Rank and File
Contact. During this same period IS members in various industries
had launched rank-and-file papers whose aim was to group around
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them militants who did not share all their political views but who
were prepared to work with them around specific issues such as
higher wages. By 1973 these papers had achieved a small, but
nonetheless, not insignificant circulation.
It was in these circumstances that IS took the first step
towards but Ld.ing a national rank-and-file movement by calling a
delegate conference to discuss the prospects of such a movement on
30 March 1974. 500 delegates representing 270 trade union bodies
attended, and set up the National Rank and File Organising
Committee (NRFOC). A second conference in November of the same year
was attended by 460 delegates, including 61 shop stewards
committees and 8 strike committees. (58) It was in this context
that Rank-and File Contact was launched at the beginning of 1976.
Rank and File Contact
The International Socialists had had a presence in the
Electricians' union since the late 1960s, and, as we have seen,
operated within Flashlight from its inception in 1969. They also
produced two pamphlets in this period - Grading and the Contracting
Sparks and Rank and File Struggles in the BTU - both of which were
attacks on the JIB agreement in electrical contracting. The latter
pamphlet was produced in Glasgow and was concerned mainly with
showing Scottish electricians the dangers of the JIB agreement that
had come into operation south of the border (it will be remembered
that the Scottish JIB agreement was signed in 1968, two years after
the English and Welsh one). Even at this early stage the IS stress
on the primacy of rank-and-file organization at site and workplace
level as opposed to electoral activity is clearly evident. But, on
the whole, it is doubtful if any activist in the union, CP or
otherwise, would find much to quarrel with in these two pamphlets.
In the early 1970s the IS produced a number of Socialist
Vorker specials for electricians. Again most activists in the EETPU
would agree with the bulk of their contents - attacks on the
Tories, the right-wing of the TUC and the policies of the Executive
Council. What many of them would not agree with though, were the
attacks made on the left of the trade union movement. For example,
an Electricians Special produced in the summer of 1973 attacked not
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only the right-wing of the TUC for its failure to fight the Tories
"Counter Inflation Policy", but went on
"Certainly no faith can be put in the will or
ability of the eXisting 'left' leaders to stop
the rot. The painful truth is that they differ
from the right wing in words but not, for the
most part, in deeds. Scanlon, Jones, Daly and
their friends have not seriously fought for
mili tant policies. Nor can this simply be put
down to their personal failings. It is a
political failing. The belief that the way
forward lies mainly in a struggle for office,
the replacement of this right wing official by
that left wing one, ignores the fact that only
a powerful rank and file movement can force the
leaderships to act or by pass them if they
refuse. No serious militant can fail to
recognise the value of supporting left-wing
candidates for office. But this activity can
have a real effect if, and only if, it is an
integral part of the struggle to build a big
rank-and-file movement on a fighting programme
which rejects class collaboration and seeks to
uni te workers against the employers and their
government." (59)
Here we have the IS strategy neatly summarized. From 1969 to
1975, IS electricians attempted to push this strategy within
Flashlight, but with the launching of the NROC in 1974, IS
attempted to strike out on its own under the banner of Rank and
File Contact. Consequently Billy Williams was run as a Rank and
File candidate in the election for the General Secretaryship in
1976. Williams was a member of the Communist Party but left after
"they [the CPJ broke up our attempt to build a Liaison Committee
for Defence of Trade Unions in Cardiff. I couldn't find any
fighting spirit in the Communist Party. I joined the International
Socialists, and that's full of fighters. I say in my election
address I'm in the IS. I'm proud of it," (60) Williams was asked in
one interview why he wasn't supporting Harold Best (who was the
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Flashlight supported candidate) against Frank Chapple. He recounted
a story of a lobby of the union's HQ during the 1975 Local
Authority electricians dispute:
" ... we got stewards together from allover the
country... Speaking to Chapple at that time I
could tell from the look in his eyes that he
was wondering who these people were. He'd never
seen them before in his life.
He loves debating with his known opponents on
the left, the Flashlight candidates, the
professional opposition-men. But these people
were different, young rank and fi Le mi I i tants
who had no respect for him at all, who treated
him as an equal and demanded action from him...
Now these are the people I'm representing in
the election: the people who want to change the
union from the bottom up. For far too long, the
left have tried to change it from the top.
I don't expect to touch Chapple in the vote.
But I do expect, through this election, to make
lots of contacts and to start the argument
about who controls the union." (61)
Given that it was Williams' first time out in an election, and
given that he openly declared that he was a member of the
International Socialists, his 10,000 votes compared to Best's
24,000 were very creditable, and showed that there was a
significant minority that went along with Rank and File Contact's
approach and ideas. Seemingly the Flashlight leadership were in two
minds whether to support Williams or not, and this might account
for Williams' good showing, with many Flashlight supporters voting
for him.
As part of Williams' campaign the Rank and File Contact group
produced a pamphlet - The Ugly Face of Chapple's Union - and how to
change it. This was a potted history of the rise of Frank Chapple
and how under his leadership there had been a complete failure to
fight the anti-trade union legislation of the Tories, the wage
cutting policies of the Labour Government, and how he had attacked
those within the union who had fought for better wages and
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conditions and against the polices of both Heath and Wilson. It
also contained a stinging section on "How Chapple keeps his Grip",
outlining the decline in internal democracy in the union. In this
section, Chapple's frequent use of lawyers to vet election
addresses and material critical of the union was referred to, and
as an aside it was said: "It is nearly 100 per cent certain that
this pamphlet you are now reading will be sent to the EETPU
lawyers". It was, and attracted damages of £22,500, but the
publishers, S.W.Litho (the IS print-shop) avoided the cost by going
bankrupt (Chapple was also awarded costs of £4000 against Socialist
Vorker for their reference to him as Franco Chapple). A month after
the Ugly Face appeared a national Rank and File Contact Conference
was held in Birmingham and the first issue of Rank and File Contact
appeared. How then did the immediate demands of and the actual
practice of the Rank and File Contact group differ from Flashlight?
In terms of the formal demands for the restoration of
democracy in the union the two groups' demands were virtually
identical. The only maj or differences being that Rank and File
Contact wanted all elected officials to be paid their members'
average wage and unofficial shop stewards' Combines to be set up in
every section of industry with EETPU members. Where they differed
was on many of the economic/political demands that they put
forward. Flashlight would put forward anti-incomes policy slogans
(in fact they were often to the left of the CP in criticising
Scanlon and Jones' support for the Social Contract), but they would
never call "For occupations to force nationalisation without
compensation of firms that sack workers", or come out against all
immigration and import controls as Rank and File Contact did. (62)
In short, the differences reflected the different politics of the
Communist Party and the International Socialists.
In terms of practice, the Rank and File Contact group were
constantly trying to make the links between the fight for better
wages and conditions in the union, the fight against the Social
Contract, and the need for a national rank-and-file movement that
could act independently of the trade union bureaucracy. To this end
they organized a number of conferences to bring those militants
together in the union that were prepared to "unite and spread the
opposi tion to Chapple". The first Conference was held on 12 June
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1976 in Birmingham, and was attended by 65 EETPU members. Besides
sharing their experiences and articulating the demands needed fDr a
real campaign against the leadership, the delegates alsD criticised
Flashlight's BrDad Left strategy. One critic's cDmments, Jim
AtkinsDn, carried special weight as he had been a leading member Df
Flashlight and had stDDd as an DppDsitiDn candidate. He said that
" a branch and wor-kshop base" was the key t o building cppoef t Lon ,
and that "the experience of the T&GWU and the AUEW is that the
electiDn Df left-sDunding Dfficials is no solution to the problems
of the rank and file". This criticism of left officials continued
when one shop-steward, Colin Simpson, representing striking
electricians from Sheffield, complained that the EC member for his
area, the Flashlight supported candidate for the position Df
General Secretary, Harold Best, had not been near the strike in the
five weeks it had been on. (63)
This was a recurring criticism made by Rank and File Contact
about left-wingers that had been elected onto the EETPU EC, and it
was a criticism that t ot.al Iy undermined Flashlight's strategy. It
was a criticism that was taken up by Steve Jefferys in a maj or-
cri tique of Flashlight that appeared in the InternatiDnal
Socialists theoretical journal the month before the Birmingham
Conference:
"So far the I opposition' grouping of Gannon ,
HarDld Best and Phil Ramshaw... has few
achievements tD its credit. At only his secDnd
meeting, fDr example, the Minutes recDrded Best
as secDnding acceptance Df the Stage 3 deal in
the Electricity Supply industry; that meeting
tDDk place during the 1974 miners' strike
against the Tor-y wages policy. And when
Flashlight No 13 headlined the need f or: the
General Secretary electiDn tD take place, Dnly
Ramshaw vot.ed against the EC decisiDn to wait
for the industrial consultants' repDrt. GannDn
and Best went alDng with Chapple." (64)
The ineffectiveness of the oppos t tiDnists on the Executive
Council a I so came acrDSS in the pages of Flashlight itself. A
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delegate from Xanchester to the 1975 BDC reported in Flashlight
that the:
"outstanding aspect at this year's conference
on the Isle of Man was once again the dominance
of Bro. Chapple wi thin the leadership. Their
apparent obedience to his promptings and wishes
stuck out like a sore thumb. Al though in all
fairness, we do know that some EC members were
opposed to many of Bro. Chapple's remarks, it
must be said that it did not manifest itself in
any way, unless their silence was itself a
protest." (65)
The only way to stop left-wing officials drifting, it was argued at
the Birmingham Conference, was for them to be accountable to a
strong rank-and-file organization at workplace level. Building that
organization was the main task. It would be difficult and would
take time, said George Kelly, the Convenor of ~lasgow Corporation
Electrical Workshops:
"We have a programme of what we want to
achieve, but we can't expect to carry
everything at once. We have to walk on two feet
on issues like wages and conditions and on
issues like racialism." (66)
It was a brick on brick strategy in many ways, with the group
focusing on those areas where EETPU members were attempting to
improve their wages and conditions, and from this economic struggle
attempting to generalise about the EETPU's and the Labour
Government's policies. A good example of this was a dispute
involving 22 electricians at Dinnington colliery in South Yorkshire
early in 1977. After a 10 week strike the electricians won a 35
pence increase in their hourly rate which broke the JIB agreement.
The EETPU leadership instructed the men back to work and announced
that the strike was political because it breached the Social
Contract pay limit. For Rank and File Contact this was precisely
the kind of action that should be encouraged, for it showed very
clearly the potential for a rank-and-file movement within the
union. As one Rank and File Contact electrician put it:
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"The Dinnington lads knew they had to rely on
rank and file EETPU members to win. From the
beginning, strike bulletins were produced to
explain their case to other workers. Support
was won from sites and factories allover the
country. The victory is the first step towards
uniting rank and file EETPU members in a fight
against the stranglehold of the JIB on wages
and conditions." (67)
To build on this victory against the JIB, the Rank and File
Contact group organized a Conference against the JIB in Sheffield
on 28 May 1977. The Conference was a success with over 80 delegates
attending from some of the major sites and strike committees in the
country. A declaration was adopted by the Conference which called
for an hourly wage rate of £2.50, a campaign against the
blacklisting of militants and the JIB grading system and for a
lobby of the union's BDC. The lobby took place and was criticised
by Flashlight:
"The Lobby of our Biennial Conference organised
by the "Rank and File" Contact, in no way
assisted the fight inside the conference. On
the contrary Chapple was able to exploit the
situation to his own advantage. Many delegates
reported on the adverse effect the lobby had.
Perhaps some lessons have been learnt, but at
what cost?" (68)
Flashlight is giving the impression here that a lively lobby of
around 100 electricians somehow til ted the balance at the BDC in
favour of the leadership.
Such criticisms were part of a general "counter-attack" that
the Communist Party and Flashlight were making against the
industrial strategy of the IS/SWP. In the December 1976 edition of
Xarxism Today, Geoff Roberts wrote a lengthy critique of the IS/SWP
industrial strategy as well as reaffirming the CP's own strategy.
(69) For its part Flashlight responded to the critique of their
strategy that appeared in International Socialism with an article
entitled "People in Glass Houses":
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"We are accused of being primarily concerned
wi th elections and not of fighting on issues.
This is qUite wrong. It is true that we regard
the official channels of struggle as being very
important. The defeat of Chapple's line on the
Industrial Relations Act owed much to the
agi tation that was stimulated, maintained and
led by our movement. In many militant struggles
Flashlight supporters gave leadership, whilst
our paper has fought consistently to present a
left policy as part of a general campaigning to
influence the direction of the whole labour
movement. The ability to get marchers out on
the streets does become, from time to time,
crucial, but it is by no means the sum total of
rank and file expression [this is a reference
to the 'Right-to Work' marches organized by
IS/SWPl. To be able to achieve the best
correlation of forces seeking democratic change
must be the constant aim. The electoral
processes offer unique periods for being able
to forward this aim. But, again, neither is
this the sum total of the fight that has to be
waged. Success will depend ultimately on a
blend of all forms of activi ties, initiatives
and motivations." (70)
Flashlight also defended its position of not always supporting
rank-and-file candidates where they considered a more moderate, or
better established, left candidate would stand a better chance of
being elected:
"We do not take the view that supporting rank
and file candidates is the 'only principled'
posi tion. Or that full-time officers aspiring
to leadership posts must do deals and align
themselves formally with the rank and file
movement is another example of 'principle'. For
us, the honest presentation of our broad
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policy, its democratic aims and reasoning is a
sound principle." (71)
Clearly Flashlight was taking the challenge of Rank and File
Contact seriously (a small indication of this is the change in
Flashl i gbt:' s masthead in 1977 from FOR ELECTRICIANS AND PLUNBERS
to A RANK AND FILE PAPER FOR EETPU XEXBERS> , just as the Communist
Party was taki ng the I S/SWP seriously . For the showing of Bi 11 Y
Williams in the General Secretary election, the production by 1977
of a pamphlet and three issues of Rank and File Contact, the
organizing of a number of conferences which attracted some of the
best militants in the country, the lobby of the 1977 BDC, and the
general pull of the new grouping all presented a serious challenge
to the Flashlight leadership within the EETPU. A third National
Rank and File Conference organized by IS in November 1977, which
was attended by 522 delegates from 251 trade union bodies, could
only have reinforced the potential challenge that Rank and File
Contact posed to Flashlight. Moreover, despite Flashlight's broader
base in the union, and despite the fact that the CP must have had
hundreds of members in the union at the time (where IS/SWP had
about 100), their ability to bring together militants in the union
seems to have been no greater than Rank and File Contact's. So that
a Flashlight Conference held in Manchester in 1978 attracted 75
EETPU members, no more on average than the Rank and File Contact
group was pulling. (72) However, 1977 was in many ways the high
point for the Rank and File Contact grouping in the union. They
never extended their base any further, and by the early 1980s
Flashlight had reasserted its hegemony as the main oppositional
grouping in the union. Why?
The fortunes of Rank and File Contact were clearly linked to
the IS/SWP strategy of building a cross-union national rank-and-
file movement, which in turn was dependent on the level of
combativity of the working class. With hindsight the SWP now admit
that the movement that they launched in 1974 was "still born", and
that the explosion of rank-and-file militancy in 1977 (which was
why the SWP called the third National Rank and File Conference) was
a "false dawn". What their analysis did not take account of, the
SVP now argues. was the existence of a number of long term
tendencies whose effect was to undermine the strong workplace
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organization that had been built up during the 1950s and 1960s. The
essential features of this process were threefold. Firstly, the
widespread replacement of piecework by national or plant agreements
and the "bureaucratisation" of full-time convenors and senior shop
stewards. Secondly, the collapse of the left trade union leaders,
most notably Scanlon and Jones, in the face of the Social Contract,
and the damage that had inflicted on a whole layer of mi li tants
that had worked for the Broad Left strategy. Accompanying this was
the rightward drift of the Communist Party, which deprived
militants of the main organizational framework that they had
previously possessed. Finally, the shop stewards' politics were, at
best, militant reformism. But the acute economic crisis of the
1970s meant that this would no longer do - militant economism
needed to be transcended. However, in the absence of a credible
alternative, most workers went along with the prevailing ideology -
profitability, national interest etc. Taken together, the SWP
argued, these factors amounted to a
"threefold crisis in the labour movement - of
organisation, leadership and ideology - [which]
had led to a marked shift of the balance of
forces in the ruling class's favour since
1974." (73)
This "downturn" analysis was first articulated by Tony Cliff
in 1979. (74) But it was only after much internal wrangling that
this analysis was accepted in the SVP, and several years before the
practical consequences of the "downturn" analysis were followed
through - the winding up of the rank-and-file papers and the
abandonment, until better times, of the attempt to build a national
rank-and-file movement. Rank and File Contact was still appearing
in 1981, while in the same year the group organized a Conference
against unemployment and a lobby by 70 EETPU members of the union's
BDC. But by late 1982, and after the EETPU leadership had
disciplined 4 leading SVlP electricans (one of them, Marc Mellor,
being banned from holding office for 5 years), the Rank and File
Contact grouping faded out.
Flashlight continued with its Broad Left strategy in the
EETPU. In the five EC seats that came up for re-election in 1980
the Broad Left were defeated in all but one of the elections. The
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next major contest was for the post of General Secretary elect at
the end of 1982. Flashlight carried the headline BROAD LEFT
CHALLENGE, and said that the election of the Broad Left candidate,
John Aitken, could point the way to a "new era" in the union. And
Aitken did quite well:
Eric Hammond 73,506 votes (55.3% of those voting)
John Aitken 32,436 (24.4%
Roy Sanderson 26,954 (20.3%
33% turnout
Source: Executive Council Minute No 13 1982.
At the same time, Ian Brown, the Broad Left candidate standing for
the post of National Secretary for the plumbers did extremely well
against the sitting candidate (Brown 7,292 votes to Lovell's
9,557). And the "flag bearer" of the left in the Scottish
Di visional election, as Flashlight called John 0' Brien, did well
against the EC member considering the left vote was split (McLuckie
5,958, O'Brien 3,426, Blacklock 1,809).
In the following year, 1983, Broad Left candidates once again
put up a good ahowi ng in two of the three EC elections of that
year. (75). More Executive Council elections took place in 1985 and
1986, but the Broad Left still failed to make the electoral
breakthrough they were hoping for. Then two blows followed in qUick
succession. John Aitken was defeated by 6,100 votes to 2,850 in the
Divisional election for the seat that covered East Anglia and East
London (including the Wapping plant) at the end of 1986. And six
months later, Eric Hammond was re-elected General Secretary by a
massive 108,146 votes to Aitken's 36,684, on a turnout of 39.7%.
Nonetheless, John Aitken believes that Flashlight is still "very
strong in some areas" and this is due to a change in orientation by
Flashlight:
organized
the Beacon
credible
launched
the only
()[ilitant
"One of the weaknesses of Flashlight is that
over the years it hasn't been a campa i gni ng
organisation. It's been more of an electoral
organisation. We have changed that over the
past five years." (76)
Today Flashlight is still
opposition grouping in the union
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journal in 1985 at a Liverpool meeting attended by 60 EETPU
members, but except for the odd flurry it seems to be making very
litle impact in the union). But on 25 June 1988 Flashlight
organized a "Unite within the TUC" Conference in Manchester
attended by 150 EETPU members to discuss the implications of the
EETPU's possible expulsion from the TUC. It seems that there is now
a possibility that Flashlight might attempt to form an "alternative
EETPU" if the union is expelled from the TUC. This would be a
disaster for Flashlight. For as the history of breakaway unions
shows (and the Electricians have had four breakaways since 1945),
the bulk of the membership stay with the parent union leaving those
that break away isolated from the members they wish to influence
and even more firmly in the control of their opponents. A breakaway
from the EETPU would at best take a few thousand of the best
oppositionists out of union and out of the way of Eric Hammond and
the leadership. In 1983, when 800 Fleet Street electricians
attempted to break away from the EETPU and join SOGAT, Flashlight
was sympathetic but nonetheless argued against the breakaway saying
that it had II caused a divisi ve note to be struck in the grass
roots struggle for change in the EETPU". (77) If this was true of
one section of an EETPU branch breaking away, how much truer is it
of maybe thousands of EETPU members breaking from the union? But,
as yet (July 1988), nothing definite has been proposed.
The evidence of organized opposition provided in this chapter would
appear to undermine Michels "law" and give much credence to
Gouldner's. Time and time again EETPU members have not just cast
their vote in opposition to the leadership but involved themselves
directly in organizing against their leaders. That this has not led
to the displacement of the right-wing EC many would argue is yet
another proof of Michels' theory. But it really is impossible to
win with Michels, for supposing Flashlight candidates had taken
every seat on the EC, a disciple of Michels would no doubt say that
one oligarchy had just replaced another. Democracy for Michels was
equated with direct or, as the Itlebbs called it, primitive
government by the masses. He argued that this type of democracy was
a "mechanical and technical impossibility" in the mass
organizations of twentieth century capitalism. (78) While this
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might well be true at a national level, it is certainly not true at
local level, in the trade union branch, at the workplace, or in the
areas of activity that we have described in this chapter. There is
a case to be made then that direct democracy, al bei t uneven and
fragmentary, still exists at the lower levels of union
organization. So we could say that Gouldner's "iron law of
democracy" is confirmed by the continued existence in the EETPU of
that "practical ideal of democracy" which Michels seemingly
thought no longer existed in trade unions. Arguably in the early
1970s, because of the high level of militancy. such "primitive"
democratic tendencies were more in evidence in the EETPU than
oligarchical ones. However, in the next chapter there is much that
could be used in support of either side of the Michels/Gouldner
debate.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE EETPU AND THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT
In the last chapter we attempted to show how the rise of organized
opposition in the union was intimately linked to the rising tide of
industrial militancy of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and to the
widespread political opposition to In Place of Strife and the
Industrial Relations Act (IR Act). In this chapter, and the one
that follows on the Social Contract, we will examine how two major
areas of policy were shaped by the "external" events that impinged
heavily on the internal democracy of the EETPU. The argument is a
simple one: that the internal democracy of a trade union is moulded
by an array of social forces far wider than those that seemingly
arise from within a particular union. Moreover, by looking at the
EETPU and the IR Act, we hope to indicate not only how such
"external" forces impinged on the internal life of the union, but
also how this relationship undermines Michels' oligarchical theory.
The General Election of June 1970 was fought largely on
Labour's failure to manage the economy, and in particular their
failure to manage the trade unions. The Conservative manifesto, A
Better Tomorrow, had the "reform" of industrial relations as one of
its major planks. The manifesto promised that, if returned to
office, the Conservatives would introduce a new Industrial
Relations Bill (IR Bill) based on the ideas set out in their 1968
pamphlet A Fair Deal At Work, which was in turn a development of
their traditional critique of trade unions as "over mighty
subj ects" contained in such publications as A Giants Strength
(1958), and Trade Unions for Tomorrow (1966). (1) The Conservatives
honoured their manifesto promise, and by November 1970 a House of
Commons debate had already taken place on the IR Bill, which became
the IR Act of August 1971.
Robert Carr, the Secretary of State for Employment, argued
that the underlying purpose of the IR Act was not to "shackle the
unions" I but to "reform and strengthen" the voluntary system of
industrial relations. Ironically. his ideas on the reform of the
industrial relations system sound very much like those put forward
by the Donovan Commission. (2) However, as McCarthy and Ellis
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observe, the difference between the traditionalist and the Donovan
cri tique of the industrial relations "problem" was not so much one
of recognising the "problem", in which there was "a remarkable
degree of agreement": the difference lay in the diagnosis of the
causes of the "problem" and the solutions deriving from this. (3)
Robert Carr's solution was a comprehensive, restrictive legal
code, which abolished overnight the whole foundation of trade
union and labour law embodied in the statutes from 1871 to 1906,
and was overtly aimed at curbing trade union action and strikes by
means of legal penal ties, and by regulating trade union internal
affairs by means of a system of state vetting and registering of
trade unions and their rule books. (4) Even the most sympathetic
commentator would be hard put to describe this as strengthening the
voluntary system of industrial relations. Certainly it had nothing
in common with the majority Donovan Report, which argued that
II vol untary unanimity" and the co-operation of workers and
management could be strengthened by giving greater responsibility
to senior stewards and by increasing the workforce's identification
wi th "their" workplace. But Carr's solution did have a lot in
common with a dissenting note to Donovan penned by the economist
Andrew Schonfield. Schonfield argued for legally binding
agreements, for legal curbs on "restrictive practices" I and for
restrictions on the right to strike in certain public services.
Carr's solution also had a lot in commom with the Labour
Government's ill-fated In Place of Strife. And the labour movements
response to In Place of strife should have forewarned the
Conservati ve Government of the reaction they could expect to the
new legislation, but they seem prepared to ride the storm.
The labour and trade union movement response to the IR Bill
was angry and immediate. Al though the TUC rejected strike action,
unofficial one day protest strikes took place in the West of
Scotland on 11 November 1970, on 8 December a national stoppage
involved half a million workers, and 50,000 came out in the
Midlands on 1 January. The TUC General Council were opposed to such
protest actions, not least because they were called by the
Communist Party controlled LCDTU, but they nevertheless called for
a "day of action" for 12 January, hoping it would be restricted to
lunch time factory meetings. It wasn't. There were national
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stoppages: 40,000 in Coventry, 50,000 om Kerseyside, and in Oxford
all the car plants were shut. Then the TUC called a national
protest demonstration for Sunday 21 February, which turned out to
be one of the biggest demonstrations in working class history, with
an estimated 250,000 taking part. This was followed early in March
by two official strike calls by the AUEW, and on both occasions 1~
million workers struck in response. On 18 March a Special TUC was
convened at Croydon, where affiliates were "strongly advised" to
completely boycott the IR Bill if it became law.
From a very early stage the EETPU leadership were at odds with
the TUC campaign of mild defiance to the IR Bill. They argued that
the Bill should not be fought with demonstrations and "days of
action" which inevitably led to strikes, but should be fought by
TUC involvement in consultation and attempts to amend the Bill
before it reached the statute book. Under no circumstances, they
argued, should trade unions use their power to defy legislation
passed by a democratically elected government, and this was the
danger with the TUC's course of action. Les Cannon well expressed
the EETPU's position in an article in the Sunday Ti:mes in October
1970, when the Bill was at its consultative stage:
" ... There are three general arguments which
have been widely used in this debate. One -
That it will seriously under:mi.ne the power and
authority of the unions built up over a
century. This I regard as nonsense. Even if all
the proposals of the consultative document were
implemented in legislation, the trade union
movement would have sufficient power exercised
legally to have a devastating effect on
important sections of the economy.
Two The legislation is an unwarranted
interference in the field of collective
bargaining. This really is an irony because
during the 1960s legislation had to make up for
serious shortcomings in the collective
bargaining system. Take the Contracts of
Employment Act, the Industrial Training Boards,
the Redundancy Payments Act, and equal pay for
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equal work. Every trade union negotiator knows
that the only way to get a universal right of
independent appeal against unfair dismissal is
through legislation.
Three That it is an interference in the
internal affairs of trade unions. Again the
1960s have many cases of injustice against
trade unionists who have gone to law and where
the union rules have had to be construed by the
High Court either because of their ambiguity or
inadequacy. There is nothing I personally
welcome more than the right to be given for
trade unionists to challenge a fraudulent
leadershi p such as existed in the Electrical
Trades Union in the 1950s, which could not be
resolved within the trade union movement at
that time and which could not be resolved by
the TUC even today.
Cannon goes on to say that it seems unlikely that there will be any
further constructive dialogue between the Government and the TUC in
the remaining five weeks still left for consultation:
" ... This leads inexorably to a confrontation
between the TUC and the Government and it also
raises a constitutional issue of the highest
importance.
Having been invited to consult and try to
modify details of this programme, will the TUC
be right in the event of not having all its
demands met decide that it will use its great
power against the fulfilment of a mandate which
the party now in government sought and received
from the electorate? I think not.
Millions of trade unionists whose working lives
will be much affected by this legislation have
the right to expect that their leaders will go
through the entire document with the
Government, submitting reasoned amendments to
its proposals. If the TUC stands on principle
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in total opposition to the document I fear the
case of these millions of workers on many
unsatisfactory features of the document will go
by default." (5)
However, it was not until after the death of Cannon that the
EETPU had its first major opportunity to put its position on the IR
Bill to a trade union audience. The occasion was the Special TUC
held in the Fairfield Halls, Croydon, on 18 March 1971, and
attended by 1,057 delegates. Seven recommendations were presented
to the Congress by the General Council, five of which were carried
wi thout division. (6) The other two recommendations turned out to
be more contentious. Recommendation No.1 "strongly advised"
affiliated trade unions not to become registered under the IR Act.
The argument at the Congress centred on whether or not "strongly
advised" would be sufficient to deter many TUC unions from
registering. Vic Feather, the General Secretary of the TUC,
defended the recommendation against those who wanted the TUC to
instruct affiliated unions not to register, by arguing that to make
non-registration an absolute condition of affiliation would only
dis-unite the movement in the face of the Tory attack. Vic
Feather's reasoning narrowly won the day: 5,055,000 voted for the
recommendation and 4,284,000 against, a majority of 771,000. (7)
Recommendation No.7 stated that:
"Congress should concentrate its support behind
the positive recommendations in this Report and
preserve its unity of purpose that has hitherto
characterized the campaign of opposition." (8)
This was an endorsement of the TUC's rejection of industrial action
to prevent the passing of the IR Bill. It was carried by 5,366,000
votes to 3,992,000, a substantial majority of 1,374,000. (9)
The EETPU had been arguing for some time that the TUC's
strategy contained the seeds of a final confrontation with the
Government, a confrontation that challenged their right to govern
and therefore put parliamentary democracy at risk. (10) At the
Special TUC Frank Chapple argued for a new TUC ini tiati ve that
would avoid such a confrontation:
"Before we take the step from which there is no
retreat ., .. ought we not challenge the
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Government's bad faith with our regard for
national interest? Could not the General
Council, for example, in return for withdrawal
of this legislation, give some guarantee of a
strike free year? What is wrong with a year of
honoured agreements to prove this Government's
policies are wrong?
He goes on to say that the legislation could be defeated by "over
co-operation":
"We say this Bill is an unworkable Bill. We say
it will worsen the industrial relations of this
country. Why not let us prove that by trying to
co-operate with it, to over co-operate with it,
because I do not believe it can succeed." (11)
Despite these suggestions, Chapple ended his speech by urging the
Congress to support the General Council's proposals. When the Bill
became law in August 1971, however, the formal support that the
EETPU had given was put to the test as the TUCfirmed up its
opposition to the legislation.
At the Blackpool TUC, held the month after the Bill had became
law, a motion moved by Hugh Scanlon of the AUEW which instructed
affiliated unions not to register under the IR Act, and to take the
necessary steps to remove themselves from the provisional register,
was carried by 5,625,000 votes to 4,500,000, a majority of
1,125,000. The AUEW motion also provided for Congress to take any
necessary disciplinary action against any union that did not de-
register in the near future. (12) De-registration now became the
central focus of the TUC's campaign against the Act, but even this
passive resistance caused a maj or internal dispute in the TUC as
many affiliated unions were reluctant to de-register. The reason
for such reluctance was fear of the consequences of de-registering.
For an unregistered union was liable to unlimited damages if it
induced a breach of any employment contract or any commercial
contract, and it also lost certain valuable tax concessions. At a
time when strikes were increasing, then, de-registration could
prove to be an expensive business for a cost conscious union
leadership. These and other considerations made the de-registering
policy highly controversial. (13)
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A month after the September TUC, 72 affiliated unions with a
total membership of 4,960,000 "had already taken actions and
decisions required of the~' reported the TUC. By January 1972, 82
unions with 5,038,000 members had complied with Congress policy; 10
unions with 2,446,000 members intended to de-register; 12 unions
with 1,921,000 members were still postponing their decision; 32
unions with 590,000 members had signified to the TUC that they
intended to remain or become registered; and two unions with 7000
members had not informed the TUC what they intended to do. At their
meeting of 28 June 1972, the General Council reviewed the situation
and noted that 40 affiliated unions remained registered, and the
EETPU was one of them. It was decided that those unions who had not
de-registered, but had not previously been summoned to meet the
F&GPC, should now be called to give an account of themselves.
Before the meeting with these unions was held, however, three more
unions de-registered, and one of these was the EETPU. Nonetheless,
the EETPU asked for its meeting with the F&GPC to go ahead so that
it could put on record what it thought was wrong with the policy of
de-registration. (14) Why did the EETPU leadership decide to de-
register then? Was it simply a change of heart, a wish to abide by
the decisions of the TUC and its own BDC?
Late in October 1971, three months after the IR Bill became
law, and two months after the TUC policy on de-registration had
been carried by Congress, the EETPU held its BDC. After attacking
the IR Act in his opening address to the Conference, Chapple went
on to argue that the main problem now was "how best do we manage
while it stays on the statute book:
"Ky personal view is similar to that expressed
by the late President in an interview on the
subject of the Bil!. .. he said, we should as a
Trade Union Kovement have sought to amend the
Bill clause by clause. The Movement's reaction
to the Industrial Relations Bill, seems to have
crystallised itself into a blind act of faith
that we must not register.
It must be accepted by everyone, it is
certainly accepted by me, that if we all failed
to register it would have presented the
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Government with a problem, and it might have
succeeded in defeating the legislation. I
reject the idea that a frontal assault on both
the Bill and the Government was either the best
or the correct way to achieve our aims.
I believe we missed opportunities in the way we
conducted that fight and I hope that later on
in the week we will seek new attitudes that
might improve on the situation. Neither
adventurous action, nor slogans can substitute
for carefully reasoned policies... " (15)
Chapple's remarks were typical of the EETPU leadership's
highly ambigious stance on the IR Act. Formally, albeit
reluctantly, they supported the TUC's position:
"After discussing the topic in great detail the
Executive Council decided to give full support
to the stand taken by the General Council of
the Trades Union Congress." (16)
How, it might be asked, was Chapple's denigration of the central
plank of TUC opposition - de-registration - consistent with the
"full support" that the union was supposed to giving the TUC's
stand? Chapple's talk of "carefully reasoned policies" suggests
that there was a "third way" to oppose the IR Act which would avoid
a "frontal assault" on the Government, while at the same time
offering a more practical and realistic strategy than the TUC's
"blind faith" in de-registration now that the legislation was the
law of the land. Clearly the EETPU leadership would have preferred
the AUEW's de-registration motion to have been defeated at the
September TUC (after all they did vote against it). Why then were
they now being so uncharacteristically cagey about their position?
Why not openly oppose de-registration and unfurl the banner of the
"third way"? The answer is that they were under pressure from
outside the union - the massive protest stikes, the Special TUC,
the September TUC - and from the opposition wi thin the EETPU to
fight the IR Act. The ambigu tty of their position reflects their
desire to traverse their own course, while at the same time being
pulled and checked by forces working in the opposite direction.
Once again, then, we have a situation where the "oligarchical"
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leadership is being buffeted by forces that are preventing them
from carrying through a course of action that they wish to follow.
This "external situation" was sharply reflected in the shaping of
the union's policy on the IR Act at their BDC.
At the EETPU BDC at the end of October 1971, the opposition in
the union pressed the leadership to translate their verbal
opposition to the IR Act into some action. This took place during
the lengthy session that debated the one motion on the IR Act:
"This Conference believes that the obj ect of
the Tory Government's Industrial Relations Bill
is to weaken the trade union movement so that
they will be able to depress the living
standards of working people and to create a
pool of unemployment as a means of keeping
wages down. Accordingly Conference calls upon
the Executive Council to initiate a campaign of
explanation and action throughout the union
and, in the event of the Bill passing into law,
to refuse to register. Furthermore the
Executive Council should submit to the Labour
Party Conference that a future Labour
Government should immediately repeal this law
and to formulate, together with other unions
and the TUC, a policy of non-cooperation in the
Government's Industrial Relations Bill." (17)
Debate centred on how the IR Act should be fought and on the
implications of any actions that the union would subsequently
undertake. The first fourteen speakers in the debate spoke in
support of the motion, until the Chairman, Frank Chapple,
intervened and called on delegates to mount the rostrum who had
differing opinions to the previous speakers. J.Atkinson, the mover
of the motion, expressed the general views of the opposition in the
union to the Act:
" ... No doubt people will tell us later on in
this debate that there will be tremendous
problems if we do not register. Of course there
will be. There will be even bigger problems if
we do register because we will be allowing the
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Government to tie our hands behind our back,
fighting on their terms. We hear quite a lot
about the Tory Government being the choice of
the people. We hear that we should not oppose
the elected Government of the country. This is
something that had our ancestors done, we would
be working 100 hours a week for 10/- a week
because we only advanced on the basis of the
struggle that the workers have put up over the
last 200 years; a struggle which has meant
deportation and imprisonment; a struggle of
workers who wanted a better life, demanded to
keep them and their families in relative
comfort. They fought for the position we have
today. Let us remember that we are not only
fighting for ourselves, we are fighting for the
interest and welfare of our families. This is
the measure of the struggle we have to put up
now. I am not saying that if we register that
will finish trade unions. What I am saying is
that if we register, if we divorce ourselves
from the mainstream of the trade union movement
then we are allowing the Tory Government to
di vide us, to weaken us to make it easier to
resist our wage demands.
Not only that, if we agree and allow this Bill
to be operated, what we are doing is allowing
trade union activi ties to come into the realm
of criminal law...
Carry composite motion number 5 and we will be
bringing ourselves back to the main stream of
the trade union movement, we will be sending a
message from this Conference to the whole trade
union movement to stand firm and resist this
vicious piece of class legislation." (18)
The same central themes that Atkinson raised in moving the
motion, de-registration, the need to defy unjust laws, and unity in
the face of the Tory attack were hammered home by the other
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delegates who spoke in favour of the motion. In fact, these were
the central issues that were debated in the entire labour and trade
union movement. Atkinson's speech, or something very close to it,
must have been repeated in conference halls, union branches, at
demonstrations, and in works canteens throughout the country. One
of the most powerful pressures that was exerted on the EEPTPU
leadership at the BDG was for them to unite behind the TUG, and not
to break ranks and di vide the movement. Vic Feather's address to
the BDG had concentrated on the issue of unity, as indeed his whole
campaign in the labour movement had done. As one delegate from
Glasgow put it:
"Vic Feather was appealing to us not to 'rat'
on the movement. With only 4% for registration,
are we to be among the few out of step? ... We
as a union supported the TUG line here in
Blackpool a couple of months ago. Since then
the need for trade union unity has hardened...
TUG policy has been very well thrashed out and
overwhelmingly carried. It is official policy.
Rank and file members get branded as
unconsti tutional if they carry out unofficial
policy. It is the Executive Gouncil this time
who are creating difficulties on this one, one
of the most vital issues in trade union
history. We delegates must tell them we just
will not have it. We must instruct them to
return to the agreed policy and cease the
unofficial action and abide by the TUG
agreement which they are party to ... " (19)
This is a classic case of the union leadership being hung by
its own petard. For ever since the right-wing EG took office in
1962, division and dissension wi thin the union were regarded as
undesirable and even dangerous. Rank and file members seeking
democratic control of their union were accused of being "divisive",
having "ulterior motives", and of destroying the unity of the union
and thereby weakening it in its struggle to improve the wages and
conditions of the membership. As we have preViously mentioned. this
approach has been dubbed the "here-come-the-saboteurs" strategy,
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which attempts to forge a link between opposition and the work of
the employers. (20) Now the oppositionists were turning the tables
and presenting the EETPU leadership as the saboteurs motivated by
poli tical considerations. It was a powerful blow in the charged
atmosphere that surrounded the entire fight against the IR Act. The
resul t was that the leadership and its many supporters at the
Conference were on the defensive. All were against the Act in
principle but, nevertheless, argued that de-registration could
seriously damage the union and warned of the grave consequences of
breaking the law of the land. A delegate from Scunthorpe, W. L.
Wright, highlighted the problems that de-registration would bring:
"If we refused to register as the motion states
in line 8 the union will no longer be afforded
any protection from the liability for inducing
a breach of contract in furtherance of a
dispute. Section 3 of the 1906 Trades Disputes
Act has now been repealed and therefore any
such inducement under clause 85 of the new Act
will then become an unfair industrial action
for anyone other than registered unions and
those acting within the scope of the said
unions. It will also follow that any
unregistered union along with its officers at
any level will then be completely exposed to
actions in court for damages and this will be
virtually applicable to every industrial action
of the union.. Our unions finances will be
placed at risk because of the peculiarity of
the Inland Revenue laws applicable to unions.
On the other side of the coin, what are the
advantages if we do not register? They are very
limited indeed ... "(21)
Another delegate, P. L. Carr, pointed to what he considered to be
the benefits of registration:
"Firstly, only registered trade unions can
apply for an agency shop agreement .. Secondly,
the right of a worker to belong to a trade
union and to take part in union activities only
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applies to registered unions. It will be an
unfair industrial practice to dismiss a worker
for trade union activities in respect of a
registered union. If we de-register, we will be
put in an invidious position of being unable to
protect our members. Thirdly, a registered
trade union may apply to the national
industrial relations court to amend a defective
procedural agreement .. " (22)
That the law of the land should not be defied was the other
major theme raised by those speaking against the motion. The
following extracts from two of the delegates' speeches were not
untypical:
"The only way you can fight the law with any
success, is with the law.. and believe you me
there is no bill a lawyer cannot sit down and
find a way round. There is no reason why the
trade union movement could not do this .. If as
a shop steward you go about your normal
business, the employer stops you and says you
are causing a disruption and gives you the sack
you call a meeting to protect yourself and your
members you can be had for disruptive practice.
You will not be put in prison. Anybody who
thinks he will be the first one to go to prison
so he will be a martyr, is wrong. They are not
going to make a martyr, they will slap a big
fine on you and attach it to your earnings .. "
"Now the Bill is an Act, is law. We can only
change it or throw it out by electing a Labour
Government pledged to do just this, but for the
next three or four years it will remain,
whether this union registers or not. It makes
not the slightest difference. Our union, our
funds, our officials, our shop stewards, indeed
our members are going to have to work wi thin
the confines of the law.. " (23)
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Chapple then entered the debate. Firstly, he replied to a
delegate who had suggested that industrial action would be needed
to defeat the Act:
"I want to make the Executive's position quite
clear. We believe that the slogans and the
marches and the strikers far from weakening
this Tory Government have served to prove the
Tories lies that we are out to ruin this
country. Instead of strengthening the battle
against the Bill, it has led to dissension and
confusion in our ranks and often you are blamed
if you do not support these acts whatever they
were. You are the one who is blamed for the
di vision. It was not the policy of the TUC to
take the head-on view as the right way to
defeat the Bill. Let me say that those who
advocated general strikes to defeat
democratically elected government's
legislation, however much you might not like
the Government, are digging a grave for
democracy inside and outside the trade union
movement. "
How then was the legislation to be defeated?
" ... the Executive believe that the best way to
to confront the country over this Bill is to
point out that it is simply irrelevant to any
of our problems either industrial relations or
economic and then to say that what the
Government should tackle is improvement in
management and decent worker representation at
the workplace with some greater power legally
enforceable on the rights of shop stewards.
That is our stand on the matter. That is a
positive alternative to all that has been
said." (24)
It was a very weak "positive alternative", and the leadership
knew it. The leadership were now in danger of being totally
outflanked by the mass of delegates who wanted to fight the Act by
233
supporting the TUC position, or by going further and calling for
strike action to defeat the Tories. Fearing this isolation and, so
he argued, in order "to maintain unity", Chapple came out in
support of the motion. It was a wise move by the leadership. for if
they were to manage the discontent in their own ranks. to "make
regular what might otherwise be disruptive", they had to channel
the "disgruntlement and ebullience" of the membership into safer
waters. (25) So straight after supporting the motion, Chapple, like
C.Wright Mills' archetypical union leader, attempts to dampen down
the discontent on the central issue of de-registration:
"Let there be no mistake about the
difficul ties ... Whatever other unions have said
and done about this. there is no union yet that
has de-registered. They have said that they are
going to do all they could against the the
Bill, as indeed we have said. They have all
passed motions and put their hands up for them.
In fact there is none that has de-registered.
To put ourselves in the position of being the
first union to de-register I believe would be
an act not of courage but of foolishness that
would put us not in the vanguard of the
movement but down the drain of the
movement ... If we had a million and a half
members or a million and a quarter with £15
million or £20 million assets, I would have
said we would de-register and fight the Bill as
a single union all the way down the line
because we would have had nothing to lose
except a few million pounds but our membership
would have remained intact .. . We will stand
where we have always stood, with the TUC. We
are not in the front, nei ther are we
behind... We support the motion" (26)
The motion was carried, with very few against. So at the end
of the EETPU's 1971 Conference, the union was officially coromi tted
to a campaign of explanation and action throughout the union and.
more importantly. to de-registration. It was a notable victory for
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the opposition in the union. However, as we have seen, things were
not that clear cut. The leadership's strategy all along had been to
formally support the TUC stand, while actively trying to undermine
that same position by proposing an "alternative" course based on
compromise and negotiation. The question now was, would the
Executive Council implement the democratic decisions of the TUC and
their own union and de-register?
Chapple had said at the 1971 BDC that the union would not de-
register on its own. By January 1972 he no longer had that excuse,
for, as we have seen, by that time 82 trade unions had de-
registered. Nonetheless the leadership still refused to implement
the Conference decision and de-register. By June 1972, only 40 of
the TUC affiliated trade unions had refused to de-register, and the
EETPU was one of them. Clearly, the EC's objections to de-
registration ran deeper than an aversion to going it alone. It was
only in the wake of the j ailing of the five London dockers, the
"Pentonville Five", in July 1972 that the EETPU de-registered and
so finally carried out the 1971 BDC decision. Ironically then, as
Chapple recalls, it was the dockers defiance of the law, and not
the wishes of the EETPU membership, that led the union to de-
register:
"The EETPU position over registration was
rudely overtaken by events. We had contended
that no one would end up in prison because of
the Heath laws, but the dockers proved us
wrong. The Pentonville Five refused to obey an
order of the National Industrial Relations
Court and were j ailed. The crisis was
tremendous. We could no longer sustain any co-
operative gesture with the Government and told
the TUC that we would de-register after
all." (27)
Of course, the union's position was not that they would de-
register if any trade unionist was jailed under the Act: the
official policy of the union, as we have seen, was for de-
registration full stop. Where Chapple is correct, however, is in
saying that the "crisis was tremendous". It was this crisis that
forced the EETPU leadership to back down and fall in line with the
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TUe's and their own union's policy decisions, both of which they
formally adhered to. In short, the crisis brought to a head the
internal and external pressures that were being exerted on the
union leadership to act democratically.
The crisis facing the Heath Government had been rumbling on
ever since he had taken office in June 1970, but it came to a head
on 9 January 1972, when the first national miners' strike since
1926 began. At the beginning of the strike editorial comments in
all the national newspapers forecast defeat or at most a pyrrhic
victory for the miners. The Financial Times commented that
"It is extremely difficult to see what the
miners hope to gain out of the national strike
they are bent on starting this weekend. Mr. Joe
Gormley ... has explained that they are fighting
a battle with the Government over its wages
strategy on behalf of the trade union
movement. .. The last union leader to speak in
similar emotive terms was Mr. Tom Jackson of
the Union of Post Office Workers early last
year. But the union movement learnt a salutory
lesson from his long and unproductive strike
both about the futility of taking on a
determined Government and about the apparent
inabili ty of the unions to unite together in
battle .. " (28)
The miners, like the postal workers before them, were doomed
to defeat in the face of a determined Government and a trade union
movement unable or unwilling to offer solidarity was the message
that was coming over loud and clear from the media. Six weeks
later, the miners had won an historic victory over the Heath
Government which would have been impossible without the solidarity
recei ved from other workers. After the settlement, the Financial
Times had this to say:
"It will be some time before we shall be able
to assess even the direct costs of the coal
strike to the country. But this immediate cost
pales to insignificance compared to the
potential long-term damage done not merely to
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the economy, but to the country as such. :Most
important in this context is that the authority
of the Government has been damaged... In war -
and that is what the miners' dispute turned out
to be - the active support of the community as
a whole is essential. The Government failed to
obtain it. That is why it lost." (29)
It was in this atmosphere of defeat that the Heath Government
first attempted to enforce the IR Act. Shortly after the Act became
law, the three railway unions put in a claim for 16%. Their
response to an 11% offer was a work-to-rule and an overtime ban.
The Government applied to the NIRC and obtained a 14-day cooling
off period. Sir John Donaldson, President of the National
Industrial Relations Court (NIRC), ordered a return to normal
working. The unions agreed but promised more industrial action once
the 14 days had lapsed. On 11 :May 1972, the Government applied to
the NIRC for a compulsory ballot. The Government was anxious for
the ballot to be conducted with the minimum of delay, since it
bel ieved that it had the support of the publ ic for its actions. In
an opinion poll conducted in :May 81% of those questioned favoured
the holding of an obligatory secret ballot before any union
resorted to industrial action, and 41% believed that the Government
should get even tougher with the railwaymen. The TUC granted the
unions the right to defend themselves in the NIRC but lost both the
ini tial case and an appeal to the High Court. So the ballot went
ahead - and resulted in 80% of the railwaymen (in a turnout of 87%)
voting in favour of further industrial action. The unions settled
for 13%, the evening before they planned to resume their work-to-
rule and overtime ban. So the Act's first outing gave the
Government another humiliating defeat. (30) But worse was yet to
come for the Heath Government.
A month after the railwaymen had delivered a double blow to
the Heath Government - they had discredited the Government's use of
the "national emergency" provisions of the IR Act and its publ ic
sector wages policy. n-} norm, which was intended to award pay
increases 1% below the previous one - the NIRC attempted to deal
wi th an unofficial dockers' boycott of low-paid container work.
Although the T&GWU. advised by the General Council. a~reed to
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appear before the NIRC, it could not prevent the dockers from
continuing their action. The cl imax was reached when the Appeal
Court ruled that, due to faulty drafting, the Act did not after all
make unions answerable for the actions of their members. The NIRC
then switched its attention from the T&GWU to the dockers
themsel ves, and on 22 JUly 1972 five of their shop stewards were
jailed for contempt of court. Widespread industrial action began to
escalate and the TUC threatened a one-day General Strike if the
dockers were not released. As Jack Jones, the leader of the T&GWU,
recalls:
"The TUC General Council had an emergency
meeting with Ted Heath, who said he could do
nothing - 'The law must be obeyed'. In face of
this the General Council decided to call a one-
day General Strike. Supported by Hugh Scanlon,
I had pressed for this; the one thing a free
trade union movement cannot tolerate is the
imprisonment of its people, even if they are
out of step." (31)
The panic comments of The T'i mee that week were testimony to
the deep crisis the Heath Government found itself in. On 22 July
its editorial was entitled "The Crisis for Mr Heath" and on 28
July, with a General Strike looming, "Yes, We Are in Danger".
However, the Law Lords reversed the decision of the Appeal Court,
and the Government sent in the mysterious figure of the Official
Sol ici tor to secure the release of the "Pentonvi Ll e Five". (32)
Edward Heath tolerated such a humiliating defeat because the
consequences of not releasing the dockers could have been far
worse. As J.A.G. Griffith comments:
"A poli tical
considerable
and economic crisis of possibly
dimensions was avoided. . It
appeared very much as if the judicial system
had bent itself to the needs of the politicians
and that, in particular, that the principles of
the rule of law to which the NIRC earlier paid
such respect had been sacrificed to the
expediency of the pol i tical and economic
situation." (33)
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This was the "tremendous crisis" that compelled the leadership
to finally de-register and so honour the union's BDC decision and
their oft repeated claim of "total support" for the TUC campaign.
Moreover, it seems that the EC now realised that the IR Act was a
direct threat to their own position as brokers between labour and
capital. How was this position threatened?
Antonio Gramsci, writing in 1920, expresses well the position
of trade unions under capitalism:
"Objectively, the trade union is the form which
labour as a commodity is bound to assume in a
capitalist system, when it organizes itself to
control the market. This form consists in an
office staffed by functionaries, organizational
technicians (when they can be called
technicians), specialists (when they can be
called specialists) in the art of concentrating
and guiding the workers' forces in such a way
as to establish a favourable balance between
the working class and the power of capital.
The development of trade-union organization is
characterized by two facts: 1, the union
embraces an ever increasing number of workers;
2, the union concentrates and generalizes its
scope until the movement's power and discipline
is focussed in a central office. This office
becomes di vorced from the masses it has
regimented, and removes itself from the eddies
and currents of fickle whims and foolish
ambitions that are to be expected in the
excitable broad masses. The union thus acquires
the ability to negotiate agreements and take on
responsibilities. In this way it obliges the
employer to acknowledge a certain legality in
his dealings with the workers, a legality that
is conditional on his faith in the union's
solvency and its capacity to secure respect for
contracted obligations ttom the working
masses." (34)
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But it is precisely because this "industrial legality", this
desire to "establish a favourable balance between the working class
and the power of capital", is constantly being disturbed and at
times shattered by the inherent conflict betweeen labour and
capi tal, that the leaders of trade unions find themselves under a
series of contradictory pressures. On the one hand, they are under
pressure from their members to deliver some satisfactory results
and thus are at times willing to mobilize the rank-and-file to
strengthen their bargaining position with the employers. On the
other hand, they suffer pressure from the employers who want a
controlled labour force and nice, tidy settlements. C. Wright Mills
put it like this:
"Even as the labour leader rebels, he holds
back rebellion. He organizes discontent and
then sits on it, exploiting it in order to
maintain a continuous organization; the labour
leader is a manager of discontent." (35)
Wi th the introduction of the IR Act, and the end of the
"voluntary system" of industrial relations that it heralded, a
further pressure was brought to bear on the union leaders - the
power of the State in the form of the HIRC. It was the open
introduction of the law in favour of the employers that in the eyes
of most trade union leaders upset the favourable balance they were
constantly trying to establish between labour and capital wi thin
the framework of the "voluntary system". What is more, the
introduction of the Act unleashed a torrent of rank-and-file
protest and militancy that the official union leaders at times
found hard to control. For example. it wasn't Jack Jones'
leadership of the T&GWU that effectively destroyed the IR Act: it
was the unofficial action of London dockers in defiance of Jones
that led to the Act's demise. Robert Carr's Act, to the dismay of
the Government and trade union leaders alike, had released forces
from the nether world that were throwing all into confusion.
Gramsci's "favourable balance" had to be restored. and that meant
on the unions side getting rid of the Act wi thout recourse to
industrial action, and on the Government's side some saving of
face. The Tue at least saw the tripartite talks on economic
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strategy and incomes policy that took place between July and
November 1972 as an attempt to move towards that goal.
The leadership of the EETPU were as anxious as the other union
leaders to restore what they considered to be a favourable balance
to industrial relations, as Chapple made clear at the 1971 BDC:
"For us, improving industrial relations means
creating a climate in which unions and
employers can meet on better, preferably more
equal terms. The legislation is bad because it
is irrelevant to Britain's industrial and
economic problems and we should all be united
in wishing to see it repealed." (36)
However, the EETPU leaders were more reluctant than most to defy
the Act because they were much more ideologically committed to the
rule of law than most other union leaders. Although the most
prominent left-winger at the time, Hugh Scanlon, President of the
AUEW, made it quite clear at the 1972 TUC that
"generally speaking the trade union movement
accepts, operates and conforms with the law of
the land. Our opposition and determination is
quite specific. It is to this law to this Act
and to the courts set up thereunder." (37)
In his theory of oligarchy Michels argued that in a trade
union it is even easier than in a political party for the officials
to initiate and pursue a course of action "disapproved of by the
majority of the workers they are supposed to represent" although
"Theoretically the leader is bound by the will
of the mass, which has only to give a sign and
the leader is forced to withdraw... But in
practice ... for various reasons the leaders
enjoy a large degree of independence." (38)
Or, as l.R. Coleman puts it:
"Because the democratic ethos is deepl y rooted
in the labour unions, continuing pressures are
felt by their leaders to maintain the form if
not the substance of democratic decision-
making."(39)
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Vie see this "mock democracy" being enacted by the Executive
Council time and time again, whether it be over the TUC decisions
for which they voted or, and more importantly, their unwillingness
to implement the BDC decision on de-registration that they
themselves had supported. But, as we have tried to indicate above,
the situation was far more complex than the EC saying one thing and
doing another. The very fact that they supported the TUC campaign,
despite the constant criticisms of it, indicated that they were
being pulled into opposition against the Act not just because of
the pressures from the rest of the movement, but because it was in
their own self-interest to oppose the Act. They were being
buffetted from all sides: from the TUC. from their own members,
from the Heath Government, and not least from their own
uncertainty. Vii th a union leadership so commi tted to the idea of
the rule of law and a philosophy that totally ruled out the use of
industrial action for political purposes the strains must have been
quite severe. The resulting deadlock that these competing pressures
had placed on the leadership's capacity to decide whether to de-
rel1ister or not was broken with the 1ailinl1" of the "Perrtouv i Ll e\...1 -- Ll
Five" .
Again, Michels' theory seems to take little account of the
complex pressures that lead union leaders to act democratically.
His concentration on the formal mechanisms of decision making
within organizations offers only a one-dimensional view of the
relationship that exists between union leaders and the rank-and-
file. No matter how forceful Michels' account might be, it is
nevertheless limited. For not only does Michels neglect the
countervail ing pressures that operate against oligarchy wi thin an
organization, but there is hardly a mention of the external social
and economic pressures that induce leaders to act democratically.
In the case of the EETPU's decision to de-rep:ister, as we have
seen, it was the unofficial action of London dockers who acted in
defiance of their own left-wing "oligarchy" that finally forced the
EC to succumb to the multiple pressures that had been bUilding up
inside and outSide of their own union since the fight against the
IR Bill began. This is not to say that Michels' theory has been
refuted, far from it. Only that it has to be treated with caution.
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Another shortcoming of Michels' theory is the historical
specifici ty of his work. Michels drew his examples of oligarchic
trade unions principally from the German trade unions, which were
indeed highly centralized and bureaucratic. In one sense this might
seem an advantage when studying a present day trade union which is
also highly centralized and bureaucratic. This is one of the
attractions of Michels. On the other hand it is a weakness, for the
development of British trade unionism since 1945 has been
characterised not just by centralization and bureaucratization, but
also by de-centralized collective bargaining at the workplace and
the growth of a strong shop-stewards "movement" which in 1988 still
numbers 335,000. These are features which tend to mitigate against
bureaucratization and oligarchical control in trade unions. They
allow room for the rank-and-file to shape union policy precisely
because they are partly autonomous from the central union
organization. And at times of working class militancy even highly
bureaucratized unions such as the EETPU are forced into following
the wishes of the membership.
By the end of the summer of 1972 the IR Act was dead in
virtually everything but name. However, the TUC was still left with
the problem of what to do with those trade unions that had defied
its pol icy and registered under the Act. During the summer the
General Council announced the suspension of a number of unions who
had refused to de-register. By the time Congress met in Brighton in
September, there was a recommendation before them that the
suspension of 32 unions with a membership of 500,000 should be
confirmed for a year. If these union failed to de-register by the
1973 Congress, they would be expelled from the TUC. Some of the
unions who were due to be suspended made appeals against the
recommendation by pleading special cases. (40) The EETPU had
intended to speak against the suspensions but, according to
Chapple, were prevented from doing so by the Congess President
George Smith, who along with Vic Feather "wanted to keep the
temperature down in the debate". Because of this, "our whole
delegation upped and walked out in disgust". (41)
As it turned out, Chapple was not just prevented from speaking
against the suspensions but against the whole of the TUC's campaign
a8a i nst the IR Act. For in a front page spread in the September
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issue of Contact, in an article entitled "Here is the speech they
wouldn' tallow", Chapple tells us that
"Congress pol icy has been a mistake from the
beginning. We thought we could prevent the Act
from reaching the Statute book but we failed.
We thought it could not be implemented, but
it is being implemented, however incompletely
... There is no easy way out. The best way is
the traditional way of the British Labour
Movement in dealing with what it believes to be
unfair acts of Parliament and the most certain
way of securing the repeal of this Act, would
be to prove that it is unworkable in practice.
This means reversing the current non-co-
operation policies of Congress ... Are we really
saying that we don't want an Act which provides
workers with protection from unfair dismissal?
Are we saying that we don' t want an Act which
forces employers to bargain with unions for the
first time in their history?
It is contrary to a 100 years of TUC policy for
us not to make use of what is to our advantage
under the law and oppose and seek to change
that which is damaging ...
Many of you feel (revolutionaries, young and
old) that the unbending opposition of the TUC,
backed by the demonstrations that have been
taking place, is shocking the citadels of
capitalism to its foundations and see the fall
of this Government as imminent.
To coi n a phrase, I don't know how the
Government sees you, but bv God you frighten
me." (42)
This was a quite staggering speech from Chapple. For what was
most notable about the TUC campaign of "unbending opposition" was
a strict "adherence to a strategy of constitutionalism" and its
desire to "avoid any strikes which might antagonise public
opinion". (43) Shocking the citadels of '~aDitalism to its
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foundations! As for proving that the Act was "unworkable in
practice" the unofficial action of the London dockers had already
done that. Moreover, it was the fear of similar such actions that
made many employers reluctant to utilise the Act's legal sanctions,
sanctions that were designed to enhance their own authority. (44)
Thus throughout the 2~ years of the IR Act there were only 4
applications to HIRC against the closed shop, and only 33
applications by firms seeking relief from industrial action, and
this was at a time when the actual number of industrial stoppages
was rising (2,228 in 1971, 2,497 in 1972, and 2,854 in 1973). (45)
In this context, and at such a late hour, Chapple's call for a
reversal of the TUC's policy of non-eo-operation didn't make much
sense. It was yet another example, more explci t than most, of the
EETPU's dual stance on the IR Act. Clearly the leadership wanted
the union to officially endorse Chapple 's" strategy" of non-co-
operation, but by de-registering they had committed themselves to
the policy decisions of the TUC and their own union. Nonetheless,
the leadership seemed determined to move the union away from its
official support for TUC policy, and this they attempted to do at
the union's BDC held on the Isle of Man in April 1973.
In its Report to the Conference the Executive Council stated
that after discussing the 1971 motion on de-registration they
"agreed that the principle contained therein be adopted". (46)
However, the tightly controlled Standing Orders Committee let two
motions onto the agenda which called for a ballot of the membership
over the registration issue. It seems fairl y certain that one of
the motions was EC inspired, although no conclusive proof can be
offered. The leadership played a very canny game at the Conference.
They kept their distance from the controversial ballot motions, no
doubt waiting to see which way the wind was blowing. So no speaker
from the EC intervened in the lengthy debate on the IR Act until
the very end, when Chapple spoke. Ideally, t or- the leadership. the
pro-registration ballot motions would be carried by the delegates
without their intervention, thereby fending off criticism that they
had betrayed TUC pol icy wi th the argument that they were merel y
implementing the wishes of the membership. The union democracy that
was for so long ignored after the 1971 BDC. could now possibly be
used to reverse the 197J decision on registra~ion
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There were four motions to be debated at the session on the IR
Act on the fourth day of the Conference. The first of them, motion
70, read as follows:
"This Conference demands that the Executive
Council uses its influence to have many of the
bad aspects of the Industrial Relations Act
amended.
It further calls on the EC to test the feelings
of the membership on registration by a ballot
vote of all members." (47)
The second motion that called for a ballot on registration was
rather odd. Besides calling for a ballot, it urged total support
for any union that found itself in conflict with the IR Act and was
"pleased to note that this union's policy continues to be one of
non-registration". (48) It nevertheless called upon the EC to hold
a ballot of the membership, with the case for and against on the
ballot paper. Seemingly, the mover of the motion believed that a
favourable ballot result would be a green light for the union to
take a more active and aggressive stance against the Act.
Of the two other motions to be debated, one simply called upon
the EC to do all in its power to assist the trade union movement to
have the IR Act repealed, while the other, composite motion 4, was
the one supported by the opposition and those who wanted to uphold
the union's 1971 position. This read:
"This Conference reaffirms the 1971 policy
conference decision of de-registering and calls
upon the Executive Council to join in the fight
for a stronger and more united TUC policy to
defeat the Act and Conference calls on the
Parliamentary Labour Party to repeal this law,
when it becomes the Government I and to pledge
that no Labour Government wi 11 interfere with
any of the hard won rights of the trade union
movement." (49)
Opposi tionists at the Conference argued that it was united
action that had defeated the Act and made it unworkable. The Heath
Government
themselves,
were
one
now very
delegate
reluctant
argued. So,
to use the
instead of
legislation
usi ng t h-
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provisions of the Act against building workers involved in
picketing during the national strike of 1972, they were being tried
under the 1875 conspiracy act (they were to go down in trade union
history as the Shrewsbury Pickets), Charlie Montgomery from
Glasgow, a leading oppositionist, expressed the feelings of most of
those delegates who wanted a determined and united opposition to
the Act:
"Let us face the facts of the Industrial
Relations Act. It is dead not because we crept
up on it but because we went out in the streets
and demonstrated, This is the reason they are
frightened. Why did they not continue to gaol
people after the Pentonville Five? Because they
knew they would have been blown out of office
and their whole rotten system with them." (50)
As the debate neared its conclusion it was clear that the
Conference was split between those who wished to register under the
Act and take advantage of its "posi ti ve aspects", and those who
wished to reaffirm and strengthen the 1971 Conference decision on
de-registration. At this juncture Chapple entered the fray. After
rei terating the EC' s position on the Act, he then called on the
movers of the motions to remit them to the EC (effectively shelving
them) in the interests of unity. He said:
" I f you do that we wi 11 then be left wi th the
motion passed last year [sic] and the way the
Executi ve Council has pursued that policy in
the ensuing two years.. I am going to put it to
conference.. I am concerned about real unity
not spurious unity. I am concerned about
reservi ng a bit of dignity for the EETPU, .. "
(51)
A vote to remit the motions would have been an endorsement of
the Executive's ambiguous position on fighting the Act and a
rej ection of the criticism implicit in composite 4 of the EC's
dithering over the previous two years. Chapple's call for unity
was an attempt to scotch the opposition's motion which by now he
must have judged was goi ng to be carried by the Conference. Such
calls for unity. as we have noted previously. can very often be
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just a means to stifle democracy. (52) The vote to remit went
against Chapple by 205 votes to 291. Motion 70, which called for a
ballot on registration was defeated by 227 votes to 260, as was the
other pro-ballot motion by 235 votes to 268. Motion 4, which
reaffirmed the union's position, and motion 73, which called upon
the Executive to do all in its power to defeat the IR Act, were
both carried by the Conference (no figures given).
Once again, then, the opposition had achieved a notable
victory over the leadership. How this would affect the leadership's
actions was of course, as the delay in implementing the 1971
decision had shown, a different matter. All the oppositionists were
demanding was that the EC carry out official union policy, which
was totally in line with IUC policy. As we have seen, the
leadership formally supported both the union's and the IUC's
policy, but, in practice, continually undermined it and avoided any
positive action, constitutional or otherwise, that might hinder the
working of the legislation. And now the tremendous pressure that
even Chapple had felt in the wake of the jailing of the dockers had
been lifted. By the time the IUC Congress convened in September
1973 any lingering thought of "unity" had long faded. Chapple had
this to say of the IUC in Contact :
"Si tting and listening at the IUC often
ressembles watching a play. Ihe actors strut
across the stage mouthing their lines,
breathing defiance or simulating sympathy,
every now and again glancing at their prompter
for assistance. Off stage most of them revert
to ordinary human beings facing ordinary human
problems in the empirical and reasonable way
that trade unionists always have done." (53)
Ihe reason for this outburst was no doubt the Congress's
decision to expel 20 affiliated unions with a total membership of
370,000 for not complying with the IUC's policy of non-
registration. In addition to the expelled unions one union, the
National Graphical Association. resigned from the Iue over the
registration issue after a ballot of its membership (32.770 for,
30,630 against). (54) So to the very end the EEIPU leaders went
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against the policy of the TUC, the very same policy that had been
endorsed by two conferences of the union.
By now, however, the IR Act was in its death agony. But it
managed one more violent final spasm before it departed. The same
month that the TUC met, a small engineering firm, Con-Mec, obtained
an HIRC order against the AUEW concerning a recognition dispute. As
usual, the AUEW boycotted the Court, so the NIRC sequestrated
£100,000 of the union's assets, eventually confiscating £75,000. It
also announced that Con-Mech could apply for compensation for
losses arising from the industrial action. The dispute resulted in
a number of one-day strikes in some key industries, especially the
motor and print industries. But it was not until April 1974, with a
Labour Government in office and in the process of repealing the IR
Act, that the Court awarded Con-Mech £47,000 compensation. An
indefini te national strike was called by the AUEW which affected
large sectors of industry I and most newspapers were closed down.
Then an anonymous donor - believed to be the Newspaper Proprietors'
Association - paid the money which the AUEW owed the Court, and the
strike was called off. (55) And that was the end of the IR Act.
In summary, we can say that the EETPU leadership were
deflected from the course of action (or non-action) that they
wished to take over the IR Act by a number of contradictory
pressures bearing down on them. Their ambiguous stand on the Act
was the most obvious sign of the tension that these competing
pressures caused. Both the internal and the external demands for
the leadership to act democratically were realised when the dockers
were jailed and the EC consequently decided that their own
interests might well be threatened by the Act. The forces that
compel union leaderships to act democratically are thus multi-
dimensional. Michels' theory has a tendency to be one-dimensional,
concentrating on the internal workings of trade unions, and not
seeing the wider relation of forces that can operate against
oligarchical control. But once the oppositional pressures, whether
they be internal to the union or external, begin to lift, then the
oligarchical control that Michels details begins to reassert
itself. We saw this clearly in the EETPU once the "tremendous
crisis" of the summer of 1972 ended.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE EETPU AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
The Times reported on 9 January 1974 that,
"Mr Heath's Government cannot survive if they
are seen to be defeated by the National Union
of Mineworkers. Such a defeat would not only
destroy the authority of the Conservative
Government ... (but) would involve damage to the
constitutional principle on which the authority
of all governments in Britain is based." (1)
This air of panic in ruling circles echoed most hysterically in the
pages of the Economist, which drew parallels with Germany before
Hitler and Latin American political instability:
"A surrender now would make unlawful force seem
the normal way of conducting the business of
earning Britain's living. There is not just a
sniff of Weimar in Britain. There is a smell of
Argentina." (2)
Heath did not surrender, but called a General Election and
campaigned on the theme of "who governs Britain?" Although the
Conservatives gained a larger share of the vote than Labour, (37.9
to Labour's 37.2) the Heath government was defeated. The Labour
minority government under the leadership of Harold Wilson took
office in February 1974 and lasted until October of the same year
when another General Election was called. This time the Labour
Party gained a tiny overall majority in Parliament. Labour's
Programme 1973, the basis of the 1974 election platform, was the
most radical since 1945, promising "a massive and irreversible
shift in the distribution of both wealth and power in favour of
working people and their families". Dennis Healey promised tax
changes that would produce "howls of anguish from the rich", and
declared that "we will squeeze the rich until the pips squeak".
At the heart of Labour's radical proposals was a deal between
the trade unions and the government - the Social Contract - under
which unions would behave "responsibly" in return for the repeal of
the 1971 IR Act and the implementation of a host of pro-union laws.
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The origin of the Social Contract was a 1973 TUC-Labour Party
liaison committee document entitled Economic Policy and the Cost of
Living. As Harold Wilson recalls:
" ... the parties agreed on a comprehensive
al ternative strategy, covering a wide area of
the social and economic life of the nation.
This included food subsidies, price controls,
housing and rents, transport and a
redistri bution of income and wealth, combined
with a policy for increasing investment in
industry. Together with the repeal of the
Conservatives' Industrial Relations Act, this
would I engender the strong feeling of mutual
confidence which alone will make it possible to
reach the wide ranging agreement which is
necessary to control inflation and achieve
sustained growth in the standard of living'.
This was Widely interpreted as a voluntary
agreement to accept restraint in pay demands as
part of a wider social agreement." (3)
When returned to office the Labour Government did indeed
introduce a wide range of legal rights in favour of the trade
unions as their part of the bargain:
"The two years after 1974 were probably the
height of union influence over government. A
detailed programme of legislation was enacted,
giving unions and individual workers new
rights. The 1974-6 Trade Union and Labour
Relations Acts restored to unions the legal
immuni ties that had been swept aside by the
1971 Act. The 1975 Employment Protection Act
secured new collective bargaining and job
security rights. The 1974 Health and Safety at
Work Act and the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act
instituted much needed reforms in t.r-ad t t t ona l Iv
neglected areas of workers' rights." (4)
For its part the TUC promised that they would help to achieve
realistic wage-claims and fewer strikes. As Jack Jones, leader of
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the T&GWU and one of the main architects of the Social Contract,
put it at the STUC in April 1974:
"The Social Contract does not mean control of
wages, but it does mean a realistic approach to
which we in the trade union movement are
already responding, and so are the Government."
(5 )
Trade union cOlnmitment to the Social Contract was firmed up in June
1974 with the release of the TUC document Collective Bargaining and
the Social Contract, which set out a number of guidel ines to be
followed in wage negotiations when the Tories Stage 3 pay
restrictions ended in July. Negotiators were told to press for a
low pay minimum of £30 per week, and to give priority to agreements
"which will have beneficial effects on unit costs and efficiency,
to reforming pay structures and to improving job security". But
they were to also recognise that "the scope for real increases in
consumption is limited" and that as a result "the central
negotiating objective will be to ensure that real incomes are
maintained", and that a smooth transition to free collective
bargaining is achieved by the observation of a twelve-month
interval between major increases. The document was ratified at the
September 1974 TUC Congress, with only a few dissenting voices,
such as Ken Gill's of the Draughtsman's union and leading member
of the Communist Party. (6)
Along with the majority of other trade unions the EETPU backed
the Social Contract at the September 1974 TUC. The justification
given by the supporters of the Social Contract for voluntary wage
restraint was "the radical ism of the Labour Government programme,
and the short term nature of the restraint proposed". (7) However,
by the Winter of 1974-75 the whole basis of the Social Contract -
Government radicalism and wage restraint - seemed to be in tatters.
Only days after the October General Election victory Dennis Healey
deli vered a budget speech that was in effect a reversal of the
Labour Government's radical strategic economic objectives. The
previous policy of redistributing money towards low income groups
was replaced by one of directing it back towards capital. The
policy of reducing capital's control over production gave way to
one of seeking an economic cl imate wi thin which companies would
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find it worthwhile to invest. Of course this reversal was not just
a sudden whim of the Labour Government: in the context of falling
economic production, falling exports and the resulting massive
balance of payments deficit, the change in policy would have been
forced on any government that was obliged to manage a capitalist
economy in crisis. The straw that broke the camel's back was the
run on sterling after the November trade figures took one-eighth of
the Government I s reserves of foreign currency. (8)
On the wages front things were not going as planned either.
For with the ending of Heath I s Stage 3 wage restrictions in July
1974 the last thing most workers had in mind was a period of
"voluntary restraint" (although real incomes increased by an
average of 3.5% per year under Heath). A wave of strikes took place
after the defeat of Heath and the accession to office of Labour.
The most militant response came in the autumn of 1974 in Scotland.
Here so many disputes came together that it looked like they might
snowball into a general strike. There was a widespread lorry-
drivers' strike, with effective use of flying pickets; a strike by
sewage workers and dustmen in Glasgow; and strikes by train
drivers, bus workers, tugboatmen, teachers and slaughterhouse
workers. By October and November, more than 40,000 workers had been
involved in lengthy and bitter disputes over higher wages. (9) The
militancy payed off: between April and December 1974 real earnings
grew by 8%. (10) It was in response to this wage militancy that the
General Council of the TUC issued a circular in November to all
affiliated unions, reminding them of the guidelines already issued,
and stressing the importance of the 12-month gap between
settlements and the need to aim only to maintain eXisting real
living standards. But who decided if real incomes were being
maintained or not? In other words, who decided if the TUC
gUidelines were being followed, the rank-and-file union members,
the trade union leaders, the employers or the government? This area
of uncertainty was to be cleared up in July 1975 when a £6 per week
pay limit was introduced by the government with the backing of the
TUC, but in the meantime the boundaries of the Social Contract
appeared to be quite elastic.
The EETPU leaders' attitude to the Social Contract was at one
level quite straightforward - they supported it - but in practice a
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number of competing and contradictory forces shaped and modified
their approach towards it. By this we mean that their ideological
support for the Social Contract was at times undermined by a
combination of self-i nterest and rank-and-file revolt, at other
times it was reaffirmed despite rank-and-file action, and in yet
other circumstances it could be thrown into confusion with their
public statements blatantly contradicting their actions. In the
rest of this chapter we will follow the course of the EETPU's
support for the Social Contract by concentrating not just on the
union's conference decisions (one reason for this, as we shall see,
is that after the May 1975 BDC, there was not another until
November 1977, by which time the Social Contract was in tatters),
but by focusing on three industrial disputes in which EETPU members
rebelled both against the Social Contract and the EETPU leadership
- the 1975 local authority strike in Scotland, the Port Tal bot
strike in 1977, and the Ford's dispute in 1978. An examination of
these disputes will tell us something of the relationship between
the EETPU leadership and the rank-and-file, and of the forces which
shape this relationhip.
On 20 January 1975 more than a 1000 electricians employed by
local authorities in Scotland came out on strike demanding parity
with contracting electricians. Council electricians had since 1970
been automatically payed the same rate as contracting electricians,
which was fixed by the Scottish Joint Industry Board (SJIB>. but
now the local authorities refused to pay the new SJIB rate of £1.23
an hour, leaving the Corporation electricians 23p an hour worse off
than contracting electricians. The strike was strongest in Glasgow
where the 500 striking electricians joined up with 450 Corporation
dustcart and highway drivers who were also engaged in strike action
for parity with the private road haulage drivers. The two groups of
workers decided to co-ordinate their fight against the Labour
controlled Glasgow Corporation by holding joint demonstrations and
lobbies of the City Chambers. For their part the employers flatly
refused to honour the decision of 17 February 1970 made by the
National Joint Council for Scottish Local Authorities which
commi tted them to automatically paying SJ IB rates. Although they
paid contracting electricians working on Corporation jobs the
correct rate, they argued that the financial cuts facing the
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Council made it impossible for them to pay their own employees the
new rate. They also argued that the new SJ IE rate did not comply
wi th the terms of the Social Contract - ie the pay rise would
increase the real incomes of the electricians and not merely
maintain them as the TUC guidelines recommended. This line of
argument was dubious to say the least with regards to the
electricians, but it was a complete nonsense in the case of the
low-paid dustcart drivers. Nonetheless, Jack Jones did not make
the drivers' strike official for fear that a victory would have a
knock-on effect pushing up wage levels nationally and thus making
the Social Contract less effective in restraining wages.
While the EETPU leadership at first promised to make the
strike official, 6 weeks later it was still unofficial. The EC's
strategy was to urge the workers to return to work, while they
fought the Councils in the courts over the latter's clear breach of
contract. By the middle of February 1975 the EC were getting very
anxious about the Scottish strike. One reason for this was that the
Scottish example had spread to England and Wales where local
authori ty electricians were on strike in some of the maj or cities
because their employers refused to pay the JIB rate. What is more,
there were signs that the various unofficial strike committees were
beginning to link up nationally and were being led by members of
the Communist Party or the International Socialists. In Glasgow,
for example, the convenor of the electricians, George Kelly, and a
number of the shop stewards, were members of the IS and active in
Rank and File Contact. And as we have already seen the industrial
strategy of the IS was to build a national rank-and-file movement
which could act independently of the union leaderships where
necessary. To regain control of the dispute the leadership of the
EETPU did two things. Firstly, Chapple sent out a personal letter
to each of the striking Scottish electricians informing them that
they were "being used as pawns in a vicious political game" and
ca 11 i ng on them "to rej ect the extremists and to support the
union's call to return to work immediately". (11) When this fai led
to have any effect they promised to make the strike official if
certain conditions were met. The major condition was that the EC
was to control any further action in the dispute. This was finally
agreed to with the prOViso that before the EC initiated any action
255
it would first consult with the strike committee. In fact the
inability of the EETPU leadership to give any effective lead in the
dispute meant in practice that the strike stayed firmly under the
control of the rank-and-file. But at least now, after 6 weeks, the
Scottish strike was official. Moreover, to regain control of the
militancy that was spreading south of the border, the EC embarked
upon a series of selective strikes against local authorities who
refused to pay the JIB rate.
In the third week of March the Labour Government sent troops
into Glasgow to break the dustcart workers' strike. The troops'
actions not only broke the dustcart strike but also the Corporation
electricians' strike. For one of the first actions of the Highland
Fusiliers was to cross an EETPU picket line in the Maryhill
district of Glasgow to light up the city's main incinerator, a job
usually done by Corporation electricians. Despite the intervention
of the army, and the refusal of the T&GWU to make the stri ke
official, the dustcart drivers stayed out for 17 weeks, until they
were finally forced back to work in the middle of April. Talks in
London aimed at ending the 12 week old Scottish electricians
dispute once again broke down when the authorities refused to pay
the agreed wage rate, which would have involved an increase of
£9.20 a week, and instead offered £5.30. The strike in Scotland was
if anything stronger than ever, with a rank-and-file steering
committee with two delegates from each main region meeting
regularly to discuss and co-ordinate the strike. After 14 weeks the
strike ended in a complete victory for the electricians. The
electricians won the SJIB rate and a commitment from the Councils
that the standing agreement of 1970 would be honoured in future.
George Kelly, the leader of the Scottish electricians, said this
of the dispute:
"Vie won because of the effort put into the
fight by the rank and file. The union executive
asked to be given control of the stri ke but
proved incapable of leading it. In fact, they
left it entirely to the shop stewards and rank
and file to win." (12)
The Scottish electricians had won a notable victory, not just
over the employers, but over the Social Contract as well, and
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despite the reluctance of the EC to give the strike the backing it
needed. The EETPU leadership were in actual fact caught on the
horns of a dilemma. On the one hand they could not tDlerate
agreements being broken by employers, whether they be Labour
Councils or not, yet Dn the other hand, they were ardent supporters
of the Social Contract which allowed wages rises only in Drder to
maintain real incomes. Whether or no t the electricians' wage rise
increased or maintained their living standards is debatable - but
clearly the leadership thought the wage rise broke the Social
Contract. What doea seem clear, however, is that the striking
electricians would have received even less support from the EC if
they were simply striking for the 23p an hour. It was the fact that
the strike had been caused by the employers ignoring the SJIB
agreement (which, as we have seen, the union leadership had taken
such pains to construct in the late 1960s) that really forced the
EETPU leadership to act contrary to the spirit of the SDcial
Contract. No trade union could stand by while the industrial
"legal i ty" that was embodied in the col l.ec t t ve bargaining process
was by-passed by a particular employer. The other factor, of
course, that pushed the EETPU leadership into acting against the
spirit of the Social Contract was the rank-and-file control of the
dispute. Early attempts to gain control of the dispute by
discrediting the rank-and- file leadership had come to nought, and
when they did formally gain control it made no difference, as the
rank-and-file strike committee still effectively controlled the
dispute.
So, once more, we see evidence that gives credence tD Michels'
theory, but we also see factors operating that do not fit with the
oligarchic view of trade unions. Formally the EETPU leadership were
ou t to police their membership and enforce the Social Contract
guidelines on wages, and that meant taking firm control of the
Scottish strike. No surprises here for Michels. However, as we have
seen, two major factors operated against this: firstly, the
breaking of negotiated agreements by the employers; and, secondly,
rank-and-file control of the dispute that served as an example to
electricians south of the border. The key element was of course
rank-and-file control of the Sco t t t ah strike. and it was this more
than anything else that forced the leadership to support the
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actions of the electricians. Now this certainly does not square
wi th the Michelian approach, and it highlights a point totally
missed by Michels that even in large organizations direct
democracy (which, as we have previously mentioned, Michels argued
in an era of mass democracy was technically impossible) is still
possible, and moreover it is a strong countervailing force against
the oligarchic pretensions of any union leadership, however
entrenched they might appear to be.
Jack Jones informs us in his autobiography that early in 1975
the Social Contract was under severe attack:
"Harold Wi lson and Dennis Healey did not seem
happy at the co-operation they were receiving
from the trade unions and there was strong
criticism of the Government in our ranks
because of their inability to stem the rapidly
rising tide of unemployment and inflation. I
never doubted the value of the Social Contract,
which I saw as a maj or step towards economic
equality and better conditions for working
people, and used every democratic means to gain
the co-operation of fellow trade unionists.
Sometimes I felt that political leaders did not
appreciate the hard work involved in
influencing rank-and-file opinion."
Jones goes on to say that wage increases were not the root cause of
inflation, but, nevertheless:
"I knew something had to be done ... I decided to
act. At a union rally in Bournemouth early in
May 1975 I called for a new approach to be
made, 'to provide for wage increases to be on a
flate-rate basis. The figures should be
directly related to the cost of living. The one
figure should then apply to all people at work
MFs, judges, civil servants and other
workers. " (13)
His call was taken up, and after lengthy discussions between the
TUe and the Government a £6 per week maximum and no pay increases
for those earning £8,500 a year was agreed upon. The £6 policy was
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accepted by the GC of the TUC at its meeting in July but only
narrowly, by 19 votes to 13. At the September 1975 TUC Jones
successfully moved the motion supporting the ~6 policy
Despite Jones' assertion that wages were not the root cause of
inflation, his remedy quite clearly put the onus of blame on what
the press were continually calling "excessive wage rises". The
Labour Government certainly saw wages as the main problem, as the
pamphlet that was issued to explain the government· s economic
strategy, Attack on Inflation: A Policy for Survival, carried
Iii lson' s much publicised remark that, "One man's pay rise is not
only another man's price rise: it might also cost him his own job -
or his neighbour's job", prominently on its back cover. Of course
the argument that wages are the root cause of inflation is
dependent on how the available statistics are calculated and used.
So, liilson tells us that from March 1974 to March 1975 the wage
index had risen by 32.9% against a rise in the RPI of 21. 4%.
Chapple argued at the 1975 TUC that it was "indisputable that the
recent percentage increase in wages has been greater than in the
retail price index". But Glyn and Harrison write that although
between April and December 1974 real earnings grew by 8%, by June
1975 real take home pay was 9% down on the December 1974 level.
Panitch argues that increases in gross money earnings for the
average worker fell from 25.5% in 1974-75 to 12.4% in 1975-76. and
that real wages fell by 5.5% in 1974-75. (14) lihatever the real
figures, the majority of trade unionists more than likely accepted
the "wages cause inflation" argument in an abstract sense at
least, although whether or not their wages were inflationary was
another matter. Added to this there was still loyalty to a Labour
Government which as yet had not appeared to directly attack the
working class movement. In this climate the ~6 pay limit was
accepted as necessary and consequently won majority support at the
TUC and Labour Party Conferences of 1975.
The EETPU BDC met in May 1975, before the voluntary incomes
policy between the TUC and Government was agreed upon. The
Conference voted to accept a motion that applauded the Social
Contract as "a positive step forward on the road to economic growth
and social justice" by 365 votes to 164. (15) At the September TUC
Chapple supported the motion moved bv Jones which endorsed t.he
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incomes policy which had as its centrepiece the £6 limit negotiated
earlier in the year:
"My union is supporting motion No.8 not because
we bel ieve it wi 11 resol ve our economic
problems either in the short or the long terms
but because we believe any other course we
might adopt at this moment would certainly lead
to a worsening of our economic situation." (16)
Motion 8 was carried without a card vote. However, a card vote
was demanded and taken on the General Counci I' s Report, and this
showed, even at this early stage of the Social Contract, a wide
unease at the introduction of wage restraint, voluntary or not.
There were 6,945,000 votes for the Report and 3,375,000 against.
(17) There were two primary reasons for this unease. Firstly, it
was an abandonment of "free collective bargaining", and secondly,
despite all the different figures that were being banded about to
show how workers' living standards were improving, it was becomimg
increasingly obvious that a £6 limit was sure to lead to a decline
in the standard of Lt v i ng for the majority of workers. As the
Economist calculated in July 1975:
"A married man with two young children will be
worse off, after tax and inflation, unless he
is earning under £22 a week. Fewer than 1~
million employees fall into this bracket (and
most of them young, single or, working part-
time) Everybody else will suffer a sharp cut in
his standard of life." (18)
By the following year the unease was growing. Although a
Special TUC Congress held in June 1976 approved the General
Council's report The Social Contract 1976-77 by 9,262,000 votes to
531,000, and thus endorsed Stage Two of the Social Contract, (a
limit of £2.50 for those earning up to £50 per weeki 5% for those
earning between £50 and £80; and a maximum of £4 for higher
earners) the TUC Congress in September voted overwhelmingly for "an
orderly return to free collective bargaining" at the end of Stage
2. However, large sections of the workforce were not prepared to
wait in an orderly fashion until Stage 2 ran its course (August
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1977) as unemployment rDse and living standards fell Dver the
winter Df 1976-77. The Observer repDrted in May 1977 that,
"The past twelve months have almost certainly
seen the sharpest fall in living standards of
Britain's wDrking pDpulation in any year fDr at
least a century, including the wars. Indeed, to
find any comparable fall, it would be necessary
to go back to the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century." (19)
As a result, early 1977 saw a spontaneous and massive rank-
and-file rebellion against the Social Contract, with over a million
days "lDst" thrDugh strikes involving 198,000 wDrkers in 445
stDppages in the first two months of the year alone. Of these
strikes only 4.3% were made official in the months of January and
February, and over the year as a whole only 79 (2.9%) of the 2,703
stoppages were made official. (20) Three of the most prominent and
bi tter of the uncf f Lcf a l disputes that took place early in 1977,
those at British Leyland, Heathrow Airport and Port Talbot
Steel works, all involved EETPU members. At Leyland and Heathrow,
however, the EETPU were not directly in dispute with the employers,
whereas at Port Talbot the dispute sDlely concerned the EETPU.
On 3 April 1977 a conference against the Social Contract
called by the British Leyland Shop Stewards Combine attracted 1,700
delegates, including 300 Leyland stewards and such figures as
Arthur Scargill of the Yorkshire NUM. One of the speakers at the
Conference was Wyn Bevan, convenor of 500 electricians who had been
out on strike since the end of March at the Margam Steelworks, Port
Tal bo t , in South Wales. For two years the electricians had been
negotiating for more money and regrading because of an increased
workload and new machinery. Finally the electricians blacked the
new machinery. British Steel then suspended five of the workers and
the strike began. But not on I y was British Steel refusing their
claim, so was the EC of the EETPU, on the grounds that negotiations
had already begun for extra payments on behalf of those working in
"special areas" and that the acrDss-the-board payment for all the
electricians at the plant that the strikers were asking for would
break Stage 2 of the Social Contract. They were then instructed
hack to work by the Ee, but ignored the instruction and instead
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passed a vote of no confidence in the Executive by 420 votes to 65.
Not surprisingly, 'Wyn Bevan told the Conference that they were
engaged in a battle on three fronts: "We are fighting the British
Steel Corporation, our own union and the Social Contract". (21)
Seven weeks into the dispute, with the entire Port Tal bot
plant at a standstill, Chapple met the 27-man strike committee for
the first time. He agreed that their case was a good one, but said
that there was nothing the EC could do:
"'We cannot support a claim that is in breach of
the Social Contract. If you're saying that all
the electricians in the works are a special
group - then that's out. There's no way we can
support you without bringing the bloody house
down." (22)
This viewpoint was shared by the BSC management who, besides
favourably quoting Chapple and other EETPU officials in the
company's newspaper Steel News, also said in their public statement
on the dispute that the whole collective bargaining process could
be upset if they settled with the striking electricians:
"A unilateral settlement with a particular
group would completely unbalance eXisting pay
structures and lead to disruptions not only at
Port Talbot works but across all the works of
the corporation... This is recognised by the
national executive of the Electrical,
Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing
Trade Union and by the other unions affected .. "
(23 )
In the end the 10 week old strike was broken by a combination
of BSC intransigence, the hostility of the EC and local EETPU
officials, with the final blow coming when electricians at the
local Tinplate works at Trostre and Velindre voted to cross the
picket line set up by the Port Tal bot strikers. The Port Tal bot
dispute was an example of what "an orderly return to free
collective bargaining" meant in the eyes of the EETPU leadership.
It meant strict adherence to the eondi tions of Stage 2 of the
Social Contract despite the record fall in living standards. This
was a view shared by the maj ori ty of t.r a de union l e ade r s.. lef t a s
262
well as right, as the opposition of both Scanlon, the left-wing
leader of the AUEVl, to the Leyland strike, and Birch the "maoist"
AUEVl official in charge of the Heathrow dispute, clearly
demonstrated.
At Port Talbot, then, the EC were able to go against the
wishes of the membership there and force them to accept a deal
within the limits of Stage 2. But there was more to it than that.
The action of the Port Tal bot electricians, as the BSC statement
quoted above makes clear, threatened the centralised bargaining
system that operated in the company. The leadership of the EETPU
feared that Port Talbot might serve as an example to other
electricians in other plants and industries and raise the spectre
of decentralised, workplace and site deals outwi th the control of
the officials. They could see in Port Talbot not just a challenge
to their political stance in support of the Labour Government then,
but also a challenge to the central control that the officials
exerted over the membership. So the Port Tal bot dispute was not
just about the Social Contract, it was also about union democracy.
And this time, unlike the Scottish local authority electricians
strike in 1975, the Social Contract was used effectively to bring a
rebellious section of the union back in line wi th the general
policy of the leadership and thus thwart any democratic challenge
from below. On this occasion, and in cirmcumstances where the
maj ori ty of the official labour and trade union movement supported
the Social Contract, the EETPU "oligarchy" were able to win the
day. Vlhat was decisive, however, was not oligarchical control per
se, but the weakness of a rank-and-file opposition held in check by
the Social Contract.
Nonetheless, the rank-and-file pay revolt spi lled over into
the annual round of union conferences in the early summer of 1977.
In May the NUPE Conference and the AUEVl National Comrnittee both
threw out the Social Contract. The miners at their Conference in
July rejected the pit productivity deal proposed by the Executive
and voted for £135 a week from November. Most dramatically of all,
the T&GVlU Conference ignored Jones' pleas and voted for an
immediate return to "unfettered collective bargaining". (24) As for
the EETPU membership, they had not met to discuss policy since
their May 197'::' BDI_ <which was be fcr e the .t6 limit was i n t r-oduc e di .
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so that their May 1977 BDC would take place after two years of
fall ing living standards and rising unemployment. To avoid any
criticism of Stage 2 and the proposed Stage 3 of the Social
Contract the EETPU leadership simply cancelled the May 1977 BDC,
and instead moved it to November, after Stage 3 had been settled.
So, unlike other trade union delegations, the EETPU leadership had
a free hand to vote which way it pleased at the September TUC and
October Labour Party Conference, unfettered by embarrassing
conference decisions.
If the conference decisions of the major unions had been
observed at the TUC in September, then a wage explosion would have
been inevitable. The General Council's resolution was aimed at
staving off such an explosion. Although it did not give backing to
the 10% maximum wage increase allowed under Stage 3 of the Social
Contract, the resolution did make the 12-month rule official TUC
policy. And it was the left-wing Scanlon that not only moved the GC
resolution, but cast his union's 3 million votes in favour of the
12-month rule against the wishes of the AUEW's National Conference,
and against the wishes of the National Committee of the engineering
section of the union and virtually the whole of the AUEW delegation
to the TUC. What was at issue at the 1977 TUC then, was not
continued support for the Social Contract but how to end the
support without a wages explosion. As Scanlon put it:
"There is no need for excuses or alibis. The
grass roots of our Movement have made perfectly
plain their revolt against any question of a
phase 3 and therefore there must be a return to
free collective bargaining .... The only issue
before congress is how we return." (25)
The 12-month rule was the device that was to ensure "an order 1 V
return to free collective bargaining" as Stage 2 came to an end.
Chapple was in line with the maj ori ty of other trade union
leaders in supporting the retention of the 12-month rule between
pay rises. He argued against Jones who, unlike Scanlon, followed
the wishes of his own members and pleaded the case for a flexible
approach to wage demands, which he said could not be reconci led
with the rigid application of the 12-month rule. Chapple would have
none 01 this:
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"I found that the strangest comment of them all
came from Jack Jones. He gave us instances of
the difficulties that we are experiencing - and
I accept that they are difficulties with
Leyland and his road haulage members. But I was
experiencing those difficulties with my members
in 1975, and you cannot now tell my contracting
members, who gave up £10 a week on their basic
pay for a £6 flat increase, that there were
likely to be anomalies; we knew about all those
when we agreed to Phases 1 and 2 ... I suggest to
you that if we renege on the 12-month rule, the
word of this Congress and the word of the
General Council will have less meaning to any
government of the future ... I do not think there
is any discredit to the way Hugh Scanlon
descri bes the end of the second stage ... " (26)
Composi te motion 7, which called for an "immediate return to
free collective bargaining at the end of the second stage of the
Social Contract, with a confirmation of the 12-month rule between
principal settlements", was carried by 7,130,000 votes to 4,344,000
votes, a majority of 2,786,000. (27) But, as Coates points out, the
retention of the 12-month rule amounted to tacit TUC support for
the continuation of the Social Contract:
" ... the wi 11 i ngness of the maj ori ty of trade
union leaders to respect the 12-month rule was
alone responsible for delaying large numbers of
major pay claims into the spring and summer of
1978, by which time the TUC's own failure to
help the firemen had consolidated the very wage
norm against which they officially committed
themselves at the end of Stage 2. II (28)
Nevertheless, the autumn and winter of 1977 witnessed the defeat of
Stage 3 in the private sector of the economy and a certain degree
of "bending" in the State sector. Overall, real wages increased by
some 5% under Stage 3 (self-financin8 productivity deals which were
permi tted under Stage 3 allowed many workers to officially exceed
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the 10% l~ximum), although at the same time unemployment had risen
to 1~ million and public spending had been drastically reduced.
At the EETPU's BDC in liovember the EC supported both the
motions that called for a return to free collective bargaining,
even the one moved by Charlie Montgomery from Glasgow, one of the
leading oppositionists in the union at the time. (29) From this
point on the union leadership became openly critical of the Labour
Government's incomes policy. Chapple wrote in Contact early in 1978
that,
" I have supported the TUC/Government pay
restraint of the last two years - primarily
because no other agreement seemed possible. But
the Government's attempt to unilaterally impose
a 10% pol icy is detrimental not only to the
possibility of long term industrial recovery
but reneges the agreement for restraint - an
agreement to which the trade unions had kept."
(30 )
In the June edition of Contact he wrote:
"Some of our friends in the Government ask why
this union is opposed to any extension of
Government pay policy. They query why we, who
have shown such loyalty to Labour Governments,
should be so adamant on this issue ... Our
posi tion is clear. We believe that wages and
conditions should be decided by the collective
bargai ni ng process - not by ci vi 1 servants."
(31)
J ames Callaghan, unperturbed by trade union hosti li ty to the
Social Contract, unilaterally introduced Stage 4 of the
Government's Attack on Inflation in July 1978. Stage 4 was to
consist of a 5% maximum with exceptions for self-financing
productivity deals and rigidly defined special cases. Chapple
found that the EC's dilemma - the wish to support the Government
while opposin~ the central plank of its policy - was heightened
by the 5';;' limi t and the Government's refusal to call a General
Elect ion. <'32) Never the less, the EETPU leadershi p made a clear
po l ic v ",.I.atement rejecting the Government's 5% pay policy in Lu l v ,
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which was re-stated further in a circular to all branches on 26
September 1978, just as the first major challenge to the pay limit
got under way at Fords.
Ford's 57,000 workers came out on a national strike at the end
of September 1978 for a claim of £20 per week and a 35 hour week.
The company made their position clear from the outset - they
intended to keep strictly wi thin the Government's 5% pay norm.
Their determination to resist the union's claim was also reinforced
by the threat of Government sanctions against the company if they
conceded more than 5%. The issue at stake was not Ford's capacity
to meet the claim (they had made a gross profit of £246. 1m in 1977
and made £300 in 1978) but the survival of Stage 4 of the Social
Contract. If the claim was conceded not only would a new norm of
some 30% be set as the "going rate", but the Government I s attempt
to discipline ,:;mnpanies for paying ove r and above the 5"10 limit
would be worthless. The result was a bitter 7 week strike that led
to a partial victory for the Ford workers. Instead of £20 they
received, on average, £10.50 07%) with strings, and no reduction
in the working week. But for the Government it was a total defeat,
and Stage 4 lay in ruins. Moreover, during the strike itself the
Labour Party Conference voted against the 5% maximum. But most
disastrously of all from the Government's point of view, the breach
made by the Ford workers in the pay policy led to what became known
as the "winter of discontent". Some 10 million days were "lost" in
strikes between October 1978 and March 1979 alone. Ironically, the
bulk of the days "lost" were the result of the revolt of the low-
paid in the first three months of 1979, and these were the very
people that the Social Contract was supposed to help.
As we have said, the dilemma the EETPU leaders found
themsel ves in was one of wishing to support the Government whi Ie
being officially opposed to its 5% pay limit. Inevitably, this
resulted in the EC attempting to square the circle - supporting the
Government while opposing it. Vie can see this clearly in the
union's attitude to the Ford dispute. Along with the AUEVI and the
T&GVlU the EETPU made up the trade union side of the Ford National
Joint Negotiating Committee <FNJNC). Both the AUEVI and the T&Gw1j
made the strike official, but there was no word at all f rom the
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EETPU as to whether the dispute was official or not. In fact, the
EC did not meet at all in September to discuss the Ford strike or
any other events. Eight shop-stewards from Fords then travelled to
the union's Headquarters to find out what was happening. Although
Chapple was present, he refused to meet the stewards. Finally on 31
October the EC met, and from that meeting the following letter was
sent to all EETPU members working at Fords:
"At their meeting on 31st October 1978 the
Executi ve Counci I discussed the Ford Dispute.
They noted that the dispute had begun whilst
the existing agreement had four weeks to run
and was based upon support for the principle of
free collective bargaining as opposed to the
Government norm of 5%. They also noted that on
the 13th October the management made an offer
of 8% coupled with a productivity deal and
offered to continue negotiations in which more
money would be available - pounds not pence. In
the I ight of that offer the Executive Council
believe that a resumption of work should have
taken place to allow negotiations to continue
in the normal manner.
In reaching a decision in respect of the
dispute the Executive Council had to take into
consideration the fact that our members could
hardly have been expected to remain at work
whilst the rest of the workforce were on
strike. However, with regard to the payment of
benefi t I the Executive Counci I decided that to
pay benefit from the date the strike began
would create a precedent for breaking
agreements that could not be sustained in the
light of union policy.
Accordingly the Executive Council made the
following decision. That the dispute be made
official and that dispute benefi t be paid as
and from the date that the contract wi th the
,:ompany ex pi red." 1):3)
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There was an angry reaction from Ford electricians to the
union's withholding of strike pay for the first four weeks of the
stri ke : 200 of them picketed the Hayes Court Headquarters of the
union demanding that benefit be payed in full. The very fact that
the union had made the strike official, and the leadership had
themselves said that "our members could hardly have been expected
to remain at work whilst the rest of the workforce were on strike",
made their refusal to pay strike benefit from the beginning of the
dispute even more absurd. But the refusal to issue strike pay was
symptomatic of the union's reluctance to support such an open
challenge to the Government's incomes policy. Even though earlier
in the year they had officially sanctioned selective strikes in the
contracting industry which led to pay settlements in excess of 5%.
Selective, low key strikes were one thing, but a national strike of
such proportions where the EETPU was the junior partner was an
entirely different matter as far as the EC were concerned.
The only way out of the "dilemma" was to attempt to steer a
third course which avoided the pitfalls of the 5% limit as well as
the open challenge to the Government that the return to free
collective bargaining had unleashed. Chapple and the EETPU
leadership began, once again, cautiously hawking round the idea of
a flexi ble incomes policy. A central feature of any such flexible
policy would be productivity linked pay rises, which would,
presumably, be less rigid than the self-financing productivity
schemes that already allowed the 5% maximum to be exceeded under
Stage 4. Such a flexible approach, they hoped, would salvage the
Government's Social Contract.
This explains the EC's Willingness to accept the 8'/. Ford
offered at the beginning of October it was coupled to a
producti vi ty deal. In the December edition of Contact,
outlines the union's thinking at greater length:
"One thing is clear - that a fixed pay policy
hits the productive and non productive alike,
reduces differentials between unskilled and
ski Ll e d and undoubtedly disenchants the very
groups that we need to encourage if output is
Chapple
to be raised. However I a return to free
col] e ct i ve bargaining will not provide an
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i~~diate remedy. With or without a pay policy,
real improvements in earnings will only be
achieved when production improves so that our
competitiveness can match the rest of the
world.
Improved productive output and export potential
are the aim of Government and unions alike. The
difference between us is not that there should
be reward but how that reward should be
divided." (34)
The idea of a productivity based flexible incomes policy was
not new. Cannon had pushed this line during 1964-70 Labour
Government, and it was now being pushed by Chapple for the same
reasons - to salvage the Labour Government's economic strategy in
the face of a massive strike wave. The process went a step further
in January 1979 with the publication of A Better W"ay. This was, as
Chapple explains, an unofficial effort to edge the unions back
toward reality (in fact the TUC mailing list was used to distribute
it "unofficially" to Trades Councils throughout the country):
"Former Fleet Street journal ist, John Grant,
was now a junior employment minister and one of
the EETPU's sponsored MPs. He was a passionate
prices and incomes policy man and inspired his
own 'private enterprise' bid to trigger off a
fresh union initiatve. He thought that both the
Government and the TUC had grossly mishandled
the situation to the overwhelming Tory
advantage and he persuaded a dozen senior trade
union leaders to sign a document called A
Better Way. They included Ali Allen, the
shopworkers' General Secretary and Chairman of
the TUC Economic Committee. NALGO's Geoi! rey
Drain, Tom Jackson of the postmen's union, Tony
Christopher of the taxmen, Terry Duffy, the
AUEW President, Bill Sirs of the steelworkers,
the NUR's Sidney Weighell and myself. He also
cajoled one or two of the mOTe reasonable lett-
wingeTs into backing the proposals
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It was hardly a blueprint for the future, but
it offered the most coherent approach for a
long while to the intractable pay policy
problem, including a more flexible line on
rewards for productivity. Regrettably, by the
time it was printed and published, it was too
late - we were already plunged into the horrors
of the I Wi nter of Discontent'. (35)
A Better Way, with its call for a flexible incomes policy and the
establishment of a new Prices and Incomes Board to oversee the
policy, made little headway in a climate when the Ford workers had
won 17% and rejected the worst strings attached to the deal.
National strikes of bakery workers and provincial journalists
followed qUickly on the heels of the Ford victory, and they in turn
were followed by oil tanker drivers in December. By January 1979,
when A Better Way was published, there were more workers involved
in strikes than in any month since May 1968. Chapple's call for a
more flexible approach to pay made little sense when strike action
was delivering the goods for many workers, although overall
earnings under Stage 4 did not exceed greatly those under Stage 3.
Yet another attempt to curb the strike wave of the "winter of
discontent" was the Concordat agreement between the Labour
Government and the TUC which surfaced the month after the
publ ication of A Better Way. The Concordat traded tougher price
controls, machinery through which to allow comparability studies of
private and public sector pay, and a slight reduction in the
restrictions on increases for the low paid, in return for a TUe
agreement to bring pay rises down to 5% bv 1982, to participate in
an annual national assessment before Easter each year, and to issue
tighter guidelines to encourage strike ballots, more flexibility in
the closed shop, and more controlled picketing. (36) However,
before the Concordat had the chance to be put into operation a
General Election was called in May.
Margaret Thatcher was elected with a 43.9% share of the vote
compared to Labour's 37.0%. The core of the anti-trade union
legislati on that the Tories outli ned in their election manifesto
was' taken from the Concordat. The only difference being that the
Cuncordat \-I11S to hCJve been based on "voluntarv unanimity", not the
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legal compulsion that the Thatcher Government introduced. However,
considering that it now seems to be taken for granted that the
"winter of discontent" lost Labour the election - a position held
strongly by the EEIPU - it is worth noting that Labour's share of
the vote had only dropped by 2.2% since October 1974 <and down by
only 0.2% from the February election) and the Tories rose by some
8% thanks to the big drop in the Liberal vote from 18.3% in 1974 to
13.8% in 1979. Liberalism, if anything, ushered in the Thatcherite
era, not a massive shift in the Labour vote - that was to come in
1983. What is more, at the 1979 General Election 51% of trade
unionists, as opposed to 55% in 1974, still voted Labour. So there
was no simple correlati on between industrial mi 1 i tancy and the
result of the 1979 General Election, although. it goes without
saying, there was a correlation.
A number of points already touched upon in this and previous
chapters are worth stressing in the light of the Social Contract
experience. Once again we see Michels' "iron law of oligarchy"
clashing with Gouldner's "iron law of democracy". For after the
rank- and-file rebellion against the Social Contract early in 1977,
we see the official policy of the trade union movement turn against
the Labour Government's economic strategy. We also see that despite
being forced to reject the Social Contract the majority of union
leaderships still tacitly supported the maintenance of wage
controls, the result of which was a reluctance to back open
challenges to the Government's pay policy. This was clearly the
case with the EETPU strike at Port Talbot and the TUC's hostility
to the firemen's strike. So there was a constant tension from 1977
onwards between a trade union bureaucracy that was officially tied
to a position of opposition to the Social Contract, but which on
the whole wanted to preserve it in some form, and a r arik-r a nd-rf t Ie
who were more concerned with preserving their liVing standards and
thus made their hostility to the Social Contract abundantly clear
at the various union conferences.
The EEIPU's position, therefore, was not exceptional. They
were just more adamant in their support for the Social Contract.
And because the rest of the off icia 1 trade uni on movement had moved
to the right since the early 19705. it is not always that easv to
dt st i ngu i ah the EETPU'~ position on thl~' .~:(l'.L,j COI,l.1',let t r om 'haT
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of left-Wing unions, in contrast to their clearly distinguishable
positions during the fight against the IR Act.This only serves to
reinforce the point that a union's industrial policy, and the
nature of its internal democracy, are shaped by external as well as
internal forces, forces that often override the formal politics of
the union leadership. So the right-wing led EETPU de-registers in
1972, while in 1977 the left led AUEW opposes strikes against the
Social Contract. Which way a union will swing on a particular issue
will depend on the strength of the various competing forces - the
rank-and-file, the political complexion of the Government, the
strength of the economy, the union's industrial coverage and
traditions and so on.
The tension we have described between a trade union
bureaucracy that was intent on supporting the Labour Government and
a membership intent on defending and extending its own interests,
is founded on the inherent contradiction that lies at the heart of
trade unionism, and which has been classically expressed by Perry
Anderson:
" ... trade unions are dialectically both an
opposition to capitalism and a component of it.
For they both resist the given unequal
distri bution of income wi thin society by their
wage demands, and ratify the principle of an
unequal distribution by their existence .. " (37)
How strongly trade union leaders oppose or ratify such a
system will depend crucially on the pressure exerted by the rank-
and-file. The lack of will on the part of the trade union
leadership to oppose the growing unequal distribution of income
under the Social Contract was obv i ou s l y increased as a result of
their loyalty to the Labour Government. And no doubt Michels would
have viewed this form of corporatism as another vindication of his
theory, which at one level it is. But the very f ac t that the trade
union leaders were forced under rank-and~ii le pressure to break
with the Government is, contrary to Michels. a clear indication of
the limi tations of the oor-por-a't t e t thesis. <.:38) Of course, the
relationship between the leaders of trade unions, their members and
the Labour Government, was far more complex in reali tv than the
1'3 nk-and- f i 1e versus 1eaders pi ct \J r e pa ill t ,c,j a bt)·;., . Ne '."~ r The 1ess.
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in recent history the dichotomy has never been clearer than in the
latter years of the Social Contract.
The EETPU, as we have seen, was no more immune from the
internal and external forces that pressurised the TUC to drop its
support for the Social Contract than any other trade union. The
ideological make-up of a union leadership is important, but at the
end of the day the right-wing EETPU crumbled almost as easi ly as
did the left-wing T&GWU. Having said that ideology is important,
the very fact that the Social Contract was supported by left and
right in the trade union movement shows that a common interest
exists between leaderships that extends beyond the barrier of
ideology. Writing in 1919 on the origins and limitations of trade
union organization and struggle,
developed,
Gramsci argues that there
"a veritable caste or trade union
officials .... wi th a group psychology of their
own absolutely at odds with that of the
workers. This eventually carne to occupy the
same position vis-a-vis the worki n8 rnasseE; as
the growing bureaucracy vi s-a-vis the
parliamentary State: it is the bureaucracy that
ru les and governs." (39)
But if Gramsci recognised the existence of a trade union
bureaucracy that despite its ideological differences shared a
commom interest derived from its power position, he certainly did
not draw the same conclusions as Michels. Not only did he believe
that the Shop-stewards' commi ttees eXisting in Italy during the
biennia TaSSO could challenge the power of the union bureaucrats,
he also believed that "developed and enriched, they must be the
organs of proletarian power". (40) So accordi ng to Gramsci. the
existence of a ~.tronE'. trade union bureaucracy or "oliQ'archv"o . does
not have to lead us to the conclusions that Michels makes - "that
the mass will never rule except in abstracts" - far from it, he
argues t.hat the bureaucracy can not onl y be challenged, bU1: that
this challenge contai rIS a potential that at times 01 s.e ve r e
e c onorm c and political c r i s ie can lead to the overthrow o t th ....
existiny order. (41, The '.:O!lclu.si on", !~ramsci d r awss t r om i.he>
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existence of a trade union bureaucracy could not be further from
those drawn by Michels.
A tentative general concl usion that can be drawn from the
Social Contract experience is that trade unions, whether they be
left-wing or right-wing I do exhi bi t a bureaucratic conservatism
that is most clearly manifest when their own rank-and-file members
are involved in actions that challenge the authority of the
leadership. The three strikes involving EETPU members considered in
this chapter tend to confirm this generalisation. To this extent
Michels' theory is confirmed. However, the very fact that the rank-
and-file successfu 11 y challenged the ru ling bureaucracies in this
period is a clear indication of the limits of bureaucratic rule -
the local authority and Ford electricians (and there are many other
examples) are illustrative of the point in the EETPU. All in all
then, the revolt against the Social Contract can be said to prOVide
a democratic corrective to the "over-determinism" of Michels.
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PART FOUR STRIKE FREE
CHAPTER NINE
BALLOTS AND UNION DEMOCRACY
During the Conservative Government's first term of office under
Margaret Thatcher, the two features of the EETPU's aggressive brand
of business unionism that were to cause such outrage in the
mainstream of the labour movement from 1985 onwards were already
taking shape. Firstly, in April 1981 the union had negotiated
what was to become its hallmark - its first "strike-free" agreement
with Toshiba in Plymouth. Secondly, the "membership war" that was
to culminate in the EETPU's involvement in the Wapping debacle was
instigated, according to the EETPU, in 1983 when they claim SOGAT
attempted to "poach" EETPU members belonging to the London Press
Branch. So already we see the beginnings of a strategy that was
aimed first at foremost at membership recruitment, especially in
new areas of employment. However, it was only under Thatcher's
second term of office that these two features of EETPU policy led
them into permanent conflict with the majority of the labour
movement.
In the wake of the defeat of the 1984/85 miners' strike
something like a seige mentality gripped the trade union movement.
There was much talk of the "crisis" of trade unionism, and the "new
realism" that had been put on ice during the course of the strike
was resurrected once more. The "crisis" was real enough, although
greatly exaggerated, and at bottom came down to declining union
membership. But how the "crisis" was perceived by a particular
union greatly influenced its response to it. The EETPU's response
was to press ahead with its strategy of carving out new areas of
recruitment unfettered by traditional trade union taboos.
Governing this strategy was a firm commitment to the business
approach to trade unionisn that Cannon had introduced into the
union in the 1960s. John Lloyd has succinctly stated the two
central features of the EETPU's business unionism:
" ... first, an acceptance of a largely market
economy in an active way - a commi tment to
harmonious industrial relations through the
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famous (and misnamed) no-strike agreements, and
a stance at local and national level of
encouragement to go-ahead, profit and growth
orientated managements as the best guarantors
of employment for the union's members.
The second is the acceptance that trade
unionism, for the present at least, operates in
the market place in which the normal anarchy
associated with such a system prevails." (1)
Such an aggressive strategy necessarily meant coming into
conflict with many of the rules that governed TUC affiliates (most
notably the Bridlington agreement). But the union was also on the
offensive against TUC on another front in the post miners' strike
period the Government's anti-union legislation. Again their
position was nothing new, they had made it abundantly clear at the
time that they agreed with the provisions in the 1980 Employment
Act that allowed unions to claim public money for secret ballots.
And when in January 1983 the Government published its Green Paper
Democracy in Trade Unions (to become the 1984 Trade Union Act), the
EETPU moved rapidly from a position of critical acceptance of the
"Employment" legislation to one of positive support for the two key
aspects of the Green Paper union elections and pre-strike
ballots. But in the changed political climate of 1984/85 the
EETPU's defiance of TUC policy on ballot money served not only to
further its attempts to disengage itself from the restrictions
imposed on it by the TUC, but it also put the TUC on the defensive
on the question of trade union democracy. In fact, we shall argue
in this chapter that the EETPU's position heralded a shift in the
trade union movement towards a view of democracy that accepts the
ballot as the central democratic mechanism.
..Affiliated unions shall observe Congress
policy and not seek or accept funds for union
ballots under the Employment Act 1980 ballot
funds scheme."
<TUC Special Conference, Wembley, April 1982).
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The 1980 Employment Act enabled unions to claim back the cost of
postal ballots on various matters from public funds. The scheme had
been in operation for four years years and no TUC affiliated trade
union had yet broken ranks and applied for funding. Late in 1984,
however, the EETPU became the first union to state its intention of
applying for public funds for their postal ballots. They were
quickly followed by the AUEW who, after successfully balloting
their membership on the issue (233,030 votes to 19,793 in favour,
with more than a third of the membership voting), became the first
TUC affiliated union to receive government money (i1.2m) for
ballots in June 1985.
As early as 23 January 1985 the TUC General Council had voted
by 26 votes to 11 to begin disciplinary proceedings against the
EETPU and the AUEW for breaking with the Wembley decisions. But
even at this early date the TUC's willingness to stick by the
Wembley decisions was beginning to crumble:
" ... in the course of a long debate, many
general counci 1 members agreed that TUC
defiance of the Government's employment laws, a
stance adopted at its 1982 Wembley special
conference, would have to be reviewed in the
light of the Conservatives' 1983 general
election victory and subsequent changes in the
industrial climate." (2)
The EETPU leadership were well aware of the GC' S crumbling defiance
of the Tory laws; after all they had already complied with the 1984
Trade Union Act back in November 1984 with impunity, when they were
the first union to order their members back to work pending a
strike ballot during the Austin/Rover dispute. At their BDC in July
1985, smelling victory, the EETPU leadership went on the offensive.
The BDC was a complete success for the EC. The August edition
of Contact carried the front page headline DISSIDENTS CLOBBERED,
and reported that "the vast maj ori ty of 740 delegates backed the
Executive Council on all the major issues":
"They agreed with the Executive's decisions to:
take public .money for ballots in defiance
of the TUC expulsion threats;
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act within the law and through the ballot
box;
oppose the TUC's support for the miners'
strike;
reject Labour's 'disastrous' unilateralist
defence policy;
seek broad understanding with Labour to
include a prices and incomes policy;
press for action against the Militant
Tendency and other extremist groups within
Labour's ranks;
carryon making the controversial strike-
free package agreements which include binding
'pendulum' arbitration."
Such overwhelming support for the leadership, triumphed Contact's
editorial, was not only a defeat for "the dWindling and frustrated
extremist fringe". but also a clear signal to the TUC: "It was
'hands off'. We won't be bullied'". (3)
Despite all this the opposition at the BDC still plugged away
with a whole series of attacks on the policies of the leadership.
In particular there were a number of opposition motions on the
agenda urging the EC to oppose the Government's anti-trade union
legislation and not to accept money for ballots. (4) Composite
motion 5 urged the Conference to fully support the TUC's opposition
to the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts, and the 1984 Trade Union Act,
concluding that: "A minimum necessity is to work to agreed
defensive policies of the TUC". This composite was defeated in
favour of one that condemned "the current Tory Industrial Relations
Legislation" and called upon the Executive "to pursue a vigorous
pol icy wi thin the law of opposition to the legislation", and it
rejected "attempts by some to use the TUC for revolutionary
purposes which is alien to our traditions". Composi te motion 3
directly linked the Government's interference in the internal
affairs of trade unions with the EC acceptance of ballot money:
"This Conference deplores the presumption of
the Government that the internal affairs of
trades unions are matters for publ ic
involvement and will resist further legislation
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designed to inhibit the autonomy of unions and
their traditional role.
It therefore urges the Executive Council to re-
align the EETPU with the Bri tish TUC policy
decision not to accept government funding for
ballots and calls on the Executive Council to
rescind its decision." (5)
The composite was defeated.
Hammond and the leadership of the EETPU used the occasion of
the BDC and the publicity surrounding it to warn the General
Council of the consequences of suspending them from the TUC. They
did this in two ways. Firstly, on the first day of the Conference
Hammond floated the idea of the creation of a right-wing/moderate
"super-union" made up of the EETPU, AUE\rl and ASTMS. Such a union of
1.7 million members would not only be able to out vote the left on
the TUC, particularly the T&G\rlU, it would also provide the basis
for a new right-wing trade union federation outside the TUC.
Hammond himself did not say this was the reasoning behind his
suggestion, instead he talked more generally about "a union for the
21st century" and the "possibilities of real advance in trade union
organization". Secondly, during the debate on whether or not the
union should accept Government ballot money, Hammond alluded to a
dossier that was being compiled by the EETPU that chronicled
hundreds of breaches of the TUC \rlembley decisions by other trade
unions. Hammond claimed that the "file" already included more than
100 instances of unions balloting on the closed shop, and that
there was "hardly a major TUC policy that had not been breached by
one or more unions". (6) Hammond was right, and not I ong after the
EETPU Conference two of the main pro-\rlembley unions, the T&G\rlU and
the GMBATU, signed an agreement with Nabisco that compl ied with
the pre-strike ballot provisions of the 1984 Trade Act. Things were
going the EETPU's way, and they knew it. The rhetoric of defiance
seemed rather hollow in the wake of the NGA dispute and the miners'
defeat, not to mention the creeping capitulation to the law by
almost all sections of the trade union movement. Nevertheless, the
1985 TUC was going to be the battleground where the \rlembley
decisions would be defended.
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The 1985 TUC
As the September 1985 TUC Congress approached, the suspension of
the AUEW and the possible formation of an al ternati ve union body
centred on the engineers and the electricians dominated debate in
the labour and trade union movement. What was at stake was the
entire policy of TUC opposition to the anti-union legislation and
the collective authority of the GC that the EETPU and AUEW were
flouting. For if the TUC conceded on the ballot money issue any
continued defiance of the legislation would be nonsensical. There
would be a domino effect, TUC discipline would be worthless, and
the Conservatives could expect the smooth implementation of their
1984 Trade Union Act - which directly interfered with the way in
which unions conducted their internal democracy. Neither the AUEW
or the EETPU showed any signs of backing down as the Congress
approached, quite the reverse. In August, just a month before the
start of the Congress, Hammond added fuel to the fire when he
announced that the union was in the process of recouping £120,000
of the £150,000 cost of the political fund ballot (as required by
the 1984 TU Act) that the union had just conducted (140,931 votes
to 23,830 to retain the political levy). The scene was now set for
what sections of the press described as a "clash of principle on
ballots".
On the Thursday before the start of the Congress on the
Monday, the TUC General Council and the leadership of the AUEW
spent a whole day locked in discussion at Blackpool's Imperial
Hotel. Norman Willis, the new TUC General Secretary, argued that
the Wembley decisions had to be honoured by the AUEW if they were
not to be suspended and eventually expelled from the TUC. Gavin
Laird, General Secretary of the AUEW, said that the Wembley
decisions were now invalid, not least because the General Election
of 1983 showed up the futility of that opposition. Laird also
pointed out that many trade unions were already changing their
rules to comply with 1984 TU Act, that ballots were being
discreetl y held on the mai ntenance of closed shops in expl ici t
defiance of Wernbley, ana that in 1984 the TUe itself had taken ~1.5
billion from the Government for education and training purposes, as
it had for many ve a r s The GC countered that taking money for
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education was not proscribed under the Wembley principles, and that
no union had actually instructed its members to ballot on the
closed shop - that had happened at local levels. (7) On the Sunday
the EETPU delegation reiterated its pledge that it would support
the AUEW, and added that it would leave the Congress hall if the
engineers were suspended. Nothing then was resolved over the
weekend, so Willis' hope of avoiding a damaging row and possible
split at his first Congress as General Secretary came to nought.
The key debate began on the first day. Debate was centred
around two motions, one from the EETPU and one from the T&GWU and
the CPSA. The EETPU motion called for a review of the Wembley
decisions in the light of the 1983 election defeat of Labour.
Hammond, when moving the motion, repeated the claim that the
Wembley principles had been breached time and time again, and that
the EETPU had details of 60 breaches of the closed-shop
recommendation alone. Moreover, argued Hammond, it was absurd to
lay down the law over the Wembley principles when "the equally
important 1984 Act has been left to individual unions". This was a
valid point. The growing number of unions adjusting their rule
books to comply with the 1984 Act and holding pre-strike and
political fund ballots, seemed to make a nonsense of the principles
of non co-operation agreed at Wembley. As so often in the trade
union movement though, "it ain't what you do, it's the way that you
do it" that counts. (8)
But the motion moved by the left-wing T&GWU and seconded by
the right-wing CPSA was of such scope that it pre-empted the
EETPU's call for a review, while staying loyal to the Wembley
decisions. The very fact that it was moved by Ron Todd and seconded
by the architect of the "new realism", Alistair Graham, was an
indication that the motion was intended to be all things to all men
and women. As the Financial Times wrote of the motion:
"It is... the fruit of an audacious strategy
pioneered by Mr Willis: that is, to take
elements from resolutions to the right and
left, often calling for quite different
outcomes, and to sew parts of them together to
form a whole which can satisfy all parties."
(9 )
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The motion appeased the left by reaffirming the TUC's "total
opposition" to the Government's anti-union legislation and by
confirming the "policy of non co-operation agreed at the special
TUC Congress at Wembley in 1982". Yet it also opened the door to a
reappraisal of the TUC's stance on the legislation when it
instructed the GC to "carry out a major review of industrial
legislation wi thin the TUC/Labour Party liaison committee". (10) In
seconding the motion Graham left the delegates in no doubt as to
what he considered the outcome of any review should be. After
reaffirming the CPSA's support for the Wembley stance of non co-
operation he went on to say:
"It would be foolhardy for the Labour Party to
enter the next general election with a simple
policy of repealing the 1980, 1982 and 1984
Acts when some of the provisions of the 1984
Act are popular with the public and our
members. .. Ballots have given the unions an
increased stature and authority to speak on
behalf of their members. We must not undermine
that hard won confidence in some crude
political reaction to what the Government have
done to us. We must ensure under new
legislation that ballots operate in a more
neutral atmosphere." (11)
The question that many trade unionists must have been asking
themselves was, why hold ballots, which were in line with the Tory
legislation, and then refuse to take the money for them? It didn't
make sense I and only confirmed what had been apparent for some
time, the verbal rhetoric of the TUC was not matched by its
practice. Six months later, in February 1986 at a Special TUC
Conference, even the verbal rhetoric collapsed as the TUC did a
volte-face on the Wembley principles. The fruits of the "major
review" were published some months later in a joint TUC/Labour
Party policy statement, People at work: new rights, new
responsi bi 1 i ti es.
Hammond in his contribution to the debate had said virtually
the same things as Graham, why then make such a big deal of the
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ballot money issue? Part of the answer is given in a Financial
Times editorial entitled "Hidden issue in the AUEVl row":
" ... some at least on the general council want
to see collective discipline asserted so that
it can be used to whip into line those unions
which may find an understanding between the TUe
and the Labour Party on incomes inconvenient."
(12)
If the collective discipline that the GC was trying to reassert on
the right-wing could not be enforced over the ballot money issue,
there was not much chance of them enforcing that discipline in the
run up to the General Election, especially over thorny problems
like incomes policy where the left-wing was likely to rebel.
Graham and Vlllis were well aware that the "review" was the most
important aspect of the motion because it was the first step in
ditching the Wembley principles. They also knew that the left's
zeal for the principles was in reality confined to unions such as
the NUM and TASS. Willis and Graham were nevertheless able to join
the left in proclaiming their support for those very same
principles, but their eye was on the future election and the
populari ty of ballot democracy. That the left, supported by the
centre and right, had taken the lead in clamouring for the
collective decisions of the TUe to be honoured by the right-wing
AUEW and EETPU, made it all the more difficult for them to break
ranks if the principles were abandoned by the GC in the run up to
the General Election. For its part the left wanted any review of
the Tory legislation to be on their terms, and for the moment that
meant blocking the right and holding them to the Wembley
principles.
So, underlying the ballot money controversy was a recognition
by both left and right that the Wembley principles were going to be
jettisoned in the not too distant future in favour of a new
industrial relations framework to be negotiated with the Labour
Party, central to which was "posi ti ve rights" for trade unionists.
What was undecided was how far the "review" would go. But for the
moment the Todd/Graham motion seemingly gave both left and right
strong corners that they could defend. Vhat neither wanted,
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however, was that the attempt to discipline the AUEW should lead to
a split in the TUC, and there was the rub.
The Todd/Graham motion was overwhelmingly carried by the
Congress. In reaffirming the Wembley principles the delegates threw
down a challenge to the AUEW, either get in line or get out. The
engineers refused to give an undertaking not to accept more
Government money for ballots. It seemed that there was no
al ternative but to expel them. And Hammond's warning from the
rostrum amid shouts of "traitor" and "Judas" seemed to confirm what
the press had been speculating about for months - that the TUC
would split:
"I must put my union's position beyond doubt.
Put us outside the TUC, declare open season on
our membership and we will not lie quiescent
waiting to be carved up.
We will do what is necessary to survive.
Unthinkable pacts about union membership, a
free for all. You ain't seen nothing yet." (13)
What actually happened was that a compromise was reached, or
as the Sunday Times put it, a "Blackpool fudge". The AUEW was
allowed to keep the £1.2 million it had already received from the
Government and they would not be immediately suspended from the
TUC. In return the union had to ballot its membership, which it had
already planned to do anyway, but this time the ballot papers had
to carry a warning that, should they vote in favour of accepting
money for ballots, their union would be suspended from the TUC.
Everything was put on ice then until the engineers held their
ballot in late November. Meanwhile, undaunted, and before the
Congress had finished, the EETPU let it be known that they were
about to receive £190,000 of Government money for ballots, and that
they were also now claiming £200,000, not £120, 000, to cover the
cost of the political fund ballot. The TUC GC then decided to write
to the union, asking it to "inform the TUC of their current
posi tion and their intentions" in relation to Government money.
(14) On 4 October the EETPU announced that it would ballot its
membershi p over taking Government money for ball ots at the same
time as the AUEW.
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The ballots and their aftermath
The ballot results were a foregone conclusion: the real question
was what would happen after the results were announced. Most
political and industrial commentators had no problem in answering
that question. Thus, John Torode, industrial correspondent for the
Guardian, could write before the ballot results were declared:
"The TUC is reportedly preparing to abandon its
position on state funding of union ballots. The
quarrel with the electricians and engineering
workers is all but over. The spirit of
compromise is abroad.. " (15)
Interviewed in the same article, Hammond showed no "spirit of
compromise":
"Vie are not turning back. There can be no
compromise whatsoever which involves us not
taking the money. We do not wish to cause
unnecessary splits in the TUC, but I repeat we
are going to take the money. If there is going
to be a compromise, it is down to them [the TUC
General Council] to back off."
What about expulsion from the TUC?
"It is for them to decide what level of
punishment they impose. They could just censure
us or slap my wrist at some council meeting. It
is not an ideal solution but it would do far
less harm than if they spl i t the movement."
(16)
The EETPU ballot paper was accompanied by the TUC's report on
the issue, which stressed the threat to unions' independence if the
money was taken; a reprint of Hammond's speech to the 1985 TUCi and
a further statement from Hammond explaining that "we are balloting
our members so that the TUC understands without doubt where the
union stands". It was accompanied by an EC recommendation to vote
yes. (17) Democracy was a key weapon in the union's arsenal as
Hammond's comment to Torode reveals: "Our conference resolutions
are not technically binding but we feel morally bound by this one",
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Clearly Hammond was confident that the ballot would fully endorse
the decision taken at the union's BDC in July to accept the
Government money. When the result was announced his confidence
proved well founded, for it showed a 9 to 1 maj ori ty in favour of
accepting Government money (136,800 to 15,339, on a 41% turnout).
Just before the result was announced, as if to rub salt into the
wound, the union received its first cheque for £168,000 for ballots
held between 1982 and 1984.
Would the EETPU and the AUEW (which in its second ballot voted
overwhelmingly to accept Government money) now be expelled from the
TUC? There were only two options that the General Council had -
start expulsion proceedings or admit that the Irlembley principles
were now untenable. There were no signs whatsoever that the
electricians and engineers were going to back down on the issue.
Hammond was blase about the prospect of expulsion:
"If we made a cold calculation, we would have
more members if we were outside the TUC than
inside." (18)
Keanwhile Laird openly rebuked the General Council in the February
1986 edition of his union's journal in an article entitled the "TUC
versus the members". Laird needn't have bothered, as the ruc
withdrew its threat to expel the EETPU and AUEIrl in late December,
and voted by 39 votes to 6 to hold a special TUC in February to
officially reverse its position on public funding of union ballots.
This climbdown was overshadowed by the furore that surrounded
another inter-union dispute that surfaced at the beginining of 1986
- the Wapping dispute. Here again the EETPU was at the centre of
the row and once again faced expulsion from the TUC. Early in
February the union was found guilty of five of the seven charges
laid against it by the TUC over its conduct at the News
International plant and threatened with expulsion if it did not
mend its ways (see next chapter).
So the ballot money debacle ended qUietly. The Wapping affair
tended to distract attention from the fact that the Wembley
principles were about to be openly ditched by the TUC, the key
moves in that direction being the TUC Special Congress to discuss
"positive rights" in February 19136 and the publication of the joint
TUC/Labour Party policy statement People at work: new rights, new
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responsibilities. The document was in effect a declaration of
surrender in the face of the attacks on internal union democracy
contained in the 1984 Trade Union Act, which were deemed to be too
popular to abandon in the run up to the General Election. As the
Financial Times commented:
"The Labour leaders were so set on keeping
balloting that there was a belief in the unions
that Labour would retain a wider membership
franchise in union affairs with or without
union agreement if necessary ... The unions have
little choice. Mr Kinnock is effectively facing
them with an ultimatum: accept this, for if you
do not, I am finished for this election, so is
Labour and so are you. If you do, we stand a
chance." (19)
However there was still some unease amongst sections of the
trade union movement about this open capitulation to the
Conservative philosophy of "ballot democracy" <and even as late as
April 1986 the TUC was still for some reason issuing gu i de l i nee
recommending that unions stick to eXisting policy rather than
comply with the Tory anti-union law). This unease manifested itself
at the 1986 TUC around a particular aspect of union democracy that
some trade unionists still, it see.med, believed was sacrosanct.
The 1986 TUC
It was not the open abandonment of the Wembley decisions, nor the
acceptance of the provisions of the 1984 Trade Union Act which
stipulated that voting members of union executives must be elected
by secret postal ballot that was the cause of unease in the run up
to the Congress. What was now the focus of the ballot controversy
was a motion submitted by the Communication workers (UCW) that, in
line with the People at Work document, called for the endorsement
of pre-strike ballots. (We are talking about a formal policy which
endorses the use of pre-strike ballots not informal acceptance. The
latter position had been endorsed by Willis as far back as July
1985 at the NUR Conference in Ayr, when he had said that the
\rIembley principles did not preclude pre-strike ballots). Late in
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August the TUC leaders agreed a compromise in an effort, the
Guardian reported, "to avoid an embarrassing situation for the
Labour leader, Mr Neil Kinnock". The original UCW motion called for
members to be given a "right to have an individual secret ballot
before being asked to participate in industrial action". Under the
amendment, engineered by Ron Todd of the T&GWU, a slightly more
flexible approach to pre-strike ballots, so as to allow for
spontaneous strikes for instance, was agreed upon. What was not in
dispute was the principle of pre-strike ballots as Todd confirmed
after the August meeting: "The amendment I sought to put forward
questioned just one small facet of the UCW motion". (20) Todd,
however, did not see his actions as a climbdown let alone a
complete abandonment of opposition to the anti-union legislation.
Instead he argued that the TUCILabour Party proposals on ballots
were different in kind from the Conservative provisions:
"The joint statement proposes that general
principles should be laid down for inclusion in
union rule-books based on a right for union
members to have a secret ballot on decisions
relating to strikes, and for the method of
election of union executives to be based on a
system of secret ballots.
This is not the same as the Tory legislation
which would be scrapped. We are not talking of
a Tory-style 'pre-strike ballot'. It would be a
ballot in relation to a strike. This wording
recognises the circumstances of spontaneous
action. In particular, there will be no
possibility of employers taking legal action on
this issue." (21)
During the debate at Congress only the NUM and TASS opposed
the pre-strike ballots compromise motion, arguing that any state
interference in the internal affairs of trade unions should be
fought. Significantly, the EETPU did not intervene in the debate.
They didn't need to. For the speeches from left and right at the
Congress on this issue were fully in accord with what they had been
preaching throughout the period of TUC oppos i tion to the
Government 's" ballot only" conception of trade union democracy.
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That the Wembley principles had collapsed and the provisions of the
1984 Trade Union Act had been accepted was only seen as a defeat
for union democracy by a few. The editorial in the Guardian the
day after the debate typifies not only the view of the press and
the political parties, but also the majority of the unions
affiliated to the TUC:
"The outcome was decisive. No card vote was
needed to show that defenders of the ballot had
won. Had it gone the other way, Congress would
have rightly been slated for ordaining a
retreat from democracy." (22)
The substance of the compromise motion was eventually
enshrined in the Labour Party's 1987 General Election manifesto,
Bri tain will win (in Scotland, Scotland will win), where the Party
promised to provide a:
"statutory framework of measures to underpin
the participative rights of union members, for
example by laying down general principles for
inclusion in union rule books. These will be
based on a right for union members to have a
secret ballot on decisions relating to strikes,
and for the method of election of union
executives to be based on a system of secret
ballots." (23)
Does the "triumph" of EETPU type "ballot democracy" (ie. a
union democracy based largely on the secret postal ballot) mean
that the classical mix of delegatory and representative democracy
that has characterised the internal workings of trade unions for
over a century is now on the wane or even finished?
The triumph of ballot democracy?
Secret postal ballots have long been a feature of trade union
democracy, but they have never been its cornerstone. The secret
postal ballot has traditionally been just one method out of many by
which the rank-and-file can express their views, elect their
leadership, and dac i de on particular courses of action that the
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union should take. Secret ballots also take place at branch,
District and Area level, and at the various conferences that the
unions hold. In short, the ways of voting in trade unions are as
complex and diverse as the history and traditions of each
particular union, and this diversi ty is reflected in their rule
books. 'Workplace union democracy also takes various forms, but a
show of hands has been the traditional way of electing
representatives and taking decisions relating to strike action. So
prior to the introduction of the 1984 Trade Union Act, union
democracy could be characterised as a classical mix of
representative and "primitive" forms of democracy. (24) Have things
changed?
Besides the unions' political funds, the 1984 Act honed in on
two particular areas of union democracy - pre-strike ballots and
the election of union executives. Before 1984, according to one
survey of 102 unions, 65 had some form of provision for strike
ballots, with 25 unions requiring a ballot of members before an
official strike was called. By contrast, in 37 unions the
responsibility for calling national strikes rested with the
national executive. Only 6 unions made provision for the use of
postal ballots for the consideration of strike action, although a
further 8 unions had provisions for the use of qualified postal
ballot procedures. Another pre-1984 survey also highlights the
various provisions for local and national industrial action that
are set down in union rule books, but states that "the number of
unions requiring ballots before calling industrial action ... is
small". (25) If we look at how unions elected their national
executives prior to 1984 we find a similar mix of electoral
methods. The 65 unions examined by Undy and Martin that used a
membership vote to elect their executives accounted in 1980 for 61%
of the TUe's membership. They comment:
"Among this group, 9 unions use a full postal
and 6 a half postal ballot. This represents the
largest number of unions using postal ballots
in any of the elections discussed, and accounts
for 2,080,982 or 17% of the total membership
surveyed. Nevertheless, the branch vote is
sti 11 the most frequently used method, with 13
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unions using a ballot and 4 a show of hands.
Among the 22 unions choosing their executive at
the national conference, 19 hold a ballot and 1
a postal ballot. In this body of unions 6 allow
their delegates to cast a block branch vote."
(26 )
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the pre-1984 position with regard to
those unions who were required by rule to use secret postal ballots
as part of their internal democracy.
TABLE 4. postal ballots and elections
Office No. of unions using postal ballot
General Secretary
President/chairman
Treasurer
Full-time officers
Executive committees
TABLE 5. Postal ballots and decisions
8
10
6
5
15
Decisions No. of unions with rules requiring .vasta]
ballots.
Reference back
National strikes 3
Local strikes 1
Rule changes 4
Source: R.Undy and R. Martin, Ballots and Trade Union
Democracy, Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, p.173
As we can see only a small number of TUC unions were r equ t r-ed by
rule to use such ballots. With the implementation of the 1984 Act
all this changed.
The 1986 report of the Government's Certification Officer
showed that only 4 unions had failed to fully comply with the
provisions of the 1984 Act requiring union executives to be elected
by secret ballots. All four of the unions, the report states,
"agreed to remedy the breaches in question". In other words, all
trade uni ons had, or were in the process of, compl yi ng with the
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internal balloting provisions of the 1984 Trade Union Act. The
report also noted that there had been 40 applications for
Government money for ballots, a rise of 14 compared to 1985. Of the
unions, 15 were TUC affiliates, 13 of them applying for the first
time. During 1987 42 unions applied for money, nevertheless the
majority of TUC affiliates are still not claiming Government money
for their ballots (the EETPU received £170,845.59 costs in 1987,
second only in terms of amount to the AUEW). (27) On pre-strike
ballots the 1986 ACAS annual report states:
"We reported last year that we had become aware
of 94 such ballots in the 15 months to the end
of December 1985, including some in unions that
had long balloted their members before taking
industrial action. 1986 saw a considerable
qu i ckeut ng of pace; no fewer than 152 ballots
came to our attention... By the end of 1986 the
Service had therefore become aware of a total
of 246 such cases, of which 189 resulted in a
maj ori ty in favour of action, 54 against and
three were tied." (28)
The ACAS report, like the report of the Certification Officer, also
notes a willingness by trade unions to co-operate with the
legislation:
"Over the year we noted that many were making
amendments to their rules to bring them within
the law and a number were making increasing use
of postal balloting methods." (29)
This shift towards postal balloting was, however, not enough
for the leadership of the EETPU. According to Chapple the
amendments to the original Trade Union Bill proposed by Tom King,
the Employment Secretary, amounted to a "Cheats Charter". (30) What
infuriated Chapple and the union leadership so much was the
following clause of the Bill:
"a presumption that ballots will be postal
unless the union is satisfied that workplace
ballots will in its circumstances meet all the
requirements of secrecy, convenience and
freedom from interference or constrai nt." (31)
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Paddy McMahon, EETPU National Officer, made it clear in an article
in Contact entitled NO WAY TO BEAT THE FRAUDSTERS, just what the
implications of such "escape clauses" were:
"The 1984 Act makes 'workplace' and 'semi-
postal' ballots legal. The supervision and
conduct of such ballots will still be in the
hands of the Left. There is ample evidence of
discrepancy between such ballots and membership
opinion. Are we being asked to believe that the
'red guards' seen on picket duty in the NGA and
NUM strikes on our screens are as impartial in
ballot distribution as the Post Office?
That such ballots, by their very nature, cannot
be secret, or free from interference, and are
wide open to malpractice should be self evident
to anyone who has taken the trouble to study
the matter at first hand." (32)
Only by a system of secret postal balloting supervised by the
Electoral Reform Society could full union democracy be secured,
argued the EETPU. With the publication in February 1987 of the
Government's Green Paper, Trade Uni ons and Their }[eJIlbers (which
became the Employment Bill in October 1987), it seems almost
certain that the independently superVised full secret postal
balloting system, for the election of all members of union
executives, that the EETPU has been arguing for since 1962 will now
be implemented. For the Green Paper concludes:
"The Government considers that there is
justification for requiring unions to use fully
postal voting for elections to the principal
executive committees and for political fund
ballots." (33)
Nevertheless, the full postal ballot will not be enforced for
pre-strike ballots because: "it is sometimes much less suitable for
strike ballots, for which the issues can be of immediate concern
and speed of decision making of the essence", although further
legal measures will be taken against unions that do not hold a pre-
strike ballot, and it seems that the linking up of individual
workplace ballots for strike action (although the workplaces belong
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to the same company) will be outlawed. Moreover, "the right of the
individual to choose to go to work despite a call to take
industrial action is an essential freedo~'. So even where a
majority vote for strike action in a single workplace, those who do
not wish to strike would be given the right to continue working and
would be legally free from any disciplinary action taken by the
union. Even sections of the CBI thought that this latter proposal
was a bit much and likely to discredit the Government's "ballot
democracy". And at the Conservative Trade Unionists Conference held
in Novemeber 1987, the vast maj ori ty of delegates voted against
this clause of the Employment Bill.
Despite the shift to secret ballots that the 1984 Trade Union
Act has caused, then, we can see that there has not as yet been a
complete move to the secret postal ballot. Trade union democracy
might be viewed by the general public, the Government, and by the
majority of trade unionists, in terms of the secret postal ballot,
but the reality, both in terms of the existing legislation and the
actual practice of trade unionists, is a little more complex.
IVorkplace secret ballots are still legal, and so there is still
scope for collective discussion and debate.
More alarming still for those who view union democracy solely
or largely in terms of ballots, there is evidence to show that
trade unionists are still ignoring the law. The sobering fact
remains, says an Institute of Personnel Management booklet, that
"a very high proportion of stoppages and
overtime bans take place wi thout a ballot. A
survey in November 1986 reported that in a
sample of 95 workplaces where industrial action
had taken place within the past two years, only
three reported having ballots beforehand!" (34)
Even more "sobering" is the ACAS Report for 1986. They report that
the 152 pre-strike ballots that took place in 1986 remain small
when compared to the 1,030 officially recorded stoppages which took
place in the same year. (35) In other words, the vast majority of
officially recorded stoppages still take place without any ballot
being held beforehand. This does not mean, of course, that the
membership of the unions involved did not vote on strike action,
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but rather that they made their decisions at mass or section
meetings by a show of hands.
The other problem with the pre-strike ballots, as far as the
employers are concerned that is, is that they tend heavily in
favour of industrial action. For example, ACAS records that of the
246 pre-strike ballots that they were aware of by the end of 1986,
189 went in favour of industrial action, although only in 20 cases
did any industrial action follow. So the figures suggest that the
mere threat of a strike may force an employer to reconsider his
position. Or as ACAS puts it: "trade union officials are coming to
see ballots before industrial action as a permanent part of the
negotiating machine" (36) Seen in another light, this form of
negotiating ploy could be said to increase the power of the
officials over the rank-and-file while at the same time reinforcing
the view that union democracy is all about secret ballots.
Ballot democracy versus oligarchy
Secret postal balloting, it is argued, is more democratic than
other forms of voting because it enables many more union members to
participate in their union's affairs. As a consequence the rank-
and-file are able to exert a greater power and control over their
union leaderships. This was the basis of the Conservative Party's
claim that they were giving the unions back to their members, and
it is also the claim of the EETPU leadership. If this is correct,
we should see some undermining of what Michels referred to as the
tendency of trade union leaders "to rule democratic organizations
on oligarchic lines". (37)
Firstly, though, what of the claim that secret postal ballots
increase membership participation/democracy. Undy and Martin write:
"If the concern is for the highest degree of
participation, the workplace ballot should be
encouraged .... if the quest is for secrecy then
postal ballots which do not require the voter's
signature are probably the most effective .. "
(38)
A pamphlet produced by the Labour Research Department confirms this
view:
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"There is a significant amount of evidence to
show that more people get the chance to vote if
the ballot is at the workplace. An analysis of
the political fund ballots 1984-86 showed that
those unions which co-ordinated their ballot in
the workplace had turnouts on average 30%
higher than those using postal ballots.
The EETPU is one of the unions whose voting
system is favoured by the government but in the
political fund ballot votes they came 28th out
of 38 in terms of turnout. In fact only two
unions using workplace ballots got less than a
50% turnout while only one postal ballot
achieved the 50% plus figure - and it had a
national membership of just over 1,000, so that
it was hardly representative of unions as a
whole. Five out of the six fully postal ballots
occupied the bottom five places in terms of
turnout." (39)
The EETPU's turnout of 46.5% in the political fund ballot was
the hi ghest in the uni on's hi st ory , but in compari son wi th other
unions it was low. This low turnout cannot be explained in terms of
its commitment to the retention of the fund, since the union
campaigned as vigorously as any union for a YES vote. In the June
1985 edition of Contact, the front page, a full inside page article
by Hammond, and the centre page spread were all devoted to the
reasons why the political fund should be maintained. Neither were
the leadership assured of the result they desired. A poll conducted
at the end of February 1985 showed that only 36% of EETPU members
would vote for the retention of the levy, while 50% said they would
not. (40) So there was no complacency on the leadership's side.
When the result was declared in August, 140,913 (84%) had voted for
the retention of the fund and 26,830 <16%) against.
Clearly then workplace ballots were the main reason for the
differing participation rates. If this is the case, why do the
EETPU object to such ballots? We would argue that underlying the
EETPU's <and the Government's) conception of union democracy is the
belief that given the chance to vote by the "comfort of their own
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firesides" the "apathetic maj ori ty" of union members will support
"moderate" candidates for union office and equally "moderate"
policies, and in so doing will isolate the "militant" minority of
union activists. The EETPU and the Government might be surprised
to know that their reasoning is based on sound Gramscian
principles. One might almost say of the "active man-in-the-mass",
wrote Gramsci:
" ... that he has two theoretical consciousnesses
(or one contradictory consciousness): one which
is implicit in his activity and which in
reality unites him with his fellow
workers ... and one, superficially explicit or
verbal, which he has inherited from the past
and uncritically absorbed." (41)
Secret postal ballots tend, we would argue, to reinforce the
dominant or "verbal" consciousness of trade unionists as they vote
individually and in the isolation of their homes and away from the
debate that can be generated around a workplace ballot. Or as the
Green Paper put it: "there is ... scope in a workplace ballot for
unduly pressuring voters to influence their choice of candidate".
(42) There is nothing hard and fast about this, as workplace debate
can result in the election of supporters of the status quo just as
much as postal ballots cani and postal ballots can, of course lead
to the election of left-wing leaders. But, generally speaking,
right-wing unions are the foremost advocates of the secret postal
ballot, and left-Wing unions of branch or workplace balloting.
In the summer of 1984, the EETPU and T&GWU exchanged heated
views in the letters column of the Financial Times about the
relative merits of workplace and secret postal balloting. The
exchange had been sparked off by an article by Philip Bassett, who
had suggested that the high turnout in the T&GWU election for a new
General Secretary to succeed Moss Evans gave support to the
argument that, "postal ballots ... are not necessarily more effective
than workplace ballots". (43) McMahon, for the EETPU, replied:
" At every stage in the elect i on procedure in
the Transport and General Workers' system it is
wide open to abuse ..... Comparing such workplace
elections favourably against the postal
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balloting system in the EETPU, where the only
factor taken into acount is the alleged higher
turnout in the former, without regard to any of
the other essential considerations, is
misleading in the extreme." (44)
Referring to the 30% turnout in the EETPU election for General
Secretary, McMahon made his point even clearer in a further letter
to the Financial Times:
"Vie can be sure that the 30% membership votes
counted actually voted. The trouble with the
T&GVlU election is that no-one can say with any
certainty if even 10% actually voted." (45)
The EETPU seemed vindicated when early in 1985 a ballot-
rigging scandal rocked the T&GVlU. There were numerous allegations
from within the T&GVlU of alleged irregularities in the election of
the new General Secretary. Ron Todd. This was the same election
that had sparked off the EETPU/T&GVlU correspondence in the
Financial Times. McMahon's point seemed graphically confirmed.
Editorials were now appearing in The Times on the subject. Bernard
Levin was deeply concerned about the corruption of Rousseau's
principle of the General Vlill and the prospect of the "ballot
riggers" repeating their performance in the proposed re-run
election. Levin's main concern was the same as McMahon's:
" ... as an indictment of the Government's
failure to legislate for direct postal ballots,
and of its refusal to listen to those who
pointed out that workplace ballots would be
rigged in one way or another (or both), it
could not be more complete or more
instructive." (46)
Todd doubled his majority in the re-run election. This did not
satisfy the EETPU. Chapple, writing in his weekly column for the
Daily Nail, expressed the general attitude of the union to Todd's
second victory:
"V/ell, it's over. Communist backed Ron Todd has
won the second cardboard box election ... And
that, say most people, is that. Maybe last
year's ballot was rigged, but now it's all OK
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and above board. Me, I'm not so
sure ..... Throughout the latest ballot I've
continued to receive letters of complaint from
individual T&GWU members about the way the
election was being run ..... " (47)
So, according to the EETPU, any claims that workplace ballots
allow more union members to participate in the internal democracy
of their unions are not to be taken seriously because the whole
system is open to corruption anyway. There is no escape from this
logic, but two things are worth noting. Firstly, in its Green
Paper, Trade Unions and Their Members, the Goverment itself says of
the T&GW affair, and the more recent CPSA "ballot rigging"
allegations, "in neither case were claims of widespread ballot
rigging upheld". The Green Paper, along with other studies, also
notes that the postal balloting system is open to corruption; for
example, by withholding ballot papers from those entitled to vote
and "by manipulating the membership register". (48) Secondly, the
EETPU are quite prepared to accept the results of workplace
ballots in other unions when they agree with the results. There was
not a murmur from the union over the "suspiciously high" workplace
returns in the political fund elections.
Purged of corruption as it is supposed to be, does the
electoral system used by the EETPU allow the rank-and-file any more
control over its own bureaucracy than in unions where such a system
is not employed? The simple answer is no, quite the reverse. To
rei terate some of the points made in previous chapters. Firstly I
there are very few occasions on which the rank-and-file can
actually vote, since all the full-time officials are now appointed,
and only the Executive Council is elected. Ironically, then, given
all the talk about secret postal balloting, elections are not a
major feature of EETPU internal democracy. Secondly, the other
forums for discussion in the union, (the branches, the BDC, the
Industrial Conferences) are just that, forums for discussion, they
have no constitutional authority that binds the leadership to their
decisions. Other unions, which combine postal and workplace
balloting, which have constitutions that make conference decisions
binding, and which elect union officials. are far more likely to be
open to rank-and-file pressure on the leadership. It is no accident
insti tutions for the
and engagement of
Even the sovereignty
occasiDn when
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that the only trade union in Britain which has no t seen maj or
shifts frDm left to right and from right to left on its leading
body in the past 25 years is the EETPU. Postal balloting in the
EETPU far from increasing democracy in the union has led to, in the
immortal words of Lord Hail sham, an "elective dictatorship". The
veneer of democracy that postal balloting allows distracts from the
very undemocratic nature of the rest Df the union's internal
structure.
In Xichelian terms, the sole reliance on secret postal
balloting in the EETPU has strengthened "the authori tati ve
character of the leaders and their tendency to rule democratic
organizations on oligarchic lines". Where postal balloting is the
cornerstone of a union's democracy then, we would argue, that
oligarchic control is likely to be increased and the democratic
countervailing tendencies severely decreased. Fairbrother, writing
of the EETPU and AUEW, makes the point very clearly:
"In both these uniDns the introduction Df
postal ballots has prDvided for their effective
deraobt Lfsa t i on as collective organisations. At
all levels Df each uniDn there has been a
gradual erDsion of the
cDllective participation
members in union activity.
Df cDnference, the
representatives engage in cDllective decision-
making, has been questioned. In short, the
introductiDn of postal ba l Lo t s is a part of a
process of undermining collective organisation
and a c t Lon." (49)
This erosion Df rank-and-file organizatiDn has important
implications fDr Dur assessment of the Michels/GDuldner thesis. For
Hyman's descriptiDn of Michels' mDdel as "overdetermined" was
premissed on the fact that Michel? failed tD take account of such
cDuntervailing pressures as ".shop-floor trade unionism" and
"wDrkplace DrganizatiDn", which aqted as cDnduits for rank-and-file
mili tancy in the 1970s. Because of these f or ms of Drganization,
wri tes Hyman, "the rank-and-fi 1e may be able t o exert cDnsiderable
influence over (or act independently of) leadership po Lt c t e s and
301
actions". (50) With the waning of rank-and-file militancy and
organization (in comparison to the '70s) in the 1980s, and the
defensive nature of that militancy when it does explode, we see the
Thatcher Government's largely successful attempt to substitute that
surrogate for union democracy the secret postal ballot. The
countervailing force of shop-floor trade unionism and the active
union democracy that accompanied it now no longer exist as an
effective check on the power of the union bureaucracies. Of course,
this power to check and by-pass the union bureaucracies in the
1970s was used actively on relatively few occasions. It remained a
potential power for most of the time, not least because workers
cou Ld achieve their ends without comi ng into contact with their
union leadership. On top of this, in the EETPU the forums within
the union where the rank-and-file could organise to exert pressure
on the bureaucracy have, as we have seen, been eroded to such a
degree that they are now mere shadows of the organizations they
once were in the 1960s. Not surprisingly therefore, it is in this
union that postal balloting is most extensive and most vigorously
defended.
However, the use of ballots in general as a means of
maintaining bureaucratic control over the rank-and-file is not just
the preserve of the right-wing EETPU. In 1987 the Yorkshire NUM
forced the Frickley miners back to work with the argument that the
resul t of the national ballot would decide how the union would
fight the NCB's disciplinary code. The Frickley miners utilised a
different form of union democracy, mass meetings and the spreading
of the strike through picketing. At about the same time the T&GWU
attempted to get Scottish bus drivers back to work before a
delegate meeting that was previously arranged to decide on that
very issue. The various bus depots voted by a show of hands to stay
out and then went on to picket out other depots. In both these
cases we see the type of democracy that Hyman was referring to, and
how, in a small way, it was used to exert rank-and-file control
over the union bureaucracies.
Overall, though, we can say that there has been a general
shift towards the conception of trade union democracy championed by
the EETPU, or, more accurately, a shift towards the balloting
methods employed by the EETPU. Even so, the secret postal ballot
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has still not been universally adopted, and as the number of
industrial disputes that have taken place without pre-strike
ballots highlights, the shift in this particular area is liable to
prove very fragile given an upsurge of trade union militancy. So
although the shift towards "ballot democracy" has tended to
reinforce the oligarchical tendencies in trade unions, the
countervailing democratic tendencies are still clearly present and
active.
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CHAPTER TEN
THE EETPU AND THE WAPPING DISPUTE
The EETPU's response to the "crisis" of trade unionism that we
discussed in the previous chapter could not be better highlighted
than by the Wapping dispute. The dispute not only showed how far
the union was prepared to go to break into new areas of employment
in an attempt to arrest the decline in its membership, but the type
of agreement that it was prepared to negotiate with News
International (ND also demonstrated quite clearly the nature of
what was being called its "new unionism", and what we would call
its old fashioned business unionism. Moreover, because of the
secrecy surrounding the union I s operation at Wapping there was
absolutely no consultation with the membership at any level about
what was going on (even the members recruited to work at Wapping).
Secret operations were totally incompatible with any form of
internal democracy. It was only when the union's actions became
public knowledge that the leadership issued a circular to all
branches stating its case. This would seem to confirm Michels
assertion that "every system of leadership is incompatible with the
as oneYet,(1)most essential postulates of democracy".
commentator sympathetic to the EETPU remarked:
"There is no doubt that the EETPU's close
involvement with the recruitment of labour for
the Murdoch Wapping plant set back the EETPU's
drive within the TUC for the 'new unionism'.
And privately electricians' leaders recognise
that." (2)
Such a "set back" suggests that there were forces operating against
the EETPU "oligarchy". In this chapter we shall examine the union's
involvement with NI and the actions of those forces that set the
union back - the TUC, the internal opposition and, most damagingly
of all, the EETPU members within the Wapping plant itself.
On 5 February 1987, the Executive Council of SOGAT '82 voted by a
maj ori ty of 23 to 9 to call off the year long dispute at .Rupert
Murdoch's News International plant at Wapping in the East End of
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London. The following day the other main print union involved in
the dispute, the NGA, also ended its support for the strike.
Nevertheless, the picketing of the Wapping plant by a small number
of the 5000 sacked print workers continued, and at the weekend the
familiar demonstration of about 2000 print workers and their
supporters gathered outside the plant. It was a bitter dispute,
which ended with those workers that were still on strike accusing
the leadership of the print unions of leading them into a dead-end
wi th a strategy that was centred on a public boycott of News
International's papers and a desire to win over public opinion,
and, when that failed, of "selling them out". For its part, the
print leadership could point to the ineffectiveness of the
"alternative" strategy of mass pickets in stopping the distribution
of the "scab" papers, as well as the scenes of violence which
"alienated" public opinion. Neither side seriously considered
pulling the rest of Fleet Street out on strike. Of course there
were a host of other factors that worked against the print unions:
in particular, the use of the law to restrict the pickets to 6
"official" strikers; the constant threat of sequestration hanging
over the union funds; the massive police operation which ensured
that Rupert Murdoch's papers could leave the plant; and above all,
perhaps, the lack of solidarity from other trade unionists - the
T&GWU drivers who crashed through the picket lines, the SOGAT
members who distributed the "scab" papers, and the trade unionists
who continued to work behind the barbed wire at Wapping.
Of all the trade unionists who worked behind the wire, the
EETPU members were the most vilified by the strikers, the print
unions, and other trade unionists. The EETPU was castigated as the
"enemy wi thin" , the fifth column of open collaborators who
blatantly ignored the unwritten, as well as some of the written,
principles upon which trade unionism was founded. It was they, it
was claimed, who had conspired with News International to replace
the sacked printworkers with their own members. Let us see how true
these accusations are.
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Chronicle of a dispute foretold
That a showdown between the print unions and the newspaper owners
was on the way had been glaringly apparent since the defeat of the
NGA in December 1983. Then, Eddie Shah, owner of the Stockport
Xessenger, employed non-union labour to work on new technology.
Using the Government's anti-union laws, and after a major climbdown
by the TUC, he forced the NGA to back down over the issue. Shah's
victory showed that the powerful NGA could be beaten, and by a
sma11 employer at that. The f 011 owi ng year there were a host of
other disputes and compromises centred on the introduction of new
technology. A disturbing feature of many of these disputes was the
inter-union confict over the jobs remaining after the new
technology was introduced. In July 1985, the EETPU negotiated an
outline single-union, "strike-free" deal with Shah, in preparation
for the launch in 1986 of his new daily paper, Today. The Times
reported on the significance of the deal:
"The 'no-strike' outline deal .... will prove to
be a watershed in the history of the British
newspaper industry ... The agreement not only
excludes traditional print unions, except for
journalists, but also cuts a swathe through the
time-honoured practices on national newspapers
of strict job demarcation, high manning and
tight union control of recruitment.
Meanwhi le Fleet Street's newspaper proprietors
have already made discreet inquiries about the
new agreement, especially those planning new
publications on greenfield sites, where the
EETPU can sign accords without foul [sic] of
the Bridlington rule." (3)
Reporting on Murdoch's possible interest in the Shah deal, the
Economist said that he too was planning a new national daily and
"is already talking to the EETPU". (4) Murdoch was also talking to
SOGAT, who in July 1985 offered him a deal similar to the one that
the EETPU had negotiated with Shah, in this case for the
production of the Sun and the News of the Yor l d at Murdoch' 5 new
plant at Wappi ng. (5)
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So, Murdoch's plans to move to Wapping and produce a Scottish
edition of the SUD from Kinning Park in Glasgow had been known to
the print unions for some time. As early as October 1984 the unions
had discussed with Murdoch the various stumbling blocks to Wapping.
However,
"By Christmas that year, Murdoch was
frustrated. He had failed to reach agreement
wi th the print unions ... Around this time, an
executive in London picked up on a phrase
:Murdoch had used one Saturday night in Gray's
Inn Road. It was about making a 'dash for
freedom' " (6)
:Murdoch's "dash for freedom" was to be faci 11 tated by the EETPU.
Early in 1985 NI began secret talks with national officers of the
EETPU about the manning of the London and Glasgow plants. But none
of this was to become totally clear until October 1986. In the
meantime, although he had already decided on his future course of
action, Murdoch continued his talks with the print unions.
However, Murdoch's real intentions for the Wapping plant were
revealed for the first time in September 1985, when Socialist
Worker published the following exclusive story:
"A local office of the EETPU is being used to
recruit workers for Rupert Murdoch's new
printing plant in Wapping, East London. There
are fears that this force could be used to
replace existing printers at the Sun and News
of the World...
Ginger Pearse, the Southampton EETPU branch
chairman, told Socialist Worker: I Men are
queueing up in the area office. It's a
recrui ting centre. Over 500 people have been
interviewed and recruited but our branch has
not been informed about these jobs, nor, as far
as I know, have any other branches in the area"
The story goes on to describe the role of EETPU officials in the
recruitment process:
"Electricians' union officials are not only
recruiting labour for Rupe r t Murdoch's va pp i ng
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presses, they are vetting applicants for the
job. People seeking work at Wapping must first
apply through the EETPU Southampton office,
where they must join the EETPU if they are not
already members ...
Those picked by the Southampton office must
then travel to London for a second interview.
This takes place at South Bank House ... Black
Prince Road, near Waterloo station. One of the
first questions asked is: 'Are you prepared to
cross picket lines?' Successful candidates
proceed to a third interview... where they meet
members of the Murdoch management team.
Those offered jobs will receive £12.000 during
a three month training period, rising to around
£16,000 when training is complete. In addition,
six weeks holiday, a free canteen and private
health care have been offered... " (7)
A similar process of recruitment took place for the Kinning
Park plant in Glasgow, with local EETPU official Pat 0' Hanlon
actually sitting in on the management interviews. (8) The writing
was clearly on the wall, but the print unions still thought they
could come to a deal with Murdoch. Murdoch, however, had no
intention whatsoever of coming to a deal. As a letter from Geoffrey
Richards, News International's solicitor, leaked to the Horning
Star in February 1986, revealed, the company's aim all along was to
get rid of the 5000 workers without paying redundancy money. (9)
Murdoch's strategy, then, was to make the print unions an
offer that they had to refuse. A leaflet produced by the print
unions at the height of the dispute lists the 12 points of a
proposed agreement that Murdoch presented to the unions on 21
November 1985:
"1 No recognition of chapels or branches, and
no negotiations at local level.
2 No strikes 'or other industrial action for
any reason whatever' .
-~-
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3 Immediate dismissal for anyone taking part
in a strike or industrial action - with no
right of appeal.
4 Union officials have 'a special duty to
enforce this section' of the agreement.
5 No closed shop.
6 Union representatives can be removed from
office by management issuing a written warning.
7 No union recognition for supervisors and
management grades.
8 Complete flexibilty of working with no
demarcation lines.
9 No job security complete freedom of
management to change methods of working.
10 No minimum staffing levels.
11 Management's 'exclusive right to
manage' ... to select people for jobs, 'classify
and reclassi fy' peopl e I ' hire I promote I demote
and transfer employees as required'. They will
also 'suspend, discipline, dismiss, layoff
employees from work' as they see fit.
12 Legally binding contracts.
I Would you give your management this
agreement?" (10)
Incredibly the print unions organized no resistance to NI,
believing that they could still strike a bargain wi th Murdoch over
the production of his existing titles, and what turned out to be
the bogus new evening paper the London Post, at the new Wapping
site. Murdoch himself later admitted that if the print unions had
come out on strike before Christmas, when preparations were less
advanced at Wapping and pre-Christmas advertising in his papers was
heavy. then it would have been effective. (11)
Meanwhile Kurdoch continued his preparations at Wapping and
set a Christmas eve deadline by which time negotiations on the
November agreement· had to be complete. The deadline passed and
there was no settlement. On 19 January, a TUC delegation headed by
Norman \IIi11is, presented a draft agreement, agreed with the print
unions, to NI that gave Murdoch practically everything he wanted,
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including binding arbitration and a "strike free" clause and a
"common commitment to profitability, efficiency, harmonious
relations, productivity and flexibility, and job security". (12)
lihat the print unions were prepared to offer HI, in other words,
was a deal that was very similar to the ones that the EETPU had
been signing for the previ ous five years. The biggest shock for
the print unions was that Murdoch rejected their unprecedented
offer. (13) The die was cast - the unions had no option but to
fight News International.
On 24 January 1986, printworkers at The Sun, News of the
YorI d, The Ti:mes, and the Sunday Ti:mes, came out on indefinite
strike following overwhelming majorities in secret ballots (82% of
SOGAT members balloted voted for strike action: 3,534 to 752, and
843 to 117 in the NGA). The next day the first lorries came down
the floodlit ramp at Wapping. There were technical hitches, but 3
million copies of the News of the World were printed at Wapping and
750,000 at Kinning Park ( 2 million down on the Fleet Street run).
Wapping also produced 1.2 million copies of the Sunday Ti:mes, only
150,000 down. (14) And these first ever non-union national
newspapers were produced with the full support of only one trade
union - the EETPU.
The enemy within
Knowledge of the EETPU's recruiting drive for the Wapping plant was
made public after Ginger Pearse, the branch chairman of the
Southampton EETPU, addressed a meeting organized by SWP Fleet
Street print workers in September 1985, and in the subsequent story
that appeared in Socialist Worker. Two weeks after the meeting
Pearse was invited by HGA General Secretary Tony Dubbins to the
union I s regional office in London. Pearse passed on all he knew
about the number of people going .to London, the jobs they were
doing and the way they had been recruited. A simi lar process of
recruitment was revealed in Glasgow when Jimmy Hay, a maintenance
engineer and AUEW member who had be~n unemployed for two years,
left his job at Murdoch's Kinning Park plant after less than
forty-eight hours. and informed his District Secretary about the
type of work he was expected to do. There were no exact numbers
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given of how many EETPU members were recruited for the Wapping and
Glasgow plants, but the figure that was most often mentioned was
500. What was clear, however, was that the Area Secretary of the
EETPU in Southampton, Mick Scanlon, and an EETPU full-time official
in Glasgow, Pat O'Hanlon, had acted as recruiting agents for News
International and even attended the vetting interviews. It was on
the basis of the Southampton and Glasgow evidence that the print
unions along with the AUEW lodged, on 11 December 1985, a complaint
to the TUC against the EETPU. On 22 January 1986, the print unions
made a formal complaint to the General Council of the TUC about the
conduct of the EETPU. On 5 February, the EETPU were brought before
the GC to give an account of themselves.
The EETPU's response, as we shall see, was to deny any
knowledge of the activities of their local officials. Even at the
time this seemed very unlikely in such a highly centralized union
as the EETPU, but this story was eventually blown apart with the
publication in October 1986 of Linda Melvern's book The End of The
Street. Melvern revealed that in April 1985, Tom Rice, National
Officer of the EETPU in charge of the print industry, travelled to
the USA with Christopher Pole-Carew, the pioneer of non-union
papers in Britain and the man who was overseeing Murdoch's Wapping
project. There they were shown round a series of newspapers by John
Keating, technical director of Murdoch's News America, all of which
had the type of working practices that HI wanted to introduce at
Wapping. Keating and Rice apparently hit it off, for on subsequent
visi ts to London Keating visited Rice at his home and was shown
around the EETPU headquarters and their training school in Kent.
Melvern writes:
"This American tour, one executive explained
later, was crucial in the planning of Wapping.
It had been organised to give Rice a I general
understanding of the modern printing industry'.
Another said it was to give Rice an 'overview
of the e qu Lpmerrt ". From the time of the
American visit, Rice and Pole-Carew had regular
meetings, generally in anonymous London Hotels,
to discuss manning and shift patterns needed
for Wappi ng." (5)
311
At the TUC disciplinary hearing on 5 February 1986, Rice
denied that he or the EETPU had had any illicit connection with
Pole-Carew:
"There is no connection with Pole-Carew. All of
the unions who associate in the industry were
concerned to learn from the press some time in
the middle of the year that this person had
emerged wi thin the Murdoch empire. All of the
unions were asked questions about him and
sought to find out information. He did attend
one meeting at the request of the unions and
explained his role. We, the EETPU, had no
contact with Pole-Carew." (16)
Melvern's book also includes some of the minutes of meetings
about Wapping held by News International directors throughout the
summer of 1985. One such meeting, on 21 May 1985, provides further
evidence of EETPU collusion with NI:
"At the May meeting, Geoffrey Richards, the
lawyer, had told executives that any ideas
would be 'welcomed on the draft agreement
between LP and the EEPTU (sic). This was also
mentioned in the agenda of the next meeting:
'London Post/EEPTU draft agreement'." (17)
The General Council meeting Of February 1986
In the run up to the TUC meeting the EETPU could hardly be accused
of keeping a low profile. Besides constantly declaring that they
were unwilling to rule out a single-union, "strike-free" deal with
News International, the union announced in early January that they
were close to reaching a final agreement with News <UK), Eddie
Shah's publishing company. They also risked further TUC
disciplinary action when they went ahead with a joint energy
seminar with the breakaway Union of Democratic Mineworkers. The NUM
decided to lodge a complaint against the EETPU under the TUC's Rule
13 on affiliated unions:
" ... it appears to the general counci 1 that the
activities of the organisation may be
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detrimental to the interests of the trade union
movement or contrary to the declared principles
or declared policy of congress." (18)
And it was under this catch-all disciplinary rule that the print
unions were going to press their case against the EETPU, which, if
successful, could lead to the eventual expulsion of the union from
the TUC.
The print unions' complaint was investigated by the GC of the
TUC in a 6 hour long meeting on 30 January 1986. Eric Hammond did
not attend the meeting because, so he wrote to Norman Willis, he
II feared for his safety". SOGAT and the NGA had prepared a 30 page
confidential submission detailing their evidence against the EETPU
(it must be remembered that Melvern's disclosures were not known
until October 1986, eight months after the TUC hearing and a month
after the TUC Congress). Their evidence concerned the recruitment
that had taken place at Southampton and Glasgow and leaked manning
I ists from Wapping. The manning lists from Wapping showed that
there were considerably more than the 50 electricians that the
EETPU maintained were working in the plant as part of the contract
to set up machinery. The evidence also showed that the EETPU were
still recruiting people through their local offices, despite Tom
Rice telling the print unions as far back as 30 September 1985 that
all recruitment had stopped. After hearing the evidence the GC
ruled that the EETPU's activities were in contravention of Rule 13.
A second meeting was arranged for 5 February, where the EETPU could
defend itself against the charges the GC had drawn up.
There were seven specific charges levelled against the EETPU
at the meeting on 5 February:
1 that they had refused to co-operate with the
print unions in making a joint approach to Hews
International and thereby jeopardized the
prospect of an all union agreement.
2 that they were imperilling the jobs and
conditions of other unions' members by helping
to produce HI titles.
3 that they had helped to recruit workers for
the new plants, who took over production jobs
preViously held by members of other unions.
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4 that they helped News International produce
a special Sunday TiIIJes supplement from its
Wapping plant on 19 January.
5 that they entered an agreement or
arrangement with News International without the
consent of other print unions, and contrary to
TUC advice.
6 that they had helped with recruitment in
exchange for a single-union deal.
7 that they continued to recruit workers for
the new plants after giving assurances that
they would not.
Eric Hammond, accompanied by Tom Rice, national officer for
the print industry, Tom Breakell, the union's President, and
Michael Short, the union's lawyer, conducted the hour long defence
of the EETPU. In his opening remarks to the General Council
Hammond referred to the "notoriety" of the print industry and its
resistance to technological change, arguing that it was better to
negotiate the introduction of new technology instead of having it
imposed. Hammond then turned to the specific allegations about
recruitment in Southampton. He said that the national office of the
union only knew of the recruitment when Rice reported to the
Executive Council on 29 September 1985. From then on the
Southampton office gave no further assistance in the recruitment of
labour for Wapping. As for the discovery of a Southampton office
compliment slip attached to an application form for work at
Wapping and dated 8 January 1986, Hammond told the GC that Vivian
Seaman, the office secretary, denied that it had been attached by
her, claiming that someone else had attached the slip and added the
date to "create a misleading impression". Rice had also informed
the print unions on 30 September that to the best of his knowledge
the Southampton EETPU members working at Wapping were engaged on
normal contracting work, installing and commissioning equipment.
Hammond dismissed the Glasgow accusations in a similar fashion,
saying there was nothing secretive about the activites of their
local official, but adding:
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"Mr O'Hanlon's activities were carried out on
his own initiative and without any consultation
wi th or encouragement from the union's head
office". (19)
As to the number of EETPU members working at Wapping Hammond
told the TUC he had no idea how many there were. He had asked Rice
on 23 January to go to Wapping and find out, but the dispute had
started the next day and such a visit would have been
misunderstood. However the EETPU had made some "informal
enquiries", and in addition to the "approximately 80 members" from
Southampton, he believed that about 100 electricians were in the
plant, employed by sub-contractors, "who had carried out
installation and commissioning work who may have been recruited by
London Post (Printers) Ltd". This, he said, had not involved the
EETPU in any way. Hammond concluded on this subject:
"There is no way of knowing .... whether all of
those 180 are members of the union or indeed
whether there are other employees at Wapping
who, may, for example, have been recruited by
word of mouth". (20)
Hammond then turned to the allegation that he considered to
be at the heart of the matter:
"The EETPU wishes to state ... as categorically
as possible that it has not entered into or
continued any agreement, arrangement or
understanding with News International covering
all or part of the operation or groups of
employees at Wapping ....
Perhaps there was a plot: but I tell you
unequivocally that we had no part of it, no
knowledge of it." (21)
In the light of Melvern's subsequent revelations this was clearly
untrue.
An adjournment followed in which the General Council members
studied a 32 page document with 16 appendices that the EETPU had
submitted to bolster its defence. In summary the document said:
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"The EETPU had only negotiated over the start-
up of the London Post, the postponed new
evening newspaper to be published by HI, and
not over the group's existing four titles.
It had not negotiated in contravention of
eXisting spheres of influence.
- It had not entered into any agreement with HI
at Wapping.
- It had no representatives or organisation at
Wapping. Some 180 electricians are at Wapping,
some of whom it believes are EETPU members.
Members of other print unions are also there.
- HI titles are only printed at Wapping because
of the strike by the main print unions.
- The local officers at Glasgow and Southampton
recrui ted labour for the plants on their own
initiatives, and did so only for the
installation and maintenance of machinery.
- the union is not responsible for the actions
of its members at Wapping." (22)
The document was also highly critical of the actions of the
other print unions in the whole affair. The EETPU said that the
print unions had helped to create a "jungle" in Fleet Street over
the past 25 years. :More specifically, the document said that the
j oint-union approach to HI was not observed by the print unions
themselves, for in November SOGAT had wished to negotiate
separately with NI. The document ends:
"Is the general council satisfied that the
acti vi ties of the EETPU are as detrimental to
the interests of the trade union movement as
those of SOGAT and the NGA have been over the
last 25 years or even in respect of the
negotiations of News International? " (23)
During the cross-examination of Hammond it was, surprisingly I
the right-wi ng General Secretaries that pressed him hard on such
things as recruitment. For example, Roy Grantham, the General
Secretary of the white-collar union APEX, said:
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" ' ... we have been told by you today about the
four officials who were party to such
recrui tment by two plants owned by the same
company. Were you saying you had no
understanding or agreement in prospect of any
kind? It seems very strange. '
Hammond: 'You can put what description you like
on it; that is the fact of the matter. We have
no arrangement, no understanding, and nor are
we seeking one at this moment'." (24)
Ron Todd pursued the point:
" 'The question I would like to know is in
August, September, October 1985, whilst there
may have been no agreement or no joint
understanding, was there knowledge that people
were involved in the knowledge of News
International intentions... ?'
Hammond: 'No there was not ... There are things
that happen in big organisations which you do
not know about. What we are making clear is
that as soon as they were complained of we took
steps that were necessary to put a stop to
it'." (25)
With the cross-examination complete the EETPU delegation left,
leaving the General Council to consider the 7 specific charges
indi vidually. The EETPU was found guilty of five of the seven
charges. They were found not guilty of the charge that they helped
in recruitment in exchange for a single-union deal, and not guilty
of continuing recruitment after 30 September 1985. The General
Council then had to, in the words of Rule 13, "direct the
organisation to discontinue such activities forthwith and undertake
not to engage therein in the future". There followed a long and
heated debate on the GC about the wording of one of the directives
that was to be issued to the EETPU. The problem was that if the GC
ordered the EETPU to instruct its members working at Vapp i ng to
stop work under pain of suspension, they would be askinp; the union
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to act unlawfully under the Government I s anti -union legislation.
The "softs" on the GC wanted the directive to read that the EETPU
should "inform" their members they were engaged in printers' work.
The "hards" wanted the EETPU to tell their members at Wapping to
"refrain" from undertaking work usually done by printers. To
"inform" or tell them to "refrain", that was the question.
Eventually the "softs" narrowly won the vot e by 15 to 14. (26) Six
directi ves were finally agreed upon by the General Council. The
EETPU were directed:
1 NDt to faci li tate further in recruitment of
staff for News International.
2 Not to recruit into membership of the EETPU
any persons employed by News InternatiDnal.
3 To inform their members at the Wapping and
Glasgow sites of News International that EETPU
members are engaged on work that is normally
done by members of Dther print uniDns.
4 Not to enter into any agreement nor to
continue any non-cont.r-ac.t.ue I arrangement with
News International with out the agreement of
the print unions Dr the TUC
5 NDt to enter into any unilateral
negotiations with News InternatiDnal ...
6 Not tD enter into a sDle negDtiating
agreement, un i on membership agreement or any
other f or-m of agreement in any circumstances
except as provided for by the TUC. (27)
On 11 February the Executive CDuncil Df the EETPU decided to accept
the TUC's 6 directives and so, Dnce again, aVDided suspensiDn from
the TUC.
Victory Dr defeat for the EETPU?
Both left and right on the TUC General Counc i 1 agreed that the
EETPU had cDlluded with News InternatiDnal and supplied EETPU
members tD dD wDrk preViously done by print workers. The acceptance
by the EETPU of the TUe direct i ves seemed to put an end to the
matter, but what had changed? For the only directive that could
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have challenged the union's role at Wapping would have been one
that forced them to instruct their members not to engage in work
previously done by printers. Certainly, the TUC directives hampered
any future plans that the EETPU might have for the plant, but they
did not do anything to stop EETPU members from continuing to work
at Wapping and Glasgow. They were, as Peter Paterson wrote in the
Spectator, "footling directions" that "Mr Hammond would find no
difficulty in complying with". Paterson went on to give his
analysis of the February GC meeting:
"So what happened at the trial of Mr Hammond
was not so much a lack of will on the part of
the TUC as a telling example of how life has
changed for the trade union movement. The
reasons are many: the TUC is hard up and could
scarcely afford to lose the contributions of
the EETPUi it feared that suspension might
provoke :Mr Hammond into establishing a rival
trade union organisation, using the
Hottinghamshire miners, rebellious railwaymen,
a sprinkling of no-strike teacher unions and
other components of an alternative movement
which has been developing in recent years:
allies of the electricians from within the
TUC's ranks, most notably the engineers, might
also have joined them out of anti -Left
solidari t y ; and the calculation was made that
an electricians' union on the loose might win
more members than it lost.
Overriding any such considerations, however,
was fear of the law. No one was certain that,
if put to the test, the TUC's constitution
could withstand the scrutiny of the courts. And
Eric Hammond made it abundantly clear to his
judges that were they to opt for suspension he
would have no hesitation in mounting a legal
challenge at once. So, in the end, the fate of
the EETPU was not decided in the time honoured
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the EETPU felt scolded can be gauged from Hammond's
the February GC meeting in the April edition ofon
way by a bunch of union leaders..... but on what
their legal advisors told them to do." (28)
Paterson was essentially correct in his assessment of the
reasons why the TUC did not prosecute the EETPU with any great
vigour. As he points out, this was in stark contrast to 1971 when
the TUC suspended and then expelled more than 20 unions for
registering under the Industrial Relations Act. Now obedience to
the law was the major concern of the TUC. For, as we have seen, in
the course of 1986 the TUC were preparing to drop their formal
opposi tion to the Tory anti -union legislation: they had already
dropped any action against the EETPU for accepting Government money
for ballots in December 1985; in March a special conference was
held which jettisoned the Wembley principles; and in July the new
position was codified in a joint TUC/LabourParty document - People
at work: new rights, new responsibilities. At the 1986 TUC this
"new realist" stance was endorsed by Congress and eventually ended
up in the Labour Party manifesto of June 1987. In these
circumstances, the TUC was hardly likely to pressurize the EETPU
into breaking the law by instructing its members not to carry out
printers' work. The "footling directions" were designed to scold
the EETPU, not to seriously challenge its role in the Wapping
affair.
How far
comments
Contact:
"I totally rej ected the contention that we
colluded with News International and were
therefore responsible for the unemployment of
Fleet Street workers. I said the immediate
responsibility for that lay with the bad
judgement and incompetent leadership of SOGAT
and the NGA ... " (29)
That the TUC had let the EETPU off lightly was felt by many trade
unionists. It seemed as if the EETPU were the victors, not the
print unions. This unease surfaced at the 1986 TUC Congress.
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The 1986 TUC CQngress
On 28 August the GC Qf the TUC vQted by 30 votes to 12 to ask the
NGA to withdraw its motiQn on the News International dispute, and
if the NGA refused to withdraw, then the General Counc i I wou l d
oppose the motion. The NGA mot t on rej ected the GC's decision in
February, on a 15-14 vote, not to issue a directive to the EETPU
requiring them to "inform their members to refrain from undertaking
work normally done by members of other print unions". (30) Again,
as in February, the main stumbling block to TUC support for the NGA
motion was the fear of an injunction - as an NGA briefing paper to
the delegates pointed out:
"The incredible point is, that the injunction
was not one from an employer, but the threat of
one from the electricians' union. It is
disgraceful that we find ourselves in a
situation where a TUC affiliate found gUilty of
acting in a manner detrimental to the trade
union movement can use the threat of Tory
legislation to stop the TUC taking action
against them."
The NGA paper called the General Council's position contradictory,
for it had already issued an "unlawful" directive when it requested
all affiliated organizations not to cross official picket lines at
Wapping:
"Any union carrying out this directive could
equally be in conflict with the Tory
legislation." (31)
Speaking during the debate on the motion Tony Dubbins, NGA
General Secretary, modified his union IS position in the 1ight of
the talks that were then going on with News International. He said
that his union was not looking for the expulsion of the EETPU from
the TUC, but that they should be told to act as "good trade
unionists". He made it clear that he did not expect the TUC to
issue a directive to the EETPU instructing their members to stop
doi ng the jobs of other print workers, until, and if, the talks
with NI collapsed. Brenda Dean, General Secretary of SOGAT '82,
said: "Not to mince words, without the EETPU, Wapping would not
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have happened". Hammond, amid shouts of "scab" from sacked
printworkers in the public gallery, repeated his union's position -
that there was no plot and that the bad judgement of print unions
themselves was the cause of the mess at Wapping. Hammond also
claimed that the EETPU's presence at Wapping had enabled them to
get peace talks restarted, which would not have happened if his
members had been out on strike. Norman Willis, arguing against the
motion, admitted that the EETPU had acted wrongly:
"There were things that went on there that I
regard as unacceptable and the movement would
regard as unacceptable. I could see how some of
these things arose out of bad practice, and I
fear also arose out of bad people, but how do
you build on that?" (32)
Nevertheless, he didn't believe the debate would help the
negotiations that were then taking place with NI, and he urged the
delegates not to press the motion.
To the surprise of many, the NGA motion was carried by
5,823,000 votes to 3,132,000. But as Peter Kellner reported in the
New St.s t eemeu.
"After the debate Willis made it clear to
anyone who would listen that he does not intend
to do anything as a result of Monday's vote. If
there is to be an early end to the dispute, it
will be as a result of the negotiations that
restarted last week. The TUC debate was
irrelevant: the best that can be said is that
it did no harm." (33)
Negotiations between the unions and HI did not lead to a
settlement of the dispute. The question now was, what action would
the TUC take against the EETPU? Congress had censured the General
Council for not issuing a firm directive in February, as the
"hards" at the meeting had pressed for, that would require the
EETPU to "inform their members to refrain" from doing work normally
done by printworkers. In plain Engl ish, this was interpreted to
mean that, prOViding the talks broke down, the GC would review its
February decision and instruct the EETPU to tell its members at
Wapping and Glasgow to cease work. However, Willis argued that
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decisions made by the GC under disciplinary procedures could not be
re-opened. So the print unions next step was to try and get the
case re-opened.
Their case was bolstered considerably at the end of October by
the publication of The End of The Street. Melvern's book totally
discredited the position the EETPU leadership had been holding till
then, namely, that there had been no collusion at a national level
between the union and News International. On 20 November the
Guardian printed further evidence unearthed by Melvern that showed
how Hammond himself had full knowledge of and was involved in
Murdoch's plans for Wapping. Melvern had obtained the minutes of a
phone call from Murdoch to Pole-Carew, the overseer of the Wapping
operation, dated 31 May 1985:
"According to the minute 'KRM' (Mr Murdoch's
initials) 'telephoned to say that he had spoken
to EH and all was satisfactory. EH was
thoroughly prepared to go ahead and also
accepted that should there be an emergency need
to start without the London Post, this would be
acceptable to him, even though he would prefer
not to do it, given the choice'.
Two independent management sources have
confirmed the existence of the minute and that
the initials EH do refer to Eric Hammond...
Mr Hammond refused yesterday to make any
comment on the minute. The union said that it
would reserve its response to any questions
raised at the TUC." (34)
Armed with this fresh evidence, the print unions intended to
challenge Willis's position at a meeting of the GC on 26 November.
At the meeting the print unions argued that the General
Council was bound by the decision of Congress to re-open the case
against the EETPU, especially as subsequent events had proved that
they had originally been tried on the basis of false evidence.
Willis was unmoved:
"No one can be tried, found guilty, punished,
and have directions given to them, and then be
tried again and given something extra. That's
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true whether you are running a club or the Old
Bailey"
Did the new evidence that Mel vern had uncovered not alter the
situation? Willis strongly criticized the EETPU, saying that if the
allegations against the union were accurate
"then I should regard the EETPU's conduct as
despicable and contrary to just about every
trade union principle I have ever believed in."
(35)
He was not, however, prepared to change his position, insisting
that the Congress did not have the power to re-open proceedings of
this nature.
Hammond told the meeting that the union had acted within the
letter and the spirit of the directions issued in February. He
accepted, however, that Rice had indeed travelled to the USA in
April 1985 with Pole-Carew of NI, as Melvern's book had revealed.
But he said that Rice's assertion at the February meeting that
neither he nor the union had had any connection with Pole-Carew was
taken out of context. In short, the union still categorically
denied that they had given the go-ahead for HI to print its titles
at Wapping using EETPU members. What about the phone memo which
showed that Hammond had given Murdoch the go-ahead to print his
newspapers at Wapping? Hammond gave no alternative explanation of
this memo.
After a five-hour meeting, the General Council decided by 23
votes to 21 not to proceed with disciplinary action against the
EETPU. As far as the TUC were concerned, the case against the
Electricians' union was now permanently closed. The wishes of
Congress, and the mounting evidence of EETPU collusion with News
International, were brushed aside. Why? Because, as a Guardian
editorial rightly stated, the General Council and its hapless
General Secretary never wanted to try the EETPU anyway:
"The EETPU is much too large an affiliate and
its harshly effec'ti ve leader much too key a
player within the corridors of non-power at
Congress House for it and him to be dealt with
peremptorily, nay expelled. ',' What purpose would
it serve the entire move.me n t if the General
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Council presided over a split in the national
centre? What a pre-election gift to set before
Queen Maggie! It may be fudge and mudge,
brothers, ... but at least it keeps the show on
the road in the hope of better climes." (36)
Far wider considerations than the livelihoods of 5000 printers were
pressing on the General Council when they made their decision - the
future of the movement and the forthcoming General Election.
Nevertheless, the Wapping dispute continued, and around
Christmas time yet another memo from Pole-Carew appeared like
Marley's ghost to haunt Hammond and the General Council. This one,
dated 19 August 1985, was addressed to John Cowley, News
International's production director at Wapping. It discussed in
detail pay rates for the new labour force recruited through the
EETPU. It also stated that if employees at Wapping were not
encouraged to join the EETPU other production unions "would then be
able to challenge the EETPU's position regarding sole bargaining
rights. That would not be at all clever". (37) Once again, further
proof of the EETPU's detailed involvement with NI had been
uncovered, but there was only a deafening silence from the TUC.
Endgame
The dispute was finally called off in February 1987, not by the
striking printers who were prepared to continue, and who were not
consulted at all about the ending of the strike, but by the
leadership of the NGA and SOGAT who considered that any further
legal action taken against them would destroy them. Throughout the
dispute every newspaper employer took advantage of the print
unions' dilemma to introduce new technology and get rid of "surplus
labour". Over the previous 18 months there had been some 10,000
redundancies in the print industry, the vast maj ori ty of them in
that supposed bastion of trade union strength and power, Fleet
Street. Undoubtedly, the Wapping dispute broke the power of the
Fleet Street unions. The irony is, that power was never fully
utilised in the course of the dispute, not only to stop Murdoch in
his tracks, but to stop the negotiating away of thousands of jobs
by Dean and Dubbins. During the course of the dispute itself, for
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example, the print unions agreed to 2,500 redundancies at the Daily
Express, and 1000 jobs were negotiated away at the Daily Telegraph.
(38 )
Al though the strike was over, the dispute between the EETPU
and the print unions and so, reluctantly the TUC, was not. In
August 1987, the chairman of the Salaried Staff Council (SSC) which
represents 1200 production workers at Wapping, Stephen Seaman,
resi gned from the company, accusi ng management of "reneging on
virtually all the undertakings made to the workforce", and of
having a "Ned Kelly attitude to the workforce". In his letter of
resignation Seaman said:
"Industrial relations have become progressively
Victorian and those promoted to positions of
responsibility, increasingly primitive." (39)
Elsewhere he says this of the EETPU:
" I've learnt that the EETPU puts its PR image
and its commercial success ahead of the
interest of its members and the loyalty of its
local staff. They wanted Wapping to get them
into a new industry and also to give them an
input into the docklands. They're much more
interested in making themselves attractive to
employers than to employees." (40)
Ironically, Seaman's mother was none other than Vivian Seaman,
secretary to Mike Scanlon, the Southampton Area Secretary of the
EETPU who played such an prominent role in recruiting workers for
the Wapping plant. And thanks to his mother's influence Stephen
Seaman played a major role in recruiting electricians for the
Wapping plant in 1985. Of that recruitment he said:
"The Southampton office of the union was not
acting on its own volition and the directive to
start recruitment for a new 24 hour London
newspaper at Wapping came by a telephone call
from Mr Rice, the national officer for
newspapers. At no time were people being hired
solely for commissioning purposes, as Mr Rice
claimed in public. II (41)
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On top of all this, on the eve of the 1987 TUC Congress, the
Guardian obtained documents that appeared to show
"that Mr Tom Rice ... has, in the words of the
in-house leaders of the Wapping workforce, been
'in constant contact with management', in
apparent defiance of the TUC instruction issued
last year.
The documents indicate that national EETPU
officials have had frequent meetings with
management and staff representatives, have
started a check-off system for payment of union
subscriptions, have prepared the production
workers' wage claim, have drawn up a draft
recogni tion agreement between the company and
the EETPU's white collar section... (42)
This was in direct contravention of the directive that the TUC
issued in February 1986, which instructed the EETPU "not to enter
into any agreement nor to continue any non-contractual arrangement
wi th News International". What would the TUC do now that its own
directives had been defied by the EETPU?
At the beginning of August 1987 the TUC's five-member F&GPC
ruled out of order a motion submitted by SOGAT for discussion at
the September TUC Congress. The SOGAT motion sought to coromi t the
EETPU to hand over to the print unions any members it still had in
the Wapping plant not working in electrical areas. The F&GPC argued
that Congress did not have the power to determine membership
disputes. To the relief of the TUC leadership then, the agenda for
the 1987 Congress contained no motions referring to the News
International dispute. But the eve of Congress revelations in the
Guardian, and the setting up by the EETPU of a three-man
investigative committee to examine the allegations, ensured that
during the session on the General Council's annual report the
Wapping dispute would be centre stage. And indeed it was. The TUC
GC were censured for the second consecutive year for their handling
at the HI dispute &s delegates voted overwhelmingly to "reter back"
(in effect reject) the GC's account of the dispute. Willis, after
warning Congress that the print leaders' offensive against the
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EETPU was heading the TUC into a "legal and constitutional morass",
and reiterating his position that the EETPU could not be tried
twice for the same offence, nevertheless warned that the GC "will
have to do what they have to do if there is any flouting of their
directions. Let no one, no individual and no union be in any doubt
about that." (43) What this meant in practice was that the whole
controversy surrounding the EETPU that the GC had thought closed in
November 1986 when they voted not to proceed with disciplinary
action against the union was now wide open again.
The dust had hardly settled on the storm that the Guardian
allegations had caused at the Congress when a new problem faced the
EETPU leadership. Late in September a ballot of the Wapping
workforce showed only 140 in favour of representation by the EETPU,
compared with 239 in favour of self-representation through the
Salaried Staff Council, and 321 in favour of another trade union
representing them. The SSC then approached the TUC asking them for
assistance in unionising or re-unionising the Wapping plant. This
was a bitter irony, for the whole reason for the EETPU's Wapping
intervention was to recruit new members and gain recognition in
areas of industry where it was weak.
Not long after this setback came yet another controversy, this
time to do with the EETPU's internal inquiry into the Guardian
allegations that the union had broken TUC directives on Wapping. In
November the three-man inquiry team headed by Paul Gallagher, the
union's President, cleared the union over charges that it had
broken the TUC directives on Wapping. However, the report did
acknowledge that there were a number of "errors of judgement" on
the uni on's part, errors of judgement commi t ted by Tom Rice, who
had been the union's national officer in charge of the Wapping
operation, but who had taken early retirement just as the report
was released. The report admitted that, amongst other things, Rice
had, in contravention of TUC directives, carried on recruitment at
Wapping, drawn up a draft recognition agreement between the union
and company, and through the sse started a check-off system for the
payment of union dues. In a letter to Willis, Hammond admits that
"we did act in a way that could be interpreted as outside the
spiri t of the directi ves". He goes on to give reassurances that
there would be no further breaches of the directives, "technical"
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or otherwise. (44) So it was an admission of sorts that the union
had breached the directives, and Rice had been ritually sacrificed
to show the TUC that they took the matter seriously, and that, as
far as the EETPU and Willis were concerned, was the end of the
matter, once more.
The General Council, however, were not prepared to accept
Hammond's undertakings, nor were they prepared to accept Willis's
recommendation that no further action should be taken against the
EETPU. Dubbins doubted the impartiality of the EETPU's internal
inquiry and called for a full TUC inquiry into the EETPU's
acti vi ties at Wapping. That didn't happen, instead the EETPU were
called before the TUC's "inner cabinet" on 14 December to answer a
number of key points on why the union had not followed the TUC's
directives. From this meeting another meeting was arranged for the
30 January 1988, where the EETPU would be faced with some 300
questions concerning their acti vi ties at Wapping. Eventually, in
March, the TUC proposed that the EETPU be suspended for three
months, but even this proposed action was postponed when the EETPU
threatened legal action if the suspension went ahead. At the end of
April the TUC finally decided on a course of action: by 27 votes to
15 the GC decided to issue a "strong censure" against the EETPU.
But by this time, the debacle over the proposed Ford plant at
Dundee and the whole controversy over single-union "strike-free"
agreements that was to emerge again in June, had raised once more
the spectre of the EETPU either being expelled or splitting from
the TUC. Consequently, the Wapping episode now seems to have come
to an unsatisfactory end.
Internal opposition
The union's involvement in recruitment for Wapping served to
revitalise some of the stronger pockets of organised internal
opposition within the EETPU, as well as generating a wave of
disgust among many non-committed rank-and-file members. After the
union was found gUilty on five of the seven charges levelled
against it at the TUe meeting of 5 February 1986, the Southampton
branch of the union held a meeting attended by a 150-200
electricians, printworkers and other trade unionists:
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"As the meeting progressed and the speakers
provided detailed information about the secret
operation, the mood changed from curiosity to
one of anger and frustration. ' It was
vitriolic' said one member. 'I've never been so
ashamed of my own union I said another EETPU
member afterwards." (45)
But the branch came up against the minefield of the union rule book
when it sought to express its protest in the wider labour movement.
On 4 December they passed a resolution for the local Trades
Council: "This branch of the EETPU disassociates itself from the
workforce employed by the Wapping press." However, at the next
branch meeting, on 19 December, full-time secretary Bill Luffman
said he had been instructed by the Executive Council not to send
the motion to the Trades Council because it was about an "internal
proble~l. The other branch in the Southampton area, Hythe, had by
February 1986 written twice to the EC asking for details of the
Wapping recruitment. They received no reply.
Branch condemnation of the leadership's role at Wapping was
fairly widespread in the union. For example, Manchester central
branch passed a resolution condemning the Executive Council on 27
January 1986 and calling on EETPU members to withdraw from Wapping.
In the same week the York branch passed a resolution calling on the
Executive to "redress the shame placed on our union and commit the
union once more to the basic trade union principles of solidarity
wi th other workers". (46) The EETPU' s largest branch in Scotland -
the 4000 strong Glasgow branch - also passed a resolution in
January alleging a conspiracy between the national leadership and
News International, and reminding the Executive not to take their
loyal ty for granted. (47)
Glasgow's warning was echoed and expanded on by John Aitkin,
leader of the Broad Left within the union in February 1986:
"If suspension goes ahead there is only one
avenue available to us, and that is to look for
support from the TUC for a nationally
recognised parallel organisation.
If we are not careful we could see a
fragmentation, with members of the uni on in
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different industries diving into whatever union
suits them best." (48)
Aitken's proposal was, frankly, nonsense. There was very little
support in the union for a breakaway or "parallel organization",
and a few weeks later, when Flashlight held a conference to discuss
the February TUC directives, the idea had already been well and
truly shelved. The proposal totally overestimated the strength of
internal opposition to the leadership. What Aitken's suggestion
did reflect, however, was that recurring desire of the Fleet Street
electricians, of which he was one, as well as many other militants
in the union, to break away from the right-wing leadership of the
union as they had attempted to do in 1983 during the Fleet Street
electricians' dispute. Now, in 1988, as the EETPU faces almost
certain expulsion from the TUC in September, the formation of a
breakaway union to be called the Electrical and Plumbing Industries
Union looks like going ahead. But as we have argued here and in a
previous chapter, such a breakaway would be a grave mistake on the
part of the Broad Left leadership.
Opposition to the leadership's Wapping policy was qUite
widespread in the union then, but it was by no means as extensive
as many of the activists thought. Barely a year after the TUC found
the union gUilty of actions detrimental to the trade union
movement, Hammond was re-elected as General Secretary of the union
by an increased majority over Aitken, and at the union's 1987 BDC
the leadership's actions at Wapping were supported, although, as
Flashlight reported, "not with the overwhelming support that he
[Hammond] and his Executive would have liked." (49) So we are faced
with a contradiction: the endorsement of undemocratic practices by
democratic means. For by any measure of trade union democracy the
EETPU's role in the Wapping affair was profoundly undemocratic. Not
only were the machinations of the leadership with News
International unknown to the membership of the union, but when they
did become public knowledge the Executive Council repeatedly denied
their involvement. Nor at the height of the furore did the union
that prides itself on its ballot democracy attempt in any way
whatsoever to consult its members about the course of action it
should take over the issue. In short, the membership of the union
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had no say at all in the course of action that its EC had embarked
upon.
Inside the Wapping plant not only had the union allowed the
management a free hand in maintaining a harsh industrial regime, as
the revelations of Stephen Seaman testified to, but the elementary
basis of any union democracy - a two-way relationship between the
rank-and-file and their officials - was practically ignored by the
EETPU. As Seaman reported, the EETPU members in the plant did not
feel adequately represented:
"Tom Rice's favourite phrase when you brought
him a complaint was 'You can tell the guys that
but for the union, they would not have a job'."
(50 )
In the end, though, the "guys" wanted a job but they didn't want
the EETPU as their union.
The EETPU's collusion with NI is undoubtedly further
confirmation that union leaders, as Michels argued, proceed with
policies regardless of the wishes of the membership. In this
instance the EETPU leaders had their actions retrospectively
endorsed by the 1987 BDC. Even if this had not been the case, the
BDC decisions are not binding, so the leadership could, as it has
done on previous occasions, have ignored it. But, as we have seen,
the Wapping debacle was more trouble than it was worth for the EC.
The constant opposition to its actions from the print unions, the
internal opposition, the GC of the TUC (despite its lacklustre
approach), and finally the EETPU members at the plant itself, all
contrived to prevent the EETPU leaders from doing exactly as they
wished. Union leaders are, therefore, not free to proceed with
policies unhindered, as their oligarchical pretensions are always
held in check by a variety of opposing currents. We would argue
then that the EETPU's role in the Wapping affair was a rather
complicated and messy example of the relationship that exists
between oligarchic and democratic tendencies in trade unions.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
SINGLE UNION STRIKE FREE AGREEMENTS
In July 1988 the EETPU was suspended from the TUC for its refusal
to withdraw from two single-union "strike-free" deals at Orion
Electronics and Christian Salveson. That same month the result of
an EETPU ballot overwhelmingly endorsed the leadership's defiance
of the TUC disputes committee ruling on the two "strike-free" deals
by 128,400 votes to 25,860 on a 43% turnout. The ballot paper
proposed that the union should stay affiliated to the TUC,
"providing... affiliation does not prevent the union entering into
agreements consistent with the rules and pol icy of the union". So
the EC successfully tied the whole question of their industrial
strategy with that of internal democracy. They argued that the TUC
had no right to interfere with the democratically arrived at policy
decisions of the union. However, other trade unions have argued
that the EETPU have completely ignored the democratic wishes of the
maj ori ty of workers at some of the plants where they have signed
"no-strike" deals. A further aspect of democracy that is raised by
the union's "strike-free" deals is that of industrial democracy.
From being an opponent of workers' participation in the 1960s and
1970s, the union now seems to be a firm advocate of it, as a
central component of the "strike-free" package is workers'
participation. These and other aspects of democracy will be
considered in the following examination of the union IS" strike-
free" agreements.
At the last three TUC Congresses the clashes between the EETPU and
its opponents have dominated the week's affairs. In 1985 the clash
was over ballot money, in 1986 over the union's role at 'Wapping,
and in 1987 over single-unionism and "strike-free" deals (and no
doubt at the 1988 TUC the EETPU's expulsion will dominate the
proceedings). The clash of 1987 arose from the same set of problems
that served to fuel the previous ones - a decline in members and
power due to unemployment, a hosti Le Government, and the changi ng
structure of the economy, and attempts by the unions to adopt
"popular" strategies which would enable them both to recrui t new
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members while staying loyal to the basic collective principles of
trade unionism. Much to the disgust of many other unions the EETPU
is all for "popular" strategies and membership recruitment, but it
does not share what it would see as the "conservative" principles
of the mainstream trade unions. The problem that causes for the
other unions is that the EETPU, uninhibited as it is by
"conservative" principles, is, it appears, able to expand and
recrui t in ways that are denied to them. The "no-strike" deals
being the prime example. Unfortunately for the other trade unions,
if they are to compete in the same market with the EETPU they will
either have to adopt, in part at least, some of the EETPU's
"radical" principles, or go all out to prevent the EETPU from
pursuing its course of action.
Beyond all the rhetoric, the EETPU seems to be pulling the
other unions in its direction and not the other way round. We have
seen that happen over "ballot democracy", and the EETPU claims that
it is the case in other areas such as "strike free" deals and
single union agreements. At the union's 1987 BDC, Hammond said that
the success of the EETPU's single-union deals had led to a
"unwholesome hypocrisy" on the part of some other unions such as
the T&GWU and GMB who had themselves signed such deals (the T&G had
signed 76, and GMB 25, single union deals, according to Hammond).
Of course, these unions would reply, quite rightly, that single-
union deals are a far cry from "strike-free" deals, and that
Hammond was deliberately conflating the two. Nonetheless, if we
examine the union's "strike-free" deals the distance separating the
EETPU from its rivals in practice is not as great as might be
expected.
The EETPU's single-union. strike-free agreements
To date (July 1988) the EETPU has signed 26 single-union, "strike-
free" agreements (with 10 more in the pipeline) covering less than
5000 workers (so they far from compensate for the 84,000 members
that the union has lost since 1980), They form a minute part of the
union's overall operations which cover some 336,115 members, and an
even smaller part of the traditional collective bargaining system
that still dominates in British industry, Why all the fuss then?
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The heat generated over these deals is largely to do with how they
are negotiated and in particular with one component of them - the
so called "no-strike" provisions. While it is understandable that
such provisions should cause such a furore in the trade union
movement, the focus on the "no strike" clauses of the agreements
distracts attention from the nature of the overall package that the
EETPU has accepted, and, more importantly, the fact that many of
the primary features of these packages are ones that are actively
sought or accepted by other trade unions. Hammond, aware of this,
is quick to defend the package and down-play the "no-strike"
component:
"Vie insist on package deals in which employer
and employee achieve a balanced trade-off of
mutual benefit. Vie emphasise single-status
conditions, providing monthly salaries, parity
of working hours, holidays, pensions and other
benefits, for technical, administrative and
production workers alike. Vie ensure that
valuable training and retraining schemes are
linked to job flexibility. Vie gain from elected
consultative bodies with access to the sort of
company information which is still a closely-
guarded secret in much of British industry.
Our critics ignore all this. They concentrate
on vehemently attacking the so-called 'no-
strike' element. Yet this does no more than
recognise that people go to work to earn a
decent living, not with the aim of taking
industrial action. Hence pendulum arbitration
is a favoured method with which we achieve
peaceful settlements if normal negotiations
break down. An independent arbitrator decides
in favour of the company offer or work-force
claim. He cannot split the difference in the
tradi ti anal inflationary way. The result binds
both employer and employees.
The right to strike has been put aside, not
abolished ... " \l)
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Here Hammond identifies the four principal elements that make
up the package - single-status, flexibility, participation and the
pendulum arbitration/no-strike provision if we add to these
single unionism we have all the maj or ingredients of the package
deals. We will deal with these 5 principal elements separately,
although it must be remembered that these are package deals, so all
the separate elements are interdependent. As the Sanyo agreement
that the EETPU signed in 1982 puts it: "individual provisions
cannot be acted upon without consideration of all other relevant
provisions in the agreement." (2) Given this proviso, dealing with
the elements separately will, hopefully, help us to understand more
clearly not just the actual workings of the deals themselves, but
also the general line of march of the EETPU's industrial strategy
and the implications this has for industrial relations in general,
and the union's conception of industrial and internal democracy in
particular.
(1) Single-status
Single-status is the least controversial of the components that
make up the "strike-free" packages, although it is the most highly
prized by the EETPU. Roy Sanderson, the primary architect of the
deals, argues that this particular feature of the agreements helps
to create an "egalitarian factory, with everyone from the managing
director to the janitor enjoying the same conditions of
employment." (3) Typically this involves all employees - t nc l udf.ng
management addressing each other on a first name basis, all
employees sharing the same restaurant (not canteen), all employees
wearing the same uniform and so on. }(ore substantially, it means
that "white" and "blue" collar workers, as well as management,
often share the same holiday entitlements, sickness benefits and
access to, for example, private medical insurance
(2) Single-unionism
That multi-unionism is the norm in British industry today is not
surprising. For at the turn of the century there were 1,049
separate trade unions in Britain. This figure only very slowly
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declined so that by the end of the Second World War there were
still 781 unions. Today there are 375 unions, of which 87 are
affiliated to the TUC. Nevertheless, although estimates vary, a
little over 50% of unionised British industry recognises only one
union for its manual workers, though there is no evidence on the
extent of pure single unionism, where only one union represents all
employees, whether manual or non-manual. (4) So single-unionism as
such is nothing new, and that is not what the ongoing row between
the EETPU and the TUC is all about. It is about the so-called
"greenfield" sites where new areas of employment are unionised for
the first time, or where in existing multi-union plants one union
gains recognition. The question at the centre of the row then, is
which union has the "right" to organise these new sites, and which
union should be accorded sole negotiating rights in a plant where
more than one union already operates? Up until December 1985 the
Bridlington principles that govern inter-union relations simply
said that unions should "have regard to the interests of other
unions which may be affected" when a single-union deal is signed.
This was amended by the TUC's Employment Policy Committee at the
end of 1985 to read that no such deals should be signed "in any
circumstances" except by prior consultation and agreement with the
other unions concerned. (5) The EETPU, it is claimed, has
repeatedly flouted this ruling, and this is what all the fuss is
about.
Four recent TUC disputes committee awards requiring the EETPU
to withdraw from single-union agreements signed at Yuasa Batteries,
Thorn ENI, Orion Electrics, and Christian Salvesen would seem to
confirm the repeated claims made by other trade unions that the
EETPU is ignoring agreed TUC procedures. The Yuasa Battery company,
based in Ebbw Vale, South Wales, had recognised no union until the
EETPU signed an outline single-union, "strike-free" agreement with
the Japanese firm in November 1985. Leaders of the T&GWU in South
Wales complained that although they had the largest number of
members in the plant (it employed about 190) the EETPU were able to
undercut them by offering the company a "strike-free" package. In
its submission to the TUC the T&GWU said:
II The facts are quite stark and fundamental to
the trade uni on movement. The act ions of the
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Electricians Union in this and other trade
union disputes raised the question of how other
unions could compete with the electricians for
recognition when the union was prepared to
undercut competing unions by offering a no
strike agreement to employers.
electriciansThe
agreements
were
containing
prepared
pendulum
to sign
arbitration
before they had secured members within a plant
or a plant had opened. By such actions, the
electricians were denying indi viduals the
fundamental right to withdraw their labour. The
T&G would never enter into such an agreement
with an employer." (6)
The TUC disputes committee finally arrived at a decision in
April 1987. Under the terms of the decision, the EETPU was required
to immediately exclude from membership the Yuasa workers it had
recruited but who were previously in the T&GWU. The union was also
ordered to withdraw from its sole recognition agreement with Yuasa
and cease all formal and informal collective meetings with the
company. It was further stipulated that neither union should
approach the company for recognition for eight weeks. Once the
eight weeks were over it was hoped that both the unions would
approach the company to seek a joint agreement. Before the eight
weeks were up, however, both unions were accusing each other of
breaking the terms of the TUC's ruling. Amongst other things, the
T&GWU claimed that Hammond addressed the night shift, while the
EETPU claimed that the T&GWU were approaching the workers with pre-
written letters resigning their membership of the EETPU. The
dispute continues, and as yet neither union is recognised by Yuasa.
(7 )
In April 1987, the disputes committee upheld complaints from
the AEU and TASS that the EETPU had signed a single-union deal with
Thorn EMI in 1984 when it only had 6 members on the site, while
they represented 200 between them. The dispute arose after Elco
Plastics, a subsidiary of Thorn EMI, told the AEU and TASS that it
was to relocate to a site three miles away in High Wycombe. The
High Wycombe plant would also take in workers from a plant in
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Gosport, Hampshire, where the EETPU had a substantial number of
members. The EETPU argued that it had not broken the TUC rules as
the High Wycombe plant was a "greenfield" site, and, further, that
when its members were transferred there were no other employees on
the site so they did not need to consult other unions. So the
EETPU went ahead and signed an agreement with the company even
though in the event only 6 (the AEU say 6, the EETPU 16) of its
members had been transferred to High Wycombe from Gosport and
despite the fact that the 200 other transferred workers voted
agai nst the EETPU deal. (8)
Even before the deal was settled at Orion Electronics, Port
Tal bot, in May 1987, the T&GWU had invoked the TUC's disputes
procedure. Again the T&GWU claimed that it had won the support of
most of the workers through traditional recruitment methods, and
that in two separate stoppages <18 December 1986 and 12 January
1987), as well as in a petition signed by 79 of the 100 workers,
the majority of Orion employees had pressed the company to
recognise the T&GWU. But because the EETPU offered Orion management
a "strike-free" deal they were granted sole recognition at the
plant. It was only after management had recognised the EETPU that
the workforce agreed to accept the EETPU even though at the time
the maj ori ty were T&GWU members. It was an odd form of democracy.
The TUC disputes committee upheld the T&GWU's claim and instructed
the EETPU to terminate its deal with Orion. The EETPU has also been
instructed by the TUC to terminate an agreement it signed in 1987
wi th Christian Salvesen, a distribution company, based in
Warrington. But in both cases, as we now know, the EETPU has
refused to obey and thus faces expulsion from the TUC. And it is
not just at "greenfield" sites such as Orion that other unions are
complaining of sharp practice from the electricians, the GMB was
infuriated at the EETPU's attempts in 1987 to sign a deal with
Matsushita in Newport even though the GMB has represented 600
workers at the plant for twelve years. (9 ) However, not all the
complaints against the EETPU are upheld.
For five years the Hitachi television and video manufacturing
plant in Hirwaun, South Wales, had been run as a joint venture with
GEC. There were a number of unions recognised at the plant - the
EETPU (716 members), AUEVi' (223), ASTMS (87), UCATT (87), APEX (60)
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and TASS (5). In addition, the T&GWU (0) had unofficial
"representational" rights, and there were 115 nDn-uniDn wDrkers. In
1984 GEC pulled DUt, and in the shake up that fDIIDwed Hitachi was
insistent that it wou I d cnLy recDgnise one trade una on. In April
1984, the cDmpany infDrmed the uniDns that it intended tD sign a
single-uniDn deal with the largest uniDn at the plant, the EETPU,
and that recDgnitiDn Df the Dther uniDns wDuld be withdrawn frDm 14
May. The Dther unions then made a f ormaI complaint against the
EETPU under the TUC's Br-Ld.l i ngt.on principles, while the cDmpany
delayed its withdrawal of r-ecogna t i on until 10 August. As the TUC
machinery grDund slDwly Dn, Hitachi spelled Dut what the new
agreement with the EETPU would entail: 508 redundancies, a 7% pay
increase, single status, full flexibility, a company members'
board, pendulum arbitratiDn, nD strikes and a single uniDn. This
agreement was rejected at a mass meeting Df 550 Hitachi wDkers Dn
16 June. A mDnth later, after the 500 wDrkers whD were tD be made
redundant had gDne, the EETPU held a secret ballot Df the remaining
wDrkfDrce Dn the company's agreement. The result was Dverwhelming -
87% in favDur. The uniDn and the cDmpany signed the agreement the
same day. It came intD effect Dn 8 August 1984 - and by the end of
the week the Dther uniDns were Dut.
The EETPU claimed that they had not br-oken the Br-Ldl I ng't on
princi p Les and that the onI y al ternati ve t o their "strike-free"
package was a nDn-uniDn plant. On 11 April 1985, the TUC made its
ruling knDwn tD the union concerned. The EETPU was reprimanded, but
it was no t or-der-ed t o abandon its deal with Hitachi. Instead, it
had to meet three pDints: new emplDyees at Hitachi shDuld be
advised that they might jDin a uniDn Dther than the EETPUj in the
case of grievances at the plant Lnvo l ving a member of an Dusted
uniDn, an official Df the union cDncerned shDuld be able tD take up
the issue with the company; and the EETPU shDuld establish a bDdy
which wDuld allDw Dusted unions to relay tD the company through the
EETPU their views. (0) The EETPU were naturally delighted by the
verdict. In a r-epor-t in the union's journal headed, TUC THROWS OUT
AHTI-EETPU BID, HammDnd described the result as
"a clear recognition that the complai nts
against us were ill-judged and ill fDunded. The
findings fully justify our agreement which we
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made to safeguard jobs for Hitachi employees
and to ensure that the plant neither shut nor
became non-union ... And the company's recently
announced programme of increased investment at
Hirwaun underlines that we were right both in
principle and practice." (11)
Hammond and other senior officials of the union then made a visit
to the Hitachi plant, where he planted a flowering cherry tree to
mark the occasion.
Others were not so happy with the verdict. The ousted unions
were so disgusted with the TUC verdict that they took the
unprecedented step of appealing against the result. They argued,
unsuccessfully, that their negotiating rights had been thrown out
and that the TUC's three point recommendation to the EETPU was
impracticable. What the Hitachi deal did set in motion, however,
were moves to tighten up the TUC rules governing single union
deals, moves which were taken in the wake of the 1985 TUC, and
which are still in the process of being taken under the rubric of
the Special Review Body launched at the 1987 TUC.
But what of Hammond's claim that the success of the EETPU's
single-union deals has led to a "unwholesome hypocrisy" on the part
of unions such as the T&GWU and the GMB who themselves have signed
such deals. As we have said a single-union deal is not the same as
a "strike-free" deal". The question is, have other unions, like the
EETPU, signed single-union deals at the expense of the negotiating
rights of other unions? There is very little evidence that this is
the case. As far as the EETPU is concerned, we are aware of only
one recent case where the union was deprived of its negotiating
rights. In cases brought against TSSA (the white collar rail way
union) the TUC disputes committee found that the union's rights had
been infringed by TSSA when it signed a single-union deal with
Bri tish Rail and London Regional Transport. (12) A case that was
often cited by the EETPU is that of Norsk Hydro. The EETPU claimed
in 1985 that the T&GWU had depri ved it of recogni tion when they
signed a single-union deal wi th Norsk Hydro, the Norwegian based
multi-national, at Immingham on Humberside. On the surface it
looked 1ike the EETPU had a case. bu tin real i t Y the deal was far
more complex than the union was making out. The deal was rejected
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by all the main unions on the site - AUEW, EETPU, ASTMS and the
T&GWU - but was accepted by the workforce who individually agreed
to changes in their contracts of employment. The T&GWU has still
not officially signed the agreement, although the agreement is in
operation. (13) Hammond's claim is without much substance then.
(3) Fl exi bil ity
It has been argued that the most concerted attack on shopfloor
organization since the productiVity offensive of the 1960s has come
from the widespread introduction of flexibility. This, in John
Atkinson's model, takes two major forms: numerical fleXibility -
the splitting of the working class into a "core" of skilled
permanent workers and a "periphery" of less skilled, part-time
workers; and functional flexi bi 1ty - the reorganization of the
workforce within a particular workplace. (14)
An indication of how far reaching the flexibility offensive by
the employers has been can be gauged from a recent eBl analysis of
9000 pay settlements between 1979 and 1986. They report that 65% of
bargained deals in unionised companies showed changes in working
practices and 42% of non-bargained, non-union deals. But the survey
also showed that industrial action was much more prevalent - almost
twice as likely - in settlements which involved changes in working
practices. So changes in working practices are not just costing the
employers money - the eBl survey reports that the level of pay
settlements in those companies which featured "improvements" in
working practices were consistently higher over the period than
those which did not - they are also being resisted by shop-floor
workers. (5) Moreover, a recent study carried out by the lnsti tute
of Manpower Studies into changing working patterns in 72 large
firms since 1980, noted that most respondents in manufacturing
"were doubtful if there had been a permanent
shift in attitude on the part of their
employees and thought that if there was a
substantial reduction in the current level of
unemployment or if there were a shift back in
the bargaining power towards trade unions, they
would have difficulty in maintaining the
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changes they had achieved over recent years."
(16)
Even though trade unions are increasingly negotiating some form of
flexible agreement with the employers, then, there is a significant
resistance to these changes amongst rank-and-file workers (the
Scottish Bus workers' strike of 1987, amd the 1988 Ford Strike are
two recent examples), a resistance, as the 11(8 study indicates,
that is likely to qUickly gain momentum if there is a shift in the
balance of power in favour of the unions.
Flexibility is not only widespread, it has been negotiated by
many of the same trade unions that have consistently denounced the
EETPU's "no-strike" deals, central to which is flexibility:
"The no-strike deals are a red herring... What
employers want, and what they are getting, is
the right to introduce infinite in-plant
flexibility .... flexibility agreements are vital
for the next generation of plants, not
necessarily this one. These future systems will
employ considerably fewer people with
considerably greater skillsj unions would be
well advised to keep this firmly in mind before
jumping at an apparently harmless deal." (7)
Barrie Sherman is right. Flexibility is the key way in which the
British employing class hope to increase productivity. Of course,
whether flexibility has increased overall productivity is
questionable. (8) What is certain though, is that there has been
a sharp shift in recent years towards formalised flexible
agreements, and although they vary in detail they all contain the
following broad features:
(1) A break down of demarcations between
different groups of skilled workers.
(2) A change in sectional organisation.
(3) Extension of shiftworking.
(4) Greater management control of overtime.
(5) Use of subcontractors/or temporary workers.
(6) Long-term pay deals.
Management's attempts to introduce flexible working based on
such formal ised agreements is nowhere better illustrated than in
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the "strike-free" agreements that the EETPU has signed with a
number of companies:
Sanyo:
"All employees are expected to work in any job
which they are capable of doing. In-plant
training is provided, and job rotation is
practiced throughout the company. There are no
job descriptions, and all production,
inspection and most clerical staff are paid the
same job salary."
Inmos:
Unions and management agree to "respond
flexibly and quickly to changes in the pattern
of demand for the company's products and to
technological innovation."
Toshiba:
"In reaching this agreement the trade union
recognises and supports the complete
flexibility of jobs and duties within the
company, both wi thin departments and between
the various departments of the company, subject
to individual skills and capabilities. In
return the company recognises and accepts the
need for training and retraining in the
broadening of skills and in new technological
developments as they affect the company's
efficiency as a manufacturing operation."
A B Electronics:
"The maximum co-operation and support from all
employees in achieving a completely flexi ble t
well-motivated workforce, capable of
transferring on a temporary or permanent basis
on to work of any nature, that is wi thin the
capabilities of such employees, having due
regard to the provisions of adequate training
and safety arrangements" (19)
One of the EETPU's sternest critics, the GMB, has also signed
a far reaching deal which involved dramatic changes in established
344
working practices. The GMB was the major signatory (the other
unions were the EETPU, AEU, and UCATT> to the three year "enabling
agreement" negotiated with Nabisco in Liverpool in July 1985. On
flexibility the agreement is as radical as any of the EETPU's "no-
strike" agreements. The Incomes Data Services report on the deal
says that Nabisco now have "the freedom to plan ahead with the
maximum flexi bili ty on the balance of the future workforce and on
production methods." And in March 1988, the GMB along with the AEU
signed a three-year pay and fleXibility agreement with the
engineering company Albright and Wilson which will eliminate
traditional demarcation lines between unions and trades. (20)
Flexibility has also been at the heart of a number of single-union
deals negotiated by the left-Wing T&GWU in recent years. For
example, at Continental Can, Wrexham, and at two Kimberly Clark
plants in North Wales. (21) And in the public sector the left-led
unions signed a flexible agreement covering 1 million manual
workers early in 1987. (22) Generally speaking then, unions are not
opposed to fleXibility, but they are opposed to the forced
introduction of new working practices (the General Motors and
Ford's disputes of 1987 and 1988, and the Seafarers' strike of 1988
are examples of this). So the key component, as far as management
are concerned, of the EETPU's "strike-free" deals - flexi bili ty -
is one that is accepted to a greater or lesser extent by all trade
unions.
(4) Participation
The Bullock Report on industrial democracy was published in 1977.
Its central concern was how worker representatives could establish
themsel ves on company boards and become "worker directors". The
Report was received with hosti 1 i ty by a very strange all iance of
forces: the CBI, the Communist Party, the International Socialists,
the left-Wing AUEW and the right-Wing EETPU, to mention but a few.
By the summer of 1977, writes John Elliott, "the Bullock Report had
only a handful of sincere commi tted advocates left." (23) But to
look at Bullock in isolation is misleading. For during the 1970s a
wide-ranging interest in industrial democracy (not just "worker
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directors"), or workers' participation as it was more commonly
known, took root in the labour and trade union movement. Many
different types of industrial democracy workers' co-ops,
alternative plans, factory occupations, shop stewards' Combines -
were identified by those involved as forms of workers'
participation, or workers' control. And as Panitch writes, vastly
different meanings were attached to these terms, "ranging in
substantive content from revolutionary to reformist to corporatist
conceptions". (24) Generally though, Elliott's broad definition of
industrial democracy as "workers (normally through their trade
unions) claiming rights to have a greater say over matters
affecting their working lives" expresses well how most workers
probably experienced and understood the idea of workers'
participation. (25)
Of course, amongst some of the more politically conscious
workers, for instance those who had come under the influence of the
Institute for Workers' Control (IWC) , workers' participation was to
be encouraged not as an end in itself but as a transitional phase
on the road to a "self-managed society of producer associations."
Real participation for the IWC was
"when workers begin to get the upper hand, and
consolidate their powers of representation,
accountability, and veto irresponsible
management prerogatives." (26)
For them the Bullock Report offered "an opportunity for a
fundamental debate on the issues of industrial democracy" and
workers' control. Such a debate took place a year after the Report
was published between IWC supporters and Arthur Scargill. Scargill
in his familiar brusque manner expressed what we might term the
left-opposition's case against Bullock and the IWC path to
Social ism:
" ... workers' control means in effect the
castration of the trade union movement, means
in effect a total collaboration as far as the
working class is concerned, and certainly in
pract i ce, wi 11 resu 1tin compromi se wi th
society as it exists." (27)
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From the employers' point of view, Bullock, the notion of
workers' participation/control, and the militancy of the trade
unions and their so-called abuse of power in the 1970s were all of
a piece. Not surprisingly then, when the Bullock Report was
published it was naturally perceived as being part and parcel of
the so-called growth in trade union power. That the American
Chamber of Commerce could hint that US investment in Britain could
suffer if the Bullock proposals were introduced only added to the
"red haze" that surrounded Bullock. (28) That the unions were in
fact either hostile or at best cool towards Bullock didn't seem to
detract from the popular conception that Bullock was the thin end
of a red wedge. The EETPU's response to Bullock was not unusual,
but the reasoning behind it was determined by their whole approach
to internal and industrial democracy.
As far back as the ETU's 1967 BDC the following motion was
moved:
"This Conference urges that the union pursue
vigorously the claim for direct representation
for all members employed in local government
and nationalised industries." (29)
The leadership of the union obviously took this motion very
seriously, for not only did Cannon lead off the debate, but the EC
also put forward a counter-motion in the form of a lengthy
statement on workers' participation:
"If workers' representatives are involved too
deeply in management and are performing the
task of management properly they will
inevitably be inhibited in their activities as
trade unionists. In other words, if they act as
managers they will no longer be acting as trade
unionists.
If on the other hand, the worker
representatives on a board of management are in
the minority their position might be even
worse. They will have no control over decision
making but due to their membership of the
decison making body could be inhibited in the
use of their counter-vaijin~ force as trade
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unionists ... This is not to say that we obj ect
to a Trade Union Official's being on a Board of
Directors. The proviso must be, however, that
he is not a representative of the workpeople in
that industry.
All this does not however, mean that trade
unionists and management should be regarded as
breeds apart. It is perfectly right and proper
that trade unionists and workers should be
invol ved in the work of the industry or the
enterprise in which they spend their working
lives and earn their livelihood. The question
at issue is the point at which 'involvement'
becomes' participation' ." (30)
What the leadership were rejecting here was, to use Pateman's
terminolgy, "fu 11 participation", where each individual member of
the decision making body has equal power to determine the outcome
of decisions. (31) They were not rej ecting "involvement", or union
officials being present on Boards of Directors, but they were
certainly rejecting any form of participation that involed rank-
and-file ETU members in the decision making bodies of companies.
The obj ections the ETU puts forward could quite easily have been
put forward by a left-wing critic of workers' participation.
Especially when the EC statement goes on to describe how there is a
"fundamental clash" of interests between workers and management,
and how solutions cannot be found "by attempting to blur the lines
of conflict." Cannon used a parliamentary analogy, arguing that
just as a strong opposition in parliament is the best check on the
abuse of power by Government and the safeguard of democracy,
likewise, strong trade unions provide a basic and vital democratic
function by checking the abuse of power by management. To get
involved in management would simply diminish the "counter-vailing
force" of trade unionism and thereby hinder the advancement of
industrial democracy. But although these points are valid, the
reasons for the ETU rejecting workers' participation run a little
deeper.
There are at least two other reasons for the ETU rejecting
workers' participation. Firstly, it is not unreasonable to assume
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that the leadership feared not so much "involvement" in management
leading to "participation", but rather "participation" leading to
demands for "workers' control" and thus to an extension of
industrial democracy. This is precisely the direction in which
people like Ken Coates, Tony Topham and Ernie Roberts of the the
IWC wished workers' participation to go. In 1968 the IWC produced a
collection of essays under the title Can the workers run industry?,
in which Coates and Topham, in their essay Participation or
Control?, made a clear distinction between the idea of workers'
participation as it was usually used, which was designed to head
off growing working class demands for control, and those who saw it
"as a step on the road to full democracy." (32) Workers' control
was aimed at establishing control "over the unfettered decisions
of the ruling party in industry, namely the employers and their
managers." (33) It was this connection that might be forged between
workers' participation and workers' control that the ETU
leadership wanted to extinguish. This scenario was highly unlikely,
but it was one, we would argue, that the leadership of the union
took seriously, and one that ran counter to their entire
philosophy. For Cannon's philosophy was very much in line with the
"ruling party in industry", which in the late 1960s was concerned
chiefly with pushing productivi ty bargaining and incomes control.
Cannon was a foremost advocate of productivi ty deals and incomes
legislation. He desired a stong market economy where efficient and
productive unions could justly demand a bigger slice of the cake.
There was no place for workers' participation in this scheme of
things.
Secondly, workers' participation, and the radical seeds that
it contained, was a diversion from the primary aim of building up
a highly centralised union; the "New Model" union that Cannon and
the leadership were then in the process of constructing. Workers'
participation was a move towards de-centralisation not
centralisation. Who would these directors be? More than likely
shop-stewards. So precisely at the time when the leadership were
attempting to rein in the activists, the idea of workers'
participation opened up the prospect of hundreds of shop-stewards
getting involved in areas of activity that were quite possibly
going to be outside the direct control of the leadership.
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Cannon and the EC won the day with their left rhetoric. So
that the union I s official position on workers' participation in
1967 was that the interests of their members could best be served
not by participation, but by improvements in the "existing
collective bargaining machinery", and by real consultation that
"involves hearing the employees view before any decision is taken".
(34) This position was unchanged ten years later when the union
issued the following circular to all members:
" The concl usi ons of the Bu11 ock Commit tee are
not in line with the policy of this union, nor
indeed with that of the TUC as expressed at
Congress. The Terms of Reference and the
composition of the committee made it inevitable
that this predetermined result would occur. It
will not solve the deep and underlying problems
of Britain, nor will it advance the cause of
genuine industrial democracy.
We do not align ourselves with those whose
objections are based on opposition to any
advance of workers' influence in decision
making, nor those whose main concern appears to
be the possible redundancy of 6,000 directors.
The real extension of democracy in industry
will come through the natural extension of
collective bargaining and not through the
elevation of a few individuals to boards of
management." (35)
The last point the circular made had a resonance far outside the
confines of the Executive Council of the EETPU. For at a time when
the Labour Government's Social Contract was denying free collective
bargaining talk of industrial democracy sounded a bit hollow to
many trade unionists.
With the election of the Thatcher Government in 1979, however,
any dreams of industrial democracy quickly faded. The shift in the
balance of power in industry during her first term meant, according
to Elliott, the sweeping aside of "Bullockry ... as an irrelevancy
along With the participative debates and experiments of the
1970s." (36) Well, not qui teo What we have seen in the Thatcher
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years is the continuation, but not the growth, of a diluted form(s)
of workers' participation - "descending participation", as Walker
dubbed forms of participation that fell well short of "full
participation". (37) The major form this watered down type of
workers' participation takes today, as it did yesterday, is joint-
consultation of some kind.
Joint-consultation is widespread in British industry. Millward
and Stevens' recent survey, British Workplace Industrial Relations
1980 - 1984, provides new evidence of how extensive consultation
committees are. In 1980, 34% of all the establishments they
surveyed reported the existence of Joint Consultation Committees
(JCCs) i the figure was still the same in 1984. The public sector
even saw a rise in such committees, from 42% to 48%. In the private
sector, however, the number of JCCs has fallen; in private
manufacturing from 36% to 30%, and in private services from 26% to
24%. But as the authors of the survey point out, the fall in the
private sector is more to do with the impact of the recession than
the abandonment of consul tati ve machinery. (38)
Ironically. descending forms of participation such as "j ob
enrichment" and joint-consultation, or "involvement" as the ETU
put it in 1967, and which have always been favoured by the union,
are now. with the "strike-free" deals, dressed up in the more
radical sounding notion of participation. Sanderson, in language
that would not have been too out of place at an IWC conference,
says that the only casualty of the "strike-free" agreements "is
managerial privilege and prerogative", because they not only
"enhance the individual and collective rights of the workers
concerned" but they also give "the workers a real and genuine say
in how the company is run." (39) Now that there is no threat of the
type of workers' participation hoped for by the IWC, the EETPU is
now advocating participation. But whereas in the 1960s and 1970s it
opposed workers' participation with the radical rhetoric of free-
collective bargaining, today it masks what is little more than
joint-consul tation with the radical rhetoric of participation. But
the following statement from Hammond illustrates qUite clearly what
the EETPU understands by participation:
"Every agreement, no matter how primitive, is
designed to avoid conflict .. but we've gone
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further. We've made them more sophisticated and
say number one is status, number two is
involvement and participation so that people
feel part of the enterprise, so that they're
gi ven information that they can have some say
in the enterprise before decisions are taken".
(40 )
Philip Bassett writes glowingly of this aspect of the EETPU's
"no-strike" deals:
" ... what the strike-free agreements offer
real involvement, real information, real
participation - runs against the tide. Central
to them all is a form of joint counci 1 which
reaches decisions on a wide range of employee-
related issues, on the basis of the provision
of the fullest possible information, which if
accepted by the company (and the strong moral
force of decisions reached in this way
certainly predisposes the company to accept
them) becomes company policy." (41)
Bassett uses the example of the Company Members Board (CME) at
Hitachi to illustrate his thesis, quoting extensively from the
minutes of a CMB meeting in 1985, minutes that are circulated to
all employees. Yet, practically every issue raised at the meeting
was to do with company efficiency:
Training: "Concern was expessed at the lack of
training for new Company Members, and it was
felt that this was contributing to the number
of rejects currently being experienced in
production .... "
Discipline:" the CME were concerned with
the way in which the disciplinary procedure was
being administered mainly that the
administration was not uniform from department
to department ... "
Production Efficiency: "Whi Le the CME agrees
that Members need to increase their efficiency,
they also felt that other factors affected
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efficiency, and were not considered
sufficiently when measuring efficiency."
Material Shortages: "Material shortages such as
the one currently experienced on tubes, were
felt to play are large part in falls in
efficiency... "
Design: "It was felt that new models were put
into pre-production on the lines before they
were ready. This has led to modifications being
carried out at the same time as production.
This does not help efficiency."
When it comes to issues directly affecting the workers, however,
the same minutes note a reluctance on the part of management to be
as forthcoming as they are on efficiency:
" ... when problems were pointed out to the CME
as the result of shop stewards and
representatives meetings, the company
frequently replied that it knew of the problem
and was taking steps to deal with it. It was
felt that the company should have brought these
problems to the CME.... This complaint was
answered by management, pointing out that
significant improvements have been made in the
terms and conditions of employees ... " (42)
Bassett, echoing the EETPU's own views, claims, then, that
this form of joint-consul tation allows "workforce
representati ves ... a genuine say in how the company operates, not
just at the level of their own effort, but beyond it, on policy."
(43) This eulogy is very questionable. Joint-consultation rarely I
if ever, gives workers an equal say in the decision making process
of the company - "full participation" - it allows them at best to
influence management decisions - "partial participation". In the
latter case, as in most cases of the former, the structure of
authority in the workplace is left intact:
"Whatever the joint consultation process might
do for those few who as representatives
actually took part, there seemed no reason to
suppose it would transform the perceptions and
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mati vations of their constituents, whose jobs
and subj ection to hierarchical authority and
control remained unchanged." (44)
The point Fox is making here is especially true of the companies
that the EETPU has signed many of its "no-strike" agreements with.
Here is a report on the same Hitachi factory in South Wales where
Bassett tells us worker representatives have a genuine say in how
the company operates and where Sanderson tells us that dignity and
democracy have been brought to the workplace:
"The logic of good industrial relations falls
into place once you accept that the Line Is
God; the Welsh recognise that, now that it's
been pointed out to them, and are rather shame-
faced about their previous slack practices,
when the plant was run by GEC.
'They used to eat bacon and eggs on top of the
sets being assembled. That appalled the
Japanese', says Tony Pegge, deputy personnel
director. Other workers used to turn up I in
carpet slippers with bobbles on'. And once when
an employee collapsed and died in the
workplace, the entire factory took the day off
in respect."
Since Hitachi took over the plant in 1984, however:
"You can be disciplined for turning away from
the assembly line to talk to a colleague, or
for smoking in the lavatory. The mindful,
disciplined concentration from clocking-on to
finishing time (excepting break periods)
demanded by the Japanese clearly has come as a
body-blow to the gregarious workforce.
Mrs Carol White, deputy convenor of the EETPU
branch says that, by comparison, discipline is
very strict under Hitachi. ' But Toshi ba' s
agreement is stricter than ours. '" (45)
Toshiba is the other example Bassett gives in his favourable
account of the participatory component of the EETPU's "no-strike"
agreements.
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In May 1986 the workers at Hitachi voted for a 3% pay increase
(the underlying annual rate of pay increases since July 1984 had
been 7~%) and a "merit review" based on an index which monitors
conduct, time-keeping, performance and accuracy of work. Two
packages were presented to the workforce by the CME, both of which
contained the new merit review. From a total workforce of around
720, below middle management level, the total number of votes cast
was 589, from which 557 showed in favour of the 3% offer. The
alternative offer would have given an additional 1% in return for
the abolition of a total of 35 minutes a week allocated for
One
was
of incomprehension at
of employees to such
weighed against other
"personal needs". The attempt to buy "bell-to-bell" working
suggested by the EETPU and was fully supported by Hitachi.
report on the settlement noted:
"Both the company and the officials of the
EETPU confess a degree
the conti nued adherence
, traditional' practices,
benefits provided." (46)
If we recall Elliott's broad definition of industrial democracy as
"workers claiming rights to have a greater say over matters
affecting their working lives", then the Hitachi workers decision
is not so incomprehensible.
We have said that the major form of participation now taking
place in British industry is that of joint-consultation. The form
this consultation will take will naturally vary from workplace to
workplace. In the case of the EETPU "strike-free" agreements JCCs
appear under different guises - a Company Members Board at Hitachi,
an Advisory Council at Inmos; a Company Advisory Board at Sanyo and
Toshiba; a Joint Negotiating Council at A B Electronics - but all
operate on the same principles as the Hitachi CME. Yet in the
context of such strict and authori tarian shop-floor regimes, it
seems a little odd to talk of challenging managerial privilege and
prerogative let alone of bringing dignity and democracy to the
workplace. If we are to characterise the JCCs as representing some
form of workers' participation, however low down Walker's
descending scale they may be I then we have to consider what the
workers are being consul ted about. The trouble with accounts such
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as Bassett I s, are that they concentrate on the "workers havi ng a
say" without questioning what they are having a say about.
At Hitachi, as Bassett's own example shows, discussion on the
CME was completely dominated by production and efficiency. This is
hardly surprising, for the package deal that the EETPU had signed
was designed to break down "traditional" attitudes to work, so that
grievances that might have been "normal" at any other plant are
automatically ruled out of court at Hitachi. So it is the
unevenness of discipline from department to department that is
complained about, not the discipline itself. It is the lack of
training that is complained about, not the whole idea of flexible
working. It is not the speed of the line that is questioned, but
the material shortages that are holding up the line. In short, the
options for discussion are company orientated in the extreme, the
agenda for joint-consultation is determined by the needs of the
company which are not seen as distinct from those of the workers.
This, ironically, is precisely what Cannon warned against in 1967
when he said that solutions cannot be found "by attempting to blur
the lines of conflict".
Things have changed. John Grant, a leading EETPU official,
wri ting in Contact about the success of the Toshiba agreement,
states concisely the EETPU approach to consultation:
"The new emphasis was firmly on co-operation
and consultation not conflict. Workers are
expected to identify with the company's
objectives - especially to turn out products of
the right kind, at the right time and at the
right price." (47)
This view of participation hardly squares with Bassett's talk
of "real involvement" and "real participation", but it does sound
very similar to Verba's concept of "pseudo participation", which
involves no genuine control, even of a partial kind, by workers in
the actual processes of decision making. Rather by creating a
feeling of participation workers are persuaded to accept decisons
that have already been made by management. (48) The objective,
then, of the various lCCs that the union is involved in is to
create an "enterprise cu I ture" (so well described by Grant) where
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the wor-ker-s feel that they are having a "genuine say" in the
fQrmatiQn Qf cQmpany pQlicy.
(5) Pendulum arbitratiQn - NQ-strike prQYisiQns
This is the mQst cQntrQversial aspect Qf the agreements, and
probabl y the moa t mtsunder-et.ood , The first thing t.o be said is
that the deals are nQt legally binding, and nQr dQ the EETPU wish
them tQ be. If there is nQthing legally binding abQut the deals and
conssequerrt Ly the "no-est.r t ke" pr-ovisf ons , then what is actually
meant by a "strike-free" agreement? The answer is, that the anti-
strike element of the over-a I I package in centrally bound up with
binding pendulum arbi t r-a t i.cn. The Tossh; ba agreement puts it like
this:
" ... In this agreement and t.hr-ough the mutual
euppor t and encouragemerrt of the Company
AdvisQry Board System bQth the cQmpany and the
trade un i on r-ecogn i se this appr-oach pr-ovf.des
fQr the resQlutiQn Qf cQnflicts Qf interest
between the cQmpany and its employees t hr-ough
consu I t at t on, negot t at i on and arbi t.r-a t t on
rather than the traditional prQcesses of
industrial actiQn...
If the matter is nQt resQlved a jQint reference
shall be made tQ an independent
arbitrator ... The terms Qf reference Qf the
arbitrator will be to find in favour Qf either
the cQmpany or the trade un Lon , A compr-omi se
sQlutiQn shall nQt be recQmmended. BQth parties
agree to abide by the decision of the
arbitratQr." (49)
Similar clauses are cont.aLned in all the EETPU's agreements.
The SanyQ deal "precludes the necessity fQr recourse to any fQrm Qf
industrial action" and says that arbitration "will be final and
binding and will represent the final solution to the issue". At
Inmos the parties agree t o "avoid any action which interrupts the
cont t nu t t y of production", and, "accordingly, the union and the
company undertake nQt to involve members covered by this agreement
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in external industrial relations matters". Optical Fibres takes a
similar line, pledging both sides to "avoid any action which
interrupts the continuity of production", as does Xidex: "A
fundamental understanding is that during any phase of this new
procedure, all normal working practices are observed and
maintained" . (50) Third party arbitration is not unusual in
Bri tish Industry, but there is an expiry date when if all else
fails traditional industrial action is sanctioned or taken. With
binding pendulum arbitration there is no such break down point, a
resolution is always achieved. Well this is the theory, but in
practice things have not worked so smoothly.
Most disputes, whether they be over payor conditions, do not
reach the pendulum arbitration stage, they are settled long before
that stage is ever reached. So al though the first "strike-free"
agreement that the union signed was with Toshiba in Plymouth in
April 1981, it was not until 12 March 1986 that the first ever
Bri tish pendulum arbitration award in a "strike-free" deal was
delivered; and it was delivered in favour of the EETPU. The details
of the dispute between the EETPU and Bowman Webber, a small firm
employing 125 workers in Essex, are long and complicated, but by
the time they reached the pendulum arbitration stage the maj or
issue at stake was the difference between the company's offer of
i151.91 a week and the union's claim of i160.31 a week - i8.40.
What is of interest here though, is that before the award was
declared in March there had been a strike at the factory. It
started in January over the imposition of double day-shift working
and the dismissal action against three workers, one the EETPU shop
steward, involved 50 workers and lasted 10 ten days. So much for
"strike-free" deals. (51) More recently there has been a strike at
the Hitachi plant in South Wales. The action - a sit-in for over
an hour in the company's single-status canteen - came after the
company refused to act on the recommendation of the Company Members
Board that the workforce should receive an 8% increase in their
basic rate. The very next day Hitachi put forward an increased
offer of 5.5% on basic rates, plus a further 1.5% for merit
increases. This offer was then rejected by the workers in a ballot
by a margin of 3 to 2. Only then did the company and the union go
to ACAS for a binding arbitration decision. (52)
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Strike-free deals do not prevent strikes then, they just make
them much more unlikely as the long disputes procedure tends to
dissipate and contain any immediate anger at the company's actions.
What is more, it seems highly unlikely that any strikes that do
occur will be made official, as a binding pendulum arbitration
award is the final stage in the resolution of any conflict. Knowing
in advance that no official backing for a strike will be
forthcoming again makes the recourse to strike action by the
workers less likely. Such a procedure naturally enables the full-
time officials of the EETPU to have a far tighter control over the
membership than is usual in "normal" collective-bargaining
si tuations. For example, at the Xidex factory in South Wales, the
EETPU members three times rej ected, once by a ballot ma.jori ty of
more than 2-1, various company and ACAS pay offers. Neverthless,
Wyn Bevan, the EC member for the area <leader of the 1977 Port
Talbot strike and one time prominent oppositionist), went ahead and
unilaterally accepted one of the offers, arguing that the terms of
the "strike-free" agreement with Xidex empowered him to take a
final decision on such issues in the "best interests of the
members". Some forty members of the EETPU, including the convenor
and branch secretary, then left the union in disgust and formed a
branch of the T&GWU. The comments of Bryan King, the former EETPU
branch secretary, give an indication of how far union democracy
has been advanced at Xidex by the "no-strike" agreement:
"It has meant that I have no right and no say
in what I'm going to accept or receive in
future years. They've taken away my right as an
indi vidual to speak and stand up and say I
don't want this I want something else." (53)
For its part the EETPU claims that there is nothing new about
their "no-strike" deals and that moreover other unions are also
signing them. Contact carried the following in its September 1984
edition:
"Even binding arbitration, misleadingly
referred to as 'no-strike' clauses, is by no
means unique though the EETPU is pioneering its
wider and more beneficial application. It
operated at the former Upper Clyde
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Shipbuilders, there are several industry-wide
agreements of this kind and the Civil Service
unions put up a 'no-disruption' option to the
Prime Minister during the GCHQ fiasco.
Moreover, Mirror group newspaper unions were
ready to make the same bargain to try to
prevent Mr. Robert Maxwell's company takeover."
(54)
strong opposition to the
free agreements, yesterday
white collar section hadits
strike
that
growth of
admitted
Since 1984 the AEU has also signed a number of "no-strike
deals, most notably with Nissan. However, the AEU is not an
opponent of such deals, unlike the G:M:B. Surprisingly, then, in June
1987 it was reported that the
"General Municipal and Boilermakers Union,
which has voiced
signed what amounts to a strike free deal at a
South Wales factory."
David Plant,the national industrial officer of the G:M:B's white
collar section, MATSA, said of the deal with Pirelli:
"It does constitute a no-strike deal. The final
stage of the disputes procedure, whatever the
issue, is final binding arbitration." (55)
And in May 1988 the TUC disputes committee ordered the GMB to
withdraw from a "strike-free" agreement it had negotiated with BICC
Cables. (56) So the EETPU's allegations are not completely without
foundation.
Opposition and democracy
"There's no opposition among rank-and-file
members to this this type of agreement. There
might be among activists and leaders and
academics and reporters. But there's not among
rank and file members, none whatsoever."
Roy Sanderson. (57)
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Opposition to the strike-free agreements has come from three
sources: firstly, from some of the workers covered by the deals
themsel ves; secondly, the organized opposition inside the union;
and, thirdly, from other trade unions and the TUC. We have already
noted the outbreaks of opposition to the working of agreements at
Bowman Webber, Hitachi, and Xidex, but that is not the same as
rejection of the deals in pr t nc i p l.e , the union might argue. Yet
when Hitachi were spelling out the details of the proposed new deal
to their workforce in 1984, the Incomes Data Services could report
that "there has been considerable opposition from the workforce to
Hi tachi I s terms. A mass meeting has rej ected the document [A New
Future at HirwaunJ". (58) So rank-and-file opposition to the deals
is not totally absent, as Sanderson would have us believe.
Moreover, it has to be remembered that, as Hammond himself admits,
the "strike-free" deals were in the main signed with companies
before the workforce had actually been hired, so they were thus
presented to the new workforce as an accomplished fact. They were
presented to the workers as the best that they could possibly get
from the companies, the alternative being non-union plants and the
loss of the benefits that the packages contained. But as the case
of Orion illustrates, there was an alternative - traditional union
organization - an alternative that was acceptable to the workforce
in this case (and others) but which was ignored by the EETPU.
Finally, when Sanderson says that there is no opposition to the
agreements from the rank-and-file, he is certainly not including
the rank-and-file of those trade unions that have been denied
negotiating rights as a result of some of the EETPU's single-union
deals.
When the BDC of the EETPU met in Blackpool on 7 November 1983,
the union had already signed 4 "strike-free" agreements. On the
third day of the Conference, the following motion (motion 110) from
the Wells Branch of the union was debated:
"This Conference is alarmed by the recent
statements from the Tory Minister Tebbi t that
workers in essential services should be denied
the right to strike.
Conference is also alarmed at the number of
employers seeking 'No Strike' agreements.
right to
employers,
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Conference believes that the basic right to
strike is a most cherished Trade Union right,
which must never be negotiated.
Conference therefore calls on the Executive
Council to vigorously defend the
strike in all negotiations with
private and public." (59)
It was evident from the debate that followed that the details
of the "no-strike" agreements were not known to the delegates. The
mover of the motion, M Solomons, and many of the speakers that
followed, referred in general terms to the right to strike, and
Solomons briefly mentioned the Toshiba agreement which he
understood had "an anti-strike clause in it". Solomons also drew
the parallel between the union leadership's support for Solidarity
and its own position: "Are we to support the right of Solidarity to
strike and then do a political somersault?" (60) Surprisingly
though, the leadership of the union gave motion 110 qualified
support, as Hammond explained:
"We are supporting Motion 110 with reservations
and these reservations concern what has been
said about so-called 'no-strike clauses'. In
reality, there can be no such thing, certainly
not in a free society like ours. Can anyone
really believe that anyone could stop people
striking if they wanted to? In the agreements
we have at Toshiba, Sony and Inmos, we have
agreed to a procedure which has as its final
stage arbitration, which is, as is normal with
many arbitration procedures, binding on both
parties. But the workers are not chained to
their place of work. If they choose to strike
nobody can prevent them...
What you should be asking yourselves is why do
we prefer agreements based on arbitration as a
final stage, and so greatly reduce the
1 ikel ihood of strike action. I wi 11 tell you
why .... They benefit nobody but our competitors
and the unemployment statistics ... even in
362
successful strikes those involved rarely gain a
sufficient improvement in their pay to make up
what they have lost whilst being on strike.
Secondly, the type of industry where we have
negotiated these agreements cannot survive
unless productivity is kept going continuously
and at a high level." (61)
After explaining the benefits that were involved in signing such
deals, Hammond urged delegates to support the motion, while bearing
in mind the reservations he had raised. On a show of hands motion
110 was carried by the Conference.
Officially then the union now had a policy that "advised" the
Executive Council "to vigorously defend the right to strike in all
negotiations with employers". How this was squared with the signing
of "no-strike" agreements was simple: the EC said that there were
no legally binding clauses in the agreements that outlawed strikes,
merely a process of arbitration that made them more unlikely. As
the Sanyo agreement put it, "this. agreement ... precludes the
necessity for recourse to any form of industrial action". (62) If
the agreements did not contain legally binding "no-strike" clauses
the "right to strike" was not threatened, and therefore the
leadership could quite legitimately support the motion from the
\Ilells branch. On the other hand, the insertion of clauses in the
agreements such as the Sanyo one hardly squared with a policy of
vigorously defending the right to strike.
It is worth stressing, however, that at this juncture the
"strike-free" agreements were not a big issue for the organized
opposi tion in the union. Flashlight did not mention the deals at
all in either its pre-Conference issue nor in it post-Conference
edition. It was only during the course of 1984, as the attention
the "strike-free" agreements were receiving increased, that
Flashlight turned its guns on the deals. (63) By the time of the
next BDC in July 1985 it might have been expected that Flashlight
would have made a major issue out of the deals, but it didn't. The
pre-Conference issue only mentioned the "no-strike" agreements in
passing, in an advert for Flashlight itself. This is surprising,
because it was obvious that there was going to be heated internal
debate and a lot of publicity surrounding this aspect of the
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Conference. A brief look at the Agenda for the 1985 BDC was a clear
enough indication that the agreements were going to be a central
issue for debate. There were 2 motions supportive of the
agreements, from the Inmos and Toshiba branches, and 6 motions
critical of the deals. On the eve of the Conference, Hammond raised
the temperature by announcing that the union had already signed 14
deals, that another 4 were in the pipeline, and at least another
half a dozen were being sounded out by his officials. Flashlight's
"pre-Conference comment" ignored all this and instead argued that
it was time that " a fixed date for holding ... our Union's biennial
conference was put into the rule book". (64) The two central issues
of the Conference - the acceptance of Government money for ballots
and the "strike free" deals - were not mentioned at all. It was a
missed opportunity to say the least. Nevertheless, these issues
were discussed at the Conference, and leading oppositionists were
in the forefront of the attack on the leadership.
Two motions on the "strike-free" agreements served as the
focus for the battle between the EC and its supporters and the
opposition forces in the union. The EC supported motion, that was
submitted by the Inmos Branch, read as follows:
"This Conference welcomes the Union's radical
approach to industrial relations, embodied in
its industrial agreements in the electronics
industry which include pendulum arbitration,
harmonised conditions of employment and
extensive workforce participation.
Conference declares its support of such
principles which represent a bold initiative in
seeking to change the adversarial tradition of
British industrial relations." (65)
Vyn Bevan put forward the case in support of the Inmos motion.
Bevan argued that the deals offered union members single status, a
"genuine say" in how the companies they work for are run,
flexibility and job security. On the "no-strike" provisions of the
deals he said:
"A method of resolving disputes without
striking makes sense. A strike-free society
would make sense and agreements which can move
the
but
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towards that end should be our aim.... [but] any
employer who wants to strike a deal including
pendulum arbitration must accept the total
EETPU package ... " (66)
The Financial T'imee reported that "impassioned support for the
controversial agreements" came from EETPU branches where the deals
were in operation. Joan Griffiths, senior steward at Toshiba's
plant at Plymouth, said the new attitudes had "brought a breath of
fresh air" into industrial relations, and that the union at Toshiba
was far from passive and compliant:
"Of course we have our problems, but we are
able to overcome them without manning
barricades. It's not the Garden of Eden
it's not a bloody battlefield." (67)
Opponents of the agreements supported the following motion
from the Falkirk, Dundee and Wallasey branches:
"This Conference is concerned at the increasing
practice of our national negotiators to
conclude 'No Strike Agreements' in industry
today. We call for an immediate end to this
trend and that we revoke all such agreements
already signed.
It is our opinion that such agreements remove a
fundamental right from our members and creates
an attitude not conducive to struggle at shop-
floor level. This is a denial of basic trade
union principles still valid today." (68)
The motion failed, but as the Guardian reported, "the majority
against the motion ... was surprisingly small". This was not the
Daily Telegraph's view however: "Both votes by a show of hands from
the 900 delegates were sufficiently decisive to make a count
unnecessary". (69) It is one of the continuing ironies of EETPU
democracy that the only place where "a show of hands" is encouraged
is where an EC member presides over the count.
Rank-and-file opposition to the deals does exist then, but it
is very weak, which in itself is a reflection of the weakened state
of the organized opposition in the union, especially the Communist
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Party. The weakness of the opposition should not be exaggerated of
course. They still fare relatively well in elections, but at branch
level they are not as strong as they were in the 1970s and early
1980s. So at the 1987 BDC, only 50 of the 900 delegates opposed the
EC's Wapping policy and the negotiating of "strike-free"
agreements. But opposition to the union's industrial strategy
outside of the EETPU seems to have been more successful.
Following the adoption of a composite motion at the September
1985 TUC Congress which criticised the behaviour of the EETPU at
Hitachi, the TUC General Council amended the Disputes Principles
and Procedures in December. They now read:
"No union shall enter into a sale negotiating
agreement, union membership agreement or any
other form of agreement in any circumstances,
including a takeover or change of ownership or
some other reason where another unionCs) would
be deprived of their existing rights of
recognition or negotiation except by prior
consultation and agreement of the other
unionCs) concerned... " (70)
This effectively outlawed the single-union, "strike-free"
packages on sites where other unions had a presence. Since the
amendment to the Bridlington Principles was passed the TUC has been
far more diligent in policing the single-union deals, as we have
seen in the earlier part of this chapter. What the TUC had not
outlawed though, were the "no-strike" clauses contained in the
EETPU deals. But by Kay 1988 the Special Review Body had drawn up a
code of practice, the key section of which said that "unions should
not conclude agreements in exchange for recognition which
specifically remove, or are designed to remove, the basic
democratic lawful rights of a trade union to take industrial
action." Late in June the TUC hardened its stance when it agreed
Cby 9 votes to 7) on a revised code of practice which would not
just "advise" affiliates not to negotiate "no-strike" deals in
exchange for recognition but would tell them not to reach such
agreements. (71) However, since the union is set to be expelled
from the TUC, the code of practice is going to make no difference
to the main signatory of the "no-stri ke" deals - the EETPU. THC
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opposition has been effective in that it has eventually disciplined
the EETPU, but they are now it seems going to be faced with a
"rogue union" outside of their discipline. In these circumstances
the TUC's campaign of non-cooperation with the EETPU (for example,
EETPU officials were excluded from a meeting of the TUC and the
Heal th and Safety Executive which met to discuss the Piper Alpha
disaster), as well as the union's intention of signing of 10 more
"strike-free" deals in the near future, is almost certainly going
to be the source of further conflicts between the two bodies.
We have said that the union's "strike-free" industrial policy has
been endorsed by the 1985 and 1987 BDCs and by the 1988 ballot on
continuing affiliation to the TUC. It could be argued that the
Conferences were unrepresentative, or that the ballot paper was so
worded that it avoided a direct "Yes" or "No" on "no-strike" deals
and TUC membership (and that anyway 200,000 EETPU didn't bother to
vote at all), While these objections have substance, they are also
ones that could be levelled to a greater or lesser extent at any
trade union. The plain fact is that the EC' S "strike-free" strategy
has been democratically approved by the majority of EETPU activists
and "passive voters", The EC of the union argues, then, that not
only do the agreements extend democracy at the workplace but that
in carrying out their "strike-free" strategy they are carrying out
the democractic wishes of the members. Democracy, therefore, is
being extended and put in practice by the "no-strike" agreements.
Against this line of argument, we would argue that while it is
true (as it was with the union's Wapping policy) that the
membership have endorsed the EC's strategy (and therefore it can be
considered democractic), that nevertheless the way the agreements
were negotiated, the way many of them have operated, and the
"enterprise culture" which they all seek to establish have led to a
weakening of union and industrial democracy at the plants
concerned. Firstly, there was nothing democractic about the way the
deals were negotiated. They were mostly signed before the sites
were built and any members were recruited to the EETPU. In a number
of cases (for example, Orion, Thorn EMI) the EETPU has ignored the
wishes of the majority of workers on the sites and unilaterally
concluded "no-strike" agreements. Secondly, as the Xidex pay
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negotiations show, the "no-strike" clauses (binding pendulum
arbi tration) enable the EETPU officials to quite legitimately
evade union democracy. Thirdly, the participatory component of the
"strike-free" packages does not extend shop-floor democracy, quite
the reverse. For the factories that are covered by the agreements
on the whole have far stricter regimes than traditionally organized
workplaces. So the workers at Hitachi, South Wales, have far less
control over the work process than their counterparts in similar
sized establishments. Moreover, as Cannon and the ETU argued in
1967, industrial democracy can only be safeguarded and extended by
the "countervailing force" of trade unionists uninhibited by too
deep an involvement in the tasks and aims of management. This is
the reverse of what is happening at the "strike-free" plants, where
participation is used to "blur the lines of conflict" between
workers and management in an attempt to construct an "enterprise
culture" where the aims and goals of the company are paramount.
We can only draw the conclusion, despite membership
endorsement for their actions, that the "strike-free" agreements
have, in the words of Michels, strengthened the "authoritative
character of the leaders and their tendency to rule democratic
organizations on oligarchic lines." (72) But there is a twist at
the end of the tale. The EETPU now faces expulsion from the TUC for
refusing to abide by the democratic decisons of its disputes
committee (which incidentally was made up of three leading
"moderates", Albert Williams of UCATT, Leslie Christie of NUCPS -
executive and support grades in the civil service - and Muriel
Turner of the ASlM-!'D. This refusal, and the expulsion that is likely
to follow, might well lead to the union having great difficulty in
securing further "no-strike" agreements as managements distance
themselves from a potentially troublesome union. (73)
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CONCLUSION
There is a vast literature dealing with the government and internal
democracy of trade unions. (1) Some writers have presented
exhaustive accounts of union affairs, detailing the formal aspects
of union decision making and membership participation. (2) Others
have employed a variety of models and methods in order to examine
union democracy more directly. (3) Many have seen union democracy
as being analagous to parliamentary or state democracy in some
way. This model usually concentrates on the constitutional and
electoral processes of a trade union which make it possible for an
opposition to replace the incumbent leadership. (4 ) The
parliamentary model has been criticised for oversimpl ifying the
nature of union democracy: one writer has stated that the
cornerstone of union democracy is the voluntary nature of union
organization, whereas state democracy is compulsory (i. e you must
pay taxes and so on). (5) Yet others have constructed models of
union democracy based on conflict and control that compliment many
Marxist writings on the divorce of the trade union bureaucracies
from the members they are meant to represent. (6) We have profited
from these and many other works, although we have followed no one
single approach in our study of the Electricians' union. Rather the
study has been informed by two broad theoretical approaches, one
implicit and one explicit.
Implicitly we have argued that the union's democracy has been
shaped and reshaped by a combination of internal and external
factors: union democracy cannot be understood by just examining
its formal decision making process, but rather the political and
industrial factors which have shaped the actual democracy of the
Electricians' union have to be considered. The objective then has
been to explain some aspects of the union I s internal history and
the leadership's approach to democracy with reference to the wider
pol i tical and industrial context. The expl ici t theme in the thesis
has been what we have referred to as the Michels/Gouldner debate:
the constant tension in trade unions between oligarchic and
democratic tendencies. The intention here was not just to go
through once more the classical debate about Michels, but to
examine the debate in the 1ight of the actual workings 01 the
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Electricians' union. What follows is an attempt to show how far
these two theoretical themes have illuminated particular aspects of
the workings of democracy in the union. Finally, a more general
comment on the future of democracy in the EETPU will be offered.
Political and industrial
Electricians' union
factors shaping democracy in the
In Part One we argued that the ballot-rigging scandal of the 1950s
could not be understood simply in terms of an electoral process
that was open to abuse by unscrupulous men. Rather, to understand
why some CP members of the ETU did rig the 1959 ballot for General
Secretary a wider view of the politics and industrial strategy of
the CP needed to be taken. Once the area of investigation was
widened in this way we could present a rationale for the
manipulation of the union's democracy that is denied to us if we
concentrate solely on the internal workings of the union.
Consequently, against the orthodox view that the CP held power in
the ETU by virtue of its ballot-rigging activities, we were able to
give an account of the rise of the CP in the ETU by examining the
political and industrial shift that the Party made in 1947, and how
this shift dovetailed with both the growing sectional militancy of
the shop-stewards "movement" in manufacturing and the "indigenous"
militancy of the ETU. However, once the CP' S domination of the ETU
began to be threatened in the wake of the Soviet invasion of
Hungary, and with it the entire strategy of the Party outlined in
the British Road to Socialism, we argued that the leadership
increasingly resorted to bureaucratic manipulation of the union's
rules and procedures and eventually some ETU leaders rigged the
1959 ballot.
What primarily shaped the leadership's approach to the ETU's
internal democracy, then, were political and industrial factors
that were largely determined by events and policies formulated
outside of the democratic structure of the ETU. For the CP in the
ETU, the union's internal democracy served as a means to reach a
desired goal - to push the labour movement in a leftward direction
via the TUC and Labour Party Conference. There was nothing
undemocratic about this: union democracy is not just concerned with
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timeless platitudes, it is a about politics, argument, and
organization wi thin the framework of a set of agreed procedures.
The CP leadership were found to have broken these procedures, and
that, not the politics they were legitimately propagating in the
union, was why their actions were undemocratic. However, we argued
that the ballot-rigging took place because of the politics of the
CP, and that consequently the rigging of the 1959 election was a
political act. This political action was to end in the ballot-
rigging trial of 1961, which in turn resulted in the right-wing
taking control of the union and reshaping its internal democracy to
serve its political and industrial policies.
In Part Two we argued that the remodelling of the union's
democractic structure under Cannon's leadership was designed to
centralize power and dislodge and isolate the activists from the
semi -autonomous centres of power in the union such as the Area
Committees and the branches. Politically this was an attempt to
neutralise the influence of the CP, and industrially it was the
first step in bringing the fragmented bargaining system under EC
control. From the start then the remodelling was not just about
making the union more democratic and efficient as the leadership
claimed - it had an overt political and industrial objective. (7)
Consequently, the remodelling was accompanied by a transformation
of the union's traditional left wing stance to one of right-wing
Labourism, although in the early 1960s when the Cannon leadership
were still viewed by many as left-wing, and when Harold Wilson was
being welcomed by many even on the New Left as a left-winger, this
shift was not so easy to discern. By the late 1960s, however, the
shift of both Cannon and Wilson was all too clearly visible. The EC
supported, al bei t critically at times, the three central policy
planks of the Wilson Government incomes policy, productivity
bargaining and industrial relations legislation - even after the
most moderate of unions had deserted the Government in the wake of
the 1967 devaluation of the pound. By this time, though, the EC had
almost completed the restructuring of the union, a restructuring
that was modelled on, and had largely the same aims as, the
American business unions. The creation of the "New Model" union
which had at its heart the reshaping of the union's internal
democracy was, therefore, an entirely political project which
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reflected the political and industrial concerns of the Cannon
leadership.
In Part Three we saw how with the rise of industrial militancy
in the early 1970s the structure and policies of the "New Model"
union, now under the leadership of Chapple, were challenged by two
political groupings in the union - the CP and IS/SWP. Although they
had different strategies for internal reform, both clearly saw the
need to reform the union's internal democracy as an integral part
of their overall strategies. So the organized opposition campaigned
against the centralization of the union's structure and the forced
closure and amalgamation of union branches and for the
reconsti tution of the Area Committees and the election of all
full-time officials. Just as the Cannon leadership knew that if
they were to be successful in pursuing their political and
industrial aims then a union democracy had to be fashioned that
facilitated that strategy, similarly the organized opposition
realised that if their strategies were to succeed then the internal
democracy of the EETPU would have to be reformed. In other words,
there is a close linkage between the implementation of a political
and industrial perspective and the type of internal democracy that
exists in a union. A brand of politics that essentially sees things
happening from "below", by the rank-and-file, will tend to favour
the type of democracy that was being advocated by the opposition,
whereas the kind of politics that essentially sees things
happening from "above", by representative leaders, will tend to
favour the type of democracy advocated by the Chapple leadership.
The opposition's challenge was unsuccessful. The political and
industrial project of transforming the union which began under
Cannon continued under Chapple and, as Part Four showed, developed
in a new direction under Hammond. A major reason why the challenge
was unsuccessful was, and is, because the internal democracy of
the union inhibits the activities of organized minorities and
prevents them even if they do gain maj or-I ty representation at
Industrial Conferences or at BDCs from translating that
representation into policies that the EC have to act upon. The EC
either ignores the decisons because they are not constitutionally
bi ndi ng or orchestrates the "acti ve voters" ina well planned and
well publicized ballot of the entire membership which usually
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favours the EC position. But this is not always the case. In 1972,
for example, 32,002 members voted for entry into the Common Market,
while 68,792 voted against. Yet in 1975 the union cast its block
vote in favour of Labour's re-negotiated terms of entry at the
special Labour Party Conference. Similarly, the 1982 Electrical
Supply Industry pay award was rejected by supply members by 41,249
votes to 31,801. Nevertheless, the EC went ahead and accepted the
rejected pay award. As was the case with the period of CP
leadership, union democracy is, besides other things, a mechanism
whereby particular political and industrial aims and goals are
furthered and legitimised. If, as in these two cases, that
legi timation is not forthcoming, then it is democracy that is
jettisoned, not the policies.
Taken as a whole, democracy in the post-war Electricians'
union has (probably more than in any other trade union) been
overtly shaped by the political ideologies and the industrial
policies of the leaderships. Two competing ideologies have
sucessfully fought for the leadership of the union and utilised or
moulded internal democracy to suit their ends. This is not to say,
of course, that a multitude of other factors have not contributed
to the shaping of the union's democracy or that the leaderships
have not gained membership support for their policies, rather it is
to stress a seemingly obvious point, but one that nevertheless
seems to be often overlooked, that unless the political and
industrial aims of a union leadership are examined in historical
context then we will fail to fully understand why leaders resort to
bureaucratic manipulation and ballot-rigging and why a union's
internal democracy develops in the particular way it does.
The Michels/Gouldner debate
Throughout the thesis we have engaged with Michels' "iron law of
oligarchy". His theory can be summed up in his famous dictum "who
says organization, says oligarchy", and in his assertion that in
the trade union movement the "authoritative character of the
leaders and their tendency to rule democratic organizations on
oligarchic lines, are even more pronounced than in political
organizations." (8) And, indeed, the post-war history of the
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Electricians' union could be viewed as a classic confirmation of
Michels' thesis. However, we have countered Michels by showing how
time and time again the rank-and-file have asserted their control
over the leadership or over particular areas of union organization.
To this extent, we have followed Gouldner in arguing that if it is
reasonable to talk of an "iron law of oligrachy" it is equally
plausi ble to posit the existence of an "iron law of democracy". (9)
In fact, the experience of the Electricians' union seems to
indicate that there is a constant and dynamic tension between the
two "laws", and that what shifts the balance in favour of one or
the other is not organization per se, but the actual practice of
the members of the union in particular historical circumstances.
The ballot-rigging saga seems to offer the strongest evidence
in support of Michels, and at one level indeed it does. For the
principles of democracy in the ETU were "attenuated and deformed in
accordance with the external needs of the organization." (10) And
not just the organizational needs of the ETU "oligarchy", but those
of the Communist Party as well were put before the democratic
wishes of the membership. Yet, in the end, the Communist leadership
was overthrown because it acted undemocratically. Vhether they
would have been ousted without the 1961 trial is debatable. Vhat is
clear, however, is that some ETU members resorted to ballot-rigging
precisely because they believed they were going to lose control of
the leadership, and why they were losing control was because of the
campaign by the press and the opposition in the union that focused
the attention of ETU members on the manipulation of democracy. That
democracy was the central issue, and not the policies of the CP
leadership, was graphically illustrated by the "orgy of democracy"
that took place at the SRRC in 1962. Vhat tipped the balance in
favour of democracy, then, was the activity of a very small group
of union activists (Cannon's Reform Group) and the publicity they
gained. It was because of, to use Coleman's terminology, the
"compulsive pressures" of democracy in trade unions that the
Foulkes and Haxell leadership were in the end forced from office.
(11)
A consideration that is totally absent from Michels theory is
the "informal" or "unofficial" ways in which union members can
exert control over their leaders and certain areas of union
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organization. In chapter 6 we charted in some detail the successes
and failures of the organized opposition in the EETPU. We said
that although the opposition had not succeeded in its aim of
ousting the right-wing leadership that, nevertheless, the permanent
constraint that the opposition imposed on the EC acted as a
democratic pull on the EC. Moreover, this type of direct democratic
organization was able to exert the influence it did because,
despite remodelling, much of the union's organization at branch and
workplace level was still of an "informal" kind. The opposition was
able to counteract the influence of the EC in the branches, on the
sites and in the workplaces, where direct democracy still existed.
Direct democracy might well be, as Michels argued, "a mechanical
and technical impossibility" at national level, but the experience
of the opposition in the EETPU would suggest that it is not
necessarily the case at local and workplace level, and such forms
of direct democracy naturally affect national policy. (12) This
type of union democracy, because it is rooted in workplace
experience, will always serve as an unpredictable and potentially
powerful countervailing force to national leadership.
Michels also argued that the division of labour in
organizations such as trade unions would inevitably lead to the
domination of a technocracy of full-time bureaucrats who would be
immune from any enduring challenge from the rank-and-file. Any
change that was forced on one leadership would merely lead to the
replacement of one oligarchy by another. Again, this thesis has
more than surface plausibility, and the replacement of the
Communist "oligarchy" of the 1950s by the right-wing "oligarchy" of
the 1960s could be cited as just such an example. However, the ETU
of the 1950s and 1960s was not dominated by technocrats, since it
had a lay EC and elected full-time national and local officials,
and the growth in the post-war period of de-centralized bargaining
allowed for a great deal of rank-and-file autonomy and direct shop-
floor democracy. That the leaders of the Electricians' union, or
any other union, could dupe and manipulate the honest but
essentially simple union members by the use of their superior
skills and expertise is a myth which has been perpetuated at least
since the days of the Webbs. As Daniel found in his study k'age
Determination in Industry, the rank-and-file trade unionist can
union
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fare qu t t e well without the assistance of "expert"
negotiators:
" ... although wage negotiations often involve
consideration of complex financial and
statistical and technical issues, they were
very frequently conducted, on the union side,
by lay officers with little or no training and
wi thout any expert or professional support or
advisory services. The role of the full-time
officer was normally to be brought in when
problems arose, rather than to have been
involved from the start." (13)
This lay competence was if anything more pronounced in the
Electricians' union where, as the McCarthy and Parker survey for
Donovan noted, the best educated and qualified stewards belonged,
wi th as many as 60% having had part-time further education. (4)
And as the experience of the JIB agreement in electrical
contracting illustrates, the union leaders were intent on removing
the opportunity for EETPU stewards at site level from using their
expertise and skills in negotiating site agreements. So the
"01 igarchical" control that the CP and right-wing leadershi ps were
able to exert was not on the basis of their monopoly of technical
skill, rather it was because they controlled the union's central
apparatus and increasingly the collective bargaining process at
local as well as national level. This, of course, does not
invalidate Michels' point that one oligarchy merely replaces
another. But it does tend to undermine his view that the masses
were incompetent and that the principal cause of oligarchy was "the
technical indispensabilty of leadership." (15)
In fact, Michels appears to undermine his own thesis by
arguing that improved education and training could begin to bridge
the gap between the specialists and the mass of workers:
"A wider education involves an increasing
capaci ty for exercising control ... It is ... the
great task of social education to raise the
intellectual level of the masses, so that they
may be enabled, wi thin the limits of what is
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"possible, to counteract the oligarchical
tendencies of the working-class movement." (6)
Yet taken wi thin the context of his overall thesis it is hard to
know how seriously Michels takes this statement. Just two pages
before the above he tells us:
"The objective immaturity of the mass is not a
mere transitory phenomenon which will disappear
wi th the progress of democratization ... On the
contrary, it derives from the very nature of
the mass as mass." (17)
These two contradictory positions would seem to suggest that
Michels himself recognized that there was an inherent tension
between oligarchy and democracy, even if in his account oligarchy
always triumphed in the end. At the end of Political Parties he
says that democracy is like a treasure that no one will ever
discover, but in continuing the search we shall perform a work
which will have fertile results in the democratic sense. (8) So
there is a very heaVily circumscribed optimism present in Michels'
work. He is saying in effect that the struggle for democracy is
like the labour of Sisyphus, never ending, but heroic and necessary
all the same, and perhaps the labour will produce some limited
resul ts.
Of course Michels is right with regards to trade union
democracy at least. Union democracy will never be fully realisable
under capitalism. This is not primarily because of the operation of
any law of 01 igarchy, however. but because external constrai nts -
the power of the employers and the state - impose forceful limits
on the aims adopted by trade unions. (19) Such external constraints
impinged directly on the EETPU's internal democracy as we showed
in the chapters on the IR Act and the Social Contract. However, as
Hyman wri tes:
" those within unions who primarily conduct
external relations do not merely react to
irresistible pressures; they help shape and
channel the nature and extent to which trade
union goals and methods adapt to external
agencies .. " (20)
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The EETPU leaders did not merely react to the constraints that the
IR Act and the Social Contract imposed on the union, they attempted
to shape union policy on the basis of their assessment of these two
pieces of government pol icy. But the EC were deflected from the
course of action they wished to take on the IR Act by external
pressures of another kind - the "tremendous crisis" that peaked
with the jailing of five London dockers in 1972. And although the
Executi ve Cou no t 1 wer·e at.aunch supporter-s of the Social Contract,
that support oscillated as opposition to the Government's incomes
policy mounted inside the union and the wider labour movement from
1977 onwards. So although the powers of the employers and the state
do most certainly set limits on the aims and goals of trade unions,
and therefore on union democracy, those limits are by no means
fixed. They are, as we saw with the two EETPU examples cited,
determined by the relative strengths of the competing forces - the
employers, the state, the union bureaucracies and the rank-and-file
- at anyone particular historical juncture. Union democracy may
well be not fully realisable under capitalism, but nonetheless,
its boundaries are elastic in the extreme.
Overall, the experience of the post-war Electricians' union
leads us to the conclusion that Michels' theory taken on its own is
inadequate. This is not just because there are instances in the
union's history that contradict Michels, but that these instances
are numerous and, more importantly, are a product of an inbuil t
tension that exists between oligarchy and democracy. Weber put it
like this:
" 'democracy I as such is opposed to the I ru le'
of bureaucracy, in spite and perhaps because of
its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of
bureaucratization. Under certain conditions,
democracy creates palpable breaks in the
bureaucratic pattern and impediments to
bureaucratic organization." (21)
~eber, unlike Michels, considered that there were a number of
mechanisms that could prevent bureaucratic power reaching a point
where it controlled the policy and action of the organization it
was supposed to serve. (22)
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Within trade unions the mechanisms that control
bureaucratic/oligarchic power are part of a "two-way-system of
control" that operates between the leaders and the rank-and-file:
"Union officials are accorded specific powers
of leadership and of discipline; in appropriate
situations they are legitimately entitled to
exert control over the members. But at the same
time they are the employees and the servants of
the members, who are thus in appropriate
situations entitled to exert control over
them. II (23)
The factors that shape this "two-way system of control" at any
given period in a union's history are, as the history of the
Electricians' union shows, complex, multiple and often
contradictory. Nonetheless, that such a system of control exists in
the Electricians' union, however thread bare it might be at times,
goes only to reinforce the argument of Gouldner: that there cannot
be an "iron law of 01 igarchy" unless there is an "iron law of
democracy." (24) The "two-way-system of control", in other words,
is founded on a dynamic tension between democracy and oligarchy in
trade unions.
Future prospects
The now almost certain expulsion of the EETPU from the TUe in
September 1988 will undoubtedly have an effect on the future
prospects for democracy in the union. Firstly, if expelled the
union will be able to pursue its "strike-free" industrial strategy
unhindered by TUe discipline. How successful they will be is
another matter. There seems little prospect of the EETPU off-
setting its membership losses by expanding in the Japanese
electronics sector where the union already has a foothold in Wales.
For in total the 20 Japanese electronics plants in Britain employ
only some 6000 workers, and in 1986 Japanese firms made only 9
separate investment decisions on new production capacity compared
wi th 158 by US owned firms and 46 by West German. (25) Nor do the
prospects for expansion in the non-Japanese electronics sectors
look all that promising. "Silicon Glen" in Scotland employs 42,000
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electronic workers, and yet the EETPU's "strike-free" packages have
not enabled them to expand in any significant way. This is because
the US companies wil not entertain unions, not even the EETPU, and
in the other plants, where unionisation is as high as in
manufacturing, multi-union bargaining is the norm (one survey
showed that only 1 plant out of 79 recognised the EETPU for both
staff and manual employees). (26) As it gets harder to recruit in
these sectors it seems certain that the EETPU will become even more
aggressive not only in its attempts at securing new deals, but also
in policing the agreements on the shop-floor. If this is the case,
then the diminuation of industrial and union democracy that the
present deals have heralded will increase.
Secondly, the Flashlight grouping is proposing that EETPU
members leave the union and join a TUC affiliated union. It then
plans to set up a federation of these electrical and plumbing
"holding" sections, draw up a rule book and then launch the
Electrical and Plumbing Industries Union (EPIU). John Aitken, the
architect of the breakaway, estimates that initially 5000 EETPU
members will join the new union. We have argued elsewhere in the
thesis that this plan could have disastrous consequences for the
future of democracy in the EETPU, essentially because the incumbent
leadership would then have a free hand to pursue its policies. As
Martin argues:
" ... democracy exists when union Executives are
unable to prevent opposition factions
distributing propaganda and mobilizing
electoral support. It does not require that
opposition should be institutionalized, nor
that it should be democratic ... merely that it
should survive as a recognized form of
political activity." (27)
While not accepting wholly Martin's definition of union
democracy as the "survival of faction" (constraints can be brought
to bear on Executives to act democratically from outside as well
as from wi thin a particular union), and while recognising that
opposition will still exist in the EETPU despite the possible
departure of its most organized section, democracy would assuredly
be greatly diminished if the strongest faction within the union was
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to voluntarily quit it. The lack of an organized countervailing
force to the Executive Council could only serve to reinforce the
oligarchical tendencies of the Hammond leadership. The highly
centralized internal structure of the union that was constructed
under Cannon, and which Flashl i glit: has been attempting to reform
for the last nineteen years, would remain intact and continue to
act as an obstacle to democratic change.
The future of democracy in the EETPU looks rather bleak, which
is not just a partisan view (although it is certainly that as
well): it is based on the belief that union democracy is shaped by
the organized actions of trade union members. As Gramsci put it:
"The trade union is not a predetermined
phenomenon. It becomes a determinate
institution, i.e. it takes on a definite
historical form to the extent that the strength
and will of the workers who are its members
impress a policy and propose an aim that define
it." (28)
Should the formation of the breakaway EPIU take place, those
members that are best placed to "impress a policy and propose and
aim" on the EETPU would be removed from the field.
Diagram 1.
Diagram 2.
Diagram 3.
Diagram 4.
APPENDIX
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE UNION
Pre-1962.
1962-1965.
The "New Model" 1965.
The present day structure.
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